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Abstract 
This  thesis  examines  Thomas  Aquinas'concept  of 
human  freedom  in  the  context  of  his  treatment  of  God's 
knowledge  of  future  contingents. 
Much  has  been  written  about  Aquinas'attempt  to  solve 
the  problem  of  how  humans  can  act  freely  if  God  knows 
all  future  things,  but  little  of  that  work  comments  on  a 
major  underlying  assumption  in  his  treatment  of  the 
problem  -  namely,  the  concept  of  human  freedom  pre- 
supposed.  This  thesis  therefore  seeks  to  establish  the 
nature  of  the  freedom  that  Aquinas  was  assuming  in 
the  important  discussions  of  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingents. 
Chapter  1  sets  out  Aquinas'  statement  of  the  problem 
and  his  solution  to  it,  that  since  God  is  outside  time,  he 
knows  things  not  as  future  but  as  'present';  and 
knowing  x  as  'present'  imposes  no  necessity  on  x  itself. 
Some  criticism  of  Aquinas'  solution  is  reviewed.  It  is 
noted  that  although  Aquinas'  approach  seems  to  imply 
a  concept  of  freedom  which  includes  the  possibility  of 
doing  otherwise  than  one  does,  other  interpretations  are 
possible.  It  is  noted  also  that  modem  commentators 
hold  differing  views  on  what  Aquinas'  concept  of 
freedom  is. 
Chapter  2  examines  the  link  between  contingency  and 
freedom  and  makes  the  point  that,  for  Aquinas, 
contingency  in  human  behaviour  seems  to  arise  from 
the  peculiarly  human  way  of  bringing  things  about  i.  e. 
by  voluntary  action.  As  a  preliminary  to  looking  at  his 
analysis  of  voluntary  action,  Aquinas'  distinction 
between  'human  acts'  and  'acts  of  a  man'  is  noted  and  a 
further  distinction  drawn  between  'simply'  and  'fully' 
voluntary  acts.  It  is  concluded  ithat  the  nature  of 
freedom  will  be  found  in-  Aquinas'  description  of  human, 
or  fully  voluntary,  acts;.  - 3 
The  elements  of  voluntary  action  are  considered  in 
Chapter  3,  and  two  main  elements  -  an  inner  principle 
of  motion  and  knowledge  of  the  end  to  which  action  is 
directed  -  identified  and  examined.  The  nature  and 
operation  of  the  will,  the  principle  of  motion  of  human 
action,  is  considered  in  detail.  Aquinas'  distinctions 
between  animal  and  human  action  are  highlighted  to 
bring  out  the  key  point  that  the  will  is  determined  only 
to  the  good  in  general,  and  not  to  any  particular  good. 
Further  key  points  identified  are  that  every  thing  may 
be  accepted  or  rejected,  since  every  thing  may  be  seen 
as  both  good  and  bad  in  different  respects,  and  that 
man  can  review  his  judgment  of  what  is  'good'.  These 
points  are  seen  as  the  basis  of  'liberum,  arbitrium', 
man's  ability  to  decide  for  himself  what  particular  ends 
to  pursue. 
Chapter  4  examines  Aquinas'account  of  the  process  by 
which  particular  ends  are  pursued.  Deliberation  and 
choice  are  identified  as  crucial  stages  in  that  process, 
and  the  nature  and  role  of  each  considered.  Some  form 
of  reasoning  is  concluded  to  be  an  essential  part  of 
human  action.  The  respective  roles  of  will  and  intellect 
in  choice  and  deliberation  are  considered  and  it  is 
shown  that  human  acts  are  a  product  of  both, 
inextricably  related.  Chapter  4  also  questions  whether 
choice  is  a  necessary  element  of  human  acts  and 
concludes  that  it  seems  to  be  so,  despite  Stump's 
argument  that  Aquinas'  approach  to  the  sinfulness  of 
sudden  actions  shows  otherwise. 
Aquinas'view  that  God's  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  what 
he  knows  is  identified  in  Chapter  5  as  a  possible 
stumbling  block  to  the  view  that  choice  is  necessary  for 
freedom.  Craig's  arguments  for  holding  that  the  causal 
nature  of  God's  knowledge  destroys  human  freedom  are 
rejected  on  the  ground  that  'causes'  is  being  used 
analogically  of  God  and  man,  and  so  it  is  possible  for 
humans  to  be  effective  contingent  causes.  It  is 
recognized  that  this  approach  might  imply  potentiality 
in  God,  which  would  be  inconsistent  with  Aquinas' 
wider  views  on  God's  simplicity.  That  difficulty  would  be 4 
avoided  if  Aquinas'  concept  of  freedom  were  compatible 
with  God's  determining  human  action,  which  would 
however  exclude  choice.  Arguments  for  a  concept  of 
freedom  which  excludes  the  possibility  of  choice  are 
considered,  and  arguments  against  Aquinas'holding 
that  position  put  forward. 
Chapter  6  concludes  that  the  key  characteristics  of  the 
concept  of  freedom  underlying  Aquinas'  treatment  of 
God's  knowledge  of  future  contingents  are  self- 
direction,  the  combination  of  will  and  intellect  which 
produces  it,  and  choice.  It  is  recognized  however  that 
this  account  of  freedom  reveals  tensions  with  other 
views  held  by  Aquinas. 5 
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ABBREVIATIONS  AND  CITATIONS 
The  abbreviations  used  in  the  following  chapters  are: 
DM:  Quaestiones  disputatae  de  malo 
DV:  Quaestiones  disputatae  de  veritate 
SCG:  Summa  Contra  Gentiles 
ST:  Summa  Theologiae 
References  to  the  Summa  Theologiae  are  as  illustrated 
below: 
STIa.  5:  ST,  first  part,  Question  5 
STIa.  11ae.  6.1c:  ST,  first  part  of  the  second  part, 
Question  6.  Article  1,  body  of  response 
ST11a.  11ae.  10.1  0bJ  1:  ST,  second  part  of  the  second 
part,  Question  10,  Article  1,  first  Objection 
ST111a.  18.4  ad  2:  ST,  third  part,  Question  18,  Article 
4,  reply  to  Objection  2. 
References  to  De  Veritate  are  made  by  Question, 
Article,  and  Difficulties  raised;  references  to  the 
Summa  Contra  Gentiles  are  by  Book,  Chapter  and 
paragraph. 9 
Quotations  in  English  from  the  ST  are  taken  from  the 
Blackfriars  Edition,  except  where  noted. 
The  notes  indicated  by  end-note  numbers  in  the  main 
text  are  placed  at  the  end  of  each  chapter. 10 
INTRODUCTION 
There  is  an  argument  which  says  that  the  writing  of 
this  thesis  is  a  necessary  event. 
This  argument  runs  that  because  God  is  omniscient 
and  infallible,  he  knew  that  I  would  write  it  before  I 
did  so,  indeed  even  before  I  was  born.  But  if  God 
knew  in  190  1,  say,  that  I  would  write  this  thesis,  it 
must  have  been  true  that  I  would  write  it,  since  only 
what  is  true  can  be  known,  by  God  as  well  as  by 
humans.  And  if  it  was  true  in  1901  that  in  20011 
would  write  a  thesis  on  Thomas  Aquinas'  concept  of 
freedom  in  relation  to  his  treatment  of  God's 
knowledge  of  future  contingents,  then  there  was 
nothing  I,  or  anyone  else,  could  do  in  the  intervening 
years  to  prevent  my  writing  that  thesis.  The  writing  of 
the  thesis  was  therefore  unpreventable,  and  so  came 
about  necessarily.  That  being  so,  since  I  could  not 
prevent  its  being  written,  I  did  not  write  it  freely. 
This  is  one  presentation  of  an  argument  which  has 
concerned  philosophers  since  before  the  time  of 
Aristotle  to  the  present  day,  an  argument  which 
raises  fundamental  issues  about  the  nature  of  truth, 
of  knowledge,  of  time  -  and  of  freedom.  For  example, 
to  be  known,  x  must  be  true,  but  if  x  is  a  future 11 
event,  can  a  statement  about  it  be  said  to  be  true 
now?  If  y  is  not  yet  determined  one  way  or  another, 
can  it  be  known  at  all?  Does  knowledge  of  the  future 
require  certainty?  If  what  has  happened  already  is 
necessary  because  it  has  happened,  is  what  is  yet  to 
happen  also  necessary?  And  if  what  is  yet  to  happen 
is  necessary,  how  can  there  be  any  contingent 
events?  Such  issues  are  obviously  important,  and 
difficult  in  themselves,  but  they  become  particularly 
acute  when  considered  in  the  context  of  the  knower's 
being  a  God  who  is  believed  to  be  omniscient, 
infallible,  eternal  and  providential.  And  who  is 
believed  to  have  created  free  human  beings. 
It  is  against  precisely  such  a  background  that 
Aquinas  considers  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingent  events.  For  him,  there  is  the  dilemma  that 
denying  God's  knowledge  of  future  contingent  events 
would  seem  to  deny  God's  omniscience  and 
providence,  but  accepting  that  God  knows  future 
events  would  seem  to  make  these  events  necessary 
and  so  deny  human  freedom. 
How  Aquinas  presents  this  dilemma  in  his  major 
works,  and  how  he  seeks  to  resolve  it,  are  examined 
in  Chapter  1  of  this  thesis.  It  will  be  seen  there  that 
the  major  elements  of  his  argument  are  that: 12 
a.  something  which  is  future  and  undetermined 
cannot  be  known,  even  by  God; 
b.  something  which  is  present  is  however  already 
determined  and  so  can  be  known; 
c.  if  something  is,  then,  necessarily,  it  is  -  otherwise 
there  would  be  a  contradiction; 
d.  the  logical  necessity  involved  in  c.  does  not  make 
the  thing  which  is  necessary  in  itself. 
Aquinas  is  here  making  the  mediaeval  distinction 
between  necessity  de  dicto  and  necessity  de  re.  The 
relevance  of  this  to  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingents  is  that  God's  knowledge,  Aquinas  argues, 
is  in  a  way  similar  to  human  knowledge  of  something 
that  is  present.  Since  God,  being  eternal,  is  outside 
time,  there  is  for  him  no  past  or  future  but  only 
something  eternally  like  our  present.  He  knows 
things,  therefore,  as  if,  in  human  terms,  they  were 
present  to  him  -  as  though  he  were  standing  on  the 
summit  of  eternity  looking  down  in  one  glance  on  the 
whole  course  of  time,  as  it  is  famously  put  in  In  Peri 
Henneneias.  But  something  which  is  present  is  not  in 
itself  necessary  simply  because  it  is  present. 
In  this  way,  Aquinas  explains  how  God  can  have 
knowledge  of  what  humans  call  future  events  without 
that  knowledge  imposing  any  necessity  on  the  event 
itself.  The  problem  of  God's  knowledge  of  future 13 
events  has  thus  become  the  apparently  much  less 
threatening  issue  of  God's  knowledge  of  present 
events. 
Aquinas'  solution  to  what  might  be  termed  the 
'temporal  fatalism'  problem,  and  his  treatment  of  the 
issues  raised,  have  been  regarded  by  both  mediaeval 
and  modern  commentators  as  unsatisfactory  in  some 
respects,  notably  in  relation  to  God's  knowledge  of 
temporal  things.  Some  of  the  criticisms  are 
considered  in  Chapter  1.  The  chief  aim  of  this  thesis 
is  not,  however,  to  evaluate  the  criticisms  nor  to 
defend  Aquinas  against  them,  both  of  which  have 
been  done  on  many  occasions  by  many  people. 
Rather  the  aim  is  to  examine  what  lies  behind 
Aquinas'  assumption  that  human  freedom  would  be 
destroyed  if  God  did  know  future  contingents  as 
future. 
Aquinas'  statement  of  the  dilemma  seems  to  imply 
that  he  holds  a  concept  of  freedom  incompatible  with 
the  future's  being  necessary  or  already  determined.  In 
de  Veritate  (DV)  2.12,  for  example,  he  says  "...  others 
have  said  that  God  has  knowledge  of  all  future 
events,  but  that  all  take  place  necessarily,  otherwise 
his  knowledge  of  them  would  be  subject  to  error.  But 
neither  can  this  opinion  stand,  for  it  would  destroy 
free  choice  and  there  would  be  no  need  to  ask 14 
advice.  "'  But  Aquinas  also  holds  that  God's 
knowledge  of  every  thing  -  present  or  future  in 
human  terms  -  is,  together  with  his  will,  the  cause  of 
that  thing.  Since  God's  will  is  irresistible,  every  thing 
would  therefore  seem  to  be  necessary  and  determined 
by  God.  Despite  this,  Aquinas  nevertheless  maintains 
that  human  beings  are  free.  There  must  therefore  be 
doubt  about  what  Aquinas'  concept  of  freedom  really 
is.  The  works  of  modem  commentators  on  Aquinas 
provide  a  variety  of  opinion,  not  always  consistent,  on 
this,  and  leave  uncertainty  about  a  major  underlying 
assumption  in  his  discussion  of  God's  knowledge  of 
future  events.  The  main  aim  of  this  thesis  therefore  is 
to  establish,  in  the  context  of  Aquinas'  treatment  of 
God's  knowledge  of  future  contingent  events,  what  his 
concept  of  freedom  is. 
The  approach  adopted  has  been  to  look  first,  briefly, 
at  Aquinas'  concept  of  contingency,  from  which  it  is 
seen  that  contingency  in  human  acts,  as  opposed  to 
natural  effects,  seems  to  lie  in  the  peculiarly  human 
way  of  bringing  things  about  -  that  is,  by  voluntary 
action. 
However,  before  Aquinas'  concept  of  voluntary  action 
is  examined  to  see  how  such  action  brings  about 
contingent  effects,  an  important  distinction  is  drawn 
which  both  sets  the  scope  of  the  actions  to  be 15 
examined  and  carries  implications  for  the  nature  of 
freedom.  This  is  the  distinction  Aquinas  makes  in  the 
Summa  Theologiae  (ST),  in  STIa  Rae.  1.1,  between 
human  acts  (actiones  humanae)  and  acts  of  a  man 
(actiones  hominis).  The  latter  are  'unthinking'or 
'unconscious'  acts  such  as  tapping  one's  fingers  on 
the  desk  or  rubbing  one's  ear  while  concentrating  on 
a  problem,  and  they  are  not  classed  as  voluntary 
acts.  The  former  -  human  acts  -  are  those  which 
matter  in  the  context  of  freedom.  They  are  those  acts 
done  by  a  man  when  acting  as  a  man,  i.  e.  acts  which 
make  use  of  his  powers  as  a  rational  animal.  They  are 
said  by  Aquinas  to  be  acts  done  for  a  purpose,  arising 
from  reason  and  will.  They  are  also  the  acts  to  which 
responsibility,  moral  or  legal,  attaches.  As  Davies 
points  out,  Aquinas  "uses  the  phrases  'actiones 
humanae  (human  actions)  and  'actus  humani  vel 
morales'(human  or  moral  action)  almost 
synonymouSly.  "2  Since,  it  is  argued,  the  purpose  of  a 
concept  of  freedom  of  action  is  to  ground 
responsibility,  it  is  in  the  analysis  of  actions  to  which 
responsibility  is  attributed  -  i.  e.  human  actions  -  that 
the  nature  of  freedom  can  be  found. 
A  further  point  has  to  be  noted.  It  is  argued  that 
human  acts  are  voluntary  acts  and  they  are  free  acts. 
Voluntary'and  Tree'are  not  however  synonymous 
terms,  for  both  humans  and  other  animals  are 16 
capable  of  voluntary  action,  albeit  to  differing  extents, 
but  it  is  only  human  actions  which  are  described  as 
'free'  (or  not).  In  the  distinctions  Aquinas  makes 
between  qimited-voluntary'  animal  action  and  Tully- 
voluntary'human  action  may  be  found  the  essentials 
of  free  action. 
The  various  elements  in  Aquinas'account  of 
voluntary  action  are  examined  in  Chapter  3.  This 
examination  follows  the  line  of  the  two  key  elements 
of  voluntary  action  identified  by  Aquinas:  that  it  has 
an  inner  principle  of  motion  and  that  the  agent  has 
knowledge  of  the  end  to  which  the  action  is  directed 
(all  action,  whether  voluntary  or  not,  being  for  some 
end  or  other).  The  main  issues  highlighted  in  Chapter 
3  as  indicating  the  nature  of  human  freedom  are  the 
linking  of  form  to  action,  and  its  consequences; 
knowledge  of  the  end  to  which  action  is  directed;  the 
possibility  of  choice  between  particular  goods;  and 
the  self-movement  of  the  will,  the  inner  principle  of 
motion  in  human  action. 
Aquinds'  linking  of  form  to  action  is  regarded  as 
particularly  important.  With  a  thing's  form  comes 
'natural  inclination'  or  'appetite'  (appetitus)  for  what 
will  lead  to  that  thing's  perfection  or  good,  and  from 
appetite  comes  action.  This  general  statement  of  the 
source  of  action,  or  inner  principle  of  motion,  leads  to 17 
a  crucial  differentiation  between  animal  and  human 
action.  An  animal's  appetite  is  determined,  because  of 
the  animal's  nature,  to  a  limited  number  of  particular 
things  which  constitute  its  good;  human,  rational, 
nature  is  such  that  the  peculiarly  human  appetite, 
the  will,  is  determined  only  to  the  universal  good  and 
not  to  any  particular  good.  Consequently,  while 
everything  that  man  pursues  he  pursues  because  he 
sees  it  as  'good',  what  he  sees  as  good  is  not  limited 
or  determined  by  his  nature.  It  is  demonstrated  that 
Aquinas'view  that  the  will  is  not  determined  to  any 
particular  good  plays  a  critical  role  in  his  concept  of 
free  action. 
As  well  as  holding  that  action  comes  from  form, 
Aquinas  holds,  with  Aristotle,  that  all  action  is  for  an 
end;  voluntary  action  is  for  an  end  which  is  known. 
Here  again  Aquinas  is  seen  to  make  a  distinction 
between  animal  and  human  action  which  provides 
valuable  insight  into  the  nature  of  freedom.  Only 
humans,  as  rational  animals,  can  recognise  an  end 
as  an  end,  and  can  see  the  relationship  between  ends 
and  means.  They  can  also  judge  whether  what  they 
plan  to  do  will  meet  their  desired  end  or  not  -  and 
they  can  review  that  judgment. 
To  the  lack  of  determination  to  any  particular  good 
and  the  ability  to  judge  means  and  ends  is  added 18 
Aquinas'  metaphysical  view  that  everything  that 
exists  is,  so  far  as  it  does  exist,  good.  Since  nothing 
created  exists  perfectly,  no  created  thing  is  perfectly 
good.  This  means  that  every  existing  thing  is  good  in 
some  respect  and  not-good  in  others,  and  can 
therefore  be  seen  as  desirable  in  some  respects  but 
not  in  others.  It  is  this  which  makes  it  possible  for 
man  to  accept  or  reject  any  particular  thing  -  in  other 
words,  to  choose  or  not  choose  x,  or  to  choose  x  or  y- 
while  still  being  motivated  by  the  universal  good. 
These  three  factors  -  the  lack  of  determination  to  any 
particular  good,  the  ability  to  judge  planned  actions 
and  to  review  that  judgment,  and  the  fact  that 
everything  that  exists  has  both  desirable  and 
undesirable  aspects  -  together  give  man  the  ability  to 
decide  for  himself  how  to  direct  his  action  (liberum 
arbitrium).  They  are  the  basis  of  Aquinas'  description 
of  the  will  as  a  'self-mover'. 
Such  an  important  point  cannot  of  course  go 
unchallenged  and  Chapter  3  looks  at  the  three  main 
objections  Aquinas  considers  in  his  account  of  the 
will  as  a  self-mover  in  STla  llae.  One  objection  which 
causes  particular  difficulty  is  the  argument  that  God 
is  an  external  mover  of  the  will  and  so  it  cannot  be 
said  to  move  itself.  Although  Aquinas  appears  to  have 
an  answer  to  this,  his  argument  has  wider 19 
ramifications  which  are  identified  here,  but 
consideration  of  them  is  postponed  until  Chapter  5. 
Two  major  points  are  drawn  from  the  analysis  of 
Aquinas'account  of  voluntary  action.  First,  that 
human  voluntary  action  is  driven  by  what  a  man 
himself  sees  as  good.  Since  it  is  open  to  him  to  see 
every  thing  as  good  in  some  respect  or  other, 
movement  toward  a  particular  thing  implies  that  that 
thing  has  -  somehow  -  been  singled  out  by  him  as 
appropriate  to  be  pursued,  as  good.  Second,  that 
while  will  is  the  inner  principle  of  motion  of  voluntary 
action,  intellect  also  plays  an  essential  role,  for  it  is 
this  which  enables  a  man  to  recognise  an  end  as  an 
end  and  to  judge  the  relationship  between  means  and 
end. 
If  human,  fully  voluntary,  action  is  free  action, 
therefore,  two  key  factors  in  freedom  would  seem  to 
be  the  ability  to  single  out  a  particular  end  to  be 
pursued  as  'good',  and  the  actions  of  intellect  and  will 
which  lead  to  this  singling  out. 
This  picture  of  freedom  is  considered,  in  Chapter  4,  in 
the  context  of  Aquinas'  analysis  of  a  voluntary  act  in 
STla  llae.  8-16.  The  aim  here  is  not  to  evaluate  that 
analysis  as  a  theory  of  action,  but  to  look  in  detail  at 
Aquinas'  account  of  the  process  by  which  a  particular 20 
end  is  pursued,  for  it  is  in  the  description  of  this 
process  that  Aquinas'  concept  of  freedom  begins 
properly  to  emerge. 
The  crucial  stages  in  the  process,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  nature  of  freedom,  are  those  of 
deliberation  and  choice.  Aquinas'  description  of  these 
stages  in  STla  llae.  14  and  13  respectively  raises 
interesting  and  often-debated  questions  about  the 
relationship  of  the  will  and  the  intellect  in  freedom. 
Although  Aquinas  assigns  'choice'  as  an  act  to  the 
will,  his  analysis  of  it  makes  clear  that  it  is  much 
influenced  by  intellect  -  as  deliberation,  ascribed  to 
intellect,  is  much  influenced  by  will.  The  conclusion 
best  drawn  from  his  discussion  in  the  Questions 
dealing  with  deliberation  and  choice  -  and  from  his 
treatment  of  voluntary  action  as  a  whole  -  is,  I  argue, 
that  Aquinas  sees  a  free  act  as  a  product  of  intellect 
and  will  inextricably  linked,  acting  and  reacting 
together. 
This  of  course  raises  the  question  whether 
deliberation  and  choice  are,  for  Aquinas,  essential 
components  of  a  free  act,  or  merely  elements  in  some 
or  most  voluntary  actions.  I  argue  first  that  choice  is 
an  essential  component  of  a  free  act:  the  interaction 
of  will  and  intellect  in  the  constitution  of  a  human  act 
as  described  by  Aquinas  ensures  that  there  is  always 21 
the  possibility  of  choosing  to  do  otherwise  than  one 
does,  in  the  same  circumstances.  This  view  is 
defended  against  a  powerful  argument  put  forward  by 
Eleonore  StUMp3  that  choice  is  not  an  essential 
element  of  freedom.  Of  the  two  main  grounds  for  her 
argument,  considered  in  Chapter  4,  the  view  that 
Aquinas  regards  actions  done  under  the  sudden 
impulse  of  passion  as  sinful  and  hence  voluntary 
although  the  agent  was  unable  to  do  otherwise,  is 
particularly  interesting.  Although  I  conclude  that  the 
treatment  of  this  issue  in  DV24.12  is  not  sufficient  to 
support  an  argument  that  choice,  or  the  ability  to  do 
otherwise  than  one  does,  is  not  an  essential  element 
of  fully  voluntary,  human,  free,  action,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  there  is  some  tension  between  what 
Aquinas  says  there  and  his  analysis  in  STIa  llae.  6-17. 
This  is  particularly  evident  when  one  looks  at  how  a 
sudden  thought  can  be  regarded  as  voluntary  and 
sinful  at  all,  and  it  seems  that  there  is  room  here  for 
some  more  fruitful  consideration  of  Aquinas'  position. 
If  choice  is  an  essential  element  of  a  human  act,  is 
the  deliberation  which  precedes  it  also  essential? 
Aquinas'  position  on  this  is  not  entirely  clear  -  on  the 
one  hand  he  says  that  deliberation  (a  sort  of  enquiryj 
is  necessary  only  when  there  is  some  doubt  about 
what  is  to  be  done;  on  the  other,  he  says  that  human 
acts  come  from  a  'deliberated  will'  ("ex  voluntate 22 
deliberata  procedunt").  And  if  it  is  the  case  that 
deliberation  is  an  essential  element,  does  this  not 
restrict  the  class  of  free  acts  to  very  few  members  - 
since  many  acts  appear  to  be  carried  out  without  any 
deliberation  -  and  so  make  Aquinas'concept  of 
freedom  valueless?  These  issues  are  also  considered 
in  Chapter  4,  and  the  view  taken  that  some  kind  of 
reasoning  process  is  an  element  of  many  more  acts 
than  it  might  seem,  however  'automatic'  some  of 
these  acts  might  appear  to  be,  and  is  an  essential 
element  of  a  human  act. 
The  purpose  of  this  examination  of  a  human  act,  as 
defined  and  analysed  by  Aquinas,  was  said  at  the 
outset  to  be  a  way  of  establishing  what  his  concept  of 
freedom  was.  The  evidence  provided  by  the 
examination  so  far  seems  to  show  that,  for  Aquinas, 
freedom  is  the  ability  to  decide  for  oneself,  by  means 
of  one's  intellect  and  will  working  together,  what  to  do 
to  achieve  what  one  considers  to  be  good.  And  that  in 
coming  to  this  decision,  one  always  has  the 
possibility  of  choosing  to  do  otherwise  than  one  does. 
I  characterize  this  as  a  Vide'  concept  of  freedom,  and 
it  seems  to  be  this  wide  concept  that  Aquinas  wishes 
to  preserve  in  putting  forward  the  solution  he  does  to 
the  temporal  fatalism  which  arises  if  God  has 
knowledge  of  future  events  as  future. 23 
That  Aquinas  did  hold  this  'wide'  concept  of  freedom 
is,  however,  challenged  by  an  examination  of  what  he 
says  about  God's  knowledge  of  present  events,  the 
kind  of  knowledge  which  is  the  core  of  the  solution  to 
the  fatalism  problem.  Aquinas  holds  that  God's 
knowledge  of  things  is,  together  with  his  will,  the 
cause  of  these  things.  In  other  words,  God's 
knowledge  that  I  am  doing  x  comes  not  from  my  doing 
x,  as  my  knowledge  that  you  are  doing  y  would  be 
caused  by  your  doing  y,  but  from  his  causing  me  to 
do  x.  This  view  leads  to  a  difficult  and  complex 
argument,  considered  in  Chapter  5,  about  how 
something  caused  by  God  can  also  be  said  to  be 
caused,  contingently,  by  a  human.  William  Lane 
Craig's  arguments  for  saying  that  Aquinas  has 
effectively  destroyed  human  freedom  in  holding  that 
God's  knowledge  is  causal  and  so  determines  human 
action,  are  rejected.  Instead,  a  possible  solution  to 
the  problem  is  thought  to  lie  in  the  argument  that  the 
term  'causes'is  used  analogically  of  God  and  man. 
This  argument  runs  that  God's  causation  is  so 
significantly  different  from  human  causation  that 
'causes'cannot  be  used  univocally.  Examination  of 
how  God  causes,  particularly  as  described  by 
Aquinas  in  Quaestiones  de  Potentia  3.7.  shows  that 
analogical  use  is  the  most  appropriate.  And  the  way 
God  causes  makes  it  possible  for  humans  to  be 
contingent  secondary  causes  and  so  to  act  freely. 24 
While  this  argument  is  thought  persuasive,  it  is  seen 
to  create  another  difficulty,  for  it  seems  to  imply  that 
God's  knowledge  in  some  way  depends  on  human 
decisions,  which  would  be  inconsistent  with  other 
views  Aquinas  holds  on  there  being  no  potentiality  in 
God.  This  difficulty  disappears,  however,  if  Aquinas' 
concept  of  freedom  is  in  fact  rather  narrower  than  it 
has  so  far  been  thought  to  be.  The  possibility  of 
Aquinas'holding  a  concept  of  freedom  which  is 
compatible  with  God's  determining  events,  but 
determining  them  in  such  a  way  that  humans  could 
also  be  considered  a  cause  of  these  events,  is  also 
therefore  explored.  One  implication  of  God's 
determining  events  is  seen  to  be  that  there  would  be 
no  possibility  of  one's  doing  otherwise  than  one  does: 
if  he  has  determined  that  I  shall  write  this  thesis  in 
2001,  there  is  no  possibility  of  my  not  writing  it. 
There  is  a  plausible  concept  of  freedom  which  does 
not  require  that  there  should  be  the  possibility  of 
doing  otherwise  than  one  does  for  an  act  to  count  as 
'free',  and  modem  arguments  in  favour  of  it, 
particularly  those  put  forward  by  Eleonore  Stump, 
are  considered. 
The  conclusion  reached  is,  however,  that  the  evidence 
is  against  Aquinas'having  held  such  a  concept. 
Particularly  telling  in  this  respect  is  the  important 25 
distinction  Aquinas  made  between  humans  and 
animals  that  humans  can  judge  the  relationship 
between  means  and  ends,  and  can  review  their 
judgments.  That  possibility  of  review  implies  a 
possibility  of  changing  one's  mind,  and  so  of  doing 
otherwise.  But  there  could  be  no  such  possibility  if 
God  determined  what  was  done. 
Although  this  conclusion  leaves  unresolved  tensions 
among  some  of  Aquinas'views,  it  is  considered  that 
his  concept  of  freedom  is  indeed  what  is  characterized 
as  the  'wide'  one,  which  includes  the  possibility  of 
real  choice  between  doing  or  not  doing  x,  or  between 
doing  x  or  y. 
Through  an  examination  of  Aquinas'  concept  of 
voluntary  action,  and  his  analysis  of  a  human  act, 
this  thesis  seeks  to  show,  therefore,  that  Aquinas 
held  a  concept  of  freedom  inconsistent  with  God's 
knowing  future  events,  qua  future,  and  that  the 
concept  he  held  can  be  defended  against  the  causal 
implications  of  God's  knowledge  of  'present'  events. 
Notes 
I  DV2.12c:  "...  alii  dixerunt  quod  deus  ornnium  futurorurn  scientiam  habet; 
sed  cuncta  ex  necessitate  eveniunt,  alias  scientia  dei  falleretur  de  eis.  Sed 26 
hoc  etiarn  esse  non  potest  quia  secundum  hoc  periret  liberum  arbitrium, 
nec  esset  necessarium  consilium  quaerere» 
2  Davies  [1993]  p.  221 
3  See  Stump  [1997] 27 
Chapter  1 
THE  DILEMMA  OF  GODYS  KNOWLEDGE  OF  FUTURE 
CONTINGENTS 
Others  apart  sat  on  a  hill  retired, 
In  thoughts  more  elevate,  and  reasoned  high 
Of  providence,  foreknowledge,  will,  and  fate, 
Fix'd  fate,  free  will,  foreknowledge  absolute, 
And  found  no  end,  in  wandering  mazes  lost. 
Milton:  Paradise  Lost 
Introduction 
Some  eight  centuries  before  Aquinas,  Augustine  put 
the  dilemma  created  by  God's  knowledge  of  the  future 
so: 
"How  is  it  that  these  two  propositions  are  not 
contradictory  and  inconsistent:  (1)  God  has 
foreknowledge  of  everything  in  the  future;  and  (2)  We 
sin  by  the  will,  not  by  necessity?  For,  you  may  say,  if 
God  foreknows  that  someone  is  going  to  sin,  then  it  is 
necessary  that  he  sin.  But  if  it  is  necessary,  the  will 
has  no  choice  about  whether  to  sin;  there  is  an 
inescapable  and  fixed  necessity.  And  so  you  fear  that 
this  argument  forces  us  into  one  of  two  positions: 
either  we  draw  the  heretical  conclusion  that  God  does 
not  foreknow  everything  in  the  future;  or  if  we  cannot 28 
accept  this  conclusion,  we  must  admit  that  sin 
happens  by  necessity  and  not  by  will.  "' 
Even  in  Augustine's  time,  the  issues  raised  by 
foreknowledge  of  the  future  were  not  new.  The  issues 
of  whether  the  future  can  be  known,  and  whether 
such  knowledge  implies  necessity,  can  be  traced 
further  back  than  Aristotle2and  Augustine's  own 
source  seems  to  have  been  Cicero.  3 
Briefly,  the  problem  can  be  put  as  follows:  if  I  know 
on  Tuesday  that  on  Wednesday  Black  will  buy  tickets 
for  the  opera,  it  must  be  the  case  that  Black  will  buy 
the  tickets,  for  if  I  know  x,  x  must  by  definition  be 
true.  If  it  is  true  on  Tuesday  that  Black  will  buy  the 
tickets,  then  Black  cannot  not  buy  them  and  so 
cannot  be  acting  freely  when  he  eventually  does  buy 
them.  This  can  be  described  as  the  problem  of 
temporal  fatalism. 
Now,  this  problem  raises  at  least  three  issues: 
Can  I  know  that  A  will  do  x  tomorrow? 
(ii)  If  I  do  know  that  A  will  do  x  tomorrow,  is  it  the 
case  that  A  must  do  x? 
(iii)  If  A  must  do  x,  is  the  act  x  therefore  not  free? 
These  issues  come  sharply  into  focus  when 
considered  in  a  theological  context,  as  Augustine's 29 
formulation  of  the  dilemma  shows.  In  the  centuries 
between  Augustine  and  Aquinas,  the  issues  were 
considered  notably  by  BoethiuS4and  by  many  other 
major  figures.  Within  the  Christian  tradition, 
Normore  cites  Anselm,  Abelard,  Peter  Lombard  and 
Robert  Grosseteste-9,  and  outside  that  tradition  major 
contributions  were  made  by,  for  example,  Alfarabi, 
Avicenna,  Averroes  and  Maimonides. 
By  the  time  Aquinas  considers  the  issues,  therefore, 
the  discussion  has  ranged  over  more  than  1500 
years.  Clearly,  the  issues  are  not  easily  settled. 
In  this  chapter,  I  consider  how  Aquinas  identifies 
these  issues  and  how  he  attempts  to  resolve  them  in 
a  way  that  will  preserve  both  God's  providence  and 
omniscience,  and  human  freedom.  Although  some 
brief  criticism  of  Aquinas'  arguments  will  be  given, 
the  main  purpose  of  this  consideration  will  not,  be  to 
assess  his  approach  or  his  success  in  reconciling 
foreknowledge  and  human  freedom.  Rather  it  will  be 
to  provide  an  expository  background  against  which  to 
investigate  what  Aquinas  means  by  human  freedom 
in  this  context.  The  concept  of  freedom  employed  is 
clearly  crucial  to  the  success  of  any  reconciliation 
but,  as  will  be  seen  from  his  treatment  of  the  problem 
of  God's  knowledge  of  future  contingents,  it  is  not 30 
entirely  clear  what  concept  Aquinas  is  employing  in 
that  treatment. 
A.  Can  God  know  future  contingents? 
In  DV2.12,  Aquinas  considers  at  length  whether  God 
knows  singular  future  contingents,  in  the  context  of  a 
Question  dealing  with  various  aspects  of  God's 
knowledge.  The  same  issue  is  considered  in  the 
Summa  Contra  Gentiles  (SCG)  Book  1  and  in  the  ST 
(ST  1  a.  14.13),  with  the  different  approaches  suitable 
to  their  format.  What  follows  here  concentrates 
mainly  on  the  arguments  in  DV  and  ST. 
DV2.12  offers  several  difficulties  designed  to  show 
that  even  if  God  knows  singulars,  he  does  not  know 
singular  future  contingents  and  that  everything  that 
God  does  know  must  be  necessary.  There  are  general 
arguments,  relying  on  Aristotle,  seeking  to 
demonstrate  that  what  is  future  and  contingent 
cannot  be  known  at  all:  a  future  contingent  has  no 
act  of  e.  -dstence,  nor  is  it  determined  either  in  itself  or 
causally;  hence  there  is  no  truth  in  it,  and  only  the 
true  can  be  known.  Therefore  neither  humans  nor 
God  can  know  future  contingents. 
Other  arguments  are  designed  to  show  specifically 
that  what  God  knows  cannot  be  contingent  but  must 
be  necessary.  In  DV2.12.2,  the  argument  is  put  that 
if  God  knew  a  singular  future  contingent,  the 31 
impossible  would  follow,  namely  that  God's 
knowledge  would  be  wrong;  therefore  it  is  impossible 
for  God  to  know  a  singular  future  contingent  and 
what  he  knows  can  only  be  necessary.  This  is  proved 
by  supposing  that  God  knows,  for  example,  the 
contingent  future  fact  that  Socrates  is  sitting.  Either 
it  is  possible  that  Socrates  is  not  sitting  or  it  is  not 
possible  that  he  is  not  sitting.  If  the  latter,  Socrates' 
sitting  is  necessary  -  but  the  assumption  was  that 
what  God  knew  was  contingent.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  possible  that  Socrates  is  not  sitting,  he  may  not 
be  sitting.  There  is  nothing  inconsistent  in  alleging 
this.  But  it  would  follow  that  God's  knowledge  was 
erroneous.  That  is  impossible.  It  must  therefore  be 
impossible  that  God  knows  singular  future 
contingents,  since  "that  from  which  the  impossible 
would  follow  is  impossible.  " 
Further,  in  DV2.12.4,  it  is  argued  that  if  God  knew  as 
existing  something  which  did  not  exist,  his  knowledge 
would  be  false.  Since  his  knowledge  cannot  be  false, 
whatever  he  knows  as  existing  must  exist.  If  therefore 
he  knew  a  future  contingent  thing,  it  would  have  to 
be  something  which  must  exist.  But  a  contingent 
thing  cannot  be  something  which  must  be.  And  so, 
again,  if  God  knows  it,  it  can  only  be  something 
necessary. 32 
Still  other  arguments  depend  on  God's  nature.  Since 
God  can  know  nothing  outside  himself  and  since 
there  is  no  potentiality  in  him,  he  cannot  know  future 
contingent  things,  for  they  have  the  potential  to  be  or 
not  to  be.  Similarly,  it  is  argued;  God  knows 
everything  through  the  medium  of  his  own  essence, 
which  is  necessary.  Anything  known  through  a 
necessary  medium  must  itself  be  necessary.  Hence 
what  God  knows  can  only  be  necessary  and  he 
cannot  know  anything  contingent. 
The  remaining  arguments  also  appear,  in  slightly 
different  guises,  in  ST  1  a.  14.13.  First,  it  is  put  that 
the  more  certain  knowledge  is,  the  less  it  has  to  do 
with  contingents.  Given  that  God's  knowledge  is  most 
certain,  it  can  have  nothing  to  do  with  contingents 
and  so  can  be  about  necessary  things  only. 
The  second  and  third  arguments  depend  on  the 
premiss  that  in  any  true  conditional  proposition,  the 
consequent  will  be  absolutely  necessary  if  the 
antecedent  is  absolutely  necessary.  qf  God  knew  that 
this  is  going  to  happen,  it  will  happen'  is  a  true 
conditional  proposition;  the  antecedent  'God  knew 
that  this  is  going  to  happen'is  absolutely  necessary 
because  it  is  something  said  about  the  past  and 
whatever  is  said  about  the  past  is,  if  true,  necessary. 
Similarly,  whatever  is  eternal  is  necessary  and  God's 33 
knowledge  is  eternal.  On  both  these  grounds 
therefore,  the  antecedent  is  absolutely  necessary  and 
so  the  consequent  R  will  happen'is  also  absolutely 
necessary.  Hence,  as  the  point  is  put  in  DV2.12.7, 
"whatever  is  known  by  God  must  necessarily  exist.  "6 
STIa.  14.13  contains  a  further  argument,  not  included 
in  DV2.12,  namely  that  since  from  necessary  causes 
there  result  necessary  effects,  and  since  God's 
knowledge  is  necessary  and  is  the  cause  of  what  he 
knows,  what  he  knows  must  be  necessary. 
The  sum  of  the  various  arguments  raised  in  the 
difficulties  and  objections  of  DV  and  STla  is  therefore 
the  dilemma  posed  by  Augustine:  either  God  does  not 
know  future  contingents  at  all  (in  which  case  how  can 
he  be  omniscient  or  provident?  )  or  he  does  know  all 
future  things  but  these  are  necessary  (in  which  case, 
how  can  man  be  free?  ).  Aquinas'  expression  of  the 
dilemma  is  in  the  opening  paragraph  of  his  reply  in 
DV2.12: 
"On  this  question  there  have  been  several  erroneous 
opinions.  Some,  wishing  to  pronounce  upon  divine 
knowledge  from  the  viewpoint  of  our  way  of  knowing, 
have  said  that  God  does  not  know  future  contingents. 
This  opinion  cannot  stand,  for  it  would  eliminate 
providence  over  human  affairs,  which  are  contingent. 34 
Consequently,  others  have  said  that  God  has 
knowledge  of  all  future  events,  but  that  all  take  place 
necessarily,  otherwise  his  knowledge  of  them  would 
be  subject  to  error.  But  neither  can  this  opinion 
stand,  for  it  would  destroy  free  choice  and  there 
would  be  no  need  to  ask  advice.  Moreover,  it  would  be 
unjust  to  punish  or  to  give  rewards  in  proportion  to 
merit  when  everything  takes  place  neceSSalily.  "7 
He  then  goes  on  to  deal  with  the  points  made  in  a 
way  which  he  believes  will  provide  the  solution  "God 
knows  all  future  events;  nevertheless,  this  does  not 
prevent  things  from  taking  place  contingently.  "8 
B.  Aquinas'  responses 
The  answers  which  Aquinas  gives  to  the  points  made 
in  DV  fall  into  two  categories:  those  responding  to  the 
issue  of  whether  future  contingents  can  be  known  at 
all  and  those  dealing  with  the  question  of  necessity. 
First,  whether  future  contingents  can  be  known  at  all. 
Aquinas'  approach  in  DV  is  to  draw  a  distinction 
between  those  powers  and  cognitive  habits  in  which, 
he  claims,  there  can  never  be  error  and  those  in 
which  error  might  arise.  He  cites  sense,  science  and 
understanding  of  principles  as  examples  of  the 
former,  and  imagination,  opinion  and  judgment  as 35 
examples  of  the  latter.  In  relation  to  things  which  are 
necessary  (here  said  to  be  things  which  cannot  be 
prevented  from  happening  because  their  causes  are 
unchangeably  ordained  to  their  production)  it  is 
possible  to  forecast  without  error,  and  so  knowledge 
of  their  happening  in  the  future  is  possible.  It  is 
possible  to  know,  for  example,  that  the  sun  will  rise 
tomorrow. 
On  the  other  hand,  contingent  things  can  be  impeded 
before  they  come  into  existence  and  so  it  is  possible 
for  us  to  be  wrong  about  whether  they  will  come  into 
existence  or  not.  Once  they  have  come  into  existence 
it  is  another  matter,  of  course,  for  then  there  can  be 
no  error  about  whether  or  how  they  are,  but  as  long 
as  they  are  future  and  so  not  yet  in  existence  there  is 
the  possibility  of  mistake  about  their  nature  or 
existence. 
Future  contingent  things  are  therefore  things  about 
which  it  is  possible  to  be  mistaken;  because  such  a 
mistake  is  possible,  knowledge  of  them  is  not 
possible.  Here  Aquinas  draws  on  the  distinction  made 
earlier  between  "science  and  understanding  of 
principles"  which  are  certain  and  "opillion  and 
judgment"  which  are  not.  Knowledge  in  the  strong 
sense  of  scientia  is  not  possible  about  future 
contingents  and  at  best  one  can  have  opinion  or 36 
conjecture  about  them.  But  God's  knowledge  cannot 
be  opinion  or  conjecture  because  his  manner  of 
cognition,  unlike  humans',  excludes  the  possibility  of 
error.  All  his  knowledge  is  therefore  like  scientia, 
where  there  is  never  error.  9 
AquinasP  argument  therefore  seems  to  be: 
(i)  Knowledge,  as  opposed  to  conjecture,  requires 
that  there  is  no  possibility  of  error; 
(ii)  The  definition  of  future  contingents  implies  that 
there  is  always  the  possibility  of  error  in  relation 
to  them; 
(iii)  Therefore,  knowledge  of  future  contingents  is 
not  possible. 
In  responding  to  the  specific  objections,  set  out  in 
DV2.12.1,12.9  and  12.10,  on  why  knowledge  of 
future  contingents  is  impossible,  Aquinas  seems  to 
accept  the  grounds  that  what  is  future  is  not 
determined,  so  has  no  determinate  truth,  and 
therefore  cannot  be  known.  Similarly,  he  accepts  that 
the  lack  of  existence  of  something  future  means  that 
it  cannot  be  known.  His  later  commentary  on 
Aristotle's  De  Interpretatione,  (In  Peri  Hermeneias)  is 
consistent  with  these  views,  10  but  he  does  not 
develop  the  arguments  in  the  DV  passages:  they 
simply  provide  additional  grounds  for  why  knowledge 
of  future  contingents  is  not  possible. 37 
Aquinas'  conclusion  is  that,  for  all  the  reasons  given, 
neither  God  nor  man  knows  future  contingents.  This 
is  put  starkly  in  the  answer  given  to  DV2.12.6: 
"Neither  our  science  nor  God's  knowledge  can  be 
about  future  contingents.  "" 
This  clearly  stated  conclusion  would  seem  to  destroy 
at  a  stroke  the  possibility  of  an  omniscient  and 
provident  God,  but  Aquinas  immediately  qualifies  it 
by  saying  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  God  to  know 
future  contingents  "if  he  knew  them  as  future.  "12This 
marks  yet  another  crucial  distinction  between  God's 
knowledge  and  human  knowledge  for,  Aquinas  says, 
God  knows  these  things  as  present,  not  future.  I  can 
be  said,  for  example,  to  know  xas  future'if  I  know 
today  about  some  thing,  x,  which  will  not  come  about 
until  tomorrow.  There  is  thus  a  temporal  relationship 
between  my  knowledge  and  the  thing  which  I  claim  to 
know.  God's  knowledge,  however,  does  not  relate  to 
what  he  knows  in  this  way,  for  God  is  eternal  and  so 
outside  time.  Aquinas  illustrates  this  in  DV2.12  by 
the  example  of  a  watcher  looking  at  passers-by  on  a 
road.  If  the  watcher  looked  for,  say,  an  hour,  he 
would  see  everyone  who  passed  by  him  in  that  hour, 
but  he  would  not  see  them  all  at  the  same  time 
because  he  can  only  see  one  after  another  as  they 
appear  in  front  of  him.  If  he  could  see  everything  at 38 
once,  he  would  see  all  the  passers-by  in  one  glance 
even  though  they  did  not  all  pass  by  him  at  the  same 
time.  When  he  looked  from  that  vantage  point,  they 
would  all  be  present  to  his  view,  although  when 
considered  in  relation  to  each  other,  one  would  still 
come  before  or  after  the  other  along  the  length  of  the 
road.  God's  knowledge  of  what  happens  is,  according 
to  Aquinas,  like  that  of  the  man  who  can  see 
everything  at  the  same  time.  13This  is  not  because 
God  has  a  long  view  of  time  but  because  God  exists 
outside  time  -  in  eternity: 
",.  since  the  vision  of  divine  knowledge  is  measured  by 
eternity,  which  is  all  simultaneous  and  yet  includes 
the  whole  of  time  without  being  absent  from  any  part 
of  it,  it  follows  that  God  sees  whatever  happens  in 
time,  not  as  future,  but  as  present.  For  what  is  seen 
by  God  is,  indeed,  future  to  some  other  thing  which  it 
follows  in  time;  to  the  divine  vision,  however,  which  is 
not  in  time  but  outside  time,  it  is  not  future  but 
present.  Therefore,  we  see  what  is  future  as  future 
because  it  is  future  with  respect  to  our  seeing,  since 
our  seeing  is  itself  measured  by  time;  but  to  the 
divine  vision,  which  is  outside  of  time,  there  is  no 
future.  "14 
Now,  since,  on  Aquinas"  account,  a  certain  judgment 
can  be  made  about  something  which  is  present, 39 
without  any  danger  of  error,  a  present  contingent  can 
be  known.  If  therefore,  everything,  including 
contingents,  is  present  to  God,  contingents  which  are 
future  to  us  can  be  known  by  him. 
In  ST  1  a.  14.13,  Aquinas  also  concludes  that  future 
contingent  events  can  be  known  by  God  but  only  as 
present  events  not  as  future.  Here,  he  draws  the 
distinction  between  contingents  as  they  actually  exist 
and  "in  their  causes"  i.  e.  as  they  are  going  to,  or  likely 
to,  happen.  Only  in  the  former  case,  as  it  actually 
exists,  can  the  contingent  event  be  the  subject  of 
certain  and  infallible  knowledge,  because  only  then  is 
it  determined  to  one  effect.  In  the  latter  case,  the 
effect  might  turn  out  to  be  different  from  what  the 
cause  suggests:  the  bulb  might  not  flower,  despite  its 
having  been  planted  at  the  right  time  of  year  in  the 
right  kind  of  soil.  So,  I  cannot  know  that  the  bulb  will 
flower  next  year  until  I  see  it  actually  flowering.  God, 
on  the  other  hand,  knows  both  the  cause  of  the 
contingent  event,  and  how  it  turns  out,  and  he  knows 
both  at  what  in  human  terms  would  be  'the  same 
time'.  Again,  Aquinas  gives  the  explanation  that  this 
is  because  God  is  eternal,  and  "eternity,  which  exists 
as  a  simultaneous  whole,  takes  in  the  whole  of 
time.  "15And  Aquinas  concludes  "It  is  clear,  then,  that 
contingent  events  are  known  infallibly  by  God 
because  they  are  the  objects  of  the  divine  gaze  in 40 
their  presence  to  him;  while  on  the  other  hand  they 
are  future  contingent  events  in  relation  to  their 
proximate  causes.  "16 
Aquinas  therefore  solves  the  epistemological  problem 
of  how  something  which  is  apparently  undetermined, 
uncertain  and  so  open  to  mistake,  can  be  known  to 
God  by  pointing  to  God's  eternity.  Because  of  the 
nature  of  eternity,  all  events  are,  he  argues,  present 
as  far  as  God  is  concerned,  and  so  he  can  apprehend 
them  precisely  as  they  are,  with  no  possibility  of 
error. 
Having  dealt  with  this  epistemological  issue,  Aquinas 
still  needs  to  show  how  it  is  possible  for  God  to  know 
x  without  x's  thereby  being  necessary.  Both  DV2.12 
and  ST  1  a.  14.13  contain  two  lines  of  argument 
concerned  with  that  issue. 
The  first  deals  with  the  logical  necessity  involved  in 
the  point  that  if  God  knows  something,  it  must 
necessarily  be.  As  it  is  put  in  ST  1  a.  14.13  Obj  3: 
"Further  all  that  is  known  by  God  must  necessarily 
be;  because  everything  known  by  us  must  necessarily 
be,  and  God's  knowledge  is  more  certain  than  ours.  "17 
Aquinas'answer  utilises  the  mediaeval  distinction 
between  de  dicto  and  de  re  propositions: 41 
"Accordingly  the  proposition  'All  that  God  knows 
must  necessarily  be'is  usually  distinguished:  it  can 
apply  either  to  the  thing  [de  rel  or  to  the  statement 
[de  dicto].  Understood  of  the  thing,  the  proposition  is 
taken  independently  of  God's  knowing,  and  false, 
giving  the  sense  Everything  that  God  knows  is  a 
necessary  thing.  '  Or  it  can  be  understood  of  that 
statement,  and  thus  it  is  taken  in  conjunction  with 
the  fact  of  God's  knowing,  and  true,  i  ing  the  sense  givi 
The  statement  a  thing  known  by  God  is,  is 
necessary'.  "18 
So,  Aquinas  is  saying  that  whether  the  statement 
What  God  knows  necessarily  exists'is  true  or  not 
depends  on  how  it  is  interpreted.  As  Kenny  points 
outI9  the  different  interpretations  can  be  brought  out 
with  careful  punctuation:  What  God  knows, 
necessarily,  exists'is  true;  'What  God  knows 
necessarily  exists'  is  false.  What  is  important  is  that 
the  interpretation  If  God  knows  x,  x,  necessarily, 
exists-*  does  not  make  x  itself  necessary.  Necessity 
attaches  only  to  the  statement  U  God  knows  x,  x 
exists'  and  the  possibility  that  x  itself  is  contingent  is 
still  open.  20 
The  second  line  of  argument  concerns  the  necessity 
which  arises  because  God  has  always  known  what  he 42 
knows.  In  both  DV2.12  and  ST1  a.  14.13  the  following 
argument  is  put: 
(i)  An  absolutely  necessary  antecedent  produces  an 
absolutely  necessary  consequent  in  all  true 
conditional  statements; 
(ii)  qf  God  knew  that  x  was  going  to  happen,  x  will 
happen'  is  a  true  conditional  statement; 
(iii)  The  antecedent  is  absolutely  necessary  because 
it  refers  to  something  which  is  past  and/or 
etemal; 
(iv)  Therefore  the  consequent  is  absolutely 
necessary. 
In  both  DV  and  ST,  Aquinas  gives  a  lengthy  and 
somewhat  difficult  reply  to  this  argument. 
He  accepts,  after  some  consideration  and  rejection  of 
other  views,  that  the  antecedent  'God  knew  that  x 
would  happen'is  absolutely  necessary.  It  would  seem 
from  the  opening  of  his  reply  to  Objection  2  Mi 
ST  1  a.  14.13  that  he  accepts  this  on  the  grounds  that 
it  concerns  something  which  is  past,  even  though  it 
also  refers  to  something  future: 
"Some  hold  that  the  antecedent'God  knew  this 
contingent  future  event'is  not  necessary  but 
contingent.  -  because  though  it  is  past,  yet  it  refers  to 
the  future.  That  however  does  not  take  away  its 43 
necessity;  because  what  had  in  fact  a  reference  to  a 
future  event  must  have  had  it,  even  though  the  future 
is  sometimes  not  realized.  "21 
The  necessity  which  Aquinas  is  accepting  here  is  not 
the  logical  necessity  considered  above,  which  arose 
from  the  nature  of  the  proposition  If  God  knows  x,  x 
must  be'.  Rather  it  is  akin  to  the  necessity  described 
earlier,  in  DV2.12,  as  something  which  cannot  be 
impeded.  What  has  happened  has  happened,  and 
cannot  now  be  prevented  from  having  happened  -  if  x 
has  existed,  nothing  can  now  prevent  x  from  having 
existed.  This  does  not  of  course  imply  that, 
counterfactually,  x  might  not  have  existed,  and  there 
is  no  contradiction  in  making  such  an  assertion. 
Aquinas  is  therefore  here  accepting  historical  or 
temporal  necessity  rather  than  the  stronger  logical 
necessity  of  the  earlier  discussion. 
Having  accepted  that  the  antecedent  is  necessary  in 
thi's  way,  he  also  concedes  that  the  consequent  is 
necessary  -  it  is  not  only  necessarily  true  that  God 
knew  that  x  would  happen  but  also  necessarily  true 
that,  therefore,  x  will  happen.  Despite  this,  however, 
Aquinas  argues  that  x  can  still  be  contingent.  His 
reasoning  is  that  because  the  antecedent  refers  to 
'knowing',  a  mental  act,  the  consequent  must  be 
understood  in  relation  to  the  mode  of  knowing,  not  as 44 
it  actually  is  in  itself.  Since  God's  knowledge  is 
eternal  and  outside  time,  what  is  known  by  him  is 
known  as  'present'.  What  is  present  must  necessarily 
be,  but  only  while  it  is  present;  it  need  not  be 
necessary  when  its  prior  causes  are  considered. 
Aquinas  therefore  again  appeals  to  the  notion  of 
God's  eternity  to  explain  how  something  humans 
consider  future  can  be  known  by  God  without  the 
thing  itself  being  necessary  except  in  the  trivial  sense 
that  while  x  exists,  it  must  be  true  that  it  exists  for 
otherwise  there  would  be  a  contradiction.  Aquinas 
therefore  also  seems  to  be  accepting  the  temporal 
necessity  of  the  present,  just  as  he  accepted  the 
necessity  of  the  past. 
In  DV2.12,  the  argument  is  put  in  terms  of  the 
relationship  between  the  thing  known  and  the 
knower,  and  more  generally  in  ST  1  a.  14.13  in  terms  of 
mental  acts.  Both  however  make  the  point  that  while 
what  is  known  by  God  is  necessarily  true,  the  thing 
known,  when  considered  in  itself,  may  still  be 
contingent.  So,  in  DV2.12  ad  7  Aquinas  says: 
"For  what  is  attributed  to  a  thing  in  itself  is  quite 
different  from  what  is  attributed  to  a  thing  in  so  far 
as  it  is  known.  What  is  attributed  to  it  in  itself 
belongs  to  it  according  to  its  own  manner;  but  what  is 
attributed  to  a  thing  or  follows  upon  it  in  so  far  as  it 45 
is  known  is  according  to  the  manner  of  the  knower. 
Hence,  if  in  the  antecedent,  something  is  signified 
which  pertains  to  knowledge,  the  consequent  must  be 
taken  according  to  the  manner  of  the  knower,  not 
according  to  the  manner  of  the  thing  known.  For 
example,  were  I  to  say,  "If  I  understand  something, 
that  thing  is  without  matter"  what  is  understood  need 
be  immaterial  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  understood. 
Similarly  when  I  say  "If  God  knows  something,  it  will 
be'  the  consequent  should  not  be  taken  according  to 
the  mode  of  being  of  the  thing  in  itself  but  according 
to  the  mode  of  the  knower.  Consequently  we  should 
rather  say  "If  God  knows  something,  it  is"  than  say  "it. 
will  be".  We  must,  therefore,  judge  in  the  same  way 
the  proposition  "If  God  knows  something  it  will  be", 
and  this  one,  "If  I  see  Socrates  running,  Socrates  is 
runnine,  for  both  are  necessary  as  long  as  the  action 
is  going  on.  -"22 
Similarly,  though  rather  more  succMictly,  in 
ST  1  a.  14.13  ad  2: 
"...  when  the  antecedent  contains  something  that 
pertains  to  a  mental  act,  the  consequent  is  to  be 
understood  not  as  it  exists  in  itself  but  as  it  exists  in 
'the  soul:  for  the  existence  of  a  thing  in  itself  is  not  the 
same  as  its  existence  in  the  soul.  For  example,  if  we 
say,  Vhatever  the  soul  knows  is  immaterial',  the 46 
word  'immaterial'is  to  be  understood  of  the  thing's 
existence  in  the  mind,  not  of  its  existence  in  itself. 
Similarly,  if  one  said,  'If  God  knew  something,  it  will 
happen',  the  consequent  is  to  be  understood  in  its 
condition  as  an  object  of  the  divine  knowledge, 
namely  in  the  existence  it  has  in  its  presence  to  him. 
And  thus  it  has  the  same  necessity  as  the  antecedent 
has,  because  that  which  is,  when  it  is,  must 
necessarily  be,  as  we  read  in  de  Interpretatione.  "23 
And  in  ad  3: 
"But  the  objects  of  God's  knowledge  must  be 
necessary  in  their  condition  as  such....  Yet  not 
absolutely  necessary  considered  as  misting  in  their 
own  causeS.  "24 
So,  Aquinas  seems  to  be  arguing  that  the  antecedent 
and  the  consequent  must  be  'balanced'  by  attributing 
to  them  the  same  kind  of  existence  if  the  necessity  of 
the  antecedent  is  to  impose  necessity  on  the 
consequent  -  like  compared  with  like,  in  effect.  What 
matters  therefore  in  this  true  conditional  statement, 
If  God  knew  that  x  was  going  to  happen,  x  will 
happen',  is  how  things  are  known.  God's  way  of 
knowing  is  different  from  the  human  way  of  knowing, 
just  as  his  way  of  being  is  different  from  human 
being.  He  is  in  eternity,  therefore  'knows'in  eternity, 
and  therefore  knows  things  as  present;  we  exist  in 47 
time,  therefore  know  as  past,  present,  or  future.  But 
the  necessity  of  the  present  imposes  no  necessity  on 
the  event  which  is  happening  in  that  present. 
Aquinas  uses,  in  DV2.12,  the  example  of  Socrates' 
running.  If  I  see  Socrates  running,  then  while  he  is 
running  it  must  be  the  case  that  he  is  running.  But 
the  most  one  can  say  about  that  necessity  is  that  it 
attaches  to  the  running  only  while  the  running  is 
happening  (or  after  it  has  happened).  It  says  nothing 
about  whether  Socrates'  running  was  necessary 
before  he  started  to  run.  That  I  see,  or  know,  that 
Socrates  is  running  does  not  therefore  show  that 
Socrates'  running  is  not.  contingenL  In  a  similar  way, 
God's  knowing  that  I  do  x  does  not  show  that  I  do  not 
do  x  contingently.  25 
By  relying  on  God's  eternity  and  on  the  limited  sense 
of  necessity  which  knowledge  of  something  as  present 
implies,  Aquinas  has  sought  to  show  that  God  can 
know  what  we  call.  future  events  and  that  these 
events  can  nevertheless  still  be  contingent.  He  has,  in 
effect,  changed  the  problem  of  God's  knowledge  of 
future  contingents  into  the  problem  of  God's 
knowledge  of  present  contingents,  and  then  shown 
that  the  necessity  which  attaches  to  present 
contingents  is  harmless.  The  general  lines  of  his 
solution,  although  different  in  detail,  remain  the 
same  in  DV  and  ST  although  these  are  written  some 48 
10  years  apart.  In  the  later261n  Peri  Hertneneias  he 
takes  the  same  approach,  though  here  the  emphasis 
is  on  eternity  and  the  contrast  between  human 
knowledge  and  God's  knowledge.  Although  lengthy, 
this  passage  is  worth  repeating,  for  it  contains  the 
major  points  of  his  mature  thought  on  the  issue: 
"....  in  regard  to  knowledge  we  should  note  that  a 
mind  contained  in  some  way  within  time  relates 
differently  to  the  knowing  of  what  happens  in  time 
from  a  mind  altogether  outside  time...  Now  since  our 
knowing  occurs  within  time,  either  in  itself  or 
incidentally 
...  things  are  known  as  present  or  past  or  future. 
Present  events  are  known  as  actually  existing  and 
perceptible  to  the  senses  in  some  way;  past  events  are 
remembered;  and  future  events  are  not  known  in 
themselves  -  because  they  don't  yet  exist  -  but  can  be 
predicted  from  their  causes:  with  certainty  if  their 
causes  totally  determine  them,  as  with  things  that 
must  happen;  conjecturally,  if  they  are  not  so 
determined  that  they  cannot  be  obstructed,  as  with 
things  that  happen  usually;  and  not  at  all  if  they  are. 
only  possible  and  not  determined  either  to  one  side  or 
the  other,  as  with  things  that  might  be  either  ....... 
God's  knowing,  however,  is  altogether  outside  time, 
as  if  he  stands  on  the  summit  of  eternity  where 
everything  exists  together,  looking  down  in  a  single 49 
simple  glance  on  the  whole  course  of  time.  So  in  his 
one  glance  he  sees  everything  going  on  throughout 
time,  and  each  as  it  is  in  itself,  not  as  something 
future  to  himself  and  his  seeing  and  visible  only  as  it 
exists  within  its  causal  situation  (although  he  sees 
that  causal  situation).  But  he  sees  things  altogether 
eternally,  each  as  it  exists  in  its  own  time,  just  as  our 
own  human  eye  sees  John  sitting  there  himself,  not 
just  as  something  determined  by  causes.  Nor  does 
our  seeing  John  sitting  there  stop  it  being  an  event 
that  might  not  have  been  when  regarded  just  in 
relation  to  its  causes.  And  yet  while  he  is  sitting  there 
we  see  him  sitting  there  with  certainty  and  without. 
doubt,  since  when  a  thing  exists  in  itself  it  is  already 
determined.  In  this  way  then  God  knows  everything 
that  happens  in  time  and  without  doubt,  and  yet  the 
things  that  happen  in  time  are  not  things  that  must 
exist  or  must  come  to  exist,  but  things  that  might  be 
or  might  not  be.  "27 
The  consistency  of  approach  which  the  key  texts 
show  would  therefore  seem  to  demonstrate  that 
Aquinas  regarded  the  eternity  of  God's  knowledge  and 
the  limited  nature  of  the  necessity  of  the  present  as 
the  lynch-pins  of  the  solution  to  the  dilemma  of  God's 
knowledge  of  future  contingents  and  human  freedom 
which  arises  from  temporal  considerations. 50 
C.  Problems  with  Aquinas'  solution 
Whether  Aquinas'  approach  resolves  this  temporal 
aspect  of  the  dilemma,  or  even  whether  the  concepts 
he  employs  are  coherent,  has  been  the  subject  of 
considerable  debate  for  a  considerable  length  of  time. 
That  debate  has  raised  important  theological, 
epistemological  and  logical  issues.  Although  the 
arguments  put  forward  for  and  against  Aquinas' 
position  are  complex  and  important,  a  proper 
evaluation  of  them  is  peripheral  to  this  thesis  and  so 
only  brief  mention  will  now  be  made  of  the  major 
points  of  concern. 
1.  Relationship  between  eterni!  y  and-temporal  events. 
First,  Aquinas'view,  crucial  to  his  resolution  of  the 
dilemma,  that  God,  in  a  timeless  eternity,  knows 
everything  that  happens  in  time. 
Aquinas  considers  the  eternity  of  God  in  ST1  a.  10, 
where  he  argues  that  the  notion  of  eternity  derives 
from  unchangeableness,  just  as  the  notion  of  time  - 
to  which  it  is  opposed  -  derives  from  change.  God  is 
utterly  unchangeable  and  so  eternal.  Eternity  exists, 
he  says,  as  an  instantaneous  whole,  lacking 
successiveness  28  and  within  that  instantaneous 
whole  God  "comprehends  all  phases  of  time".  29 
In  ST  1  a.  14.13  he  says: 51 
"Now  although  contingent  events  come  into  actual 
existence  successively,  God  does  not,  as  we  do,  know 
thern.  in  their  actual  existence  successively  but  aU  at 
once;  because  his  knowledge  is  measured  by  eternity, 
as  is  also  his  existence;  and  eternity  which  exists  as  a 
simultaneous  whole,  takes  in  the  whole  of  time  ..... 
Hence  all  that  takes  place  in  time  is  eternally  present 
to  God...  because  he  eternally  surveys  all  things  as 
they  are  in  their  presence  to  him.  '30 
Aquinas"  views  on  the  relationship  between  eternity 
and  temporal  events  have  however  been  criticized  by 
both  mediaeval  and  modem  writers.  Goris,  for 
example,  cites  William  de  la  Mare  andSCotUS31  and 
Kenny  argues  that  Aquinas'  concept  is  simply 
incoherent:  "The  whole  concept  of  a  timeless  eternity, 
the  whole  of  which  is  simultaneous  with  every  part  of 
time,  seems  to  be  radically  incoherent.  For 
simultaneity  as  ordinarily  understood  is  a  transitive 
relation.  "32So,  if  I  see  A  and  B  simultaneously,  A 
must  be  simultaneous  With  B.  But  this  would  seem  to 
imply,  to  use  Kenny's,  example,  that  from  God's 
perspective,  while  Kenny  writes  his  criticism  of 
Aquinas'  argument,  Nero  fiddles  heartlessly  on,  since 
God  sees  both  Kenny's  writing  and  Rome's  burning  at 
the  same  time  i.  e.  present. 52 
This  criticism  seems  to  be  a  misrepresentation  of 
Aquinas'  position,  trading  as  it  does  on  the 
expression  "simultaneity  as  ordinarily  understood7. 
Simultaneity  as  ordinarily  understood  is  a  concept 
which  applies  to  relationships  in  time.  Kenny  is  of 
course  correct  in  saying  that  if  I  see  his  writing  and 
Rome's  burning  at  the  same  time  they  must  be 
simultaneous  with  each  other,  but  that  is  because  all 
three  relationships  (me  to  Kenny,  me  to  Rome,  Kenny 
to  Rome)  exist  in  the  same  time.  God  is  outside  the 
time  in  which  Kenny  and  Rome  exist,  for  neither 
Kenny  himself  nor  Rome  itself  exists  in  eternity. 
Aquinas  attempts  to  explain  the  relationship  in 
SCG1.66.8  by  using  the  example  of  the  centre  of  a 
circle  and  its  circumference: 
"Let  us  consider  a  determined  point  on  the 
circumference  of  a  circle.  Although  it  is  indivisible,  it 
does  not  co-exist  simultaneously  with  any  other  point 
as  to  position,  since  it  is  the  order  of  position  that 
produces  the  continuity  of  the  circumference.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  centre  of  the  circle,  which  is  no  part 
of  the  circumference,  is  directly  opposed  to  any  given 
determinate  point  on  the  circumference.  Hence 
whatever  is  found  in  any  part  of  time  co-exists  with 
what  is  eternal  as  being  present  to  it,  although  with 
ý  respect  to  some  other  time  it  be  past  or  future. 53 
Something  can  be  present  to  what  is  eternal  only  by 
being  present  to  the  whole  of  it,  since  the  eternal  does 
not  have  the  duration  of  succession.  The  divine 
intellect  therefore  sees  in  the  whole  of  its  eternity,  as 
being  present  to  it,  whatever  takes  place  through  the 
whole  course  of  time.  And  yet  what  takes  place  in  a 
certain  part  of  time  was  not  always  existent.  "33 
The  spatial  analogy  of  the  centre  and  the 
circumference  of  a  circle  may  not  be  entirely  helpfUJ34 
but  the  key  to  Aquinas'  treatment  seems  to  lie  in 
what  he  perceives  as  the  difficulty  of  describing  God's 
eternal  knowledge  in  a  human  vocabulary: 
"The  difficulty  in  this  matter  arises  from  the  fact  that 
we  can  describe  the  divine  knowledge  only  after  the 
manner  of  our  own,  at  the  same  time  pointing  out  the 
temporal  differences.  For  example,  if  we  were  to 
describe  God's  knowledge  as  it  is,  we  should  have  to 
say  that  God  knows  that  this  is,  rather  than  that  it 
will  be;  for  to  Him  everything  is  present  and  nothing 
is  future.  "35 
Even  to  say  however  that  everything  is  present 
imports  a  human  temporal  sense,  for  in  eternity  there 
cannot  be  a  '-present'  exactly  as  there  is  for  us,  since 
our  present  is  defined  by  'past'  and  'future'.  Although 
the  present  tense  may  be  the  most  appropriate  to 54 
apply  to  God36  it  would  seem  from  Aquinas' 
discussion  of  the  tenses  that  should  apply  to  God37 
that  even  that  tense  inadequately  reflects  his  being. 
As  with  other  attributes,  'present'may  therefore  be 
considered  to  be  said  analogically  of  God.  The  present 
of  eternity  is  therefore  Present*  perhaps,  and'so 
future  contingent  events  are  Present*  to  God,  or  'as  if' 
present.  But  Present*  suggests  simultaneity*  and 
simultaneity*  need  not  have  all  the  characteristics  of 
temporal  simultaneity.  Simultaneity*  need  not  then 
be  transitive;  Stump  and  Kretzmann's  development  of 
ET-simultaneity  adopts  this  Idnd  of  approach.  38And 
an  intransitive  simultaneity  avoids  Kenny's  writing 
and  Rome's  burning  being  simultaneous  events 
though  both  are  present  to  God. 
Much  more  might  be  said  on  the  difficulty  of  working 
through  Aquinas'  concept  of  eternity  and  the 
relationship  between  God's  eternal  knowledge  of 
things  and  their  existence  in  time.  Here,  however,  it  is 
merely  noted  that  there  are  difficulties,  though  these 
may  be  resolvable. 
2.  Omniscience 
Even  if  it  is  granted,  however,  that  the  concept  of  a 
timeless  eternity  simultaneous  with  every  part  of  time 
is  coherent,  there  are  still  difficulties  over  what 
limitations  such  a  concept  would  place  on  God's 55 
knowledge.  The  most  obvious  is  that  God  cannot 
know  the  future,  as  Aquinas  himself  points  out.  On 
the  other  hand,  this  seems  to  be  irrelevant  to  both  his 
omniscience  and  his  providence  since  he  knows  x 
even  if  he  knows  it  as  present  rather  than  as  future. 
Kenny  objects  however,  39  that  on  Aquinas'  approach 
of  reducing  everything  to  the  present  one  would 
always  have  to  say  that  'God  knows  a  man  is  landing 
on  Mars'.  But  that  is  false  at  a  point  in  time  when  no 
man  is  landing  on  Mars  and  so  cannot  be  known  by 
God;  God  therefore  could  not  know  what  we  express 
by  'A  man  will  land  on  Mars'.  This  objection  seems  to 
ignore  the  point  that  there  is  a  difference  between  the 
human  present  and  the  eternal  present  (Present*). 
God's  saying,  as  it  were,  'A  man  is  landing  on  Mars'is 
not  the  same  as  our  saying  'A  man  is  landing  on 
Mars',  for  the  latter  means  that  a  man  is  now  landing 
on  Mars.  But  'now'is  a  temporal  expression  and 
cannot  apply  to  what  God  knows.  As  Craig  points 
oUt,  40what  God  knows,  on  Aquinas'  account,  is  not 
that  a  man  is  [now]  landing  on  Mars  but  that  "God 
knows  that  the  proposition  'Men  are  landing  on  Mars' 
is  true  at  tn,  after  having  been  false  at  tn-l.  " 
If,  however,  statements  about  what  God  knows 
cannot  be  qualified  by  time,  this  seems  to  lead 
directly  to  the  criticism  made  by  Prior,  that  if  God's 
knowledge  is  timeless  then  he  can  know  only  truths 56 
which  are  timeless.  If  that  is  so,  there  will  be  many 
things  which  humans  can  know  which  God  cannot. 
Prior's  own  example4l  is  that  God  cannot  know  that 
the  1960  final  examinations  at  Manchester  are  now 
over,  since  that  is  something  which  was  not  true  in 
1959,  and  hence  is  not  timelessly  true.  "All  that  can 
be  said  on  this  subject  timelessly  is  that  the 
finishing-date  of  the  1960  final  examinations  is  an 
earlier  one  than  the  29th  August  [the  date  of  Prior's 
writing]  and  this  is  not  the  thing  we  know  when  we 
know  that  those  examinations  are  over  .........  what 
we  know  when  we  know  that  the  1960  final 
examinations  are  over  can't  be  just  a  timeless  relation 
between  dates  because  this  isn't  the  thing  we're 
pleased  about  when  we're  pleased  that  the 
examinations  are  over.  "  If  Prior  is  correct,  God  would 
be  rather  less  than  omniscient.  It  is  not  clear  however 
that  Prior's  argument  succeeds,  for  it  is  arguable  that 
what  God  knows  is  indeed  the  same  as  what  humans 
know,  but  that  it  is  not  open  to  God  to  express  it  in 
the  same  way  (See,  for  example,  Hasker  [1989] 
pp.  160-161  and  Kenny  [  1979]  pp.  42-48). 
Whatever  the  status  of  these  arguments,  it  is  at  least 
fair  to  say  that  Aquinas'  account  of  God's  eternal 
knowledge  of  things  which  exist  in  time  causes 
tension  with  accounts  of  God's  omniscience. 57 
3.  Necessily  of  the  present  and  1past 
That  God's  knowledge  of  temporal  things  is  'as  if  they 
were  present'  also  seems  to  raise  a  difficulty  in 
relation  to  the  Aristotelian  dictum  Everything  which 
is,  when  it  is,  must  necessarily  be'on  which  Aquinas 
relies.  In  human  temporal  terms,  this  means  that 
while  something  currently  existing  must  be  existing, 
before  it  came  into  existence  it  might  or  might  not 
have  happened  i.  e.  its  coming  into  existence  can  be 
contingent  but  its  existence  once  it  has  so  come  is 
necessary  (for  as  long  as  it  is  in  existence).  But  such 
an  analysis  clearly  depends  on  a  'before'  and  'after', 
which  do  not  apply  to  God's  knowledge.  It  seems  to 
make  no  sense  to  apply  the  dictum  to  things  which 
exist  outside  space  and  time,  for  example  numbers  or 
logical  truths,  for  when  would  3  or  the  law  of  non- 
contradiction  exist? 
Now,  God's  knowing  eternally  that  x  exists  does  not 
by  itself  make  x  eternal,  as  Aquinas  points  out  in 
ST  1  a.  14.8  ad  2:  "Knowledge  is  the  cause  of  things  in 
accordance  with  the  way  things  are  in  the  knowledge. 
But  it  was  no  part  of  God's  knowledge  that  things 
should  exist  from  eternity.  Hence  although  God's 
knowledge  is  eternal,  it  does  not  follow  that  creatures 
exist  for  eternity.  "42But  what  the  Aristotelian  dictum 
applies  to  in  ST  1  a.  14.13  ad  2  is  specifically  not  x  in 
itself  but  x  as  an  object  of  God's  knowledge  -  and  x  as 58 
an  object  of  God's  knowledge  is  present  to  him, 
always.  Therefore,  as  far  as  God  is  concerned,  there  is 
never  'a  time'when  x  can  be  anything  other  than 
necessary.  If  this  is  so,  it  would  seem  that  x  is 
necessary  in  relation  to  God  but  it  might  (somehow) 
still  be  contingent  in  relation  to  humans.  Whether 
and  how  this  is  possible,  and  its  implications,  are 
considered  later,  in  Chapter  5.  Here  the  point  is  made 
only  that  reliance  on  the  eternal  nature  of  God's 
knowledge  appears  to  create  a  difficulty  if  one  wishes 
to  rely  also  on  the  harmless  necessity  of  the  temporal 
present,  which  must  be  different  from  Present*. 
Apart  from  the  issue  of  eternity,  questions  can  also  be 
raised  about  Aquinas'  approach  to  the  point  raised  in 
ST  1  a.  14.13  ObJ  2.  His  reason  for  rejecting  the 
argument  that  the  antecedent  'God  knew  this 
contingent  event'is  contingent  rather  than  necessary 
because  it  is  knowledge  of  something  which  refers  to 
the  future  even  though  the  knowledge  itself  is  past,  is 
not  entirely  clear.  Aquinas'view  was  certainly  not 
shared  by  all  his  predecessors.  Bonaventure  and 
Albert  are  cited  by  Gornall  in  his  Blackfriars 
translation  of  this  passage  as  examples  of  people  who 
held  otherwise  and  Normore  cites  Robert  Grosseteste 
and  Peter  Lombard.  43  And  it  was  notably  disputed  by 
Ockham. 59 
What  Aquinas  argues  is  that  the  antecedent  is 
necessary  "because  what  had  in  fact  a  reference  to  a 
future  event  must  have  had  it,  even  though  the  future 
is  sometimes  not  realized.  "44  It  is  difficult,  however,  to 
see  how  there  can  be  knowledge  of  a  future  event 
which  fails  to  be  realized,  and  therefore  to  see  what 
Aquinas'point  is.  Nevertheless,  Hasker  offers  a 
plausible  explanation.  45  He  takes  Whatever  has  had  a 
relation  to  the  future'to  be  some  kind  of  intentional 
attitude  (belief  or  hope  for  example).  If  in  1999  1 
hoped  that  x  would  happen  in  June  2000,  it  is  now 
[in  2001]  necessary  that  I  did  so  hope,  because  that 
hope  is  now  in  the  past,  and  it  is  irrelevant  to  that 
necessity  whether  x  happened  or  not.  As  Hasker 
points  out,  if  the  intentional  attitude  is  knowledge 
then  x  must  happen,  but  Aquinas  makes  his  point 
stronger  by  considering  the  more  general  case  not 
involving  knowledge.  46  So,  the  antecedent  is 
necessary  because  the  intentional  attitude  is  in  the 
past.  This  seems  to  me  to  be  a  plausible 
interpretation  of  what  Aquinas  is  saying,  and  as  such 
to  provide  a  good  ground  for  rejecting  the  argument 
that  the  future  reference  makes  the  antecedent 
contingent. 
Whether  Aquinas  is  right  to  accept  the  necessity  of 
the  past  is  itself  open  to  dispute,  but  this  is  an 
argument  which  goes  well  beyond  the  scope  of  this 60 
chapter;  it  is  sufficient  for  this  purpose  simply  to  note 
that  there  are  differing  views.  Aquinas  nevertheless 
did  accept  that  what  was,  in  human  terms,  a  past 
event  was  now  necessary  and  so  the  antecedent  'God 
knew....  'was  necessary.  He  could  not  therefore,  on 
his  own  account  of  the  issues,  deny  the  logic  of  the 
argument  that  the  consequent  was  in  some  sense 
necessary.  His  only  escape  therefore  seemed  to  be  to 
try  to  defuse  that  necessity. 
D.  Future  contingents  and  freedom 
Aquinas'  consideration  of  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingents  raises,  as  has  been  seen,  many 
epistemological  and  logical  issues.  Examination  of 
these  issues  is  obviously  valuable  in  itself,  as  the 
brief  summary  of  some  of  the  problems  raised  by 
Aquinas'  solution  to  the  apparent  dilemma  of  God's 
knowledge  of  future  contingents  and  human  freedom 
shows.  But  there  is  another  major  issue,  arising  not 
from  the  solution  to  the  problem,  but  from  the 
statement  of  the  problem  itself. 
The  quotation  from  Augustine  with  which  this 
chapter  opens  argues  that  either  (a)  God  knows  the 
future  or  (b)  sinning  is  necessary  and  therefore  not 
free.  As  we  have  already  seen,  Aquinas'opening 
response  in  DV2.12  envisages  a  similar  dilemma: 61 
"Some,  wishing  to  pronounce  upon  divine  knowledge 
from  the  view  point  of  our  own  way  of  knowing,  have 
said  that  God  does  not  know  future  contingents.  This 
opinion  cannot  stand,  for  it  would  eliminate 
providence  over  human  affairs,  which  are  contingent. 
Consequently,  others  have  said  that  God  has 
knowledge  of  all  future  events,  but  that  all  take  place 
necessarily,  otherwise  his  knowledge  of  them  would 
be  subject  to  error.  But  neither  can  this  opinion 
stand,  for  it  would  destroy  free  choice  and  there 
would  be  no  need  to  ask  advice.  "47 
Here  Aquinas  seems  to  make  the  assumption,  as 
Augustine  does,  that  if  all  future  events  take  place 
necessarily,  then  there  can  be  no  human  freedom. 
Because  such  lack  of  human  freedom  would  be  as 
theologically  and  morally  repugnant  as  the  idea  of 
God's  not  knowing  all  future  events,  he  goes  on  to  try 
to  defuse  the  effect  of  'necessary'  to  make  God's 
knowledge  consistent  with  human  freedom.  But  need 
the  necessity  which  such  foreknowledge  implies  have 
that  effect?  Or,  put  another  way,  even  if  Aquinas' 
grounds  for  his  solution  to  the  problem  posed  by 
God's  foreknowledge  were  wrong,  is  human  freedom 
destroyed?  Say,  for  example,  that  I  know  (per 
impossibile,  on  Aquinas'  account)  that  tomorrow 
Jones  will  decide  to  go  to  the  opera.  On  the 
arguments  put  forward  in  DV,  ST  and  In  Peri 62 
Hermeneias,  it  is  necessary,  in  some  sense  or  other, 
that  Jones  make  that  decision.  But  it  must  also  be 
the  case  that  tomorrow  Jones  does  make  that 
decision.  Now,  what  is  it  about  that  decision-making 
that  leads  one  to  say  that  it  was  not  free?  The  answer 
to  this  seems  to  depend  crucially  on  what  one  thinks 
counts  as  freedom. 
One  might  argue  that  it  was  not  in  Jones'power  to  do 
other  than  decide  to  go  to  the  opera  if  it  were 
necessary  that  he  make  that  decision,  since  what  is 
necessary  cannot  be  impeded,  and  it  must  be 
necessary  if  I  (or  God)  knew  that  it  was  to  happen.  If 
it  were  not  in  his  power  to  do  otherwise,  Jones  was 
not  free. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  arguable  that  what  matters  is 
that  Jones  made  the  decision  to  go  to  the  opera.  No 
one  forced  him  to  make  such  a  decision  and  he  was 
not,  for  example,  in  the  grip  of  some  psychological 
affliction  which  compelled  him  to  go  to  every  opera 
advertised.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  the  fact  that  I  knew 
he  was  going  to  make  such  a  decision  could,  even  if 
he  were  aware  of  my  foreknowledge,  compel  him  to 
make  it.  Therefore,  even  though  he  could  not  have 
done  other  than  make  the  decision,  he  made  it  freely. 63 
On  the  second  argument  there  seems  no  need  to 
defuse  the  necessity  which  arises  from  the  temporal 
problem  of  foreknowledge  of  the  future  in  order  to 
protect  human  freedom.  That  Aquinas  even  attempts 
to  do  so  because  he  assumes  that  foreknowledge 
destroys  human  freedom  therefore  seems  to  show 
that  his  concept  of  freedom  must  be  one  which 
implies  a  power  to  do  otherwise,  rather  than  one 
which  requires  simply  a  lack  of  compulsion  i.  e.  his 
concept  must  be  one  where  I  am  said  to  do  x  freely 
because  I  could  instead  not  have  done  (or  at  least 
could  have  chosen  not  to  do)  x  or  could  have  done  y. 
Nevertheless,  that  interpretation  of  Aquinas'  position 
is  not  the  only  one  possible.  For  example,  in  an 
important  article,  considered  in  detail  in  Chapter  4, 
Eleonore  Stump  argues  that  the  ability  to  do 
otherwise  is  not  an  essential  feature  of  Aquinas' 
concept  of  freedom.  48And  specifically  in  the  context 
of  discussions  of  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingents  there  are  widely  differing  views  of  what 
Aquinas'concept  of  freedom  consists  in.  Calvin 
Normore,  for  example,  takes  it  that  Aquinas  denies 
that  "being  able  not  to  choose  A  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  choosing  A  freely.  "49  -  whereas 
Copleston,  in  a  more  general  context,  says  that 
"[Aquinas]  obviously  thought  that  free  choice  implies 
the  power  to  choose  otherwise  than  one  actually  does 
choose.  "-90  Kenny,  in  Divine  Foreknowledge  and 64 
Human  Freedom,  casts  his  whole  discussion  against 
an  assumption  that  an  ability  to  do  otherwise  is 
essential:  "For  in  order  for  me  to  be  able  to  do  an 
action  freely,  it  is  necessary  that  it  should  be  within 
my  power  not  to  do  that  action.  "51  And  Craig52  simply 
claims  that  Aquinas'  treatment  of  the  dilemma  has 
eliminated  human  freedom  altogether.  Without  saying 
what  he  thinks  Aquinas  understands  by  human 
freedom. 
There  is  however  another  aspect  of  God's  knowledge 
of  future  contingents  which  may  cast  a  different  light 
on  Aquinas'concept  of  human  freedom,  and  indeed 
may  help  to  explain  why  commentators'views  vary. 
This  is  hinted  at  in  ST1  a.  14.13  Obj  1:  "For  from  a 
necessary  cause  there  proceeds  a  necessary  effect. 
But  God's  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  the  things  he 
knows...  "53  In  addition  to  the  problems  raised  by 
God's  knowledge  of  the  future  described  above  as 
'temporal'  problems,  there  are  also  'causal'  problems 
raised  by  the  view  that  such  knowledge  is  the  cause 
of  what  is  known.  So,  God  does  not  just  know  that 
Jones  will  decide  to  go  to  the  opera  tomorrow:  in 
knowing  this  he  also  causes  it.  Yet  Jones,  according 
to  Aquinas,  is  still  free.  This  aspect  of  the  problem 
might  indicate  that  Aquinas'  understanding  of 
freedom  is  not  as  it  first  appears.  Or  Aquinas  might 
again  defuse  the  necessity  which  God's  causation 65 
seems  to  imply,  making  room  for  an  'alternative 
possibilities'  concept  of  freedom. 
The  wide  divergence  of  views  about  a  major 
assumption  on  which  Aquinas  bases  one  of  his  most 
frequently  considered  discussions  is  intriguing  and 
important.  At  best,  it  can  be  said  that  the  concept  of 
freedom  he  is  employing  is  not  clear,  but  since  this  is 
a  crucial  element  in  any  reconciliation  of  God's 
knowledge  of  the  future  and  human  freedom,  it 
merits  further  investigation.  What  will  now  be 
considered  therefore  is  the  concept  of  freedom  which 
seems  to  underlie  Aquinas'  arguments  in  DV2.12  and 
ST  1  a.  14.13.  The  interim  conclusion  reached  will  then 
be  considered  against  the  second  part  of  the  problem, 
the  causal  nature  of  God's  knowledge.  The  problems 
raised  by  God's  causing  what  he  knows,  how  Aquinas 
deals  with  those,  and  the  implications  of  this  for  his 
concept  of  freedom,  are  considered  in  depth  in 
Chapter  5.  From  this  it  should  then  be  possible  to 
take  a  view  on  the  nature  of  human  freedom  which 
Aquinas  was  so  anxious  to  preserve  in  dealing  with 
the  issues  surrounding  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingents. 66 
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dixerunt  quod  "deus  futura.  contingentia,  non  cognoscit.  Sed  hoc  non  potest 
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tamen  propter  hoc  impeditur  quin  aliqua  contingenter  eveniant.  ' 
9  In  humans,  understanding  (intelligentia)  and  science  (scientia)  are  used 
of  knowledge  of  principles  and  of  conclusions  respectively.  We  come  to 
know  things  by  working  from  understood  principles  to  known  conclusions. 
In  God,  there  is  no  such  division  of  knowledge  and  he  simply'knows': 
ST  1  a.  14.1  and  14.7.  It  can  at  least  be  said  that  his  knowledge  is  like 
human  intelligentia.  or  scientia  in  that  there  can  be  no  error  in  it. 
10  See  In  Peri  Hermeneias  Bk  1,13-15 
11  DV2.12  ad  6:  "sicut  scientia  nostra  non  potest  esse  de  futuris 
contigentibus,  ita.  nec  scientia.  dei" 
12  DV2.12  ad  6:  "et  adhuc  multo  minus,  si  ea  ut  futura  cognosceret; 
cognoscit  autem  ea  ut  praesentia.  sibi,  alfis  autem.  futura;  et  ideo  ratio  non 
procedit7 
13  A  more  famous  illustration  perhaps  is  that  in  In  Peri  Hermeneias,  where 
Aquinas  uses  the  example  of  a  watcher  looking  at  travellers  on  a  road. 
Those  travelling  along  the  road  can  see  only  those  travelling  with  them  and 
perhaps  some  of  those  ahead  of  them  who  travelled  the  road  earlier;  they 67 
cannot  see  those  behind,  who  are  still  to  come  along  the  road.  But  if 
someone  were  outside  this  stream  of  people  -  standing  on  a  high  hill,  for 
example  -  he  would  be  able  to  see  all  the  travellers  in  one  glance,  even 
though  they  were  not  all  at  the  same  point  on  the  road.  The  points  Aquinas 
makes  in  In  Peri  Hermeneias  are  considered  below. 
14  DV2.12c:  "  unde  cum  visio  divinae  scientiae  aeternitate  mensuretur, 
quae  est  tota  simul  et  tamen  totum  tempus  includit,  nec  alicui  parti 
temporis  deest,  sequitur  ut  quidquid  in  tempore  geritur,  non  ut  futurum, 
sed  ut  praesens  videat:  hoc  enim  quod  est  a  deo  visum  est  quidem,  futurum 
rei  alteri,  cui  succedit  in  tempore;  sed  ipsi  divinae  visioni  quae  non  est  in 
tempore,  sed  extra  tempus,  non  est  futurum,  sed  praesens.  Ita  ergo  nos 
videmus  faturum  ut  futurum,  quia  visioni  nostrae  futurum  est,  cum 
tempore  nostra  visio  mensuretur;  sed  divinae  visioni,  quae  est  extra 
tempus,  futurum.  non  est.  " 
Is  STla.  14.13c  "aeternitas  autem  tota  simul  existens  ambit  totum 
tempus..  ' 
16  STIa.  14.13c  "Unde  manifestum  est  quod  contingentia  infallibiliter  a  Deo 
cognoscuntur,  inquantum.  subduntur  divino  conspectui  sua 
praesentialitate;  et  tamen  sunt  futum  contingentia,  suis  causis  proximis 
comparata.  " 
17  STla.  14.13  ObJ  3:  "Praeterea,  omne  scitum  a  Deo  necesse  est  esse;  quia 
etiam  omne  scitum  a  nobis  necesse  est  esse,  cum  tamen  scientia  Dei  sit 
certior  quam  scientia  nostra.  " 
18  STIa.  14.13  ad  3:  "Unde  et  haec  propositio,  'omne  scitum  a  Deo 
necessarium.  est  esse,  consuevit  distingui:  quia  potest  esse  de  re  vel  de 
dicto.  Si  intelligatur  de  re  ,  est  divisa  et  falsa;  et  est  sensus,  'omnis  res 
quam  Deus  scit,  est  necessaria'.  Vel  potest  intelligi  de  dicto:  et  sic  est 
composita  et  vera;  et  est  sensus,  'hoc  dictum,  scitum.  a  Deo  esse,  est 
necessarium.  -" 
19  Kenny  [1973]  p.  53 
20  And  of  course,  as  STIa.  14.13  ObJ  3  implies,  the  same  distinction  can  be 
made  in  relation  to  human  knowledge,  if  'knowledge'is  taken  in  the  strong 
sense  of  scientia  rather  than  of  conjecture.  If  I  know  it  is  mining  then  it 
must  be  raining,  otherwise  I  could  not  be  said  to  know  it  was  raining.  But 
this  does  not  make  the  rain  considered  in  itself  necessary.  Aquinas'point 
therefore  is  not  one  which  concerns  God's  knowledge  solely,  but  one  which 
addresses  the  wider  logical  issue  of  the  scope  of  the  necessity  being 
considered. 68 
21  STla.  14.13  ad  2:  "Ad  secundum  dicendurn  quod  quidarn  dicunt  quod  hoc 
antecedens,  Deus  scivit  hoc  contingens  futurum',  non  est  necessarium 
sed  contingens:  quia  licet  sit  praeteritum,  tamen  importat  respecturn  ad 
futurum.  -Sed  hoc  non  tollit  ei  necessitatem;  quia  id  quod  habuit 
respecturn  ad  futurum,  necesse  est  habuisse,  licet  etiarn  futurum  non 
sequatur  quandoque.  "  It  may  seem  somewhat  odd  that  Aquinas  should 
hold  here  that  the  antecedent  is  necessary  because  it  concerns  something 
that  is  past,  since  the  discussion  in  STla.  14.13  and  the  solution  to  the 
problem  centre  on  the  eternity  of  God's  knowledge.  Nevertheless,  in  both 
DV2.12  and  STIa.  14.13  ad  2  the  necessity  of  the  antecedent  is  tackled  only 
in  terms  of  what  is  past,  the  latter  discussion  referring  to  something's  being 
eternal  and  expressed  as  past.  Aquinas  may  therefore  be  assuming  that 
necessity  attaches  to  eternity  just  as  it  does  to  pastness.  He  may  also 
however  be  addressing  the  point  that  for  us,  existing  in  time,  it  is  possible 
to  sayGod  knew  ...  etc.  and  that  this  expression  produces  a  necessary 
consequent. 
22  DV2.12  ad  7:  "aliter  enim  est  de  his  quae  attribuuntur  rei  secundum  se; 
aliter  de  his  quae  attribuuntur  ei  secundum  quod  est  cognita.  Illa  enim 
quae  attribuuntur  ei  secundum  se,  conveniunt  ei  secundurn  modurn 
suum,  sed  illa  quae  attribuuntur  ei  vel  quae  consequuntur  ad  ipsam  in 
quantum  est  cognita  sunt  secundum  modurn  cognoscentis.  Unde  si  in 
antecedente  significetur  aliquid  quod  pertineat  ad  cognitionem,  oportet 
quod  consequens  accipiatur  secundum  modum  cognoscentis  et  non 
secundum  modurn  rei  cognitae.  Ut  si  dicarn  si  ego  intelligo  aliquid,  illud  est 
immateriale;  non  enim  oportet  ut  quod  intelligitur  sit  immateriale  nisi 
secundum  quod  est  intellectum;  et  similiter  cum  dico  si  deus  scit  aliquid, 
illud  erit;  consequens  est  sumendum,  non  secundum  dispositionern  rei  in 
seipsa,  sed  secundum  modurn  cognoscentis.  Quamvis  autern  res  in  seipsa 
sit  futura  tamen  secundum  modurn  cognoscentis  est  praesens.  Et  ideo 
magis  esset  dicendum:  si  deus  scit  aliquid  hoc  est;  quam:  hoc  erit;  unde 
idem  est  iudicium  de  ista:  si  deus  scit  aliquid,  hoc  erit;  et  de  hac;  si  ego 
video  socratem  currere,  socrates  currit  quorum  utrumque  est  necessarium 
dum  est.  " 
23STla.  14.13  ad  2:  «...  dicendum  est  quod  quando  in  antecedente  ponitur 
aliquid  pertinens  ad  actum  animae,  consequens  est  accipiendum  non 
secundum  quod  in  se  est,  sed  secundum  quod  est  in  anima:  aliud  enim  est 
esse  rei  in  seipsa,  et  esse  rei  in  anima.  Ut  puta  si  dicam,  'Si  anima  intelligit 
aliquid,  illud  est  immateriale',  intelligendum  est  quod  illud  est  immateriale 69 
secundum  quod  est  in  intellectu,  non  secundum  quod  est  in  seipso.  Et 
similiter,  si  dicam,  'Si  Deus  scivit  aliquid,  illud  erit,  consequens 
intelligendum  est  prout  subcst  divinae  scicntiae,  scilicct  prout  est  in  sua 
praesentialitate.  Et  sic  necessarium  est,  sicut  et  antecedens,  quia  omne 
quod  est,  quando  est,  necesse  est  esse,  ut  dicitur  in  Periherm.  ' 
24  STla.  14.13  ad  3:  "Sed  ea  quac  sunt  scita  a  Deo  oportet  esse  necessaria 
secundum  modum  quo  subsunt  divinae  scientiae  ....  non  autem  absolute, 
secundum  quod  in  propriis  causis  considerantur.  ' 
25  It  is  perhaps  worth  noting  at  this  point  that  Aquinas'  argument  about  the 
limited  necessity  of  the  present  or  past  does  not  show  that  I  do  x 
contingently;  it  shows  only  that  contingent  actions  are  possible  even  when 
these  are  known  by  God.  Aquinas'  argument  takes  it  for  granted  that 
human  actions  are  contingent;  what  makes  them  so  is  another  issue 
entirely.  This  is  considered  in  later  chapters. 
26  Dating  ST1  in  the  period  1265-67  and  In  Peri  Hermeneias  1269-72.  See 
Appendix. 
27  In  Peri  Hermeneias  1.14:  "Nam  primo  quidem  ex  parte  cognitionis  vel 
scientiae  considerandum  est  quod  ad  cognoscendum  ea  quae  secundum, 
ordinem  temporis  eveniunt,  aliter  se  habet  vis  cognoscitiva,  quae  sub 
ordine  temporis  aliqualiter  continetur,  aliter  illa  quae  totaliter  est  extra 
ordinem  temporis  .....  Quia  igitur  cognitio  nostra.  cadit  sub  ordine  temporis 
vel  per  se  vel  per  accidens  .....  Consequens  est  quod  sub  eius  cognitione 
cadant  res  sub  ratione  praesentis,  praeteriti  et  futuri.  Et  ideo  praesentia 
cognoscit  tanquam  actu.  existentia  et  sensu  aliqualiter  perceptibilia; 
practerita  autem  cognoscit  ut  memorata;  futura  autem  non  cognoscit  in 
seipsis,  quia  nondum.  sunt,  sed  cognoscere  ea  potest  in  causis  suis:  per 
certitudinem  quidem,  si  totaliter  in  causis  suis  sint  determinata,  ut  ex 
quibus  de  necessitate  evenient;  per  coniecturam.  autem,  si  non  sint  sic 
determinata  quin  impediri  possint,  sicut  quae  sunt  ut  in  pluribus;  nullo 
autem  modo,  si  in  suis  causis  sunt  omnino  in  potentia  non  magis 
determinata  ad  unum  quam  ad  aliud,  sicut  quae  sunt  ad  utrumlibet  ....  Sed 
deus  est  omnino  extra  ordinem  temporis,  quasi  in  arce  aeternitatis 
constitutus,  quae  est  tota  simul,  cui  subiacet  totus  temporis  decursus 
secundum  unum.  et  simplicem  eius  intuitum;  et  ideo  uno  intuitu  videt 
omnia  quae  aguntur  secundum,  temporis  decursum,  et  unumquodque 
secundum  quod  est  in  seipso  existens,  non  quasi  sibi  futurum  quantum  ad 
eius  intuitum  prout  est  in  solo  ordine  suarum  causarum  (quamvis  et 
ipsum  ordinem  causarum.  videat),  sed  omnino  aeternaliter  sic  videt 70 
unumquodque  eorum  quae  sunt  in  quocumque  tempore,  sicut  oculus 
humanus  videt  socratem  sedere  in  seipso,  non  in  causa  sua.  Ex  hoc  autem 
quod  homo  videt  socratem  sedere,  non  tollitur  eius  contingentia  quae 
respicit  ordinem  causae  ad  effectum;  tamen  certissime  et  infallibiliter  videt 
oculus  hominis  socratem  sedere  dum  sedet,  quia  unumquodque  prout  est 
in  seipso  iam  determinatum  est.  Sic  igitur  relinquitur,  quod  deus 
certissime  et  infallibiliter  cognoscat  omnia  quae  fiunt  in  tempore;  et  tamen 
ea  quae  in  tempore  eveniunt  non  sunt  vel  flunt  ex  necessitate,  sed 
contingenter.  ' 
28  STla.  10.  lc.:  "  ipsa  aeternitas  successione  caret  tota  simul  existens.  " 
29  ST  1  a.  10.2  ad  4:  "  ...  verba  diversorum  temporum  attribuuntur  Deo 
inquantum  ejus  aeternitas  omnia  tempora  includit,  non  ita  quod  ipse 
varietur  per  praesens,  praeteritum  et  futurum.  " 
30  STIa.  14.13c:  "Et  licet  contingentia.  fiant  in  actu  successive,  non  tamen 
Deus  successive  cognoscit  contingentia  prout  sunt  in  suo  esse,  sicut  nos, 
sed  simul;  quia  sua  cognitio  mensuratur  acternitate,  sicut  etiam  suum 
esse;  aeternitas  autem  tota  simul  existens  ambit  totum  tempus....  Unde 
omnia  quae  sunt  in  tempore,  sunt  Deo  ab  aetemo  praesentia...  quia  ejus 
intuitus  fertur  super  omnia  ab  aeterno,  prout  sunt  in  sua  praesentialitate.  " 
31  Goris  [1996]  p.  242  onwards 
32  Kenny  [1969]  p.  264 
33  SCG1.66.8:  "Cuius  exemplum  utcumque  in  circulo  est  videre:  punctum 
enim  in  circumferentia  signatum  etsi  indivisibile  sit,  non  tamen  cuilibet 
puncto  alii  secundum  situm  coexistit  simul,  ordo  enim  situs  continuitatem 
circumferentiae  facit;  centrum  vero,  quod  est  extra  circumferentiam,  ad 
quodlibet  punctum  in  circumferentia  signatum  directe  oppositionem  habet. 
Quicquid  igitur  in  quacumque  parte  temporis  est,  coexistit  aeterno  quasi 
praesens  eidem:  etsi  respectu  alterius  partis  temporis  sit  praeteritum  vel 
futurum.  Aeterno  autem  non  potest  aliquid  praesentialiter  coexistere  nisi 
toti:  quia  successionis  durationem  non  habet.  Quicquid  igitur  per  totum 
decursum  temporis  agitur,  divinus  intellectus  in  tota  sua  aeternitate 
intuetur  quasi  praesens.  Ncc  tamen  quod  quadam  parte  temporis  agitur, 
semper  fuit  existens.  " 
34  There  are  nevertheless  human  experiences  which  may  make  the  point 
Aquinas  is  seeking  to  make.  A  composer,  for  example,  may  conceive  the 
whole  of  a  new  piece  of  music  in  an  instant  -  the  Hallelujah  Chorus 
presenting  itself,  entire,  to  Handel,  say.  But  as  well  as  hearing  the  whole 
work  instantaneously  the  composer  will  also  hear  in  his  mind's  ear  the 71 
temporal  unfolding  of  the  individual  notes  which  constitute  the  work  and 
the  relationship  between  these  notes  and  the  complete  work.  The 
instantaneous  presentation  of  the  work  implies  that  every  note  is  present 
simultaneously  -  but  there  is  certainly  an  'order  of  before  and  after'among 
the  notes  themselves.  This  analogy  may  also  be  limited,  but  it  does  seem 
to  make  it  possible  to  grasp  how  temporally  distinct  events  could  be 
comprehended  simultaneously.  A  similar  analogy  is  suggested  by  Broadie 
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Chapter  2 
CONTINGENCY  AND  FREEDOM 
Article  13.  Has  God  knowledge  of  contingent  future 
events?  ..... 
Editor's  footnote:  "The  chief  interest  of  the  present  article  is  in 
connection  with  free  will.  " 
Editor's  footnote  to  STIa.  14.13 
Introduction 
It  has  already  been  seen  in  Chapter  1  how  Aquinas 
shows  that  God  does  have  knowledge  of  what 
humans  call  future  contingent  events,  but  knows 
them  as  present  (Present*)  events.  What  is  to  be 
explored  in  thischapter  is  the  connection  between 
contingency  and  freedom,  to  provide  a  starting  point 
from  which  to  try  to  discover  the  nature  of  freedom 
as  seen  by  Aquinas.  For  the  relationship  between 
contingency  and  freedom  is  by  no  means  obvious,  as 
the  need  for  an  editorial  footnote  to  the  discussion  of 
God's  knowledge  of  future  contingents  in  the 
Blackfriars'  edition  of  the  Summa  Theologiae  suggests 
(taking,  for  the  moment,  'free  will'to  mean  human 
freedom). 
It  is  proposed  to  examine  first,  briefly,  Aquinas' 
concept  of  contingency.  The  distinction  between 74 
human  and  natural  contingency  will  then  show  that 
contingency  in  human  behaviour,  or  action,  seems  to 
lie  in  the  peculiarly  human  way  of  bringing  about 
such  action.  Since  the  term  'free'  is  applied  to 
contingent  human  actions  but  not  to  contingent 
natural  effects,  this  distinction  will  provide  a  basis 
for  an  examination  of  what  Aquinas  understands  by 
freedom.  As  a  preliminary  to  that  examination,  the 
purpose  of  his  concept  of  freedom  and  his  definition 
of  human  actions  are  considered. 
A.  Contingency  and  necessity 
Aquinas  uses  the  term  'necessary'  in  several  different 
ways,  and  takes  the  view  -  in  STla.  82.1,  for  example  - 
that  there  are  several  kinds  of  necessity.  But  it  would 
seem  that  for  Aquinas  the  notions  of  necessity  and  its 
opposite,  contingency,  are  primarily  aspects  of  being. 
In  SCG  3.72.3  for  example  he  says:  "But  being  is 
divided  into  the  contingent  and  the  necessary,  and 
this  is  an  essential  division  of  being.  "'  Further,  in 
STla.  82.1,  he  defines  the  necessary  as  "that  which 
cannot  not  be.  "2and  in  ST111a.  46.1  he  endorses 
Aristotle's  description  of  the  necessary  as  "something 
which  by  its  very  nature  cannot  be  othel-wise.  "3 
Whether  something  is  the  kind  of  thing  which  cannot 
not  be,  or  the  kind  which  can  be  or  can  not  be, 75 
depends  on  that  thing's  nature.  In  STla.  82.1, 
absolute  necessity  is  said  to  come  from  an  intrinsic 
cause,  material  or  formal:  "For  the  necessary  is  that 
which  cannot  not  be.  Now  this  can  be  from  an 
intrinsic  cause,  whether  material,  as  when  we  say 
that  anything  compounded  of  contraries  must  cease 
to  be,  or  formal,  as  when  we  say  a  triangle  has  to 
have  three  angles  together  equal  to  two  right  angles. 
Such  is  natural  necessity.  "4A  similar  approach  is 
taken  in  his  later  description  of  natural  necessity  in 
ST111a.  14.2:  "The  other  kind  of  necessity  [i.  e.  not 
externally  imposed  necessity]  is  natural,  the  kind 
that  follows  on  natural  principles,  such  as  form  (for 
example,  it  is  necessary  that  fire  should  give  heat)  or 
matter  (it  is  necessary  that  a  body  composed  of 
opposites  should  eventually  decompose).  "5Thatthe 
necessary  is  related  to  the  intrinsic  nature  of  a  thing 
is  also  argued  in  In  Peti  Hertneneias  1.14,  where 
Aquinas  is  commenting  on  Aristotle's  views  on 
possibility  and  necessity.  Having  rejected  the  views 
that  necessity  and  possibility  are  to  be  distinguished 
on  the  basis  of  what  always  happens  or  what 
sometimes  happens,  or  by  whether  or  not  something 
can  be  obstructed  from  happening,  Aquinas  goes  on 
to  endorse6what  he  believes  to  be  Aristotle's  view: 
"So  other  people  have  formulated  a  better  distinction 
by  reference  to  the  nature  of  things,  saying  that  must 76 
be  is  constrained  by  nature  to  exist,  can-t  be  is 
constrained  by  nature  not  to  exist,  and  can  be  is  not 
entirely  constrained  to  either,  but  is  sometimes 
inclined  more  to  one  than  the  other  and  sometimes 
equally  balanced  between  the  two  -  the  so-called 
'might  be  either'  "7 
It  seems,  therefore,  that  x  is  necessary  because  of  its 
nature.  This  necessity  can  arise  from  either  Vs  form 
or  its  matter.  It  is  the  form  of  "having  three  angles 
together  equal  to  two  right  angles"  which  makes  the 
thing  under  discussion  to  be  a  triangle  and  anything 
with  that  form  must  therefore  be  a  triangle  -  it 
cannot  not  be  a  triangle.  Similarly,  necessity  may 
arise  from  a  thing's  matter,  Aquinas  says,  and  he 
gives  the  example  of  the  inevitable  ceasing  to  be  of  a 
thing  whose  matter  is  a  compound  of  contraries. 
Thus  a  human's  ceasing  to  be  is  said  to  be  necessary 
because  the  matter  of  a  human  body  is  composed  of 
contraries  -  the  %vet'  and  'dry'  of  blood  and  skin,  for 
example. 
What  it  is  about.  ýes  nature  which  determines  whether 
it  is  necessary  or  contingent  is  also  set  out  in 
SCG2.30: 
"...  there  are  some  things  in  the  universe  whose  being 
is  simply  and  absolutely  necessary. 77 
Such  is  the  being  of  things  whereinthere  is  no 
possibility  of  not-being.  Now  some  things  are  so 
created  by  God  that  there  is  in  their  nature  a 
potentiality  to  non-being;  and  this  results  from  the 
fact  that  the  matter  present  in  them  is  in  potentiality 
to  another  form.  On  the  other  hand,  neither 
immaterial  things,  nor  things  whose  matter  is  not 
receptive  to  another  form,  have  potentiality  to  non- 
being,  so  that  their  being  is  absolutely  and  simply 
necessary.  "8 
So,  beings  who  have  in  their  own  nature  a 
potentiality  to  non-being  are  contingent  beings;  those 
with  no  such  potentiality  in  their  nature  are 
necessary  beings.  This  natural  potentiality  arises 
from  the  principles  of  form  and  matter.  In  beings 
which  are  purely  form,  for  example  angels  and  souls, 
there  is  no  matter  which  can  take  on  another  form, 
and  so  there  is  no  potentiality  within  an  angel,  say, 
for  it  to  be  anything  other  than  it  is.  Likewise, 
according  to  Aquinas,  in  those  beings  whose  matter 
is  fully  actualized  by  their  form  there  is  no 
potentiality  for  another  form  and  so  they  too  have  no 
potentiality  to  be  otherwise,  and  consequently  no 
potential  to  non-being.  Celestial  bodies  are  what  he 
has  in  mind  here.  9 
Both  angels  and  celestial  bodies  are  therefore 
necessary  beings.  10  Beings  whose  matter  is  open  to 78 
the  possibility  of  taking  on  another  form  are  however 
contingent  beings,  and  humans  clearly  fall  into  this 
category,  as  do  all  other  natural  things  except,  in 
Aquinas'  cosmology,  the  heavenly  bodies.  " 
Now,  contingent  causes,  in  Aquinas'view,  can 
produce  only  contingent  effects:  "...  an  effect  whose 
cause  is  contingent  cannot  be  a  necessary  one; 
otherwise  the  effect  could  be  even  though  the  cause 
were  removed.  "12And  an  effect  must  be 
commensurate  with  its  cause:  "Now  contingent 
effects  follow  from  a  changeable  cause  for  an  effect 
cannot  have  a  more  stable  being  than  its  cause.  "13 
Since  both  natural  things  and  human  beings  are 
contingent  beings,  what  they  do  will  be  contingent  if 
they  are  both  contingent  causes.  But  it  seems  that  it 
is  not  simply  that  relationship  between  the  nature  of 
being  of  the  cause  and  effect  which  accounts  for  the 
contingency  of  the  effect,  for  Aquinas  gives  a  very 
different  explanation  for  the  roots  of  contingency  in 
what  he  calls  natural  causes  (plants,  for  example) 
and  human  causes.  And  it  is  at  this  point  that  the 
link  between  contingency  and  freedom  begins  to 
appear. 
In  the  case  of  natural  causes,  their  effect  is 
contingent  because  of  some  imperfection  either  in 
them  or  in  something  external  on  which  they  are 79 
acting.  Conversely,  what  humans  do  is  said  to  be 
contingent  because  of  the  source  of  human  action 
itself.  This  sharp  distinction  is  made  in  SCG3.73, 
where  Aquinas  says: 
"Now  among  inanimate  things  the  contingency  of 
causes  is  due  to  imperfection  and  deficiency,  for  by 
their  nature  they  are  determined  to  one  result  which 
they  always  achieve,  unless  there  be  some 
impediment  arising  either  from  a  weakness  of  their 
power,  or  on  the  part  of  an  external  agent,  or  because 
of  the  unsuitability  of  the  matter.  And  for  this  reason, 
natural  agent  causes  are  not  capable  of  varied 
results;  rather  in  most  cases,  they  produce  their 
effect  in  the  same  way,  failing  to  do  so  but  rarely. 
Now  the  fact  that  the  will  is  a  contingent  cause  arises 
from  its  perfection,  for  it  does  not  have  power  limited 
to  one  outcome  but  rather  has  an  ability  to  produce 
this  effect  or  that;  for  which  reason  it  is  contingent  in 
regard  to  one  or  the  other.  "14 
This  is  consistent  with  what  is  said  in  In  Peri 
Hermeneias,  where  the  contingency  arising  from 
human  causes  is  put  down  to  the  human  ability  to 
deliberate,  following  Aristotle's  explanation  of  the 
"can  be  and  might  be  in  human  behaviour  as  due  to 
our  ability  to  deliberate.  "15  And  deliberation,  it  is  said 
elsewhere,  can  always  turn  out  in  different  ways.  16 80 
In  natural  things  such  as  plants,  therefore,  the  fact 
that  the  outcome  is  not  always  the  same  is  put  down 
to  a  failure  of  some  sort.  The  action  of  bulbs  is  to 
flower,  but  they  do  not  always  do  so.  If  they  do  not 
flower,  it  is  because  of  some  fault  in  the  bulb  itself,  or 
in  the  soil,  or  in  the  atmosphere.  Were  all  the 
conditions  perfect,  the  bulb  would  always  perform 
the  same  action  i.  e.  flower.  Contingency  exists  only 
because  of  the  possibility  of  failure  in  the  pre- 
programmed  outcome.  With  humans,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  contingency  is  pre-programmed.  The 
source  of  action,  whether  identified  as  'will'  or  'ability 
to  deliberate',  has  itself  the  power  to  produce 
different  effects.  17 
It  seems  therefore  that  humans  are  themselves 
contingent  causes  in  a  way  that  natural  things  are 
not.  Now,  contingency  is  clearly  not  to  be  identified 
with  freedom,  for  both  people  and  plants  are 
contingent  beings  and  both  produce  contingent 
effects,  but  only  people  are  said  to  cause,  or  do, 
anything  freely  or  otherwise.  Freedom  perhaps 
therefore  lies  in  the  peculiarly  human  way  of  causing 
contingent  effects,  so  far  put  down  only  to  'the  will' 
and  the  'ability  to  deliberate'.  The  assertions  made  by 
Aquinas  about  the  will  and  about  deliberation  clearly 
need  further  examination  and  it  will  therefore  be 81 
necessary  to  look  in  some  depth  at  Aquinas'  concept 
of  how  humans  do  produce  effects  i.  e.  at  what  is 
generally  known  as  his  theory  of  action.  I  shall 
approach  this  by  considering  first,  the  purpose  of  the 
concept  of  freedom  and  second,  what  it  is  that  is  free. 
B.  Purpose  of  concept  of  freedom 
It  is  important  to  consider  the  purpose  of  Aquinas' 
concept  of  freedom,  for  one  valuable  way  of 
evaluating  the  content  of  such  a  concept  is  against 
the  purpose  it  is  thought  to  serve.  And  different 
concepts  of  freedom  may  serve  different  purposes. 
For  example,  the  concept  of  freedom  which  was  a 
cornerstone  of  the  then  EEC  was  arguably  one 
designed  to  serve  the  end  of  economic  growth.  It  is  in 
the  light  of  that  aim  that  the  question  of  whether  a 
particular  way  of  transferring  goods,  capital  or 
labour  between  member  states  counts  as  'free'  or  not 
falls  to  be  decided. 
It  seems  clear  from  Aquinas'  discussions  of  whether 
or  not  actions  are  contingent  that  his  main  concern 
is  responsibility,  whether  people  can  be  praised  or 
blamed  for  what  they  do.  In  DV2.12  for  example,  he 
talks  of  it  being  "unjust  to  punish  or  to  give  rewards 
in  proportion  to  merit"  if  nothing  happens 
contingently.  In  SCG3.73.5,  he  refers  to  both  moral 
and  legal  responsibility:  "[If  there  were  no  freedom] 82 
the  praise  of  human  virtue,  which  is  nothing  if  man 
does  not  act  freely,  would  be  destroyed.  Justice, 
which  rewards  and  punishes,  would  also  be 
destroyed  if  man  could  not  freely  do  good  or  evil.  "18 
The  very  close  link  for  Aquinas  between  freedom  and 
responsibility  can  perhaps  be  seen  best  in  his 
treatment  of  human  acts  in  general,  in  STla  llae.  6-17, 
particularly  in  Question  6  which  deals  with  voluntary 
and  involuntary  acts.  As  will  be  considered  later,  free 
acts  are,  Aquinas  maintains,  a  subset  of  voluntary 
acts.  In  considering  whether  fear  or  ignorance  makes 
an  act  involuntary,  Aquinas  uses  examples  which  are 
clearly  ones  of  legal  responsibility.  In  STla  llae.  6.6  for 
example,  he  talks  of  jettisoning  a  cargo  from  fear  of 
the  ship's  foundering  in  a  storm.  If  this  is  a  voluntary 
act,  then  the  person  who  jettisons  the  cargo  will  be 
legally  responsible  to  the  ship  owner,  and  if  not, 
there  will  be  no  such  liability.  And  in  STla  llae.  6.8,  in 
considering  whether  ignorance  renders  an  act 
involuntary,  he  cites  examples  of  a  man  shooting  his 
enemy  -  both  a  legal  and  a  moral  responsibility.  In 
his  approach  here  he  appears  to  follow  Aristotle, 
whose  concerns  were  also  with  both  moral 
responsibility  and  law.  19  The  issues  of  moral 
responsibility  are  clearly  emphasised  in  STla  llae.  7, 
where  the  relevance  of  the  circumstances  of  a  human 
act  is  considered.  The  importance  too  is  seen  in  the 83 
linking  of  voluntary  actions  and  sin  -  there  is,  it 
seems,  no  sin  without  voluntary  action.  20 
It  appears  therefore  that  for  Aquinas  the  question  of 
freedom  in  relation  to  action  is  not  an  abstract  one 
but  one  which  is  to  be  considered  in  the  context  of 
responsibility.  This  may  seem  obvious,  particularly 
when  viewed  from  the  other  end  of  the  telescope,  for 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  society  can  have  rules  of 
law  or  morality  without  corresponding  concepts  of 
human  freedom  and  responsibility.  As  Fuller  puts  it: 
"To  embark  on  the  enterprise  of  subjecting  human 
conduct  to  the  governance  of  rules  involves  of 
necessity  a  commitment  to  the  view  that  man  is,  or 
can  become,  a  responsible  agent,  capable  of 
understanding  and  following  rules,  and  answerable 
for  his  default.  "21  But  to  hold  someone  "answerable 
for  his  default"  pre-supposes  a  way  of  determining 
both  that  it  was  a  default  and  that  it  was  his,.  This  is 
the  role  that  a  concept  of  freedom  fills. 
It  is  nevertheless  worth  emphasising  that 
responsibility  is  the  purpose  of  Aquinas'  concept  of 
freedom  in  relation  to  action,  for  this  has  two 
important  implications.  First,  there  may  be  more 
than  one  concept  of  freedom  which  will  satisfy  the 
need  to  decide  whether  or  not  A  is  to  be  held 
responsible  for  what  he  has  apparently  brought 84 
about.  In  Chapter  1,  it  was  argued  that  Aquinas' 
concept  of  freedom  might  be  found  to  be  one  which 
depended  solely  on  lack  of  compulsion,  external  or 
psychological.  Such  a  concept  may  be  thought 
limited,  but  it  is  compatible  with  the  purpose  of  the 
concept's  being  the  need  to  allocate  or  attribute 
responsibility. 
Second,  the  question  of  responsibility,  and  of  freedom 
or  voluntariness,  often  arises  only  after  the  event. 
Say,  for  example,  that  A  signs  a  document  at  B's 
request.  The  question  of  whether  or  not  he  did  so 
freely  will  arise  only  if  one  seeks  to  hold  him 
responsible  for  that  action,  and  this  is  likely  to  come 
about  only  if  the  content  of  the  document  is 
subsequently  disputed.  This  means  however  that  in 
establishing  what  A  did  and  whether  or  not  he  is 
responsible  for  it,  one  has  to  reconstruct  the  action. 
In  other  words,  A  is  to  be  asked  to  explain 
retrospectively  what  he  did.  That  such  an 
explanation  is  a  retrospective  analysis  is,  it  will  be 
shown,  an  important  aspect  of  Aquinas'theory  of 
action.  This  point  is  dealt  with  in  Chapter  4. 
C.  What  Is  it  that  is  free? 
So  far,  the  expressions  'freedom  of  action'  or  'human 
freedom'have  been  used  even  in  contexts  where  the 85 
modem  term  'freewill'might  have  seemed  the  more 
natural.  This  is  deliberate. 
One  of  the  major  difficulties  of  writing  about  this 
topic  is  the  need  to  translate  into  modem  English  the 
terms  Aquinas  uses  when  considering  freedom  under 
various  aspects,  and  moreover  into  English  terms 
which  will  not  pre-judge  the  nature  of  the  concept  of 
freedom  which  one  is  trying  to  discover.  This  is  well 
illustrated  by,  for  example,  the  Blackfriars 
translation  of  STla.  82  and  83,  Questions  headed 
respectively  Will'and  'Freewill'.  In  STIa.  82  Aquinas 
considers  whether  the  will  (voluntas)  as  a  faculty  acts 
from  necessity  -  "Utrum  voluntas  aliquid  ex 
necessitate  appetat;  Utrum  omnia  ex  necessitate 
appetat"  (Articles  1  and  2)  -  and  concludes  that 
while  in  one  respect,  that  of  seeking  happiness,  the 
will  acts  necessarily,  in  others  it  does  not.  In  the 
latter  respects,  the  will,  i.  e.  the  faculty  voluntas,  is 
exercised  freely.  In  STla.  83  however,  what  is 
translated  as  'freewill'  is  "de  libero  arbitrio"  and  this 
Question  deals  with  one  particular  act  of  the  will, 
that  of  free  choice  or  decision,  liberum  arbitrium.  So, 
does  one  look  for  freedom  in  the  faculty  of  will  itself, 
or  in  the  individual  acts  of  the  will,  or  even  in  one 
particular  act  of  the  will? 86 
These  questions  are  further  complicated  by  the 
differing  mediaeval  views  on  the  relationship  between 
will  and  intellect,  which  debate  might  lead  one  to  ask 
whether  the  question  ought  to  be  "Is  freedom  to  be 
found  in  the  will  at  all  or  in  the  intellect?  "  On  one 
side  there  was  the  view  that  the  intellect  was  the 
'nobler'power  and  the  ultimate  determinant  of 
action;  for  others,  the  will  had  primacy.  Scotus  for 
example,  notably  took  the  view  that  will  was  not 
determined  by  intellect,  but  was  the  seat  of  freedom 
and  a  nobler  power  than  the  intellect.  Copleston 
describes  this  as,  generally  speaking,  a  Franciscan 
view,  and  states  that  Aquinas  took  a  different  VieW.  22 
There  is  no  doubt  that  Aquinas  held  the  view  that 
something  has  to  be  known  before  it  can  be  willed 
and  that  in  this  sense  intellect  must  be  prior  to  will. 
The  understanding  of  the  universal  good  to  which  will 
is  necessarily  directed  is  also  a  matter  for  the 
intellect  and  in  this  sense  too  intellect  might  be  said 
to  direct  will.  But  while  Aquinas  is  often  credited  with 
the  view  that  intellect  is  nobler  than  will,  his 
position,  as  will  be  seen,  was  rather  more  subtle  than 
a  simple  ranking  of  the  powers  would  suggest. 
In  some  respects,  however,  all  these  questions  are 
sterile,  for  what  matters  to  Aquinas  is  whether  or  not 
a  person  acts  freely.  It  is  not  the  faculties  of  will  or  of 
intellect  which  act,  but  the  person  who  has  these 87 
faculties  and  who  acts  through  them.  This  thesis 
does  not  therefore  address  the  issue  of  whether  the 
intellect  determines  the  will  or  whether  the  will  is 
more  important  than  the  intellect  in  order  to  come 
down  on  one  side  or  the  other.  It  will  be  shown 
however  that  how  these  faculties  act  together  in 
bringing  about  a  free  act  is  of  crucial  importance  in 
Aquinas'concept  of  freedom. 
D.  Human  action 
The  concern  over  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingent  events  was  said  in  Chapter  1  to  be  that  if 
God  knows  that  A  will  do  x,  A  cannot  then  do  x  freely. 
Aquinas  argues  that  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingent  events  is  present  knowledge  of  what  to  us 
is  future,  and  present  knowledge  that  A  is  doing  x 
does  not  exclude  the  contingency  of  x.  It  has  been 
seen  above  that  contingent  effects  may  be  caused  by 
both  plants  and  people,  leading  to  the  conclusion 
that  a  contingent  effect  is  not  necessarily  something 
which  happens  'freely',  since  the  effects  of  plants  are 
not  said  to  be  free.  But  the  contingency  in  human 
effects,  or  action,  seems  to  lie  in  the  peculiarly 
human  way  of  bringing  things  about  -  through 
'deliberation'  or  'the  action  of  the  will'  according  to 
Aquinas  in  In  Peri  Hertneneias  and  SCG  respectively. 
These  two  elements  come  together  in  Aquinas' 
analysis  of  human  action  in  STIa  llae.  1-  17. 88 
For  Aquinas,  human  acts  are  acts  which  are  willed, 
voluntary  acts.  They  are  more  than  just  willed 
however,  for  Aquinas  describes  them  as  acts  of 
deliberated  willing.  23Acts  are  deliberately  willed 
when  they  are  done  for  an  end,  or  purpose.  He  here 
draws  a  distinction  between  'acts  of  a  man'  such  as 
scratching  one's  ear  absentmindedly,  for  example, 
and  'human  acts'which  are  the  kind  of  acts  a  man 
does  specifically  as  a  human  being  rather  than  as  an 
animal:  "Of  the  actions  a  man  performs  those  alone 
are  properly  called  human  which  are 
characteristically  his  as  a  man.  "24  And  "It  should  be 
said  that  such  actions  [i.  e.  rubbing  one's  chin  or 
shifting  one's  feet]  are  not  properly  human,  because 
they  do  not  proceed  from  the  deliberation  of  reason, 
which  is  the  proper  principle  of  human  acts. 
Therefore,  they  have  some  imagined  end,  but  not  one 
set  out  by  reason.  "25 
Human  acts,  therefore,  are  those  which  involve  both 
will  and  reason.  This  additional  requirement  of 
reason  is  of  course  the  same  as  that  which  marks 
man  out  from  other  animals,  and  so  human  acts  can 
be  said  to  be  those  in  which  man  acts  in  his  'higher' 
role  as  man,  rather  than  in  his  animal  role.  It  would 
seem  from  the  way  that  Aquinas  draws  the 
distinction  that  physically  similar  actions  may  be,  on 89 
different  occasions,  a  human  act  or  an  act  of  a  man. 
Scratching  one's  car  because  it  itches,  for  example, 
and  because  one  knows  that  scratching  will,  at  least 
temporarily,  relieve  the  irritation,  is  a  human  act,  in 
that  it  is  one  done  for  a  purpose.  The  same  arm  and 
finger  movements  may  be  made  when  one  is 
concentrating  on  a  text  however,  the  scratching  then 
having  no  purpose  at  all,  and  so  not  constituting  a 
human  act  on  this  occasion.  26 
A  human  act  is  not  however  simply  a  voluntary  act 
done  for  a  purpose,  for  animals  may  also  perform 
voluntary  acts  for  an  end.  The  dog's  scratching  its 
ear  may  also  be  a  voluntary  act  on  Aquinas'  account, 
and  here  he  extends  the  role  that  reason  plays  in 
distinguishing  between  the  voluntary  acts  of  animals 
and  those  of  humans.  In  STla  llae.  6.2,  he  argues  that 
non-rational  animals  also  are  capable  of  voluntary 
action,  though  in  a  limited  sense.  This  limitation 
comes  about  because  while  animals  do  undoubtedly 
act  for  an  end,  they  do  not  act  for  an  end  they  have 
recognized  as  an  end.  The  dog  digging  in  the  garden 
to  recover  a  previously  buried  bone  is  clearly  acting 
for  an  end,  but  he  does  not  realise  that  what  he  is 
pursuing  is  an  end,  nor  think  of  the  digging  as  a 
means  of  achieving  it.  Rational  humans,  on  the 
other  hand,  can  recognize  an  end  as  such,  and  they 
therefore  have  full  knowledge  of  that  end.  Humans 90 
are  said  to  act  in  a  fully  voluntary  way,  animals 
voluntarily,  but  only  to  a  limited  extent: 
"Now  the  knowledge  of  the  aim  is  of  two  sorts,  full 
and  partial.  The  first  consists  not  only  in 
apprehending  a  thing  which  is  in  fact  an  end,  but 
also  in  recognizing  its  character  as  an  end  and  the 
relationship  a  means  bears  to  it.  A  being  of  rational 
nature  alone  is  capable  of  such  knowledge.  Partial 
knowledge  of  an  end  consists  merely  in  perceiving  it 
without  appreciating  it  in  terms  of  purpose  and  the 
adaptation  of  activity  to  that  purpose.  This  is  the  sort 
of  knowledge  encountered  in  animals  through  their 
senses  and  natural  instinct. 
Full  knowledge  of  an  end  goes  with  voluntary  activity 
in  the  complete  and  proper  sense  of  the  term;  it  is 
present  when  a  person,  having  apprehended  and 
deliberating  about  an  end  and  the  steps  to  be  taken, 
can  be  moved  to  it  or  not.  Partial  knowledge 
accompanies  voluntary  activity  in  a  lesser  sense  of 
the  term;  it  is  present  when  there  is  perception  of  but 
no  deliberation  about  the  end,  and  the  movement 
towards  the  end  is  unpremeditated. 
To  sum  up:  only  beings  of  a  rational  nature  enjoy 
complete  voluntary  activity,  yet  it  may  be  allowed  to 
non-rational  animals  to  a  limited  extent.  "27 91 
A  human  act  has  therefore  now  become  not  just  one 
which  is  voluntary  and  done  for  an  end,  but  one  in 
which  there  is  full  knowledge  of  the  end,  as  an  end. 
And  there  is  such  knowledge  when  the  end  has  been 
apprehended,  the  means  to  it  deliberated  about  and 
the  end  adopted.  This  description  Aquinas  gives  of  a 
fully  voluntary  act  is  an  important  one,  for  he  says 
also  that  it  is  to  such  acts  that  praise  and  blame 
attach28i.  e.  fully  voluntary  acts  are  those  which 
carry  responsibility.  Fully  voluntary  acts  would 
therefore  seem  to  be  those  in  which  freedom  is  found. 
The  distinction  between  'fully  voluntary'  and  'partially 
voluntary',  and  the  human  ability  to  recognize  an  end 
as  such,  will  be  seen  to  have  important  implications 
for  the  nature  of  human  freedom. 
To  establish  the  nature  of  that  freedom,  a  detailed 
examination  of  Aquinas'  concept  of  voluntary  action 
will  therefore  now  be  necessary. 
Notes 
I  SCG.  3.72.3:  "Ens  autem  dividitur  per  contingens  et  necessarium;  et  est 
per  se  divisio  entis.  » 
2  STla.  82.  lc:  «Necesse  est  enim  quod  non  potest  non  esse.  » 92 
3  STIlla.  46.1c:  "Dicendum  quod,  sicut  Philosophus  docet  in  v  Meta. 
necessarium  multipliciter  dicitur:  uno  quidern  modo,  quod  secundum  sui 
naturam  impossibile  est  aliter  se  habere.  -' 
4  STla.  82.1c:  "Necesse  est  enim  quod  non  potest  non  esse.  Quod  quidern 
convenit  alicui,  uno  modo  cx  principio  intrinseco,  sive  materiali,  sicut  cum 
dicimus  quod  omne  compositurn  ex  contrarfis  necesse  est  corrumpi,  sive 
formali,  sicut  cum  dicimus  quod  necesse  est  triangulum  habere  tres 
angulos  aequales  duobus  rectis.  Et  haec  est  necessitas  naturalis  et 
absoluta.  "  Necessity  here  is  absolute  or  simple  necessity.  Aquinas  also 
talks  of  conditional  or  suppositional  necessity,  where  B  is  necessary  if  A 
obtains.  Such  conditional  necessity,  which  arises  from  an  external  cause, 
is  considered  in  STla.  82.1  explicitly  in  relation  to  freedom  and  will  be  seen 
in  later  chapters  to  play  an  important  role. 
5  STIlla.  14.2c:  *Alia  autem  est  necessitas  naturalis,  quae  consequitur 
principia  naturalia  -  puta  formarn,  sicut  necessarium  est  ignem  calefacere; 
vel  materiam,  sicut  necessarium  est  corpus  ex  contrariis  compositurn 
dissolvi.  " 
6  With  qualification  -  see  note  11  below. 
In  Peri  Hermeneias  1.14:  "et  ideo  alii  melius  ista  distinxerunt  secundurn 
naturam  rerum  ut  scilicet  dicatur  illud  necessarium,  quod  in  sua  natura. 
determinatum  est  solum  ad  esse;  impossibile  autem  quod  est 
determinatum  solum  ad  non  esse;  possibile  autem  quod  ad  neutrum  est 
omnino  determinatum,  sive  se  habeat  magis  ad  unum  quam  ad  alterum, 
sive  se  habeat  aequalitcr  ad  utrumque,  quod  dicitur  contingens  ad 
utrumlibet.  "  No  clear  distinction  is  drawn  here  between  'possible'and 
'contingent'.  Although  the  two  terms  are  usually  distinguished  on  the  basis 
that  contingency  is  opposed  to  necessity  while  possibility,  strictly  speaking, 
includes  necessity,  there  are  occasions  when  Aquinas  does  not  make  this 
distinction.  See  Goris  [1996]  pp.  258  &  268.  In  the  passage  from  In  Peri 
Henneneias  quoted,  it  seems  clear  that  'possible'is  not  being  used  in  the 
strict  sense,  since  things  are  described  as  'being  either'i.  e.  two  way 
possibility.  Things  which  are  possible  in  the  strict  sense  are  those  which 
are  properly  described  only  as  'can  be,  not  'can  be  or  can  not-be'. 
8  SCG  2.30.1  &2:  "Sunt  enim  quaedam.  in  rebus  creatis  quae  simpliciter  et 
absolute  necesse  est  esse.  Illas  enim  res  simpliciter  et  absolute  necesse  est 
esse  in  quibus  non  est  possibilitas  ad  non  esse.  Quacdam  autem  res  sic 
sunt  a  deo  in  esse  productae  ut  in  earum  natura  sit  potentia  ad  non  esse. 
Quod  quidem  contingit  ex  hoc  quod  materia  in  eis  est  in  potentia  ad  aliam 
formam.  Illae  igitur  res  in  quibus  vel  non  est  materia,  vel  si  est,  non  est 93 
possibilis  ad  aliam.  formam,  non  habent  potentiarn  ad  non  esse.  Eas  igitur 
absolute  et  simpliciter  necesse  est  esse.  "  A  particularly  striking  example  of 
the  created  potentiality  to  'non-being'would  be  human  apoptosis,  the  pre- 
programming  of  human  body  cells  to  undergo  a  finite  number  of  divisions, 
lose  their  reproductive  capacity  and  die. 
9  See  SCG2.30.9 
10  This  does  not  mean  that  they  cannot  cease  to  exist,  for  God,  having 
created  them,  could  equally  well  annihilate  them.  But  this  is  not  a 
potentiality  within  their  own  nature.  Their  ceasing  to  exist  depends  on 
something  extrinsic,  namely  God.  All  created  things,  including  angels  and 
celestial  bodies,  are  of  course  in  a  sense  contingent,  in  that,  on  Aquinas' 
account,  God  need  not  have  created  them;  he  freely  willed  their  existence. 
Within  the  created  order  however  some  things  may  still  be  necessary 
despite  that  original  contingency  of  creation  and  it  is  in  this  second, 
created  order,  sense  that  the  nature  of  the  created  thing  is  the  key  to  its 
contingency  or  necessity. 
11  What  Aquinas  says  in  SCG2.30  about  celestial  bodies  might  be  thought 
to  be  at  variance  with  what  he  says  in  In  Peri  Henneneias  1.14  about 
matter's  potential  to  be  otherwise  being  insufficient  to  account  for 
contingency.  In  the  latter  work,  he  points  out  that  the  heavenly  bodies, 
which  are  necessary  beings,  have  the  potential  to  be  otherwise  (even 
though  they  have  no  potential  to  not-be)  for  they  can  be  in  different 
locations.  He  argues  that  the  powers  that  act  on  the  matter  must  therefore 
also  be  taken  into  account  in  explaining  contingency.  If  these  powers  are 
irresistibly  determined  to  one  course  (as,  presumably,  he  believes  the 
power  acting  on  the  celestial  bodies  is)  then  the  potential  'Might  be'of 
matter  will  always  be  realised  only  in  one  way.  If  the  powers  are  not  so 
determined,  there  will  be  contingency.  I  do  not  think,  however,  that  this 
elaboration  of  the  position  taken  in  SCG2.30  affects  the  thrust  of  the 
argument  that  whether  x  is  contingent  or  not  depends  on  x's  nature,  for  the 
irresistible  one-way  determination  of  x's  matter  is  part  of  . 7es  nature.  The 
importance  of  such  determination  for  freedom  is  considered  later. 
12  SCG1.67.6:  "...  effectus  non  potest  esse  necessarius  cuius  causa  est 
contingens;  contingeret  enim  effecturn  esse  remota  causa.  ' 
13  SCG1.85.4:  "a  causa  autem  variabili  effectus  contingentes  sequuntur: 
non  enim  potest  esse  effectus  firmioris  esse  quarn  sua  causa.  *  Contingent 
causes  can  produce  only  contingent  effects,  but  necessary  causes  can 
produce  both  contingent  and  necessary  effects.  The  importance  of  this  view 
in  relation  to  God's  causation  is  considered  in  detail  below,  Chapter  5. 94 
14  SCG  3.73.2:  "  In  rebus  autem  inanimatis  causannn  contingentia.  ex 
imperfectione  et  defectu  est:  secundum  enim  suam  naturam  sunt 
determinata.  ad  unum  effectum,  quem  semper  consequuntur  nisi  sit 
impedimentum  vel  ex  debilitate  virtutis,  vel  ex  aliquo,  exteriori  agente,  vel 
ex  niateriae  indispositione;  et  propter  hoc  causae  naturales  agentes  non 
sunt  ad  utrumque,  sed.  ut  frequentius  eodem  modo  suum  effectum 
producunt,  deficiunt  autem  raro.  Quod  autem  voluntas  sit  causa. 
contingens,  ex  ipsius  perfectione  provenit:  quia.  non  habet  virtutem 
limitatam  ad  unum,  sed  habet  in  potestate  producere  hunc  effectum  vel 
illum;  propter  quod.  est  contingens  ad  utrumlibet.  * 
Is  In  Peri  Hermeneias  1.14  :  'Assignat..  rationem  possibilitatis  et 
contingentiae,  in  his  quidem  quae  sunt  a  nobis  ex  eo  quod.  sumus 
consiliativi.  ' 
16  See  for  example  DM6. 
17  The  striking  difference  in  the  source  of  contingency  in  plants  and  in 
human  action  might  lead  one  to  suppose  that  Aquinas  has  two  concepts  of 
contingency.  I  think  however  that  it  would  be  right  to  say  that  he  has  one 
concept  taldng  different  forms.  Contingency  is  a  way  of  being,  for  both 
plants  and  humans,  which  arises  from  their  potential  for  not-being.  In  both 
plants  and  hurrians  contingency  results  from  their  nature  and  their  activity 
results  from  form.  Further,  there  is  a  sense,  considered  in  Chapter  3,  in 
which  man's  natural  inclination  will  result  in  natural  action  unless 
impeded  (although  crucially  the  impediment  there  is  not  due  to  something 
external  or  to  failure,  but  to  man's  own  decision.  ) 
18  SCG  3.73.5:  'Tolleretur  enim,  laus  virtutis  humanae,  quae  nulla  est  si 
homo  libere  non  agit.  Tolleretur  etiam  iustitia  praerniantis  et  punientis,  si 
non  libere  homo  ageret  bonum  vel  malum.  *  My  translation. 
19  See  Ethics  iii,  1109  WO  -  1110  a  18,  in  particular  the  introduction: 
'Since  moral  goodness  is  concerned  with  feelings  and  actions,  and  those 
that  are  voluntary  receive  praise  and  blame,  whereas  those  that  are 
involuntary  receive  pardon  and  sometimes  pity  too,  students  of  moral 
goodness  must  presumably  determine  the  limits  of  the  voluntary  and 
involuntary.  Such  a  course  is  useful  also  for  legislators  with  a  view  to 
prescribing  honours  and  punishments.  '  Translation  Thomson  [1976] 
20  See  STIa  Hae.  76.4 
21  PuUcr(19691  p.  162 
22  Copieston  (19901  p.  173 
23  Slla  llae.  1.1  c:  «actiones....  quae  ex  voluntate  deliberata  procedunt» 95 
24  ST1a  Hae.  1.1  c:  «Dicendum  quod  actionum  quae  ab  homine  aguntur,  iUae 
solae  proprie  dicuntur  humanae  quae  sunt  propriae  hominis  inquantum 
est  homo.  » 
25  STla  Ilae.  1.1  ad  3:  'Dicendum,  quod  hujusmodi  actiones  non  sunt  proprie 
humanae,  quia  non  procedunt  ex  deliberatione  rationis,  quae  est  proprium 
principium  humanorurn  actuum.  Et  ideo  habent  quidem.  finem 
imaginatum,  non  autem.  per  rationem.  praestitutum'  Trans.  McInerney 
[19981 
261he  fact  that  one  might  query  whether  the  arm  and  hand  movements 
then  amounted  to  'scratching'at  all  merely  underlines  that  a  purpose  is 
necessary  if  something  is  properly  to  be  considered  an  action. 
27STIa  llae.  6.2c:  "Est  autern  duplex  cogr1itio,  finis,  perfecta  scilicet  et 
imperfecta.  Perfecta  quidem.  finis  cognitio  est  quando  non  solurn 
apprehenditur  res  quae  est  finis,  sed  etiarn  cognoscitur  ratio  fmis  et 
proportio  eius  quod  ordinatur  ad  finem.  ipsum;  et  talis  cognitio  finis 
competit  soli  rationali  naturae.  Imperfecta  autem  cognitio  finis  est  quae  in 
sola  finis  apprehensione  consistit,  sine  hoc  quod  cognoscatur  ratio  finis  et 
proportio  actus  ad  finem;  et  talis  cognitio  finis  reperitur  in  brutis 
animalibus  per  sensum.  et  aestimationem  naturalern.  Perfectam.  igitur 
cognitionern  finis  sequitur  voluntarium  secundum  rationem  perfectam, 
prout  scilicet  apprehenso  fine  aliquis  potest  deliberans  de  fine  et  de  his 
quae  sunt  ad  finem,  moveri  in  finem  vel  non  moveri.  Imperfectam  autem. 
cognitionem  finis  sequitur  voluntarium,  secundum  rationem.  imperfectam, 
prout  scilicet  apprehendens  finem,  non  deliberat,  sed  subito  movetur  in 
ipsum.  Unde  soli  rationali  naturae  competit  voluntarium  secundum 
rationem.  perfectam  sed  secundum  rationem.  imperfectam.  competit  etiam. 
brutis.  " 
It  would  seem  that  Aquinas  agrees  with  Aristotle's  statement  in  Ethics  iii,  2 
quoted  in  the  Sed  Contra  to  S71a  Ilae.  6.2  that  children  as  well  as  animals 
share  in  limited  voluntary  activity.  7be  position  of  children  is  covered 
specifically  in  DV24.2  ad  1:  'Thus  the  voluntary  is  said  to  be  in  brutes  and 
in  children  because  they  act  of  their  own  accord  but  not  by  the  exercise  of 
free  choice.  "  'Ut  sic  dicatur  voluntarium.  esse  in  brutis  vel  puens,  quia,  sua 
sponte  aliquid.  faciunt,  non  propter  usurn  liberae  electionis.  '  Children 
would  presumably  be  excluded  from  full  voluntary  activity  because  they 
had  not  yet  reached  the  age  of  reason  and  so  would  be  intellectually  unable 
to  recognize  an  end  as  such.  This  re-emphasises  the  importance  of  reason 
in  what  Aquinas  classifies  as  'human  acts,  for  the  inclusion  of  children 96 
with  animals  gives  a  more  complex  distinction  than  would  normally  be 
drawn  between  animals  and  human  beings. 
28  STIa  llae.  6.2  ad  3:  "Laus  et  vituperium  consequuntur  actum, 
voluntarium.  secundum  perfectam  voluntarii  rationem.  * 97 
Chapter  3 
VOLUNTARY  ACTION-AND  THE  WILL 
"Those  things  which  have  some  grasp  of  what  an  end  implies 
are  said  to  move  themselves,  because  within  them  lies  the 
source,  not  only  of  acting,  but  also  of  acting  with  a  purpose. 
And  since  on  both  counts  the  principle  is  internal  to  them, 
their  acts  and  motions  are  termed  voluntary.  " 
u..  voluntariness  in  its  full  sense  is  a  quality  of  human  acts.  " 
STIa  Ilae.  6.1  c 
Introduction 
We  have  seen  that  'human  acts'  are  'fully  voluntary 
acts'  and  that  such  acts  are  free  acts,  being  those  to 
which  responsibility  attaches.  In  STla  llae.  6,  Aquinas 
considers  what  constitutes  a  voluntary  act, 
establishing  at  the  outset  that  human  acts  are 
voluntary,  and  later  refining  the  term  'voluntary'  by 
considering  what  factors  might  make  an  act 
involuntary. 
In  STla  llae.  6.1,  he  develops  the  characteristics  of  a 
voluntary  act,  starting  from  the  principle  of 
movement  of  inanimate  things,  of  animals  and  of 
humans  in  particular.  The  essential  points  in  this 
development  are: 98 
(i)  Some  actions  derive  from  an  inner  rather  than 
external  principle  of  motion  e.  g.  a  stone's  falling 
to  the  ground  comes  from  its  inner  principle  of 
motion;  its  rising  derives  from  an  external 
principle; 
(ii)  Some  of  these  actions  which  have  an  inner 
principle  of  motion  arise  from  the  thing  moving 
having  set  itself  in  motion,  and  some  -do  not; 
(iii)  Since  all  actions  are  for  an  end,  knowledge  of 
that  end  will  be  required  if  the  action  truly  is  to 
be  self-movement.  Things  which  have  no  notion 
of  the  end  are  not  moved  by  themselves  but  by 
others; 
(iv)  Action  which  is  truly  self-movement  is  termed 
voluntary  action. 
This  is  set  out  in  STla  llae.  6.1: 
"Those  things,  however,  which  have  some  grasp  of 
what  an  end  implies  are  said  to  move  themselves, 
because  within  them  lies  the  source,  not  only  of 
acting,  but  also  of  acting  with  a  purpose.  And  since 
on  both  counts  the  principle  is  internal  to  them,  their 
acts  and  motions  are  termed  voluntary,  which 
conveys  the  meaning  of  following  a  bent  quite  their 
own.  " 
Aquinas  buttresses  this  point  with  reference  to  the 
authorities  Aristotle,  Nemesius  and  Damascene, 99 
quoted  in  the  Objection  to  Article  1,  for  he  goes  on 
"they  define  voluntary  action  as  having  its  principle 
within  the  agent  together  with  the  added  proviso  that 
it  is  done  with  knowledge.  "  1 
So,  a  voluntary  action  is  an  action  where  both  the 
motion  and  the  end  for  which  that  motion  is 
undertaken  arise  from  an  internal  principle.  2 
Some  further  consideration  of  the  metaphysical 
background  to  Aquinas'  argument  is  necessary  to 
draw  out  the  implications  of  this  description  of 
voluntary  action.  The  elements  of  his  description  are 
therefore  considered  in  turn  before  returning  to  what 
he  identifies  as  the  principle  of  motion  in  human 
actions,  the  will.  From  an  examination  of  the  nature 
of  the  will  and  its  acts,  some  idea  of  how  human  acts 
can  be  said  to  be  free,  and  hence  of  Aquinas'  concept 
of  freedom,  will  emerge. 
A.  Elements  of  voluntary  action 
A.  1  Inner  Principle  of  Motion 
First,  'some  actions  derive  from  an  inner  principle  of 
motion'. 
For  Aquinas,  all  things  act  in  some  way  or  other:  a 
stone's  falling  down,  a  daisy's  pushing  through  the 100 
lawn,  a  dog's  burying  a  bone,  a  man's  locking  the 
door,  are  all  actions.  Actions  come  about  from  form  - 
form  is  always  accompanied  by  some  tendency  or 
inclination,  and  it  is  this  that  leads  to  action.  This 
tendency  is  the  'inner  principle  of  motion'which 
produces  action  and  may  be  referred  to  as  the  thing's 
nature.  On  Aquinas'  outdated  natural  philosophy,  a 
stone's  tendency  is  to  be  at  the  centre,  for  example, 
and  so  if  dropped  from  a  height  will  fall  towards  the 
centre  until  its  fall  is  obstructed.  Falling  downward  is 
the  natural  movement  of  the  stone;  this  contrasts 
with  the  violent  movement  which  would  come  about  if 
the  stone  were  thrown  upwards.  Such  a  motion  is 
violent  because  the  principle  of  movement  is  external 
to  the  stone  and  produces  an  act  contrary  to  its 
nature. 
There  is  therefore  in  Aquinas'  account  a  close  link 
between  the  nature  of  a  thing  and  action.  It  can 
certainly  still  be  said  that  the  tendency  to  act  in  a 
certain  way  helps  define  the  nature  of  a  thing,  and 
enables  one  to  classify  it  as  one  kind  of  thing  or 
another.  Acids,  for  example,  are  substances  which 
have  certain  tendencies,  namely  to  donate  protons:  it 
is  part  of  what  they  Me  that  they  will,  in  most 
circumstances,  do  certain  things.  3 101 
As  the  example  of  acids  shows,  a  tendency  or 
inclination  is  towards  something.  For  Aquinas, 
endorsing  Aristotle,  tendencies  are  towards  'the  good', 
and  only  the  good.  In  STla  llae.  8.1  for  example,  he 
says: 
"Now  appetite  is  only  for  the  good.  The  reason  for 
this  is  that  appetite  is  simply  an  inclination  for 
something  on  the  part  of  the  one  who  desires  it.  Now 
nothing  is  favourably  disposed  to  something  unless  it 
is  like  or  suitable  to  it.  Hence  since  everything, 
insofar  as  it  is  a  being  and  a  substance  is  a  good, 
every  inclination  is  to  a  good.  Therefore  the  - 
Philosopher  says  that  the  good  is  'that  which  all 
desire'.  "4 
The  implications  of  this  idea  that  all  inclinations,  or 
appetites,  are  towards  only  the  good  are  considered 
below  in  relation  to  the  will.  At  this  stage,  it  is  noted 
only  that  'the 
, 
good'is,  on  Aquinas'  account,  what  is 
good  for  the  thing  in  question,  whether  plant,  animal 
or  man,  in  fulfilling  its  nature  -  i.  e.  in  becoming  a 
perfect  example  of  whatever  kind  of  thing  it  is.  In 
SCG  1.37  for  example,  Aquinas  says  that  "each  thing 
seeks  its  perfection  as  the  good  belonging  to  it.  "s  And 
in  STla  l1ae.  1.5  "..  each  thing  desires  its  own 
fulfillment  and  therefore  desires  for  its  ultimate  end  a 
good  that  perfects  and  completesit.  "6 102 
Everything,  then,  has  an  inclination  towards  what  is, 
broadly  speaking,  good  for  it.  This  inclination  is 
however  manifest  in  different  ways  in  natural  things 
(stones  and  plants,  for  example),  animals  (e.  g.  dogs) 
and  human  beings.  As  it  is  put  in  DV23.1:  "..  it 
pertains  to  everything  whatever  to  have  an  appetite, 
natural  or  animal  or  rational  (that  is,  intellectual); 
but  in  different  beings  it  is  found  in  different  ways.  "7 
So  too  in  SCG1.72.4:  "Now,  it  belongs  to  every  being 
to  seek  its  perfection  and  the  conservation  of  its 
being,  and  this  in  the  case  of  each  being  according  to 
its  mode:  for  intellectual  beings  through  will,  for 
animals  through  sensible  appetite,  and  to  those 
lacking  sense  through  natural  appetite.  "8 
In  the  ST,  and  in  de  Malo  (DM)  6.1,  the  reason  given 
for  the  difference  in  tendencies  is  form,  and  in 
particular  the  difference  in  forms  between  things  with 
cognition  and  things  without.  In  STla.  80.1,  for 
example,  having  said  that  tendency  follows  form, 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  say: 
"But  form  means  more  in  things  with  knowledge 
than  it  does  in  things  without  it.  In  things  without 
knowledge,  form  fixes  each  in  its  own  determinate 
being.  The  propensity  accompanying  this  natural 
form  is  called  its  natural  appetite.  But  things  that 103 
know  are  each  fixed  in  their  natural  being  in  such  a 
way  as  to  be  open  to  receive  forms  from  other  things. 
Sense  receives  sense  forms,  the  understanding 
receives  intellectual  forms...  "9 
The  distinction  between  natural,  animal  and  human 
beings  is  taken  further,  and  the  implications  of  it 
spelled  out,  in  DM6.1,  where  Aquinas  says: 
u..  action  in  nature  originates  from  thingsforms, 
which  give  them  natural  tendencies  (called  desires  of 
their  nature)  leading  to  action,  just  as  in  human 
beings  from  forms  taken  in  by  mind  there  follow 
willed  tendencies  leading  to  external  activity;  but  also 
unlike,  because  forms  in  nature  are  forms  taken  on 
and  made  individual  by  matter,  so  that  the  resultant 
tendency  is  fixed  on  one  course,  whereas  forms  taken 
in  by  mind  are  general  forms  covering  a  number  of 
different  things,  so  that  the  willed  tendencies  remain 
open  to  more  than  one  course  of  action  ..... 
The  active 
principle  in  lower  animals  lies  somewhere  in  between: 
the  forms  their  senses  take  in  are  individual  like  the 
forms  of  nature  and  give  rise  to  tendencies  to  react  in 
fixed  ways  as  in  nature;  yet  the  form  taken  in  by  their 
senses  is  not  always  the  same  as  it  is  in  nature 
(where  fire  is  always  hot)  but  varies....  "10 104 
The  inner  principle  of  motion  in  all  things  is  therefore 
their  inclination  or  appetite  for  what  will  lead  to  their 
perfection;  that  comes  from  form.  The  type  of  form 
which  gives  rise  to  action  is  important,  for  there  is  a 
hierarchy  of  appetites.  "  Natural  appetite  comes  from 
natural  form,  and  is  determined  by  that  natural  form 
to  one  course  of  action:  stones  dropped  always  fall 
downwards,  for  example,  fire  always  rises  up.  Animal 
appetite  comes  from  forms  received  in  the  senses  and 
leads  to  fixed  actions,  but  of  more  than  one  sort. 
Intellectual  or  rational  appetite  comes  from  forms 
received  in  the  intellect,  which  forms,  being  general, 
leave  the  particular  action  which  follows  open  i.  e. 
indeterminate.  All  three  kinds  of  appetite  or 
tendencies  will,  it  should  be  noted,  be  found  in  man 
depending  on  whether  he  is  being  considered  simply 
as  a  natural  (as  opposed  to  manufactured)  thing,  or 
as  an  animal,  or  as  a  man.  When  he  is  acting  as  a 
man,  the  principle  of  motion  is  the  intellectual 
appetite  -  namely,  will. 
A.  2  Self-movers 
Since  the  principal  concern  in  this  chapter  is  human 
actions,  how  Aquinas  characterizes  the  will  as  a  self- 
mover  must  be  the  main  consideration.  Again, 
however,  Aquinas'general  statements  about  self- 
movement  provide  illuminating  background. 105 
The  principle  of  self-movement  is  expressed,  not 
altogether  clearly,  in  DV24.1,  in  a  passage  that  owes 
much  to  Aristotle's  Physics.  Here  Aquinas  again 
distinguishes  between  natural,  animal  and  human 
movement.  All  things  have  an  inner  principle  of 
motion,  as  we  have  just  seen,  but  only  some  of  these 
things  can  be  said  to  move  themselves.  Those  things 
which  move  themselves  must  be  distinguishable  into 
two  parts,  one  of  which  acts  as  mover  and  the  other 
as  moved.  Here  Aquinas  follows  Aristotle's  argument 
that  nothing  acting  as  a  whole  can  move  itself  as  a 
whole,  so  that  when  one  says  that  an  animal  moves 
itself,  one  means  that  one  part  of  the  animal  moves 
another  part  of  the  animal.  12Where,  therefore,  it  is 
impossible  to  make  such  a  distinction,  there  can  be 
no  self-movement. 
There  is  a  further  reason  for  denying  self-movement 
in  some  things,  namely  that  the  form  which  is  the 
principle  of  their  movement  is  given  them  by  their 
generator:  "Because  they  have  [their  form]  from  the 
being  which  generated  them,  they  are  said  to  be 
moved  essentially  by  their  genitor  and  accidentally  by 
that  which  removes  an  obstacle,  according  to  the 
Philosopher.  These  are  moved  by  means  of 
themselves  but  not  by  themselves.  "13  By  implication, 
Aquinas  seems  to  say  that  men  and  animals  do, 106 
somehow,  have  the  forms  which  give  rise  to  their 
movement  from  themselves.  But  he  does  not  then  use 
difference  of  form-source  as  the  basis  of  distinction 
between  those  kinds  of  beings  which  do,  move 
themselves.  Instead,  he  distinguishes  self-movement 
in  men  and  in  brutes  on  the  basis  of  judgment:  "Men 
act  and  are  moved  by  rational  judgment,  for  they 
deliberate  about  what  is  to  be  done.  But  all  brutes  act 
and  are  moved  by  a  natural  judgment.  "  He  goes  on  to 
say,  in  a  passage  which  will  later  be  seen  to  have 
considerable  importance  for  the  nature  of  freedom: 
"It  is  accordingly  apparent  to  anyone  who  considers 
the  matter  aright  that  judgment  about  what  is  to  be 
done  is  attributed  to  brute  animals  in  the  same  way 
as  motion  and  action  are  attributed  to  inanimate 
natural  bodies.  Just  as  heavy  and  light  bodies  do  not 
move  themselves  so  as  to  be  by  that  fact  the  cause  of 
their  own  motions,  so  too  brutes  do  not  judge  about 
their  own  judgment  but  follow  the  judgment 
implanted  in  them  by  God.  Thus  they  are  not  the 
cause  of  their  own  decision  nor  do  they  have  freedom 
of  choice.  But  man,  judging  about  his  course  of 
action  by  the  power  of  reason,  can  also  judge  about 
his  own  decision  inasmuch  as  he  knows  the  meaning 
of  an  end  and  of  a  means  to  an  end,  and  the 
relationship  of  the  one  with  reference  to  the  other.  "14 107 
In  SCG2.47  however,  in  a  fuller  description  of  self- 
movement,  the  difference  between  those  things  which 
move  themselves  and  those  which  do  not  is  clearly 
put  down  to  the  origin  of  the  form  which  is  the 
principle  of  their  movement.  And  the  distinction 
between  the  two  groups  of  self-movers,  men  and 
animals,  is  also  put  down  to  the  origin  of  forms, 
though  judgment  also  plays  a  part: 
"Now  natural  forms,  from  which  natural  motions  and 
operations  derive,  do  not  proceed  from  the  things 
whose  forms  they  are,  but  wholly  from  extrinsic 
agents.  For  by  a  natural  form  each  thing  has  being  in 
its  own  nature,  and  nothing  can  be  the  cause  of  its 
own  act  of  being.  So  it  is  that  things  which  are  moved 
naturally  do  not  move  themselves.  .... 
Likewise,  in 
brute  animals  the  forms  sensed  or  imagined,  which 
move  them,  are  not  discovered  by  them,  but  are 
received  by  them  from  extrinsic  sensible  things, 
which  act  upon  their  senses  and  are  judged  of  by 
their  natural  estimative  faculty.  Hence  though  brutes 
are  in  a  sense  said  to  move  themselves,  inasmuch  as 
one  part  of  them  moves  and  another  is  moved,  yet 
they  are  not  themselves  the  source  of  the  actual 
moving  which,  rather,  derives  partly  from  external 
things  sensed  and  partly  from  nature.  For,  so  far  as 
their  appetite  moves  their  members,  they  are  said  to 
move  themselves  ....  ;  but,  so  far  as  appetition  in  them 108 
follows  necessarily  upon  the  reception  of  forms 
through  their  senses  and  from  the  judgment  of  their 
natural  estimative  power,  they  are  not  the  cause  of 
their  own  movement....  On  the  other  hand,  the  form 
understood,  through  which  the  intellectual  substance 
[sc.  man]  acts,  proceeds  from  the  intellect  itself  as  a 
thing  conceived,  and  in  a  way  contrived  byit.  "15 
The  important  factors  in  self-movement  identified  so 
far  are  therefore  appetite,  which  arises  from  form, 
and  the  source  of  that  form  from  which  it  arises. 
Animals  are  not  really  the  cause  of  their  own 
movement  because  the  forms  which  give  rise  to  their 
movement  are,  in  some  sense,  imposed  from  outside 
and  subject  to  only  a  'natural  estimative  power',  or 
'natural  judgment'.  The  forms  which  give  rise  to  their 
movement  come  from  external  objects  sensed  -  food 
smelled  by  a  dog,  for  example.  This  sense  form  does 
not  automatically  result  in  the  dog  eating  the  food, 
however,  as  the  plant's  form  automatically  leads  it  to 
turn  towards  the  sun.  Dogs  may  react  in  more  than 
one  way  to  a  sensed  form,  depending  on  how  the  form 
is  received  by  them.  In  DM6,  quoted  above,  Aquinas 
uses  the  example  of  fire:  a  dog  may  find  fire  hot,  in 
which  case  he  will  run  away  from  it,  or  as  pleasantly 
warm,  in  which  case  he  will  lie  down  beside  it. 
Similarly,  if  he  smells  food,  he  will  eat  it  if  he  is 
hungry,  but  reject  it  if  he  is  not.  This  is  his  'natural 109 
judgment'.  The  important  point  Aquinas  seems  to  be 
making  here  is  that  every  time  the  dog  feels  the  fire 
hot,  he  will  run;  every  time  he  smells  food  and  feels 
hungry,  he  will  eat.  In  similar  circumstances,  the 
action  will  be  fixed.  While  therefore  there  is  a  (limited) 
range  of  actions  open  to  dogs,  which  action  they  will 
actually  perform  is  imposed  on  them  by  a 
combination  of  the  external  object  and  a  natural  pre- 
programmed  response. 
Human  beings,  however,  are  themselves  the  source  of 
the  forms  which  give  rise  to  their  movement.  This  is 
because  the  forms  which  give  rise  to  human  action 
are  forms  taken  in  by  the  mind.  In  Aquinas' 
epistemology,  the  forms  of  external  things  are,  very 
broadly  speaking,  taken  in  by  the  senses  and 
processed  by  the  active  intellect,  then  stored  in  the 
passive  intellect  for  later  use,  as  it  were.  It  is  this 
'form  processing'  by  which  the  intellect  'contrives'  the 
form  which  later  gives  rise  to  action:  in  this  way, 
humans  'discover',  as  brute  animals  do  not,  the  forms 
which  move  them.  As  will  be  seen  later,  this  point 
that  activity  is  stimulated  by  forms  taken  in  by  the 
intellect  has  important  implications  for  the  action  of 
the  will. 110 
A.  3  Action  for  an  end. 
In  Aquinasview,  everything  which  acts,  acts  for  an 
end,  or  purpose.  If  it  were  not  so,  actions  would  be 
random  or  would  not  happen  at  all: 
"All  efficient  causes  must  needs  act  for  an  end  ..... 
matter  does  not  achieve  form  unless  it  be  changed  by 
an  efficient  cause,  for  nothing  potential  is  self- 
actualizing.  Now  an  efficient  cause  does  not  start  this 
change  except  by  intending  an  end.  For  were  it  not 
shaped  towards  producing  a  determinate  effect,  it 
would  not  produce  this  rather  than  that,  and  to 
produce  a  determinate  effect  it  must  be  set  on 
something  defined,  which  is  what  an  end,  finis, 
implies.  "16 
And  we  have  already  seen  in  Chapter  2  that  'being 
done  for  a  purpose'is  what  distinguishes  'human 
acts'  from  mere  'acts  of  a  man',  which  are  not  really 
acts  at  all,  but  simply  movements. 
The  idea  of  acting  for  an  end  is  of  course  implicit  in 
the  idea  of  natural  tendencies  or  appetite:  a  tendency 
must  be  to  something,  and  appetite,  an  appetite  for 
something.  But  such  a  teleological  notion  need  not 
imply  an  anthropomorphic  belief  in  the  'acting  for  a 
purpose'  of  flowers  when  they  open  their  petals  to  the ill 
sun,  for  example.  It  says  only  that  there  must  be 
some  reason  arising  from  the  flower's  nature  why  x 
rather  than  y  happens. 
That  Aquinas'  approach  is  not  anthropomorphic  is 
seen  in  the  crucial  distinction  he  makes  between  the 
ways  that  inanimate  things,  animals  and  men  act  for 
an  end.  Some  things,  he  argues,  have  their  end 
imposed  on  them  and  they  are  set  in  motion  towards 
it,  like  an  arrow  towards  a  target.  The  archer  decides 
where  the  arrow  is  to  be  aimed  and  he  aims  it  and 
then  looses  it.  Though  this  is  clearly  an  action  for  an 
end  -  hitting  a  target,  killing  a  deer  -  the  arrow, 
equally  clearly,  has  no  knowledge  of  this  end  and 
does  not  determine  the  direction  in  which  it  is  aimed. 
This  is  one  reason  the  arrow  cannot  be  said  to  be  a 
self-mover,  even  though  it  arguably  has  a  property, 
its  impetus,  which  keeps  it  moving  along  the  path  the 
archer  has  chosen.  Another  example  would  be  a 
clockwork  toy  designed  to  throw  balls  into  the  air  - 
when  the  lock  on  its  mechanism  is  released,  the  toy 
raises  its  arm  and  throws  a  ball,  repeating  the  action 
until  stopped.  Its  actions  are  clearly  for  an  end,  and 
there  is  certainly  an  internal  principle  of  motion,  but 
the  toy  obviously  has  no  knowledge  of  that  end.  For 
self-motion  there  must  be  not  just  this  inner  principle 
of  motion,  but  also  some  knowledge  of  the  end  to 
which  the  motion  is  directed.  The  man  and  the  dog 112 
can  be  said  to  be  self-movers  because  in  a  sense  they 
'aim  themselves'  at  the  glass  of  wine  or  the  bone  and 
do  so  knowingly.  They  are  therefore  both  acting  for  a 
purpose  in  a  way  the  arrow  is  not. 
However,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  dog's  end  has 
to  some  extent  been  imposed  externally  on  him,  and 
to  this  degree  he  is  not  fully  a  self-mover.  This  is 
consistent  with  the  distinction  already  noted  in 
Chapter  2  between  fully  voluntary  and  partially 
voluntary  action,  the  former  arising  from  knowledge 
of  the  end  as  an  end  and  applicable  only  to  human 
action. 
The  distinction  between  animals  and  humans  leads 
to  another  important  point  about  acting  for  an  end  in 
relation  to  human  actions.  As  well  as  holding  that  all 
human  actions  are  for  an  end,  Aquinas  also  holds, 
with  Aristotle,  that  there  is  an  ultimate  end  to  which 
all  human  actions  are  directed.  When  I  do  x,  I  am 
doing  it  for  a  purpose,  but  that  purpose  has  another 
purpose  behind  it,  and  so  on  until  I  come  to  the 
'ultimate  end'.  There  must  be  an  ultimate  end,  since 
this  chain  of  ends  cannot  go  on  indefinitely.  In  STIa 
llae.  1.5,  Aquinas  argues  that  there  can  be  only  one 
ultimate  end,  for  the  ultimate  end  has  to  be 
something  that  completely  satisfies  desire  so  that 
there  is  nothing  left  to  desire.  Otherwise,  of  course,  it 113 
would  not  be  the  final  end.  "Now  this  would  not  be 
the  case  were  something  else  outside  it  still  wanted. 
Hence  it  cannot  be  that  desire  should  go  out  to  two 
things  as  though  each  were  its  fulfilment.  "17The  one 
ultimate  end  is  what  everything  else  done  is  directed 
towards,  either  directly  or  as  contributing  towards  it: 
"whatever  a  man  desires  is  because  of  its  evidence  as 
good.  If  not  desired  as  the  perfect  good,  that  is  the 
ultimate  end,  then  it  is  desired  as  tending  to  that,  for 
a  start  is  always  made  in  order  to  come  to  a  finish  as 
appears  in  the  products  of  nature  and  art  alike.  "18 
The  ultimate  end  is  therefore  the  complete  good,  and 
each  particular  action  is  a  movement  towards  that, 
and  a  movement  towards  something  seen  as  good  in 
itself  or  good  as  a  means  to  the  ultimate  good. 
Whether  Aquinas  is  right  in  holding  that  all  human 
acts  are  done  for  a  purpose  and  that  there  is  an 
ultimate  end  to  which  all  acts  are  directed  is 
debatable.  Kenny,  for  example,  criticises  on  empirical 
grounds  the  view  that  all  human  actions  are  done  for 
the  sake  of  happiness,  or  for  an  overarching  goal.  19 
And  Anscombe  criticises  the  Aristotelian  basis  of 
Aquinas'  argument  on  the  grounds  both  of  its  false 
premiss  (that  human  beings  must  always  act  with 
some  end  in  view)  and  its  logic  (the  apparent  "..  illicit 
transition  in  Aristotle  from  'all  chains  must  stop 
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must  stop'.  ").  20  Detailed  consideration  of  Aquinas' 
arguments  in  relation  to  the  ultimate  end  is 
peripheral  to  this  thesis,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that 
the  distinction  he  draws  between  the  particular  goods 
and  the  ultimate  end  has  important  implications  in 
his  own  account.  There  is  equally  no  doubt  that  he  is 
certain  that  all  human  acts,  as  he  defines  them,  are 
for  an  end,  and  that  all  human  actions  are  directed  to 
one  ultimate  end,  the  complete  goodneSS.  21 
Knowledge  of  the  end  is  also  an  ingredient  of  a 
voluntary  act,  and  we  saw  in  Chapter  2  that 
knowledge  of  the  end  as  an  end  is  a  distinguishing 
mark  of  human  as  opposed  to  animal  action.  Aquinas 
is  quite  clear  that  without  knowledge  of  the  end  there 
can  be  no  voluntary  action.  This  does  not  mean, 
however,  that  there  has  to  be  knowledge  of  every 
aspect  of  the  end  for  the  action  to  be  voluntary.  I  may 
book  a  flight  to  Europe  on  the  Internet,  for  example, 
having  little  or  no  knowledge  of  how  the  computer 
connection  is  made  or  the  money  transferred  from  my 
account  to  the  airline's  account,  or  indeed  of  the 
airline  itself  beyond  a  vague  idea  of  its  general 
reliability.  But  such  ignorance  would  not  normally  be 
regarded  as  making  my  action  involuntary.  Here,  the 
things  about  which  I  am  ignorant  are  peripheral  to 
my  end,  the  booking  of  a  flight  to  Europe.  If,  on  the 
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keyboard  button  would  book  me  a  flight  to  America 
rather  than  Europe,  and  I  did  press  the  button,  my 
booking  a  flight  to  America  would  seem  to  be 
involuntary,  for  here  the  ignorance  is  about 
something  central  to  the  end. 
On  Aquinas'  account,  ignorance  makes  an  action 
involuntary  to  the  extent  that  that  ignorance  deprives 
the  agent  of  the  necessary  knowledge.  22He  goes  on  to 
say,  however,  that  not  every  kind  of  ignorance  does 
have  this  effect.  Where  the  ignorance  is  itself 
involuntary,  the  act  which  follows  is  not  a  voluntary 
one.  Aquinas  gives  the  example  of  a  man  who,  having 
taken  all  proper  precautions  to  ensure  that  the  field 
is  clear,  shoots  at  a  target  without  realising  that 
someone  has  just  walked  into  the  line  of  fire,  and  so 
kills  him.  That  killing  is  'absolutely  involuntary' 
because  the  archer  had  checked  properly  before  he 
fired  his  arrow  and  would  not  have  shot  had  he 
known  that  there  was  somebody  in  line.  It  is 
otherwise  where  the  ignorance  is  voluntary,  either 
because  it  was  willed  (if,  for  example,  the  archer  had 
decided  not  to  look  to  see  if  anyone  was  coming)  or 
because  it  arose  from  failure  to  do  something  which 
could  and  should  have  been  done  (if,  say,  the  archer 
had  not  even  considered  checking).  In  such  cases, 
the  ignorance  does  not  make  the  action  of  killing  the 
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Aquinas  also  introduces  another  distinction:  the  case 
where  there  is  involuntary  ignorance  about  what  is 
done,  but  where  the  act  would  still  have  been  done 
had  the  agent  known  the  facts.  If,  for  example,  the 
archer  had  shot  at  what  he,  justifiably,  believed  to  be 
a  target  but  was  in  fact,  unknown  to  him,  a  man 
whom  he  wished  to  kill,  the  killing  would  not  be 
voluntary.  In  this  case  however,  the  killing  could  not 
be  described  as  involuntary,  Aquinas  says,  referring 
to  Aristotle.,  because  the  effect  produced  was  not 
against  the  man's  will.  Nevertheless,  the  killing 
cannot  be  voluntary,  for  what  is  not  known  cannot  be 
willed;  it  is  therefore  non-voluntary.  23 
While  this  last  case  is  clearly  distinguishable  from 
that  of  the  archer  who  would  not  have  shot  had  he 
known  the  facts,  it  is  debatable  whether  Aquinas 
should  make  the  distinction  he  does  on  the  basis  that 
the  killing  is  not  against  the  archer's  will.  It  is  not 
against  his  wishes,  but  he  did  not  in  the  case  in 
question  will  to  do  anything  other  than  hit  the  target 
when  he  drew  his  bow,  and  Aquinas  elsewhere  makes 
a  careful  distinction  between  'wishing'  and  'willing' 
which  he  does  not  seem  to  have  observed  here.  It 
would  seem  that  in  the  particular  circumstances  of 
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knew  that  he  was  doing  so  -surely  enough  to  make 
the  action  of  killing  him  qualify  as  involuntary. 
Some  of  the  unease  about  this  example  perhaps 
comes  from  Aquinas'  description  of  the  actions  as 
'voluntary',  'involuntary'  or  'non-voluntary'when  in 
modem  terms  they  would  be  considered  under  the 
headings  of  Intended'  or  'unintended'.  It  is  outside 
the  scope  of  this  thesis  to  examine  the  concept  of 
intention,  or  its  relationship  to  voluntariness, 
although  brief  mention  is  made  of  its  Place  in 
Aquinas'  analysis  of  a  human  act  in  Chapter  4.  His 
treatment  of  the  effect  of  lack  of  knowledge  on  the 
voluntariness  of  an  act  does  however  bring  out  some 
important  points  about  voluntary  action,  in  particular 
the  importance  of  both  knowledge  and  will  to  a 
voluntary  act.  Also  clear  from  this  treatment  is  the 
emphasis  on  responsibility  -  whether,  in  these 
circumstances,  A  is  to  be  held  responsible  for  what  he 
has  done.  It  brings  out  too  an  important  point  about 
voluntariness  in  general:  that  something  may  be 
voluntary  even  though  it  is  not  positively  willed,  for 
he  says  in  STla  llae.  6.8  that  "ignorance  may  be 
voluntary  in  the  way  that  not  willing  and  not  acting 
can  be  voluntary:  it  is  an  ignorance  of  what  we  can 
and  should  know.  "24 118 
The  question  of  voluntary  'not  willing'  or  'not  acting'  is 
considered  in  STIa  llae.  6.3,  where  Aquinas  argues 
that  there  can  be  voluntariness  without  any  external 
action,  and  indeed  even  where  there  is  no  intemal 
action:  "There  can  be  voluntariness  without  an  act, 
sometimes  without  an  extemal  act  though  with  an 
intemal  act,  as  when  a  person  wills  not  to  act, 
sometimes  however,  without  even  an  intemal  act,  as 
when  he  does  not  will  to  act.  "25 
Aquinas'  treatment  here  is  interesting,  for  it  extends 
the  notion  of  'voluntary'from  what  a  man  does  to 
what  he  does  not  do  -  at  least  in  some  circumstances. 
Anything  voluntary  must  spring  from  will,  he  argues, 
but  this  can  be  directly  from  will,  or  indirectly,  just  as 
a  ship  wreck  can  come  indirectly  from  a  failure  to 
steer  the  ship  (as  opposed  to  its  arising  directly  from, 
for  example,  a  deliberate  steering  on  to  rocks). 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  make  the  point  that  the  result  of 
non-acting,  whether  brought  about  by  willing  not-to-F 
or  by  not-willing  F,  is  "not  always  to  be  brought  home 
to  the  non-acting  agent,  but  only  where  he  could  and 
should  have  acted.  "26The  example  used  in  STla 
llae.  6.3  is  of  a  helmsman  who  fails  to  steer  a  ship, 
perhaps,  say,  because  he  was  daydreaming,  and  the 
ship  is  then  wrecked.  The  helmsman  (H),  it  seems 
from  Aquinas'  account,  is  responsible  for  the  wreck  of 
the  ship  because  he  failed  to  do  what  he  could,  and 119 
should,  have  done,  namely  steer  the  ship.  It  appears 
that  Aquinas  regards  the  wrecking  of  the  ship  as 
indirectly  voluntary  on  H's  part,  because  H  either 
willed  something  -  not  to  steer  -  which  later  caused 
the  wreck,  or  because  H  did  not  will  something  which 
he  should  have  done,  and  that  failure  caused  the 
wreck.  The  'willing'  element  of  this  voluntariness  may 
therefore  be  positive  or  negative,  but  in  either  event 
the  relationship  between  it  and  the  wrecking  is 
indirect. 
What  is  rather  less  clear  is  the  relationship  between 
the  wreck  and  the  'knowledge'  element  of 
voluntariness.  Even  indirect  voluntariness  must 
require  some  knowledge  of  the  end  which  comes  from 
the  willing-not-to-act/not-willing-to-act.  Now,  in  the 
case  of  H's  failure  to  steer  there  is,  on  the  facts  as 
stated,  no  question  of  his  non-willing  being  directed 
to  the  end  of  wrecking  the  ship;  it  appears  that  he  did 
not  think  of  that  at  all.  It  must  be  the  case,  then,  that 
knowledge  of  that  end  is  to  be  imputed  to  him,  in 
those  cases  where  he  'could  and  should'have  acted. 
Though  it  is  not  entirely  clear,  this  would  seem  to  be 
the  implication  of  Aquinas'  response  to  Objection  3  to 
STIa  llae.  6.3,  where  it  is  put  that  there  cannot  be 
voluntariness  without  some  activity,  because 
voluntariness  requires  knowledge  and  knowledge 
involves  activity.  Aquinas'reply  confirms  that  an  act 120 
of  cognition  is  required  for  voluntariness,  and  that 
the  ability  to  consider  must  lie  in  a  person's  power  for 
an  act  to  be  voluntary.  He  goes  on  to  say  that  not 
considering  may  be  voluntary,  just  as  not  willing  may 
be.  27  It  would  seem  therefore  that  there  is  what  might 
be  described  as  'indirect  cognition'  of  the  end  in  such 
cases  of  voluntariness. 
This  extension  of  voluntariness  to  not  acting  and  not 
willing  clearly  raises  some  difficulties,  not  least  the 
question  of  the  circumstances  in  which  I  'could  and 
should'  act  -  fertile  ground  for  theologians,  moral 
philosophers  and  lawyers.  Pursuit  of  these  issues  is 
however  beyond  the  bounds  of  this  thesis.  Since  the 
paradigm  case  of  voluntariness  is  action,  most  of  the 
consideration  which  follows  relates  to  human  action 
rather  than  inaction,  as  a  route  to  establishing 
Aquinas'concept  of  freedom.  Here,  it  is  sufficient  to 
note,  again,  that  for  Aquinas,  'the  voluntary'  extends 
beyond  human  action  -  not  just  to  animal  action  but 
also  to  human  inaction. 
The  key  elements  of  voluntary  action  can  be 
summarized,  then,  as  an  inner  principle  of 
movement,  self-movement  and  knowledge  of  the  end 
to  which  that  movement  is  directed.  Animals  and  men 
are  self-movers  and  can  act  for  a  purpose  and  so  are 121 
capable  of  voluntary  action.  But  there  is  a  vital 
distinction  between  them:  the  action  of  animals  is  to 
a  great  extent  extemally  dictated  and  so  they  are  not 
the  true  cause  of  their  own  action. 
Aquinas'  arguments  that  men  are  the  cause  of  their 
own  actions  are  challenged  in  the  texts  on  three  main 
grounds: 
(i)  that  the  source  of  human  acts  is  in  fact 
external,  namely  the  desirable  object  which 
prompts  appetite  to  act; 
(ii)  that  human  acts  require  some  external  motion 
before  they  can  start,  and  so  have  an  external 
principle  of  motion; 
(iii)  that  humans  cannot  act  by  themselves  without 
God's  help. 
These  challenges  will  be  considered  in  the  context  of 
the  will,  already  identified  as  the  principle  of  motion 
in  human  acts. 
B.  The  will 
The  will  is  the  intellectual  or  rational  appetite,  the 
desire  for  good  in  creatures  with  understanding.  28As 
such,  it  is  one  of  the  five  powers  of  the  soul, 
principles  by  which  a  human  being  carries  out  its 
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sensitive,  appetitive,  locomotive  and  intellective, 
following  Aristotle's  classification.  In  STIa.  80.1, 
Aquinas  describes  the  appetitive  power  as  the  one  by 
which  "an  animal  can  seek  after  what  it  knows,  not 
merely  going  where  natural  inclination  leads.  "29  It  is 
therefore  the  power  to  go  after  something 
apprehended,  either  by  sense  or  by  intellect. 
Sense  appetite  and  intellectual  appetite  are,  Aquinas 
maintains,  two  distinct  powers  because  their  object  is 
different.  His  argument  runs  that  since  appetite  is  a 
passive  power  i.  e.  one  that  is  moved  by  its  object 
rather  than  one  which  effects  some  change  in  an 
external  object,  its  nature  depends  on  what  activates 
it.  The  will  is  activated  by  something  apprehended  by 
the  intellect,  the  sensual  appetite  by  something 
apprehended  by  the  senses.  And  "since  what 
intelligence  grasps  is  of  a  different  class  from  what 
sense  grasps,  it  follows  that  intellective  appetite  is  a 
power  distinct  from  sensitive  appetite.  "30 
This  passage  contains  several  important  points  about 
the  nature  of  the  will.  First,  it  classifies  it  as  a  passive 
power,  one  which  is  moved  by  something 
apprehended;  second,  it  highlights  the  importance  of 
the  intellect  in  the  will's  operations,  for  the  will  is 
moved  by  what  the  intellect  grasps;  and  third,  it 
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the  intellect  grasps.  At  this  stage,  I  consider  only  the 
points  about  the  object  of  the  will;  the  importance  of 
the  intellect  to  the  will's  operations  is  considered  in 
Chapter  4. 
B.  1  The  will  and  the  good 
Like  all  appetites,  the  will  moves  towards  the  good. 
What  is  distinctive  about  the  will  however  is  that  it 
moves  towards  the  good  as  apprehended  by  the 
intellect,  and  what  the  intellect  apprehends  are 
universals.  As  the  intellectual  appetite,  the  will  is 
therefore  directed  towards  goodness  itself  and  not 
just  towards  a  particular  good.  In  STla.  59.1,  in 
considering  whether  angels  have  will,  Aquinas 
distinguishes  natural,  animal  and  intellectual 
appetites  on  the  basis  of  the  generality  of  that 
appetite: 
"For  all  things  emanate  from  the  divine  will,  and 
consequently  each  and  every  thing  has  its  own 
distinctive  appetite  for  goodness.  But  some  things 
move  towards  goodness  without  awareness  of  it, 
tending  to  the  good  simply  because  of  the  relation  to 
it  that  is  in  their  nature.  Such  are  plants  and 
inanimate  bodies  whose  tending  to  goodness  is  called 
natural  appetite.  Other  things  move  towards  the  good 
with  some  degree  of  knowledge,  but  with  no  idea  of 
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instance,  in  a  sensation  of  what  is  sweet,  or  white,  or 
the  like;  and  the  tendency  that  goes  with  knowledge 
of  this  sort  is  called  sense  appetite.  Finally,  there  are 
beings  that  tend  to  the  good  and  at  the  same  time 
know  it  precisely  as  good;  and  this  kind  of  knowing  is 
distinctively  intelligent.  And  the  beings  that  have  it 
are  those  that  move  to  goodness  in  the  best  possible 
way;  as  not  merely  directed  towards  it,  as  by  some 
extrinsic  power,  like  the  things  devoid  of  knowledge; 
nor  merely  tending  to  this  or  that  good  in  particular, 
like  things  whose  knowledge  is  limited  to  sensation, 
but  they  tend  towards  goodness  itself,  taken  quite 
generally.  And  this  tendency  is  calledwill.  "31 
So,  what  the  will  is  naturally  inclined  to  (i.  e.  inclined 
to  by  its  nature  as  the  intellectual  appetite)  is  just 
'goodness  in  general'and  not  any  particular  good,  or 
series  of  particular  goods  as,  say,  a  dog  would  be. 
This  goodness  in  general  is  the  complete  good,  or 
ultimate  end.  However,  this  assertion  seems, 
instinctively,  wrong,  for  it  is  obviously  the  case  that 
when  I  want  something,  I  want  not  'the  universal 
good'  but  a  particular  thing  -a  coveted  book,  a  ticket 
for  the  opera,  an  end  to  thesis  writing  and  so  on.  This 
point  is  made  in  STIa.  80.2,  Objection  2,  in  relation  to 
the  distinction  between  sensual  and  intellectual 
appetite  -  since  appetite  is  towards  things,  which  are 
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intellectual  appetite,  must  bear  on  concrete 
particulars.  Aquinas'  response  is  that  although  will 
does-bear  on  things  which  exist  externally  as 
particulars,  it  desires  each  of  these  things  because  it 
is  an  example  of  the  good: 
"Intellectual  appetite,  though  it  bears  on  objects 
which  exist  outside  the  soul  as  concrete  particulars, 
nevertheless  attains  in  them  a  universal  object  of 
reason,  desiring  a  thing  precisely  because  it  is  good. 
Thus  Aristotle  observes  in  his  Rhetoric  that  hate  can 
bear  on  something  universal,  as  when  we  hate  every 
type  of  thief.  "32 
This  distinction  between  the  inclination  towards  the 
universal  good  and  the  concrete  particular  which  I 
want  can  also  be  looked  at  in  terms  of  the  distinction 
between  the  will  as  a  faculty  and  the  acts  which  are 
the  exercises  of  that  faculty.  While  the  nature  of  the 
will  as  a  faculty  is  inclined  to  the  universal  good,  each 
individual  act  of  will,  whether  %villing',  'intending', 
'choosing'etc.  is  directed  to  a  particular  good.  What  I 
want  when  I  go  for  a  walk  is just  that,  to  go  for  a 
walk.  But  Aquinas'  point  is  that  in  willing  to  do  that 
particular  thing,  I  do  so  because  I  see  it  as  an 
example  of  something  good. 126 
This  movement  of  the  will  towards  the  good  is  a 
natural  necessity  as  the  movement  of  the  flower 
towards  the  sun  is  a  natural  necessity.  But  the 
natural  necessity  by  which  the  will  moves  towards  the 
complete  good  is  not  one  which  compels  in  the  sense 
of  forcing.  Aquinas  is  consistent  about  this.  In  the 
Commentary  on  the  Sentences,  he  says:  "Coercion  and 
prevention  imply  violence  and  are  not  characteristic 
of  the  kind  of  necessity  that  follows  from  a  thing's 
nature:  violence  is  always  against  nature.  So  since 
will  is  carried  towards  bliss  with  a  necessity  derived 
from  its  nature  it  isn't  coerced  and  is  no  less  free.  "33 
Similarly,  in  DV22.5: 
"Although  the  will  wills  the  last  end  by  a  certain 
necessary  inclination,  it  is  nevertheless  in  no  way  to 
be  granted  that  it  is  forced  to  will  it  for  force  is 
nothing  else  but  the  infliction  of  some  violence.  " 
And  at  22.5  ad  2: 
"However  effectively  a  good  moves  the  will,  it  still 
cannot  force  it,  because  as  soon  as  we  posit  that  the 
will  wills  something,  we  posit  that  it  has  an 
inclination  to  it.  But  that  is  the  contrary  of  force.  It 
does  happen  however  that  because  of  the  excellence 
of  a  good  the  will  is  determined  to  it  by  an  inclination 
of  natural  neceSSity.  "34 127 
Because  the  movement  is  natural,  it  cannot  be  a 
forced  movement  even  if  it  is  a  necessary  one.  But  it 
is  pnly  the  complete  good  which  moves  the  will 
necessarily.  This  has  two  important  implications. 
First,  although  the  ultimate  end,  the  complete  good, 
is  fixed,  what  that  consists  in  and  how  it  might  be 
attained  are  not.  In  the  Commentary  on  the 
Sentences,  Aquinas  says: 
"Now  although  we  can  consider  things  generally  in 
mind  without  particularizing,  things  can't  exist 
generally  outside  the  mind  without  being  particulars. 
And  so  will  can't  ever  be  carried  towards  good  without 
being  carried  towards  a  defined  good,  and  can't  ever 
be  carried  towards  supreme  good  without  being 
carried  towards  supreme  good  defined  in  this  or  that 
way.  Now  although  will  is  inclined  by  nature  towards 
bliss  in  general,  an  inclination  towards  bliss  of  this  or 
that  sort  comes  not  from  nature  but  from  a  reasoned 
discrimination  deciding  that  the  supreme  human 
good  is  to  be  found  in  this  place  or  that.  "35 
And,  much  later,  in  STIa  llae.  1.7,  in  considering 
whether  all  men  act  for  an  end,  he  makes  the 
important  distinction  between  the  notion  of  the 
ultimate  end  and  how  that  end  is  realised: 128 
"We  can  speak  of  the  ultimate  end  in  two  senses, 
namely  to  signify  first  what  it  means,  and  second  that 
in  which  it  is  realized.  As  for  the  first,  all  are  at  one 
here  because  all  desire  their  complete  fulfilment 
which...  is  what  final  end  means.  As  for  the  second 
however  all  are  not  unanimous  for  some  want  riches, 
others  a  life  of  pleasure,  others  something  else.  "36 
And  in  DM6.1  ad.  9:  "For  total  happiness  can  be 
reached  by  many  paths;  so  though  a  human  being 
may  compulsively  will  total  happiness,  none  of  the 
paths  to  it  are  willed  compulsively.  "37 
The  second  implication  is  that  while  there  are 
potentially  many  particular  objects  which  could  move 
my  will,  the  only  particular  object  which  would  do  so 
necessarily  would  be  one  which  represented  the 
complete  good.  And  even  then  there  is  only  limited 
necessity,  Aquinas  argues,  for  the  completely  good 
object  would  only  compel  what  is  willed,  not  the 
exercise  of  the  will.  This  distinction  between  whether 
or  not  the  will  is  exercised  on  the  one  hand  and  what 
it  is  directed  towards  on  the  other  is  like  that  between 
seeing  and  not-seeing  and  between  seeing  red  and 
seeing  black,  for  example.  Whether  one  sees  or  not 
depends  on  whether  or  not  the  power  of  sight  is 
exercised  i.  e.  whether  one  opens  one's  eyes  or  not. 
What  one  sees  depends  on  the  objects  in  one's  sight. 129 
If  I  see  a  red  ball  it  is  because  I  have  exercised  my 
power  of  sight  and,  normally,  because  there  is  a  red 
ball  in  front  of  me;  but  if  I  never  open  my  eyes,  I  will 
never  see  the  red  ball,  no  matter  how  long  it  is  left 
there.  Whether  I  see,  therefore,  depends,  loosely 
speaking,  on  me;  only  wha  I  see  depends  on  the 
object.  This  is  the  point  Aquinas  wishes  to  make 
about  the  will:  whether  I  will  depends  not  on  the 
object,  but  on  me.  The  distinction  between  exercise 
and  object  is  used  several  times  in  DM6  to  make  this 
point,  but  it  appears  also  in  STIa  Ilae  and  in  DV22.6, 
though  in  slightly  different  terms. 
In  STla  llae.  10.2,  Aquinas  says  that  no  object 
necessitates  the  exercise  of  the  will's  activity 
"whatever  it  is,  a  man  always  has  the  power  not  to 
think  about  it,  and  consequently  not  actually  to  will 
it.  "38And  in  DM6,  the  point  is  made  that  even 
something  which  is  good  in  every  possible  respect 
need  not  be  willed  in  the  sense  of  not  being  thought 
about: 
"Now  will  is  an  ability  to  be  moved  by  good  in 
general;  so  no  good  will  be  powerful  enough  to  compel 
will  to  will  unless  it  be  good  in  every  respect,  the  only 
perfect  good,  total  happiness.  This  our  wills  cannot 
not  will,  if  that  means  willing  what  conflicts  with  it; 
but  they  can  avoid  actually  willing  it  by  avoiding 130 
thinking  of  it,  since  mental  activity  is  subject  to  will. 
In  this  respect  then  we  aren't  compelled  to  will  even 
total  happiness,  just  as  one  is  not  compelled  to  get 
hot  if  one  can  shut  down  the  heat  when  one  wants.  "39 
What  Aquinas  seems  to  be  arguing  here  is  that  even 
the  complete  good  can  be  rejected  by  a  refusal  to 
think  about  it.  If  this  is  so,  it  seems  to  make  a 
powerful  case  for  the  will's  ability  to  reject  any  object 
whatever  offered  to  it.  There  must  be  doubts  however 
over  whether  this  distinction  between  exercise  and 
object  of  the  will  is  well  made  in  relation  to  a  totally 
good  object. 
Aquinas  argues  that  I  can  avoid  willing  the  complete 
good  by  avoiding  thinking  about  it,  or  by  thinking  of 
something  else.  The  issue  is  not  however  thinking 
about  the  total  good,  but  the  total  good  itself.  It  is 
not  difficult  to  see  how  I  can  avoid  thinking  about  the 
complete  good,  for  the  thought  of  the  complete  good  is 
not  itself  the  complete  good.  As  Jordan  puts  it:  "The 
particular  act  of  thinking  about  beatitude  may  not 
possess  the  same  power  over  the  will  as  the 
presentation  of  beatitude  itself,  and  so  the  will  could 
choose  to  turn  away  from  thinking  about  beatitude 
considered  as  a  particular  act.  "40  That  can  be 
accepted.  The  problem  however  is  what  happens 
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total  good  presents  itself  -  how  then  can  the  will  not 
will  it?  To  think  of  something  else  will  require  an  act 
of  will,  and  whatever  is  willed  must  be  willed  under 
the  aspect  of  good.  But  this  alternative,  while  good  in 
some  respect,  is  bound  to  be  less  good  than  the  'total 
good'  and  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  Aquinas' 
account  for  a  good  recognized  at  the  time  as  the 
lesser  of  two  goods  to  be  chosen  in  preference  to  the 
recognized  greater  good.  It  might  be  argued  that  it  is 
possible  for  the  totally  good  to  be  rejected  because  it 
is  not  recognised  as  such,  but  Aquinas'  argument  in 
DM  seems  to  assume  that  the  object  has  been 
apprehended  as  totally  good.  Of  course,  if  it  is  not 
apprehended  at  all,  for  example  because  one  is 
thinking  about  something  else  and  does  not  happen 
to  notice  it,  then  certainly  it  cannot  be  willed,  for  only 
the  apprehended  can  be  willed.  Aquinas'point  may 
therefore  be  that  even  the  totally  good  cannot  force  us 
to  apprehend  it  -  but  that  is  saying  that  the  total 
good  cannot  compel  the  intellect,  not  that  it  cannot 
compel  the  will. 
Jordan's  answer  to  this  probleM41  is  that  Aquinas 
insists  on  the  possibility  of  rejection  to  "clarify 
something  in  the  conditions  of  the  present  life", 
namely  that  the  soul  in  via  can  always  shift  attention 
from  thoughts  of  the  complete  good,  just  because 
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imperfect.  For  the  reasons  given  above,  I  do  not  think 
this  solution  runs.  Aquinas  would  certainly  maintain 
that  in  the  present  life  one  never  does  meet  the 
complete  good,  but  that  is  a  different  point  and 
provides  no  answer  to  the  question  "How  can  the  will 
not  will  the  total  good  if  that  were  to  be 
apprehended?  " 
It  seems  to  me  that  on  Aquinas'own  account  of  the 
role  of  the  total  good,  once  that  has  swum  into  one's 
ken,  as  it  were,  it  is  too  late  for  one  to  turn  one's 
thoughts  elsewhere.  420nce  the  object  has  been 
perceived  as  totally  good  I  cannot  choose  to  will 
anything  else  and  must  will  it. 
But  whether  or  not  the  distinction  between  exercise 
and  object  is  justified  in  relation  to  the  totally  good, 
Aquinas  is  consistent  in  holding  that  only  the  totally 
good  object  compels  thewill.  43 
Aquinas  also  holds  that  the  will  wills  only  the  good. 
Intuitively,  this  seems  to  be  an  untenable  position,  for 
experience  clearly  shows  that  people  will  and  do  all 
sorts  of  things  which  are  inappropriate,  unsuitable  or 
simply  evil.  But  Aquinas  maintains  that  it  is  only  the 
good  which  is  desired.  In  STla  llae.  8.1,  in  the 
important  passage  quoted  above,  he  says: 133 
"The  will  is  a  rational  appetite.  Now  appetite  is  only 
for  the  good.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  appetite  is 
simply  an  inclination  for  something  on  the  part  of  one 
who  desires  it.  Now  nothing  is  favourably  disposed  to 
something  unless  it  is  like  or  suitable  to  it.  Hence 
since  everything,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  being  and  a 
substance,  is  a  good,  every  inclination  is  to  a  good.  "44 
Aquinas'  point  here  is  that  everything  can  be  good, 
and  so  can  be  desired,  and  what  is  desired  is  what  is 
seen  as  the  good  aspect  of  it. 
The  view  that  everything  that  exists  is  good  'insofar  as 
it  is  a  being  and  a  substance'is  expressed  earlier  in 
the  ST,  in  the  context  of  the  general  notion  of  good,  in 
STla.  5.3:  "Inasmuch  as  they  exist  all  things  are  good. 
For  everything,  inasmuch  as  it  exists,  is  actual  and 
therefore  in  some  way  perfect,  all  actuality  being  a 
sort  of  perfection.  "45Since  anything  perfect  is 
desirable  and  good  (STIa.  5.1)  it  follows  that 
"inasmuch  as  they  exist,  all  things  are  good".  There  is 
therefore  goodness  in  every  thing  that  exists,  and 
every  thing  that  exists  is  in  that  way  potentially 
desirable.  Conversely,  things  are  bad  because  they 
fail  to  exist  in  some  way:  "Nothing  that  exists  is  called 
bad  because  it  exists,  but  rather  because  it  fails  to 
exist  in  some  way;  thus  a  man  is  called  bad  when  he 
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fails.  "46  In  such  a  case  there  is  some  potentiality 
which  fails  to  be  actualized  and  in  this  respect  the 
thing  is  bad;  in  the  respects  in  which  potentialities 
are  actualized,  the  thing  exists  and  so  is  good: 
"  'Good'...  expresses  the  idea  of  desirable  perfection 
and  thus  the  notion  of  something  complete.  So  things 
are  called  'good'without  qualification,  when  they  are 
completely  perfect;  when  their  perfection  is  not  so 
complete  as  it  should  be,  then,  even  though  having 
some  perfection  inasmuch  as  they  actually  exist,  they 
will  nonetheless  not  be  called  perfect  or  good  without 
qualification  but  only  in  a  certain  respect.  "47 
Now,  the  statement  that  all  men  desire  the  good 
seems  somewhat  unilluminating  if  it  means  no  more 
than  that  all  men  desire  something  which  exists. 
Since,  however,  there  is,  in  Aquinas'view,  no  created 
thing  which  has  all  its  potentialities  actualized, 
everything  must  have  at  least  one  undesirable  aspect. 
Equally,  since  no  thing  can  be  wholly  bad,  for  it 
would  then  have  no  potentialities  actualized  and  so 
could  not  exist,  everything  must  have  at  least  one 
good  aspect.  It  is  this  metaphysical  view  which  gives 
Aquinas  the  resources  to  be  able  to  say  that 
everything  is  good  in  some  respect  and  so  everything 
can  be  desirable. 135 
Further,  the  goodness  or  otherwise  of  the  thing 
desired  is  not  objective  goodness,  but  subjective.  In 
STIa  llae.  8.1,  Aquinas  goes  on  to  say: 
"But  it  must  be  noted  that  since  every  inclination 
arises  from  some  form,  natural  appetite  arises  from 
the  form  that  is  present  in  the  natural  thing,  whereas 
sense  appetite  as  well  as  rational  appetite  -  the  will  - 
arises  from  a  form  as  known.  Hence  just  as  natural 
appetite  tends  to  a  good  that  is  in  fact  good,  so  sense 
appetite  as  well  as  the  will  tend  to  the  good  as  known. 
Consequently,  for  the  will  to  tend  to  something  it  is 
not  required  that  it  be  in  truth  good,  but  that  it  be 
apprehended  as  good.  "48 
Aquinas  therefore  defends  his  position  that  the  will 
tends  to  the  good,  and  only  to  the  good,  by  arguing 
that  everything  which  exists  is  good  insofar  as  it 
exists,  and  hence  desirable  in  some  respect,  and 
further,  that  even  those  aspects  of  things  which  are 
not  objectively  good  can  seem  to  be  good. 
Such  a  consistent  characterization  of  the  will  as  a 
tendency  towards  only  the  good  also  says  something 
very  important  about  the  will's  nature.  The 
distinctions  Aquinas  makes  between  the  tendencies  of 
plants,  animals  and  men  lies  in  how  their  good  is 
identified  and  sought;  in  each  case  the  tendency  is 136 
pre-set  towards  the  good.  It  seems  therefore  that  he 
does  not  see  the  will  as  peculiarly  a  neutral  tendency, 
but  rather  as  a  force  positively  directed  towards  the 
good  for  a  person.  As  Kretzmann  puts  it:  "  ... 
in 
Aquinas's  view  [the  will's]  nature  is  fundamentally  not 
that  of  an  independent,  equipoised  capacity  for 
choice,  but  that  of  an  innate  inclination  towards  what 
is  cognized  as  good  by  each  individual  intellect 
naturally  associated  with  each  individualwill.  "49 
The  will,  then,  is  a  power  to  want  what  is  understood 
as  good.  As  the  intellectual  appetite,  it  is  directed 
towards  the  good,  but  to  the  good  in  general  and  not 
to  any  particular  good  as  are  plants  and  animals. 
Because  it  is  not  confined  to  any  particular  good,  it 
may  tend  toward  anything  that  is  good.  And  anything 
that  exists  is,  or  may  be  seen  as,  good  to  some  extent. 
The  will  therefore  is  a  power  which  may  tend  towards 
absolutely  anything. 
But  just  as  anything  may  be  apprehended  as  good,  so 
it  may  be  apprehended  as  'not  good'.  Only  one  thing 
qualifies  as  totally  good;  everything  else  falls  short: 
"that  good  alone  which  is  complete  and  which  lacks 
for  nothing  at  all  is  that  object  which  the  will  is 
unable  not  to  want.  And  this  is  beatitude.  All  other 
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of  some  good,  can  strike  us  as  not  good  on  this  head, 
and  the  will  can  refuse  them  or  accept  them  as  the 
case  may  be  for  it  is  able  to  respond  to  one  and  the 
same  object  from  different  points  of  view.  "-50 
Here  is  the  vital  thing  about  the  will's  relationship  to 
particular  goods  -  it  can  accept  or  reject  them, 
because  they  can  be  apprehended  as  good  in  some 
respects  and  not  in  others.  It  is  in  this  sense  only 
that  the  will  might  be  regarded  as  "an  equipoised 
capacity  for  choice"  for  it  can  choose  between 
particular  goods,  not  being  determined  to  any  one, 
and  it  can  see  any  one  as  good  or  bad  or  as  a 
mixture.  This  ability  to  accept  or  reject  any  particular 
thing,  peculiar  to  the  will  and  not  shared  by  non- 
rational  animals,  is  qiberum  arbitrium'. 
B.  2  Liberum  arbitrium 
Because  the  will  is  not  determined  by  its  nature  to 
any  particular  good,  man  can  be  attracted  to  any 
good  and,  indeed,  to  anything  which  seems  good.  It  is 
possible  for  him  to  apprehend  any  individual  thing  as 
good  in  some  respects  and  not  good  in  others.  Since 
whatever  movement  he  makes  is  towards  the  good,  it 
seems  that  he  must  therefore  be  able  to  'make  up  his 
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are  not.  Aquinas  maintains  that  man  does  indeed 
have  such  a  power,  liberum  arbitrium'.  51 
Despite  first  appearances,  this  is  an  appetitive  power 
and  not  a  cognitive  one,  Aquinas  argues  in  STIa.  83.3. 
His  reasoning  is  that  choice  is  the  distinguishing 
mark  of  liberum.  arbitrium,  for  in  exercising  that 
power  we  are  deciding  in  favour  of  x  rather  than  y,  or 
x  rather  than  not-x.  Choice,  he  points  out,  involves 
both  cognition  and  desire  because  it  requires 
whatever  the  intellect  decides  to  be  accepted  by  the 
Will.  52Since  choice  is  directed  towards  good  however 
and  "since  good  as  such  is  the  object  of  appetite,  it 
follows  that  choice  is  more  an  act  of  an  appetitive 
power.  And  so  freedom  of  decision  is  an  appetitive 
power.  "53  That  appetitive  power  is  in  fact  will 
(STIa.  83.4). 
The  will  therefore  has  the  power  to  choose,  and  does 
choose  in  moving  towards  one  thing  or  another.  And 
in  acting  or  not  acting,  bearing  in  mind  Aquinas' 
distinction  between  the  exercise  and  the  object  of  the 
will.  If  voluntary  acts  are  willed  acts,  voluntary  acts 
seem  therefore  also  to  be  chosen  acts.  How  choices 
are  made,  and  the  part  choice  plays  in  a  voluntary 
act,  are  considered  in  depth  in  Chapter  4.  The  idea  of 
choice  also  highlights,  however,  the  close  relationship 139 
between  intellect  and  will  in  a  voluntary  act,  and  that 
also  is  considered  in  Chapter  4. 
At  this  stage,  the  main  points  to  be  noted  from  this 
discussion  of  the  will's  relationship  with  the  good  and 
what  it  says  about  the  will's  nature  are  that: 
(i)  the  will,  as  man's  inner  principle  of  motion,  is 
necessarily  directed  towards  the  good; 
(ii)  it  is  however  necessarily  directed  only  towards 
the  complete  good;  it  is  not  determined  to  any 
particular  good; 
(iii)  any  thing  whatever  may  be  apprehended  as 
good  in  some  respect,  and  so  the  will  may 
incline  to  any  thing  whatever; 
(iv)  any  thing  may  also  be  apprehended  as  bad  in 
some  respect,  and  so  may  be  rejected  by  the 
will; 
(v)  the  will's  moving  to  one  particular  thing  rather 
than  another,  or  moving  rather  than  not  moving 
is  not  determined  by  the  will's  nature,  but 
seems  to  arise  from  the  will's  choosing  between 
alternatives  or  options. 
To  the  extent  that  the  will's  movement  is  not 
determined  by  its  nature  therefore,  the  will  might  be 
said  to  move  itselL  But  is  this  really  so?  Might  there 
not  perhaps  be  something  else  which  moves  the  will 
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point,  how  far  the  will  really  is  a  self-mover,  to  which 
I  now  turn. 
B.  3  The  will  as  self-mover 
We  have  already  seen  that  Aquinas  identifies  the  will 
as  the  inner  principle  of  movement  in  human  actions, 
and  that  he  characterizes  humans  as  self-movers, 
since  they  have  within  themselves  both  an  inner 
principle  of  movement  and  knowledge  of  the  end  to 
which  that  movement  is  directed.  Further,  humans 
are  self-movers  in  the  fullest  possible  way,  since  they 
have  in  some  sense  'created'the  form  which  initiates 
their  movement.  In  order  for  them  to  be  regarded  as 
self-movers,  it  must  be  possible  to  identify  a  part 
which  moves  and  a  part  which  is  moved:  the  good  as 
apprehended  by  the  intellect,  plays  the  part  of  ýmover' 
and  the  will,  the  'moved'. 
The  will,  on  Aquinas'account  also  moves  itself.  In 
STla  llae.  9.3,  he  argues  that  it  sets  itself  in  motion, 
by  first  willing  an  end  and  then  by  willing  the  means 
to  that  end.  54  So,  by  willing  to  go  to  Rome,  my  will 
moves  itself  to  will  the  means  of  getting  there.  -95  As 
Aquinas  points  out,  this  two-fold  willing  of  means  and 
ends  shows  that  the  will  is  not  both  mover  and  moved 
in  the  same  respect,  and  so  not  (per  impossibile) 
simultaneously  actual  and  potential:  "It  is  as  actually 141 
willing  an  end  that  it  brings  itself  from  potentiality  to 
actuality  with  regard  to  willing  objects  for  that  end.  "56 
Nevertheless,  there  are  grounds  for  doubting  that  the 
will  really  does  move  itself.  The  self-movement 
described  above  relates  only  to  those  instances  where 
the  will  has  already  begun  to  will  something.  Having 
willed  to  go  to  Rome,  I  will  the  means  of  getting  there, 
but  the  initial  willing  of  going  to  Rome  still  needs  to 
be  accounted  for,  and  Aquinas  concedes  that  an 
external  principle  of  motion  is  needed  to  start  the 
will's  willing.  Further,  although  it  has  been  seen 
above  that  the  will's  nature  does  not  determine  it  to 
will  any  particular  thing,  only  to  will  the  complete 
good,  might  not  the  external  principle  of  motion  be 
something  which  moves  it  towards  a  particular  good? 
How  Aquinas  sees  the  relationship  between  the 
internal  and  external  principles  of  motion  is  therefore 
important  in  his  concept  of  voluntary  action. 
B.,  3.1  External  Principle  of  motion 
In  STIa  Ilae.  9.3,  Aquinas  argues  that  the  will  moves 
itself.  Immediately  afterwards,  in  9.4,  he  qualifies  this 
by  pointing  out  that  the  will's  claim  to  self-movement 
lies  in  the  fact  that  by  willing  an  end,  it  brings  itself 
to  willing  the  steps  to  that  end.  But  the  will  was  not 
always  willing  that  end,  and  so  something  must  have 
brought  about  that  willing.  Since  such  a  chain  of 142 
willing  ends  and  means  cannot  go  on  indefinitely,  he 
says,  there  must  be  some  exterior  efficient  cause 
which  initiates  the  process. 
A  similar  argument  is  developed  in  an  important 
passage  in  DM6: 
"...  by  way  of  actually  willing  one  thing  we  move 
ourselves  to  actually  willing  another;  from  willing 
health,  for  example,  to  willing  medicine,  since 
because  we  want  to  be  healthy,  we  start  to  deliberate 
about  what  will  make  us  healthy,  and  eventually, 
coming  to  a  decision,  want  to  take  our  medicine.  The 
willing  of  the  medicine  is  thus  preceded  by 
deliberation,  which  has  itself  issued  in  turn  from  the 
willer's  will  to  deliberate.  Now  because  will  moves 
itself  by  way  of  deliberation  ........  will  does  not  compel 
itself  to  will.  But  since  it  hasn't  always  been  willing 
deliberation,  something  must  have  moved  it  to  will 
deliberation,  and  if  that  was  itself,  then  deliberation 
must  have  preceded  that  movement  too,  and 
preceding  that  deliberation,  another  act  of  will.  Now 
this  can't  go  on  for  ever;  so  we  are  forced  to  admit 
that,  in  any  will  that  is  not  always  willing,  the  very 
first  movement  to  will  must  come  from  outside, 
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Aquinas'reason  for  insisting  that  something  external 
to  the  will  itself  is  necessary  to  start  the  will's 
movement  comes  from  his  general  metaphysical  view 
that  "Every  agent  which  is  sometimes  in  act  and 
sometimes  in  potency  needs  to  be  moved  by  some 
mover.  "58  So,  the  will  can  potentially  move  the 
intellect  to  deliberate,  or  the  other  powers  to  their 
appropriate  acts,  or  it  can  actually  be  doing  so.  But 
the  cause,  or  explanation,  of  its  moving  from 
potentially  doing  x  to  doing  x  actually  has  to  be 
sought  outside  the  will  itself.  This  is  a  clear  echo  of 
Aristotle's  arguments  for  a  first  mover  and  of  the 
argument  which  underpins  the  first  two  of  Aquinas' 
'five  waysof  proving  the  existence  of  God  (STla.  2.3). 
It  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis  to  examine  the 
soundness  of  Aquinas'  arguments  for  the  need  for 
such  an  external  first  cause.  What  is  important  for 
my  arguments  are  the  implications  of  there  being 
such  a  need. 
In  the  first  place,  one  might  have  considered  that  the 
need  for  an  external  principle  was  inconsistent  with 
voluntary  movement,  and  this  point  is  put  in  STla 
llae.  9.4,  Objection  1.  Aquinas  responds  that  the 
internal  principle  of  motion  which  is  the  hallmark  of 
voluntary  action  does  not  have  to  be  the  only 
principle  of  motion  in  such  an  action.  Although  in 
one  context,  the  will  can  be  taken  as  a  self-mover, 144 
this  is  not  so  if  one  looks  at  the  wider  context.  59  This 
is  consistent  with  the  view  in  STIa  llae.  6.1  in  the 
context  of  voluntary  action  generally:  "It  is  not 
essential  to  a  voluntary  act  that  its  internal  principle 
should  be  the  first  principle.  "60 
Aquinas  is  therefore  maintaining  that  the  will  is  a 
self-mover,  but  only  up  to  a  point.  What  matters 
however,  particularly  in  the  context  of  responsibility, 
is  not  the  need  for  some  external  principle  of 
movement  but  what  effect  that  principle  has  on  the 
will's  movement.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  will's 
self-movement  is  limited  in  that  it  does  not  move 
itself  to  the  ultimate  end  of  total  goodness;  the 
question  now  is  whether  the  external  principle  of 
motion  places  any  further  limitation  on  the  will's 
movement. 
In  STla.  105.4,  Aquinas  makes  clear  that  an  external 
principle  of  motion  does  not,  per  se,  force  the  will  - 
coercion  arises  only  if  the  external  mover  moves  the 
object  in  a  way  contrary  to  its  own  natural 
inclination.  61  Even  if  the  will  is  not  forced,  however, 
there  still  seems  to  be  a  major  difficulty  if  the  external 
mover  is,  as  Aquinas  maintains,  God.  If  God's  power 
is  irresistible,  as  Aquinas  must  hold,  how  is  it 
possible  for  the  will  to  do  other  than  accept  that  to 
which  God  has  moved  it?  And  if  that  is  so,  how  can  it 145 
be  moving  itself?  It  would  seem  that  God's  moving  my 
will  leaves  no  room  for  my  will  to  move  itselL  This 
point  is  made  throughout  Aquinas'various 
discussions  of  free  movement  of  the  will,  from  de 
Vertitate  to  de  Malo.  It  is  made  in  STIa  llae.  6.1  at 
Objection  3  in  the  context  of  voluntary  action 
generally  -  since  without  God  nothing  is  possible, 
humans  cannot  act  by  themselves  and  so  cannot  act 
voluntarily.  It  is  made  again  in  STla  llae.  10.4  Ob  1  j 
more  forcibly:  "Now  God,  who  is  of  infinite  power,  is 
irresistible:  so  it  is  written  Who  can  resist  his  will? 
Therefore  when  he  acts  on  the  human  will  its  motion 
necessarilyfolloWS.  "62 
Aquinas'  explanation  of  how  the  will  can  be  a  self- 
mover  even  though  God  is  the  external  principle  of 
movement  makes  the  points  that  (i)  the  way  God 
moves  my  will  is  very  different  from  the  way  it  moves 
itself;  and  (ii)  in  moving  my  will,  God  moves  it  only  in 
a  way  that  is  consistent  with  its  nature. 
It  is  quite  clear  that  Aquinas  does  not  see  God's 
movement  of  the  will  as  replacing  the  will's  inner 
principle  of  movement  -  there  is  still  a  role  for  the  will 
to  play.  In  STla.  105.5  for  example  he  says: 
"There  are  some  who  have  taken  God's  working  in 
everything  that  acts  to  mean  that  no  created  power 146 
effects  anything  in  the  world,  but  that  God  alone  does 
everything  without  intermediaries.  For  example,  it 
would  not  be  the  fire  giving  heat,  but  God  in  the  fire 
and  similarly  in  other  instances.  But  this  is 
impossible...  "  (because  'creation's  pattern  of  cause 
and  effect'would  then  be  taken  away,  and  because 
there  would  be  no  point  in  creatures'  having  the 
active  powers  they  obviously  do  have  if  these  powers 
did  nothing).  "God's  acting  in  creatures  therefore 
must  be  understood  in  such  a  way  that  they 
themselves  still  exercise  their  own  operations.  "63 
God's  movement  of  the  will  is  therefore  somehow  in 
parallel  with  the  will's  own  movement.  That  it  is  not 
prior  to  the  will's  own  movement  in  the  sense  of  the 
movement  being  started  by  God  and  then  continued 
by  the  will  itself  is  clear  from  what  Aquinas  says  in 
SCG3.70: 
"It  is  also  apparent  that  the  effect  is  not  attributed  to 
a  natural  cause  and  to  a  divine  power  in  such  a  way 
that  it  is  partly  done  by  God  and  partly  by  the  natural 
agent,  rather  it  is  wholly  done  by  both,  according  to  a 
different  way,  just  as  the  same  effect  is  wholly 
attributed  to  the  instrument  and  also  wholly  to  the 
principal  agent.  "64 147 
The  difference  in  manner  between  God's  movement  of 
the  will  and  the  will's  causing  its  own  movement  can 
be  seen  in  Aquinas'  extensive  treatment  of  God's 
activity  in  nature  and  will  in  de  Potentia  3.7.  In 
explaining  how  it  can  be  said  that  "God  is  at  work  in 
the  very  activity  of  nature  and  will"  he  lists  four  ways 
in  which  one  thing  can  be  said  to  cause  another's 
activity.  These  are  summarized  at  the  end  of  the  main 
body  of  the  response: 
"God  then  causes  everything's  activity  inasmuch  as 
he  gives  the  power  to  act,  maintains  it  in  existence, 
applies  it  to  its  activity  and  inasmuch  as  it  is  by  his 
power  that  every  other  power  acts.  And  when  we  add 
to  this  that  God  is  his  own  power  and  therefore  exists 
within  everything,  not  as  a  part  of  its  being  but  as 
holding  it  in  existence,  it  follows  that  he  is  at  work 
without  intermediary  in  everything  that  is  active.  "  65 
This  is  echoed  in  STIa.  105.5,  particularly  in  the 
response  to  Objection  3:  "  God  does  not  merely 
impart  forms  to  things,  but  upholds  them  in 
existence,  applies  them  to  their  actions  and  is  the  end 
of  all  actions...  "66 
God  is  therefore  said  to  be  the  external  principle  of 
motion  of  the  will  because  he  creates  the  will, 
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out  its  proper  acts.  This  external  principle  sits 
alongside,  as  it  were,  the  internal  principle  or  nature 
which  causes  the  will  to  will  end  E  and  then  means 
M.  This  latter  way  of  moving  the  will  is  clearly  very 
different  from  God's  way  of  doing  so. 
There  is  too  a  further  way  in  which  God  moves  the 
will,  mentioned  in  STIa.  105.5  ad  3,  above  -  as  final 
cause.  As  has  already  been  seen,  the  natural 
movement  of  the  will  is  to  the  universal  good.  And  the 
universal  good,  in  Aquinas'  account,  is  of  course 
God.  67God  is  therefore  both  the  first  efficient  cause 
and  the  final  cause  of  the  will's  movement. 
If  God's  being  the  external  principle  of  motion  of  the 
will  consists  in  his  creating  the  will,  sustaining  it  in 
existence  and  applying  it  to  its  activity,  it  follows  that 
his  movement  of  it  will  be  consistent  with  its  nature 
i.  e.  consistent  with  its  being  able  to  accept  or  reject 
any  particular  good  and  necessarily  drawn  only  to  the 
wholly  good.  This  is  expressed  somewhat  obscurely  in 
DV24.1  ad  3: 
"God  works  in  each  agent,  and  in  accordance  with 
that  agent's  manner  of  acting,  just  as  the  first  cause 
operates  in  the  operation  of  a  secondary  cause,  since 
the  secondary  cause  cannot  become  active  except  by 
the  power  of  the  first  cause.  By  the  fact,  then,  that 149 
God  is  a  cause  working  in  the  hearts  of  men,  human 
minds  are  not  kept  from  being  the  cause  of  their  own 
motion  themselves.  Hence  the  note  of  freedom  is  not 
taken  away.  1168 
In  STla  llae.  10.4,  the  point  is  expressed  in  terms  of 
the  necessity  or  otherwise  of  the  will's  movement: 
"Since  the  will  is  an  active  principle  without 
determinism  to  one  but  poised  before  many  objects, 
so  God  moves  it  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  not  pre- 
determined  to  one  object.  " 
And  in  10.4  ad  1: 
"The  divine  will  stretches  not  merely  to  the  doing  of 
something  by  the  thing  it  moves,  but  also  to  the 
manner  of  the  doing  consistent  with  the  nature  of  the 
doer.  Accordingly  it  would  be  more  repugnant  to 
divine  motion  were  the  will  to  be  forced  and  set  in 
motion  of  necessity,  for  this  does  not  befit  its  nature, 
than  for  it  to  be  set  in  motion  freely,  which  does  befit 
its  nature.  "69 
And,  finally,  in  DM6,  having  identified  God  as  the 
first  mover  of  mind,  he  goes  on  to  say  that  God  "just 
as  he  moves  everything  in  the  way  natural  to  it,  light 
up  and  heavy  down,  moves  will  in  the  way  will  is 
disposed  to  be  moved,  not  compelling  it  to  one 
course,  but  as  open  to  more  than  one  possibility.  "70 150 
Aquinas'  argument,  deployed  consistently  throughout 
the  texts,  is  therefore  that  God's  being  an  external 
first  cause  of  the  will's  movement  does  not  prevent 
the  will's  being  a  self-mover,  for  the  way  he  moves  the 
will  means  that  it  moves  only  as  he  designed  it  to  be 
moved.  And  he  designed  it  so  that  it  is  able  to  accept 
or  reject  any  particular  good.  The  will  is  therefore  not 
determined  to  any  particular  good  by  God's 
movement  of  it. 
This  description  of  Aquinas'  position  leaves 
unaddressed  here  however  the  major  issue  of  the 
relationship  between  the  first  cause  and  my  will  as 
secondary  cause,  in  particular  how  God  as  first  cause 
can  have  necessary  effects  but  the  will  as  secondary 
cause,  contingent  effects.  That  issue  may  cast  doubts 
on  Aquinas'  account  of  the  will's  ability  to  accept  or 
reject  any  particular  good,  and  hence  on  his  concept 
of  freedom.  It  is  considered  in  depth  in  Chapter  5.  At 
this  stage,  it  is  sufficient  to  note  how  Aquinas  deals 
with  the  point  that  the  will  cannot  be  a  self-mover, 
and  so  human  action  cannot  be  voluntary,  if  God  is 
the  external  principle  of  movement.  71 151 
B.  3.2  Other  things  which  move  the  will. 
The  will,  then,  is  not  moved  necessarily,  or 
determined  to  any  particular  thing,  by  either  its 
nature  or  the  external  principle  which  moves  it, 
namely  God. 
For  completeness,  it  should  be  noted  here  that 
Aquinas  also  holds  that  the  will  is  not  moved 
necessarily  by  the  sensitive  appetite  or  by  habit. 
Certainly,  he  concedes,  emotions  can  influence  how 
one  feels  about  an  object,  and  to  that  extent  can 
move  the  will.  Objects  can,  as  we  have  seen,  appear 
to  be  good  in  respects  in  which  they  are  not 
objectively  so;  how  one  feels  can  affect  how  one 
regards  the  object  and  make  it  seem  good,  or  bad,  in 
respects  which  might  appear  differently  if  one  were  in 
a  different  mood.  So,  if  one  is  or  has  been  ill,  food 
which  might  previously  have  seemed  desirable  is  now 
unappetising.  Similarly,  if  one  is  in  a  bad  temper,  one 
might  see  a  course  of  action  -  hitting  the  dog,  for 
example  -  as  good  when  in  more  relaxed  moments 
one  might  take  some  other  approach  to  the  dog's 
behaviour.  The  example  of  anger  is  the  one  Aquinas 
uses  to  make  this  point  in  STla  llae.  9.2: 152 
"Now  it  is  clear  that  man  is  changed  as  to  his 
disposition  according  to  the  passions  of  the  sense 
appetite.  Hence  something  seems  fitting  to  a  man 
when  experiencing  a  certain  passion  which  would  not 
seem  so  with  the  passion  absent;  for  example, 
something  seems  good  to  a  man  when  angry  which 
does  not  seem  so  when  he  is  calm.  In  this  way,  on  the 
part  of  the  object,  the  sense  appetite  moves  the 
Will.  "72 
However,  although  the  senses  and  their 
corresponding  appetite  may  move  the  will,  they  do  not 
ever  do  so  necessarily.  In  STla  llae.  10.3,  Aquinas 
argues  that  as  long  as  there  is  reason,  there  is  will, 
and  it  is  only  where  feelings  completely  overcome 
reason  that  they  control  actions.  In  such  a  case, 
however,  a  man  is  not  acting  as  a  man,  but  like  a 
beast.  Where  there  is  no  reason,  there  is  no  will,  but 
where  there  is  reason,  there  is  will,  and  will  is  not 
bound  to  follow  the  passion.  73The  reasoning  here 
seems  to  be  that  passion  will  influence  how  the  object 
appears  and  if  passion  completely  overcomes  reason, 
the  object  will  be  apprehended  only  as  passion 
dictates,  as  completely  good,  say.  If  reason  is  still 
functioning  however,  it  will  be  able  to  discriminate 
and  to  present  the  will  with  an  object  good  in  some 
respects  but  bad  in  others,  leaving  room  for  choice. 153 
Further,  this  inability  of  passion  to  necessitate  the 
will  would  seem  to  apply  not  just  to,  say,  an  isolated 
bout  of  bad  temper,  but  also  to  a  habitually  bad- 
tempered  disposition.  In  DM6,  for  example,  Aquinas 
concedes  that  although  emotions  are  easier  to  get  rid 
of  than  habitual  dispositions,  even  habit  "doesn't 
altogether  compel  one,  but  mainly  when  one  is  taken 
unawares;  for  however  habituated  you  are,  given  time 
to  ponder  you  can  go  against  habit.  "74 
These  passages  raise  several  interesting  issues, 
considered  in  detail  later;  75  their  importance  here  is 
in  showing  that  while  the  senses  may  influence  will's 
action,  they  do  not  compel  its  exercise  nor  determine 
its  object.  It  is  therefore  possible  for  Aquinas  still  to 
claim  that  the  will  moves  itself,  since  it  is  able  to 
choose  which  objects  to  move  towards. 
B.  4  Acts  of  will 
Just  as  the  power  of  intellect  is  exercised  in  several 
different  ways,  such  as  understanding  or  reasoning, 
the  will  acts  in  different  ways.  Choosing,  as  noted 
above,  is  one  act  of  the  will  relevant  to  a  voluntary 
act. 
Aquinas  divides  willed  acts  into  two  categories,  those 
commanded  by  the  will  and  those  elicited  by  it  - 
actus  imperati  and  actus  eliciti.  76The  precise  nature 154 
of  this  distinction,  and  the  purpose  of  it,  are  not 
however  easy  to  understand.  It  would  seem  that  an 
actus  elicitus  cannot  simply  be  an  act  interior  to  the 
will  in  the  sense  of  involving  only  the  will,  since 
choice  and  deliberation  are  both  said  to  be  elicited 
acts  and  both  involve  intellect  (choice  being  an  act  of 
will  informed  by  intellect  -  STla  l1ae.  13  -  and 
deliberation  an  act  of  intellect  prompted  by  and 
terminating  in  will:  STla  llae.  14).  Equally,  the 
distinction  cannot  be  made  on  the  basis  that  an  actus 
elicitus  is  one  beginning  and  ending  in  the  will,  since 
an  act  of  will  may  itself  be  an  actus  imperatus  (STla 
llae.  17);  as  such  it  is  an  act  of  reason,  based  on  will 
and  terminating  in  will. 
Kenny  describes  actus  imperati  as  "acts  whose 
execution  involves  some  power  other  than  thewill"77 
but  this  seems  too  wide,  since  it  would  include 
deliberation.  Brock  describes  an  elicited  act  of  a 
power  as  "one  exercised  by  it  as  that  act's  immediate 
source".  78This  would  allow  choice  to  be  included  as 
an  elicited  act  of  the  will,  but  seems  still  to  exclude 
deliberation.  It  may  be,  as  Kenny  suggests,  that 
deliberation  ought  to  be  classified  as  an  actus 
imperatus;  it  may  also  be  that  there  is  no  satisfactory 
description  of  'actus  elicitus'Which  would  allow 
deliberation  to  be  included.  Nevertheless,  two 155 
possible  explanations  suggest  themselves  for  Aquinas' 
having  so  included  it. 
First,  to  emphasise  the  very  close  link  between 
intellect  and  will  in  relation  to  this  element  of  the 
human  act:  deliberation  is  prompted  by  will's  desire 
for  an  end  and  terminates  in  will's  choice  of  the 
means  to  achieve  that  end.  While  strictly  speaking 
deliberation  is  not  an  act  of  will  but  is  immediately  an 
act  of  the  intellect,  its  existence  depends  utterly  on 
will's  desire  for  an  end.  Without  that  desire,  there 
would  be  no  deliberation.  79  Including  deliberation 
with  actus  eliciti  stresses  the  importance  of  the  willed 
element. 
Second,  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  deliberation 
as  an  element  in  a  voluntary  human  action.  Human 
actions,  it  was  seen  in  Chapter  2,  are  those  which  are 
deliberately  willed  -  "quae  ex  voluntate  deliberata 
procedunt".  80  On  this  account,  what  gives  rise  to  a 
human  action  is  not  just  an  act  of  will  but  an  act  of 
'deliberated  will'.  It  seems  that  it  is  at  this  point, 
when  the  will  has  become  'deliberated',  that  the 
action  takes  on  the  characteristic  of  'voluntary'.  Now, 
on  Aquinas'  account,  only  some  acts  of  the  will  can  be 
compelled.  In  STIa  Ilae.  6.4,  he  says  that  the  will  can 
suffer  violence  (i.  e.  be  acted  on  externally  against  its 
own  natural  inclination)  only  in  relation  to 156 
commanded  acts,  here  described  as  acts  Which  come 
under  the  will  yet  are  performed  by  other  active 
powers':  "As  to  [actus  imperatil  the  will  can  suffer 
violence,  to  the  extent  that  our  external  members  can 
be  stopped  from  carrying  out  its  command.  As  to  its 
own  proper  act,  however,  the  will  cannot  be  exposed 
to  violence.  "81  That  I  will  (or  intend,  or  choose  etc.  ) 
something  cannot  therefore  come  about  as  the  result 
of  external  coercion,  because  the  meaning  of  an  act  of 
will  is  that  it  should  spring  from  an  inner  want,  from 
a  natural  inclination  in  a  being  with  cognition.  If 
'deliberated  willing'is  as  important  as  it  seems  to  the 
concept  of  voluntary  action,  Aquinas  would  no  doubt 
wish  to  make  the  point  that  the  'deliberate'  element 
could  not  suffer  violence,  and  so  would  include 
deliberation  in  the  class  of  acts  which  cannot  be 
compelled. 
However,  important  though  this  use  of  the  distinction 
between  actus  eliciti  and  actus  imperati  is,  it  seems 
to  make  the  basis  of  the  distinction  less  clear.  Kenny 
uses  the  point  that  violence  cannot  be  suffered  by 
actus  eliciti  to  argue  that  deliberation  cannot  then 
count  as  an  actus  elicitus:  "a  blow  on  the  head  may 
interrupt  deliberation  about  how  best  to  steal  the 
jewellery  just  as  it  may  interrupt  the  theft  itself.  "82 
This  argument  depends  of  course  on  deliberation's 
being  regarded  as  a  process  which  takes  some  time, 157 
what  Kenny  calls  a  'clockable  event',  and  other 
reasons  have  already  been  given  above  why  Aquinas 
may  be  justified  in  treating  deliberation  as  an  actus 
elicitus.  But  the  distinction  between  the  two 
categories  does  seem  to  be  blurred  when  one 
considers  that  an  act  of  will  itself  may  be  an  actus 
imperatus.  In  STla  llae.  17.5,  Aquinas  states  clearly 
that  an  act  of  will  may  be  commanded.  83  If  this  is  so, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  violence  may  be  done  to  it,  if 
'violence'  is  used  in  Aquinas'  sense  of  a  coercive 
external  source  rather  than  Kenny's  'blow  on  the 
head'. 
It  seems  therefore  that  the  distinction  between  'actus 
elicitus'  and  'actus  imperatus'  is  not  entirely  clear. 
Perhaps  what  is  more  important  than  the  detail  of  the 
division  is  the  point  that  there  are  some  aspects  of  a 
human  act  which  can  only  come  from  within  and 
cannot  be  externally  imposed.  For  one  important 
implication  of  the  point  that  willed  action  cannot  be 
compelled  is  that  such  action  is  therefore  uniquely 
mine:  if  I  will  x,  it  is  I  and  no  one  else  who  does  that 
willing.  I  may,  on  the  other  hand,  as  Aquinas  points 
out,  be  dragged  along  by  force  even  if  I  do  not  will  to 
move.  In  such  a  case  my  action  is  involuntary,  and 
indeed  on  Aquinas'  characterization  would  not  seem 
to  be  my  action  at  all,  since  the  movement  of  my 
limbs  is  not  commanded  by  My  will.  But  a 158 
commanded  act  of  the  will  is  surely  just  as  much 
uniquely  mine  as  an  elicited  act  of  the  will. 
Discussion  of  the  division  of  acts  of  will  into  actus 
eliciti  and  actus  imperati  raises  however  another 
question  about  Aquinas'  account  of  acts  of  the  will. 
There  is  no  doubt  from  his  account  in  STla  llae.  6-17 
that  Aquinas  regards  willing,  intending,  choosing, 
deliberating,  consenting  and  enjoying  as  elements  of 
what  counts  as  a  human  action.  The  question 
frequently  raised  is  whether  these  constitute  an  act  or 
acts  which  take  place  'before'  I  walk  or  talk,  say.  Or 
indeed  before  I  undertake  a  mental  act  such  as 
thinking.  Or  willing. 
To  consider  walking  -  must  the  movement  of  my  legs 
be  preceded  by  some  identifiable  act  of  will?  There  are 
certainly  cases  where  such  an  act  can  easily  be 
identified  -  at  the  end  of  a  long  walk,  for  example, 
where  one  is  all  too  aware  of  willing  one's  legs  to 
cover  the  last  100  metres.  Similarly  with  thinking  - 
one's  mind  wandering  from  a  problem  and  one  then 
willing  oneself  (i.  e.  one's  intellect)  to  concentrate  on  it 
is  a  familiar  experience.  But  is  Aquinas  saying  that 
there  must  always  be  such  'acts  of  will'  before  a 
voluntary  action  takes  place,  that  a  voluntary  action 
consists  of  an  act  of  will  +  something  else?  Such  a 
concept  would  seem  to  be  challengeable,  notably  on 159 
the  grounds  put  forward  by  Ryle84that  such  frequent 
acts  as  acts  of  will  ought  to  be  describable,  but  are 
not  found  in  experience  to  be  so.  I  may  be  well  aware 
of  my  willing  my  legs  to  walk  the  last  100  metres,  but 
am  not  at  all  aware,  even  by  considered  introspection, 
of  the  almost  constant  acts  of  will  which  would  have 
to  be  taking  place  for  me  to  perform  everyday 
'voluntary  actions'.  Further,  since  willing  itself  may 
be  counted  as  a  voluntary  act,  it  too  would  have  to  be 
preceded  by  an  act  of  willing  to  count  as  voluntary, 
thus  leading  to  an  infinite  regress. 
Kenny85  defends  Aquinas  against  these  challenges  by 
arguing  that  the  various  'acts  of  the  will'are  not  acts 
in  the  sense  of  something  performed,  but  states  of  the 
will:  "When  Aquinas  says  that  actus  eliciti  are 
'unmediated  exercises  of  the  will',  he  is  not  referring 
to  mythical  acts  of  pure  willing;  he  means  merely  that 
when  we  describe  someone  as  wanting  something,  or 
intending  to  do  something,  or  delighting  in 
something,  we  are  merely  recording  the  state  of  his 
will,  and  not  saying  anything  about  his  talents,  skills, 
abilities  or  the  exercises  of  his  other  faculties.  "86He 
argues  for  this  position  on  the  grounds  that  'actus' 
need  not  mean  'act'  but  actualization  rather  than 
potentiality.  On  this  account,  Aquinas  would  then  be 
talking  of  the  'actualized'  as  opposed  to  the  'potential' 160 
will.  In  short,  the  expression  'act  of  will',  while 
convenient  in  English,  is  misleading. 
Kenny's  argument  is  plausible;  it  is  not  clear  however 
whether  it  really  represents  Aquinas'  position.  What 
is  clear  is  that  Aquinas  does  not  see  an  'act  of  will'  as 
preceding  a  voluntary  act  but  as  an  integral  aspect  of 
it.  This  emerges  from  his  description  of  a  human  act, 
a  fully  voluntary  act,  as  a  unity.  In  STla  Ilae.  17.4, 
dealing  with  the  question  of  whether  the  act  of 
command  and  the  act  commanded  are  one  act  or  two, 
he  makes  the  general  comparison  between  a  human 
act  and  things  composed  of  different  parts.  Just  as  a 
man  is  a  natural  unity  despite  being  composed  of 
body  and  soul,  so  it  is  with  human  acts:  "Accordingly 
it  is  clear  that  command  and  the  commanded  act 
form  one  single  human  act,  for  the  whole  activity  is 
single,  though  its  parts  are  multiple.  "87To 
understand  the  whole  human  act,  the  parts  of  it  have 
to  be  analyzed  and  one  part  is  clearly,  on  Aquinas' 
account,  some  activity  by  the  will.  In  the  context  of 
trying  to  establish  Aquinas'concept  of  human 
freedom,  the  most  important  issue  is  how  Aquinas 
sees  the  nature  of  the  will  and  the  role  it  plays. 
C.  Voluntary  acts,  the  will  and  the  intellect 
We  have  so  far  seen  how  the  will  is  the  inner  principle 
of  motion  giving  rise  to  a  human,  or  fully  voluntary, 161 
act.  We  have  also  seen  that  the  will  can  be  said  to 
move  itself,  in  that  it  first  wills  an  end  and 
consequently  the  means  to  that  end.  It  can  be  called 
a  self-mover  even  though  it  is  moved  by  both  an 
external  principle,  God,  and  by  external  objects.  This 
is  because  God  moves  the  will  only  in  accord  with  the 
will's  own  nature,  and  that  nature  does  not  determine 
which  particular  things  the  will  moves  towards. 
Instead,  the  will  can  accept  or  reject  any  particular 
object  and  choose  to  move  towards  it  or  not.  This  lack 
of  determinism,  and  the  consequent  ability  to  choose 
among  objects  seen  as  good  distinguishes  human 
acts  from  those  of  other  animals  and  from  plants  etc. 
The  process  of  choice  therefore  seems  to  be  a  crucial 
element  in  the  constitution  of  a  human  act  and  since 
human  acts  are  free  acts,  in  the  concept  of  freedom.  A 
detailed  consideration  of  that  process  is  therefore 
necessary. 
It  will  become  clear  in  the  examination  of  that  process 
that  the  will  is  not  the  only  faculty  involved  in  a 
voluntary  act.  Even  at  this  stage  however  it  is  clear 
that  an  act  of  will  is  not  sufficient  to  make  an  act 
voluntary.  It  was  established  at  the  beginning  of  this 
chapter  that  knowledge  of  the  end  to  which  an  action 
is  directed  is  necessary  for  that  action  to  count  as 
voluntary.  And  it  has  also  been  established  that 
knowledge  of  the  end  as  an  end,  and  of  the 162 
relationship  the  action  bears  to  that  end,  is  necessary 
for  an  action  to  count  as  fully  voluntary  and  human. 
Such  knowledge  comes,  clearly,  from  an  act  of 
intellect,  not  of  will,  and  so  intellect  must  also  have  a 
role  to  play  in  the  constitution  of  a  voluntary  action. 
This  is  clear  too  from  the  discussion  of  the  will's 
nature  and  its  ability  to  move  towards  anything 
'apprehended  as  good':  that  apprehension  is  an  act  of 
intellect,  often  described  as  the  intellect's  presenting 
x  to  the  will  as  good. 
Further,  Aquinas  says  that  by  so  presenting  the 
object  to  it,  intellect  moves  the  will  aas  a  formal 
cause".  What  makes  a  particular  mental  activity 
'willing'is  that  it  has  been  caused  by  the  presentation 
of  an  object  as  good  by  the  intellect,  just  as  what 
makes  another  particular  activity  'heating'  is  that  it 
has  been  caused  by  'heat'.  88This  description  in  the 
ST  of  the  intellect  as  formal  cause  of  the  will's 
movement  raises  two  further  points  which  will  be 
seen  to  be  important:  first,  that  it  is  only  those 
objects  apprehended  by  the  intellect  as  'good  and 
desirable'which  move  the  will  (STla  llae.  9.1  ad  2) 
and,  second,  that  it  seems  that  the  intellect  does  not 
move  the  will  necessarily  (ad  1). 163 
Finally,  one  of  the  key  things  which  ground  'self- 
movement'is  the  ability  to  judge  about  one's  own 
judgments  -  an  act  of  intellect. 
The  role  intellect  plays  in  a  voluntary,  human,  action, 
and  the  relationship  between  intellect  and  will  in  the 
constitution  of  such  an  action  will  therefore  also  have 
to  be  examined.  This  will  be  done  after  the  process  of 
'choosing'has  been  considered,  in  the  next  chapter. 
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appetite  [viz.  for  the  good]  is  of  course  called  natural  appetite;  a  stone  for 
example  is  said  to  have  an  appetite  for  being  farther  down.  But  in  things 
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deorsum.  In  his  autem  quae  cognitionem  sensitivam,  habent,  dicitur 
appetitus  animalis  ......  In  his  vero  quac  intelligunt,  dicitur  appetitus 
intellectualis  seu  rationalis,  qui  est  voluntas.  "  Trans.  Kretzmann  [1997] 
p.  201 
12  See  for  example  Physics  viii 
13  DV24.  I  c:  "quamvis  motus  eorum  consequatur  aliquod  principlum  In 
seipsis,  scilicet  formam  quarn  quia  a  generante  habent,  dicuntur  a 
generante  moveri  per  se,  secundum  philosophum  in  viii  phys.  Sed  a 
removente  prohibens  per  accidens;  et  haec  moventur  seipsis  sed  non  a 
seipsis.  ' 
14  DV24.1c:  "  Eorum  autem  quae  a  seipsis  moventur,  quorumdam  motus 
ex:  iudicio  rationis  proveniunt.  Quorumdam  vero  ex  fudicio  naturali  ex 
iudicio  rationis  homines  agunt  et  moventur:  conferunt  enim  de  agendis; 
sed  ex  iudicio  naturali  agunt  et  moventur  omnia  bruta.  '.  ...  "Unde  recte 
consideranti  apparet  quod  per  quem  modum  attribuitur  motus  et  actio 
corporibus  naturalibus  inanimatis  per  eumdem  modum  attribuitur  brutis 
animalibus  iudicium  de  agendis;  sicut  enim  gravia  et  levia  non  movent 
seipsa,  ut  per  hoc  sint  causa  sui  motus,  ita  nec  bruta  iudicant  de  suo 
iudicio.  Sed  sequuntur  iudicium  sibi  a  deo  inditum,  et  sic  non  sunt  causa 
sui  arbitrii,  nec  libertatem  arbitrii  habent.  Homo  vero  per  virtutem  rationis 
iudicans  de  agendis  potest  de  suo  arbitrio  iudicare,  in  quantum  cognoscit 
rationem  finis  et  eius  quod  est  ad  finem,  et  habitudinem  et  ordinem  unius 
ad  alterum.  " 
15  SCG2.47.4:  "Formae  autem  naturales,  ex  quibus  sequuntur  motus  et 
operationes  naturales,  non  sunt  ab  his  quorum  sunt  formae,  sed  ab 
exterioribus  agentibus  totaliter:  cum  per  formam  naturalem  unumquodque 
esse  habeat  in  sua  natura;  nihil  autem  potest  esse  sibi  causa  essendi..  Et 
ideo  quae  moventur  naturaliter,  non  movent  seipsa:  non  enim  grave  movet 
seipsum  deorsum,  sed  generans,  quod  dedit  ei  formam.  In  animalibus 
etiam  brutis  formae  sensatae  vel  imaginatae  moventes  non  sunt  adinventae 
ab  fpsis  animalibus  brutis,  sed  sunt  receptae  in  eis  ab  exterioribus 
sensibilibus,  quae  agunt  in  sensum,  et  diiudicatae  per  naturale 
aestimatorium.  Unde,  licet  quodammodo  dicantur  movere  seipsa, 
inquantum  eorum  una  pars  est  movens  et  alia  est  mota,  tamen  fpsa 
movere  non  est  eis  ex  seipsis,  sed  partim  ex  exterioribus  sensatis  et  partim 
a  natura.  Inquantum  enim  appetitus  movet  membra,  dicuntur  seipsa 
movere,  quod  habent  supra  inanimata,  et  plantas;  inquantum  vero  ipsum 
appetere  de  necessitate  sequitur  in  eis  ex  formis  acceptis  per  sensum  et 166 
iudicium  naturalis  aestimationis,  non  sibi  sunt  causa  quod  moveant.  Unde 
non  habent  dominium  sui  actus.  Forma  autem  intellecta,  per  quam 
substantia  intellectualis  operatur,  est  ab  ipso  intellectu,  utpote  per  ipsum 
concepta  et  quodammodo  excogitata....  " 
16  STIa  Rae.  1.2c:  "Dicendum  quod  omnia  agentia  necesse  est  agere  propter 
finem.  ...  materia  non  consequitur  formam  nisi  secundum  quod  movetur 
ab  agente;  nihil  enim  reducit  se  de  potentia  in  actum.  Agens  autem  non 
movet  nisi  ex  intentione  finis.  Si  enim  agens  non  esset  determinatum  ad 
aliquem  effectum,  non  magis  ageret  hoc  quam.  illud;  ad  hoc  ergo  quod 
determinatum  effectum.  producat,  necesse  est  quod  determinetur  ad  aliquid 
certum,  quod  habet  rationem  finis.  " 
17STla  Ilae.  1.5c:  "Quod  esse  non  potest,  si  aliquid  extraneum  ad  ipsius 
perfectionem  requiratur.  Unde  non  potest  esse  quod  in  duo  sic  tendat 
appetitus,  ac  si  utrumque  sit  bonum.  perfectivum  ipsius.  " 
18  STIa  Ilae.  1.6c:  'Quia  quidquid  homo  appetit  appetit  sub  ratione  boni. 
Quod  quidcm  si  non  appetitur  ut  bonum.  perfectum,  quod  est  ultimus  finis, 
necesse  est  ut  appetatur  ut  tendens  in  bonum  perfectum:  quia  semper 
inchoatio  alicujus  ordinatur  ad  consummationem  ipsius;  sicut  patet  tam  in 
his  quae  fiunt  a  natura  quam.  in  his  quae  flunt  ab  arte.  * 
19  Kenny  [1994]  p.  68 
20  Anscombe  [20001  pp.  33-34.  That  human  beings,  as  humans,  must  act 
with  some  end  in  view  is  a  necessary  truth  given  Aquinas'  definition  of  a 
human  act  and  so,  on  Aquinas'  account,  the  premiss  must  be  true. 
Nevertheless,  it  might  be  thought  that  Aquinas'  definition  of  human  action 
narrows  its  scope  so  much  that  an  inadequate  account  of  human  action 
results;  this  issue  is  considered  in  Chapter  4. 
21  For  detailed  consideration  and  a  defence  of  Aquinasposition,  including  a 
response  to  the  'Anscombe  fallacy',  see  Scott  McDonald  [  199  1  a]  pp.  31-65 
22  STIa  Rae.  6.8c:  "ignorantia  habet  causare  involuntarium  ea  ratione  qua 
privat  cognitionem.  quae  praeexigitur  ad  voluntarium  ....  Non  tamen 
quaelibet  ignorantia  hujusmodi  cognitionem  privat.  * 
23  STIa  llae.  6.8c:  *Et  talis  ignorantia,  non  facit  involuntarium,  ut 
Philosophus  dicit,  quia  non  causat  aliquid  quod  sit  repugnans  voluntati; 
sed  facit  non  voluntarium,  quia  non  potest  esse  actu  voliturn  quod 
ignoratum  est.  " 
24  STIa  Hae.  6.8c:  "Alio  modo  dicitur  ignorantia  voluntaria  ejus  quod  quis 
potest  scire  et  debet,  sic  enim  non  agere  et  non  velle  voluntarium  dicitur.  -* 167 
25  STIa  Ilae.  6.3c:  "Et  sic  voluntarium  potest  esse  absque  actu;  quandoque 
quidem  absque  actu  exteriori  cum  actu  interiori,  sicut  cum  vult  non  agere; 
aliquando  autem,  etiam.  absque  actu  interiori,  sicut  cum  non  vult  agere., 
26  STIa  Ilae.  6.3c:  "Sed  sciendum  quod  non  semper  id  quod  sequitur  ad 
defectum  actionis  reducitur  sicut  in  causam.  in  agens  ex  eo  quod  non  agit, 
sed  solum  tunc  cum  potest  et  debet  agere.  " 
27  STIa  llae.  6.3  Obj  3:  "de  ratione  voluntarii  est  cognitio  ...  Sed  cognitio  est 
per  aliquem  actum.  Ergo  voluntarium  non  potest  esse  absque  aliquo  actu.  ' 
Ad  3:  "eo  modo  requiritur  ad  voluntarium  actus  cognitionis  sicut  et  actus 
voluntatis,  ut  scilicet  sit  in  potestate  alicujus  considerare,  et  velle,  et  agere; 
et  tunc  sicut  non  velle  et  non  agere,  cum  tempus  fuerit,  est  voluntarium, 
ita.  etiam  non  considerare.  ' 
28  SCG2.47,  above 
29  STIa.  80.1  c:  'per  quam.  animal  appetere  potest  ea  quae  apprehendit,  non 
solum  ea  ad  quae  inclinatur  ex  forma  naturali.  " 
30  STla.  80.2c:  "Dicendum  quod  necesse  est  dicere  appetitum  intellectivum 
esse  aliam.  potentiam  a  sensitivo.  Potentia  enim  appetitiva  est  potentia 
passiva,  quae  nata  est  moveri  ab  apprehenso.  ...  et  ipsa  potentia  passiva 
propriam.  rationem  habet  ex  ordine  ad  suum  activum.  Quia  igitur  est 
alterius  generis  apprehensum  per  intellectum  et  apprehensum  per  sensum, 
consequens  est  quod  appetitus  intellectivus  sit  alia  potentia  a  sensitivo.  " 
31  STla.  59.1  c:  "cum  omnia  procedant  ex  voluntate  divina,  omnia  suo  modo 
per  appetitum  inclinantur  in  bonum,  sed  diversimode.  Quaedam  enim 
inclinantur  in  bonum  per  solam.  naturalem  habitudinem  absque 
cognitione,  sicut  plantae  et  corpora  inanimata;  et  talis  inclinatio  ad  bonum 
vocatur  appetitus  naturalis.  Quaedam  vero  ad  bonum  inclinantur  cum 
aliqua  cognitione;  non  quidem  sic  quod  cognoscant  ipsam  rationem  boni, 
sed  cognoscunt  aliquod  bonum  particulare;  sicut  sensus,  qui  cognoscit 
dulce  et  album,  et  aliquid  hujusmodi.  Inclinatio  autem.  hanc  cognitionem 
sequens  dicitur  appetitus  sensitivus.  Quaedam  vero  inclinantur  ad  bonum 
cum  cognitione  qua  cognoscunt  ipsam.  boni  rationem,  quod  est  proprium 
intellectus;  et  haec  perfectissime  inclinantur  in  bonum;  non  quidem  quasi 
ab  alio  solummodo  directa  in  bonum,  sicut  ea  quae  cognitione  carent; 
neque  in  bonum  particulariter  tantum  sicut  ea  quibus  est  sola  sensitiva, 
cognitio;  sed  quasi  inclinata  in  ipsum  universale  bonum.  Et  haec  inclinatio 
dicitur  voluntas.  " 
32  STla.  80.2  ad  2:  «Ad  secundum  dicendum  quod  appetitus  intellectivus, 
etsi  feratur  in  res  quae  sunt  extra  animam  singulares,  fertur  tamen  in  eas 
secundum  aliquam  rationem  universalem,  sicut  cum  appetit  aliquid  quia 168 
est  bonum.  Unde  Philosophus  dicit  in  sua  Rhetoyica  quod  odium  potest 
esse  dc  aliquo  universali,  puta  cum  odio  habernus  ornne  latronurn  genus.  " 
33  Commentary  on  the  Sentences  Book  4,  Ds  49  qu  1  ar  3b  ad  2:  "ad 
secundum  dicendurn  quod  coactio,  cum  violentiam  importet  et  prohibitio 
similiter,  non  pertinent  ad  illam  necessitatern  quae  naturam  rei 
consequitur:  quia  omne  violenturn  est  contra  naturam;  et  ideo  cum 
naturaliter  voluntas  necessario  feratur  in  beatitudinem,  hoc  coactionern  in 
ipsa  non  ponit  nec  aliquarn  libertatis  diminutionem.  " 
34  DV22.5c:  "Quamvis  autem  quadam  necessaria  inclinatione  ultimum 
finern  velit  voluntas;  nullo  tamen  modo  concedendurn  est  quod  ad  illud 
volendum  cogatur.  Coactio  enim  nihil  aliud  est  quarn  violentiae  cuiusdam 
inductio.  "  DV22.5  ad  2:  "quantumcumque  aliquod  bonum  efficaciter 
moveat  voluntatern  non  tamen  ipsam  cogere  potest:  quia  ex  quo  ponitur 
quod  velit  aliquid,  ponitur  inclinationern  habere  in  illud  quod  est  coactioni 
contrarium.  Sed  ex  perfectione  boni  alicuius  contingit  quod  voluntas 
determinatur  ad  iRud  inclinatione  naturalis  necessitatis.  " 
35  Commentary  on  the  Sentences  Book  4,  Ds  49  qu  I  ar  3c.  c:  "Ad  tertiam 
quaestionern  dicendum  quod  %onum  quod  est  objecturn  voluntatis,  est  in 
rebus'ut  dicit  philosophus  in  6  meta.;  et  ideo  oportet  quod  motus 
voluntatis  terminetur  ad  rem  extra  animam  existentem.  Quamvis  autem 
res,  prout  est  in  anima  possit  considerari  secundum  mtionem  communern 
praetermissa  ratione  particulari;  res  tamen  extra  animam  non  potest  esse 
secundum  communern  rationern  nisi  cum  additione  propriae  mtionis;  et 
ideo  oportet,  quantumcumque  voluntas  feratur  in  bonum,  quod  feratur  in 
aliquod  bonum  determinatum;  et  similiter  quantumcumque  feratur  in 
summum  bonum,  quod  feratur  in  summum  bonum  hujus  vel  illius 
rationis.  Quamvis  autem  ex  naturali  inclinatione  voluntas  habeat  ut  in 
bcatitudinem  feratur  sccundum  communern  mtionem.  Tamen  quod  fcmtur 
in  beatitudinern  talem  vel  talem.  Hoc  non  est  ex  inclinatione  natume,  sed 
per  discretionern  mtionis,  quae  adinvcnit  in  hoc  vcl  in  illo  summum  bonum 
hominis  constare.  " 
36  STIa  Rae.  1.7c:  "Dicendum  quod  de  ultimo  fine  possumus  loqui 
dupliciter:  uno  modo  secundum  rationern  ultimi  finis;  alio  modo  secundum 
id  in  quo  finis  ultimi  ratio  invenitur.  Quantum  igitur  ad  rationem  ultimi 
finis,  omnes  conveniunt  in  appetitu  finis  ultimi:  quia  omnes  appetunt  suam 
perfectionern  adimpleri,  quae  est  ratio  ultimi  finis.  ...  Sed  quantum  ad  id  in 
quo  ista  ratio  invenitur,  non  omnes  homines  conveniunt  in  ultimo  fine; 
nam  quidam  appetunt  divitias  tanquam  consummaturn  bonum,  quidam 
autem  voluptatem,  quidam  vero  quodcumque  aliud.  11 169 
37  DM6.1  ad  9:  "multis  viis  ad  beatitudinern  perveniri  potest;  et  ideo  licet 
horno  ex  necessitate  velit  beatitudinern  nihil  tamen  eorum  quae  ad 
beatitudinern  ducunt  ex  necessitate  vult.  " 
38  STIa  llae  10.2c:  "potest  enim  aliquis  de  quocumque  objecto  non  cogitare, 
et  per  consequens  neque  actu  velle  illud.  * 
39  DM6.1  ad  7:  "cum  autem  voluntas  se  habeat  in  potentia  respectu  boni 
universalis,  nullum.  bonum  superat  virtutem  voluntatis  quasi  ex 
necessitate  ipsam  movens,  nisi  id  quod  secundum  omnem  considerationem 
est  bonum:  et  hoc  solum.  est  bonum  perfectum  quod  est  beatitudo  quod 
voluntas  non  potest  non  velle,  ita  scilicet  quod  velit  eius  oppositum;  potest 
tamen  non  velle  actu,  quia  potest  avertere  cogitationem  beatitudinis,  in 
quantum  movet  intellectum  ad  suum  actum;  et  quantum  ad  hoc  nec  ipsam 
beatitudinem  ex  necessitate  vult;  sicut  etiam,  aliquis  non  ex  necessitate 
calefieret,  si  posset  calidum  a  se  repellere  cum  vellet.  " 
40  Jordan  [  199  11  p.  149 
41  in  op.  cit.  p.  149 
42  See,  however,  Chapter  4  below,  on  the  voluntariness  of  sinful  thoughts, 
and  the  possibility  that  thoughts  might  develop,  voluntarily,  from  Inklings' 
to  'fully  fledged  thoughts. 
43  There  is  a  suggestion  that  Aquinas  developed  this  distinction  between 
the  exercise  and  the  specification  of  an  act  as  a  reaction  to  the  Tempier 
Condemnations  of  1270,  to  avoid  any  implication  of  intellectual 
determinism.  See  Gallagher  [19941  pp.  249-250.  The  distinction,  expressed 
in  other  terms,  appears  in  earlier  works  (the  Commentaries  and  DV)  and 
cannot  therefore  have  been  introduced  as  a  reaction  to  the  1270 
Condemnations.  The  emphasis  on  the  distinction  does  however  become 
more  marked  in  the  later  works  (STla  llae  and  DM).  See  Lottin  [19421 
pp.  252-262.  But,  in  any  event,  I  would  contend  that  Aquinas'account  of 
the  relationship  between  the  will  and  the  intellect  does  not  lead  to 
intellectual  determinism,  irrespective  of  the  distinction  between  the 
exercise  and  the  object  of  the  will  discussed  here. 
44  Text  at  Note  4  above. 
45  STla.  5.3c:  "Omne  ens  inquantum  est  ens  est  bonum.  Omne  enim  ens 
inquantum  est  ens  est  in  actu  et  quodammodo  perfectum,  quia  omnis 
actus  perfectio  quaedam.  est. 
46  STla.  5.3  ad  2:  "nullum  ens  dicitur  malum,  inquantum  est  ens  sed 
inquantum  caret  quodam.  esse,  sicut  homo  dicitur  malus  inquantura  caret 
esse  virtutis,  et  oculus  dicitur  malus  inquantum  caret  actione  visus.  "  The 
Leonine  Edition  here  reads  "...  inquantum.  caret  acumine  visus.  "  implying 170 
perhaps  that  the  eye  is  losing  its  sharpness  of  focus,  say,  rather  than 
losing  its  power  of  sight  completely.  The  term  'fails'  in  the  English 
translation  '..  an  eye  bad  when  its  vision  fails'  seems,  however,  to  cover  both 
possibilities.  In  both  cases,  Aquinas'point  is  made  that  something  is  called 
bad  because  it  lacks  something  it  ought  to  have  i.  e.  it  fails  to  exist  in  some 
way  or  other. 
47  STIa.  5.1  ad  1:  "Sed  bonum  dicit  rationem  perfecti  quod  est  appetibile,  et 
per  consequens  dicit  rationem  ultimi.  Unde  id  quod  est  ultimo  perfectum 
dicitur  bonum  simpliciter;  quod  autem  non  habet  ultimam  perfectionem 
quam  debet  habere,  quamvis  habeat  aliquam  perfectionem  inquantum  est 
actu,  non  tamen  dicitur  perfectum  simpliciter  nec  bonum  simpliciter  sed 
secundum  quid.  " 
48  STla  llae.  8.1  c:  "Sed  considerandum  est  quod  cum  omnis  inclinatio 
consequatur  aliquarn  formam,  appetitus  naturalis  consequitur  formam  in 
natura.  existentem;  appetitus  autem  sensitivus,  vel  etiarn  intellectivus  seu 
rationalis,  qui  dicitur  voluntas,  sequitur  formam  apprehensam.  Sicut  igitur 
id  in  quod  tendit  appetitus  naturalis  est  bonum  existens  in  re,  ita  id  in 
quod  tendit  et  appetitus  animalis  vel  voluntarius  est  bonum  apprehensum. 
Ad  hoc  igitur  quod  voluntas  in  aliquid  tendat  non  requiritur  quod  sit 
bonum  in  rei  veritate,  sed  quod  apprehendatur  in  ratione  boni;  "  Trans 
Oesterle 
49  Kretzmann  [1997]  pp.  202-203 
50  STIa  Ilae.  10.2c  "..  ideo  illud  solum  bonum  quod  est  perfectum  et  cui  nihil 
deficit  est  tale  bonum.  quod  voluntas  non  potest  non  velle,  quod  est 
beatitudo.  Alia  autem  quaelibet  particularia  bona  inquantum  deficiunt  ab 
aliquo  bono  possunt  accipi  ut  non  bona;  et  secundum  hanc 
considerationem  possunt  repudiari  vel  approbari  a  voluntate,  quae  potest 
in  idem  ferri  secundum.  diversas  considerationes.  ' 
51  Frequently  translated  as  'free  will',  'free  choice,  or  'free  decision'. 
Because  it  contains  elements  of  all  these  English  concepts,  I  shall  leave  it 
untranslated. 
52  This  should  not  be  taken  to  imply  intellectual  determinism.  The 
relationship  between  the  will  and  the  intellect  in  relation  to  choice  is 
considered  in  Chapter  4. 
53  STIa.  83.3c:  "Unde  cum  bonum,  inquantum  hujusmodi,  sit  objectum, 
appetitus,  sequitur  quod  electio  sit  principaliter  actus  appetitivae  virtutis. 
Et  sic  liberum  arbitrium  est  appetitiva  potentia.  " 
54  STIa  Ilae.  9.3c:  'voluntas  per  hoc  quod  vult  finem  movet  seipsam  ad 
volendum  ea  quae  sunt  ad  finem.  ' 171 
55  How  these  means  are  identified  and  a  suitable  one  chosen  and  willed  is  a 
complex  issue,  looked  at  in  Chapter  4.  Here  I  pursue  only  the  general  issue 
of  how  the  will  moves. 
56  STIa  Ilae.  9.3  ad  1:  "Voluntas  non  secundum  idem  movet  et  movetur, 
unde  nec  secundum.  idem  est  in  actu  et  in  potentia;  sed  inquantum  actu 
vult  finem  reducit  se  de  potentia  in  actum.  resPectu  eorum  quae  aunt  ad 
finem,  ut  scilicet  actu  ea  velit.  ' 
57DM6.  lc:  "ita  per  hoc  quod  homo  aliquid  vult  in  actu,  movet  se  ad 
volcndum  aliquid  aliud  in  actu;  sicut  per  hoc  quod  vult  sanitatem,  movet 
se  ad  volendum  sumere  potionem;  ex  hoc  quod  vult  sanitatem,  incipit 
consiliari  de  his  quae  conferunt  ad  sanitatem;  et  tandem  determinato 
consilio  vult  accipere  potionem.  Sic  ergo  voluntatem  accipiendi  potionem 
praecedit  consilium,  quod  quidem  procedit  ex  voluntate  volentis  consiliari. 
Cum  ergo  voluntas  se  consilio  moveat  .....  non  ex  necessitate  voluntas 
seipsam  movet.  Sed  cum  voluntas  non  semper  volucrit  consiliari,  ncccssc 
est  quod  ab  aliquo  moveatur  ad  hoc  quod  vclit  consiliari;  et  si  quidcm  a 
seipsa,  necesse  est  iterum  quod  motum  volUntatis  praecedat  consilium,  et 
consilium.  praecedat  actus  voluntatis;  et  cum  hoc  in  infinitum,  procedere 
non  possit,  necesse  est  ponere,  quod  quantum  ad  primum  motum 
voluntatis  moveatur  voluntas  cuiuscumque  non  semper  actu  volentis  ab 
aliquo  exteriori,  cuius  instinctu  voluntas  velle  incipiat.  ' 
58  STIa  Ilae.  9.4c:  "Omne  enim  quod  quandoque  est  agens  in  actu  et 
quandoque  in  potentia  indiget  moveri  ab  aliquo  movente.  "  Trans.  Oesterle 
59  STIa  Ilae.  9.4  ad  3:  "voluntas  quantum  ad  aliquid  sufficienter  se  movet,  et 
in  suo  ordine,  scilicet  sicut  agens  proximum;  sed  non  potest  seipsam 
movere  quantum  ad  omnia  ....  unde  indiget  moveri  ab  alio,  sicut  a  primo 
movente.  " 
60  STIa  Ilae.  6.1  ad  1:  'non  est  de  ratione  voluntarii  quod  principium 
intrinsecum  sit  principium  primum.  -* 
61  STIa.  105.4  ad  1:  'illud  quod  movetur  ab  altero  dicitur  cogi,  si  moveatur 
contra  inclinationem  propriam;  sed  si  moveatur  ab  alio  quod  sibi  dat 
propriam  inclinationem,  non  dicitur  cogi;  sicut  grave,  cum  movetur 
deorsum,  a  generante,  non  cogitur.  Sic  igitur  Deus  movendo  voluntatem 
non  cogit  ipsam,  quia  dat  ei  ejus  propriam  inclinationem.  ' 
62  STIa  Ilae.  10.4  Obj  1:  "Sed  Deo,  cum  sit  infinitae  virtutis,  resisti  non 
potest;  unde  dicitur  Rom.,  Voluntati  ejus  quis  resistit?  Ergo  Deus  ex 
necessitate  movet  voluntatem.  * 
63  STIa.  105.5c:  "Dicendum  quod  Deum  operari  in  quolibet  operante  aliqui 
sic  intellexerunt  quod  nulla  virtus  creata  aliquid  operaretur  in  rebus,  sed 172 
solus  Deus  immediate  omnia  operaretur;  puta  quod  ignis  non  calefaccret 
sed  Deus  in  igne,  et  similiter  dc  omnibus  alfis.  Hoc  autem  est 
impossibile.  '  ......  .  Sic  igitur  intelligendum  cst  Dcum  operari  in  rebus,  quod 
tamen  ipsae  res  propriam  habcant  operationem.  " 
64  SCG  3.70.7:  "Patet  etiam  quod  non  sic  idem  effectus  causae  naturali  et 
divinae  virtuti  attribuitur  quasi  partim  a  deo,  et  partim  a  naturali  agente 
fiat,  sed  totus  ab  utroque  secundum  alium  modum:  sicut  idem  effectus 
totus  attribuitur  instrumento,  et  principali  agenti  etiam  totus.  " 
65  De  Potentia.  3.7c:  "sic  ergo  deus  est  causa  actionis  cuiuslibet  in  quantum 
dat  virtutem  agendi,  et  in  quantum  conservat  eam,  et  in  quantum  applicat 
actioni,  ct  in  quantum  eius  virtute  omnis  alia  virtus  agit.  Et  cum 
coniunxerimus  his,  quod  deus  sit  sua  virtus,  et  quod  sit  intra  rem 
quamlibet  non  sicut  pars  essentiae,  sed  sicut  tenens  rem  in  esse,  sequetur 
quod  ipse  in  quolibet  operante  immediate  operetur" 
66  STIa.  105.5  ad  3:  "deus  non  solum  dat  formas  rebus,  sed  etiam  conservat 
eas  in  esse  et  applicat  eas  ad  agendum  et  est  finis  omnium  actionum...  " 
67  STIa.  105.5c:  "cum  enim  omnis  operatio  sit  propter  aliquod  bonum  verum 
vel  apparens,  nihil  autem  est  vel  apparet  bonum  nisi  secundum  quod 
participat  aliquara  similitudinem  summi  boni  quod  est  Deus,  sequitur  quod 
ipse  Deus  sit  cujuslibet  operationis  causa  ut  finis.  " 
68  DV24.1  ad  3:  "deus  operatur  in  unoquoque  agente  etiam  secundum 
modum  illius  agentis;  sicut  causa  prima  operatur  in  operatione  causae 
secundae,  cum  secunda  causa  non  possit  in  actum  procedere  nisi  per 
virtutem  causae  primae.  Unde  per  hoc  quod  deus  est  causa  operans  in 
cordibus  hominum,  non  excluditur  quin  ipsae  humanae  mentes  sint 
causae  suorum  motuum;  unde  non  tollitur  ratio  libertatis.  " 
69  STIa  Ilae.  10.4c:  "Quia  igitur  voluntas  est  activum  principium  non 
determinatum.  ad  unum  sed  indifferenter  se  habens  ad  multa,  sic  Deus 
ipsam  movet  quod  non  ex  necessitate  ad  unum,  determinat.  '  10.4  ad  1: 
"Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  voluntas  divina  non  solum  se  extendit  ut 
aliquid  fit  per  rem  quam  movet,  sed  ut  etiam  eo  modo  fiat  quo  congruit 
naturae  ipsius.  Et  ideo  magis  repugnaret  divinae  motioni  si  voluntas  ex 
necessitate  moveretur,  quod  suae  naturae  non  competit,  quam  si 
moveretur  libere,  prout  competit  suae  naturae.  " 
70  DM6.  I  c:  "qui  cum  omnia  moveat  secundum  rationem  mobilium,  ut  levia 
sursum  et  gravia  deorsum,  etiam  voluntatem  movet  secundum  eius 
conditionem,  non  ut  ex  necessitate,  sed  ut  indeterminate  se  habentem  ad 
multa.  ' 173 
71  Also  left  unaddressed  is  the  question  of  grace.  In  STIa  Ilae.  9.6  ad  3, 
Aquinas  says  that  God  does  sometimes  move  the  will  to  a  determinate  good 
gas  when  he  quickens  us  by  his  grace.  "  This  is  a  large  and  important  topic 
in  its  own  right,  and  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  Since  Aquinas  argues 
that  God  moves  the  will  only  according  to  its  nature,  it  is  possible,  I  believe, 
to  consider  the  nature  of  the  will,  as  here,  without  considering  the  effect  of 
grace. 
72  STla  Ilae.  9.2c:  "Manifestum,  est  autem  quod  secundum,  passionem 
appetitus  sensitivi  immutatur  homo  ad  aliquam  dispositionem;  unde 
secundum  quod  homo  est  in  passione  aliqua  videtur  ipsi  aliquid 
conveniens  quod  non  videtur  ei  extra  passionem  existenti,  sicut  irato 
videtur  bonum  quod  non  videtur  quieto;  et  per  hunc  modum  ex  parte 
objecti  appetitus  sensitivus  movet  voluntatem.  "  Trans.  Oesterle 
73  STIa  Ilae.  10.3c:  "To  the  extent  that  the  reason  remains  free  and  not 
subject  to  passion  the  motion  of  the  will  survives  and  is  not  of  necessity 
driven.  In  brief,  either  there  is  no  motion  of  will  in  a  man  because  he  is 
dominated  by  passion,  or  if  there  is,  then  it  is  not  bound  to  follow  the 
passion.  "  "Inquantum  ergo  ratio  manet  libera  et  passioni  non  subjecta, 
intantum,  voluntatis  motus,  qui  manet,  non  ex  necessitate  tendit  ad  hoc  ad 
quod  passio  inclinat.  Et  sic  aut  motus  voluntatis  non  est  in  homine,  sed 
sola  passio  dominatur,  aut,  si  motus  voluntatis  sit,  non  ex  necessitate 
sequitur  passionem.  " 
74  DM6.1  ad  24:  "  consuetudo  facit  necessitatem  non  simpliciter,  sed  in 
repentinis  praecipue  nam  ex  deliberatione  quantumcumque  consuetus 
potest  contra  consuetudinem  agere.  " 
75  See  Chapter  4  below. 
76  STIa  llae.  1.1  ad  2:  "Actio  autem  aliqua  dupliciter  dicitur  voluntaria:  uno 
modo  quia  imperatur  a  voluntate,  sicut  ambulare  vel  loqui;  alio  modo  quia 
elicitur  a  voluntate,  sicut  ipsum  velle.  " 
77  Kenny  [1994]  p.  83 
78  Brock  [  19981  p.  174 
79  This  relationship  is  considered  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  4. 
80  STIa  Ilae.  1.1 
81  STIa  Ilae.  6.4c:  "Quantum  igitur  ad  actus  a  voluntate  imperatos,  voluntas 
violentiam  pati  potest,  inquantum,  per  violentiam  exteriora  membra 
impediri  possunt  ne  imperium  voluntatis  exequantur.  Sed  quantum  ad 
ipsum  proprium.  actum  voluntatis,  non  potest  ei  violentia  inferri.  " 
82  Kenny  [1994]  p.  87 174 
83  STIa  Ilae.  17.5c:  "Manifestum  est  autem  quod  ratio  potest  ordinare  de 
actu  voluntatis:  sicut  enim  potestjudicare  quod  bonum  sit  aliquid  velle,  ita 
potest  ordinare  imperando  quod  homo  velit.  Ex  quo  patet  quod  actus 
voluntatis  potest  esse  imperatus.  " 
84  Ryle  [2000] 
85  Kenny  [1975]  [1994] 
86  Kenny  [1994]  p.  86 
87  STIa  Ilae.  17.4c:  "Unde  patet  quod  imperium  et  actus  imperatus  sunt 
unus  actus  humanus,  sicut  quoddam  totum  est  unum,  sed  est  secundum 
partes  multa.  ' 
88  STIa  Ilae.  9.  lc:  "The  object  ......  moves  by  determining  the  act  after  the 
manner  of  a  formal  principle,  like  the  form  by  which  action  is  specified  in 
natural  things,  for  instance  heating  by  heat.  Now  the  first  formal  principle 
is  universal  being  and  truth,  which  is  the  object  of  the  intellect.  Hence  the 
intellect  moves  the  will  in  this  way,  as  presenting  its  object  to  it.  ' 
"Scd  objectum  movet  determinando  actum  ad  modum  principii  formalis,  a 
quo  in  rebus  naturalibus  actio  specificatur,  sicut  calefactio  a  calore. 
Primum  autem  principium  formale  est  ens  et  verum  universale,  quod  est 
objectum  intellectus;  et  ideo  isto  modo,  motionis  intellectus  movet 
voluntatem  sicut  praesentans  ei  ob  ectum  suum.  "  Trans.  Oesterle  j 175 
Chapter  4 
CHOICE  AND  DELIBERATION 
"The  will  is  the  root  of  freedom,  for  that  is  where  freedom  lies, 
yet  reason  is  its  cause.  " 
STIa  llae.  17.1  ad  2 
Introduction 
The  model  of  voluntary  human  action  so  far 
constructed  has  been  built  on  the  following 
foundations: 
(i)  all  action  is  done  for  an  end; 
(ii)  among  acts  done  for  an  end,  human  acts  are 
distinctive  because  they  are  done  for  an  end 
recognized  as  an  end.  All  human  acts  are  means 
to  some  end  or  other,  and  humans  are  able  to 
understand  the  relationship  between  their  acts 
and  the  end  to  be  achieved; 
(iii)  the  will,  which  is  the  internal  principle  of  motion 
of  human  acts,  can  be  moved  to  everything  - 
and  away  from  everything  except  total 
happiness,  the  only  complete  good.  Although  it 
is  moved  necessarily  towards  the  ultimate  end  of 176 
total  happiness,  it  can  move  towards  anything 
believed  to  constitute  that  end,  and  to  anything 
seen  as  a  means  of  achieving  that  end; 
(iv)  the  will's  movement  towards  any  particular 
thing  is  in  a  man's  own  power,  because  he  can 
decide  what  he  is  going  to  move  towards.  His 
making  such  a  decision  makes  his  action 
voluntary. 
This  model  provides,  however,  only  a  general  picture 
of  fully  voluntary  human  action.  To  fill  in  the  details 
of  that  picture,  it  is  necessary  to  look  further  at  the 
process  which  culminates  in  movement  towards  x,  for 
it  is  in  Aquinas'account  of  that  process  that  the 
nature  of  the  freedom  of  a  human  act  begins  properly 
to  emerge. 
We  already  know  from  the  general  model  that  all 
action  is  for  an  end  and  that  the  will  moves  towards 
what  is  seen  as  good.  Particular  actions,  however, 
seek  rather  more  specific  ends  than  'the  good'  or  even 
'something  apprehended  as  falling  under  the 
description  good'.  Aquinas'analysis  of  human  action 
in  STla  l1ae.  12  -  17  therefore  starts  with  a  particular 
end  as  its  first  stage.  The  act  of  will  which  establishes 
the  particular  end  to  which  action  is  to  be  directed  is 
labelled  Intention'in  Aquinas'  account.  An  intended 
act  is  more  than  just  willed:  it  has  been  resolved  on 177 
and  a  plan  for  achieving  it  is  to  be  put  in  place.  ' 
Intention'is  an  important  and  interesting  topic  in  its 
own  right,  and  has  provided  much  scope  for 
discussion  in  both  philosophical  and  legal  fields.  2  It  is 
mentioned  here,  however,  only  as  the  starting  point 
(and  in  its  realization,  the  finishing  point)  of  Aquinas' 
account  of  a  particular  voluntary  action.  The  features 
of  that  account  on  which  I  shall  concentrate  are  those 
which  constitute  the  next  stage  of  action  and  which 
determine  how  the  settled  end  is  to  be  achieved, 
namely  deliberation  and  choice.  These  are  the 
elements  which  constitute  the  decision-making 
process  by  which  the  will  moves  itself  to  the  means  of 
achieving  that  end. 
This  account  of  what  deliberation  and  choice  are,  and 
how  they  operate,  will  inevitably  raise  questions 
about  the  relationship  between  intellect  and  will,  and 
that  issue  is  considered  following  the  examination  of 
the  decision-making  process.  Finally,  I  shall  consider 
whether  choice  and  its  associated  reasoning  process 
really  are  essential  features  of  Aquinas'account  of  a 
fully  voluntary,  human  act. 
A.  Choice 
Aquinas  deals  with  choice  in  the  context  of  voluntary 
action  in  STla  Ilae.  13,  describing  it  in  the 
Introduction  to  that  Question  as  one  of  the  three 178 
"acts  of  will  with  regard  to  objects  which  are  for  an 
end.  "3He  goes  on  to  say,  somewhat  perversely:  "Now 
in  order  to  choose,  we  have  to  deliberate  beforehand. 
Accordingly,  we  shall  consider  first  choice,  second 
deliberation.  "4  It  might  have  been  thought  logically 
more  appropriate  to  consider  deliberation  first,  but  it 
may  be  that  Aquinas  puts  'choice'first  to  reflect  the 
fact  that  conceptually  choice  comes  before 
deliberation.  One  deliberates  in  order  to  make  a 
choice  which  one  has  already  implicitly  recognized  as 
needing  to  be  made  -  if  I  am  going  to  London,  it  is  the 
need  to  choose  a  way  of  getting  there  which  prompts 
me  to  deliberate  about  the  possibilities.  Choice  is 
therefore  the  final  cause  of  deliberation,  and  so 
Aquinas'  ordering  may  simply  be  the  normal  one  of 
treating  cause  before  effect.  Equally,  it  may  be  that 
Aquinas  places  choice  first  to  give  precedence  to  the 
role  of  will:  he  is,  after  all,  said  to  be  considering  the 
acts  of  will  relating  to  means  to  an  end,  and 
deliberation  is  an  act  of  intellect,  which  alone  seem  to 
make  it  inappropriate  as  the  first  thing  to  consider. 
Westberg  suggests  that  Aquinas'  approach  "highlights 
the  primary  role  of  choice,  basic  to  all  voluntary 
human  action,  and  the  secondary  role  of 
deliberation.  "5Whether  deliberation  is  indeed 
secondary  to  choice  in  Westberg's  sense  remains  to 
be  seen,  but  I  shall  follow  Aquinas'  treatment  in  the 
ST  and  consider  choice  before  deliberation. 179 
A.  1  What  choice  is 
However  curious  this  ordering  of  choice  and 
deliberation  in  the  introduction  to  Question  13  might 
seem,  it  does  serve  to  distinguish  choice  at  the  outset 
from  both  the  acts  of  will  relating  to  the  end  and  from 
the  intellectual  act  of  deliberation. 
Choice  is  established  first,  in  STIa  llae.  13.1,  as  an  act 
of  will,  but  not  simply  so.  Aquinas  uses  the  term 
'electio'for  choice,  and  that  term  implies,  he  says,  a 
quality  of  both  reason  andWill;  6and  if  considered  as 
a  kind  of  substance,  choice  can  be  said  to  be 
composed  of  both  reason  and  will.  Aquinas  here  uses 
the  analogy  of  an  animal's  being  composed  of  body 
and  soul:  just  as  an  animal  is  body  and  soul  together, 
neither  solely  one  nor  the  other,  so  choice  is  will  and 
reason  together.  7Similarly,  just  as  the  soul  is  the 
form  of  the  animal,  so  reason  is  said  to  be  the  form  of 
choice,  will  the  matter.  Reason's  input  is  what  makes 
the  particular  will  act  one  of  'choice'rather  than,  say, 
one  of  simply  'willing'.  Further,  just  as  liberum 
arbitrium  is  said  to  be  "a  faculty  of  reason  and  of 
will"8  so  choice  -  which  is  liberum  arbitrium  in  action, 
as  it  were  -  must  involve  both  reason  and  will.  9 
Despite  this  admixture  in  the  composition  of  choice, 
Aquinas  concludes  that  it  is  properly  an  act  of  will  - 180 
but  only  after  careful  consideration  of  both  sides  of 
the  coin. 
In  DV22.15,  for  example,  he  responds  to  the  question 
'Is  choice  an  act  of  the  will?  'by  saying  that  it  contains 
something  of  both  will  and  reason.  He  cites  Aristotle 
as  apparently  leaving  it  in  doubt  whether  it  is 
properly  an  act  of  the  will  or  of  reason,  since  he 
(Aristotle)  says  it  is  an  act  either  of  the  intellective 
appetite  (desire  ordered  by  reason)  or  of  the  appetitive 
intellect  (reason  ordered  by  desire).  Aquinas'own  view 
is  that  the  former  is  the  more  correct,  as  evidenced 
both  by  its  object  -  the  means  to  an  end,  a  kind  of 
good  -  and  the  act  itself,  "the  acceptance  of 
something  to  be  carried  out.  "10 
In  STla.  83.3,  he  again  describes  choice,  "the  proper 
act  of  liberum  arbitrium",  as  containing  both 
something  cognitive  and  something  appetitive;  these 
are  said  to  meet  in  choice.  The  responses  to  the 
Objections  further  emphasise  the  use  of  both  reason 
and  will.  So,  the  powers  of  appetite  are  said  to 
accompany  those  of  knowledge  (ad  1);  choice  is 
described  as  a  kind  of  judgment,  because  it  accepts  a 
decision  of  reason  (ad  2);  and  desire  is  said  to  opt  for 
one  thing  rather  than  another  because  it  has  been 
moved  by  knowledge's  comparisons  (ad  3).  11  In  the 
body  of  the  reply,  Aristotle  is  said  to  leave  open 181 
whether  choice  belongs  principally  to  the  will  or  to 
the  intellect,  but  to  favour  the  view  that  it  is  an 
intellectual  appetite  (appetitus  intellectivus).  This 
inclination  of  Aristotle's  is  again  supported  by 
Aquinas  on  the  grounds  that  the  proper  object  of 
choice  is  the  means  to  an  end:  "Now  this  precise 
concern  is  concern  with  the  kind  of  goodness  called 
utility.  So  since  good  as  such  is  the  object  of  appetite, 
it  follows  that  choice  is  more  an  act  of  an  appetitive 
power.  "12 
By  the  time  of  STIa  Hae.  13.1,,  however,  Aquinas'view 
is  more  positively  expressed  and  the  emphasis  is  less 
on  Aristotle's  approach  than  on  the  composition  of 
choice.  As  we  have  seen,  the  relationship  of  will  and 
reason  is  now  more  intimate.  Instead  of  being  a 
'concurrence'  or  simply  'something  of  will  and 
something  of  reason',  it  has  become  the  close 
relationship  of  form  and  matter.  Nevertheless,  despite 
this  closeness,  choice  is  still  said  to  be  an  act  of  will, 
and  now  said  obviously  to  be  so,  since  it  comes  to 
completion  in  a  "going  out  of  the  soul  to  a  good  which 
is  preferred,  clearly  an  act  of  appetitive  power.  "13 
These  passages  describing  the  nature  of  choice  are,  I 
believe,  very  important.  Consistently  through  the  DV 
and  the  earlier  and  later  parts  of  the  ST,  Aquinas 
takes  the  line  that  choice  is  composed,  in  some  way 182 
or  other,  of  both  will  and  reason.  Certainly  by  the 
time  of  STIa  Ilae.  13,  it  is  clear  that  both  will  and 
reason  are  essential  to  choice  -just  as  matter  cannot 
exist  without  form,  so  choice  cannot  exist  without 
reason,  for  intellect  is  the  form,  will  the  matter. 
Equally  consistently,  he  takes  the  line  -  whether 
following  or  explicating  Aristotle  -  that  choice  is 
primarily  an  actof  Will.  14 
It  perhaps  seems  strange  that  this  is  his  conclusion. 
He  could  justifiably  have  left  it  as  an  open  question 
whether  choice  was  an  act  of  the  will  or  of  the 
intellect,  or  equally  he  could  have  concluded  that  it 
was  an  act  of  the  intellect  -  considerably  influenced 
by  will,  of  course,  but  'principally'  an  act  of  intellect. 
This  might  have  seemed  the  most  likely  contender, 
given  that  reason  is  said  to  be  the  form  of  choice, 
what  marks  it  out  from  other  acts  involving  the  will. 
However,  in  all  the  passages  quoted,  he  assigns  the 
act  of  choice  to  the  will  -  and  in  each  case,  on  the 
same  grounds,  namely  that  the  object  of  choice  is  the 
good.  From  this,  one  can  infer  therefore  that  for 
Aquinas  one  of  the  most  important  things  about 
choice  was  that  it  was  concerned  primarily  with  the 
good,  rather  than  the  true. 
If  choice  is  indeed  an  essential  component  of  a 
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will  say  a  great  deal  about  the  nature  of  free  acts.  In 
particular,  the  significance  of  his  apparent  view  that 
the  object  of  choice  is  primarily  the  good  will  emerge 
when  we  consider  how  an  act  may  be  said  to  be  free, 
in  Section  C  below. 
A.  2  Role  of  choice. 
Choice  is  that  particular  act  of  the  will  which  accepts, 
or  rejects,  means  to  an  end.  Aquinas  distinguishes  it 
from  simple  willing,  which  relates  only  to  ends.  In 
STla  Ilae.  8.2,  he  makes  the  point  that  the  activity  of 
willing  is,  properly  speaking,  only  for  something 
which  is  in  itself  an  end: 
"For  every  act  denominated  from  a  power  designates 
the  simple  act  of  that  power;  for  example, 
'understanding'  designates  the  simple  act  of  the 
intellect.  Now  the  simple  act  of  a  power  is  referred  to 
that  which  is  in  itself  the  object  of  that  power.  But 
that  which  is  good  and  willed  for  itself  is  the  end. 
Hence  strictly  speaking  the  simple  act  of  willing  is  of 
the  end  itself.  "15 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  say  that  there  is  an  element  of 
simple  willing  in  the  willing  of  the  means  to  the  end, 
in  the  sense  that  what  is  (simply)  willed  in  the  means 
is  the  desire  for  the  end  which  they  will  achieve.  He 
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said  to  apply  to  first  principles  only,  not  to  the  truths 
which  are  drawn  from  them  -  except  in  so  far  as 
these  inferred  truths  are  seen  in  the  first  principles. 
The  end,  then,  is  present  in  the  means  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  the  starting  point  which  leads  to  the  means 
being  considered,  just  as  first  principles  are  the 
starting  point  in  ýmatters  of  cognition'.  Further,  just 
as  the  inferences  drawn  in  a  piece  of  speculative 
reasoning  embody  the  first  principles  from  which  they 
were  drawn,  so  the  means  embody  the  end  which  is 
to  be  achieved. 
This  parallel  between  practical  and  speculative 
reasoning  is  drawn  again  in  STla  llae.  13.3  where 
Aquinas  makes  it  clear  that  ends  are  not  chosen, 
endorsing  Aristotle's  distinctionl6that  willing  is  "of 
the  end  but  choice  of  the  means"  and  his  view  that 
the  end  is  the  starting  point  of  practical  reasoning, 
not  the  conclusion  from  which  choice  results: 
"Therefore  an  end  is  not,  as  such,  a  matter  of 
choice.  "17  If  the  end  is  what  drives  the  reasoning 
which  produces  the  conclusion  from  which  choice 
follows,  the  end  cannot  be  the  produc  of  that 
reasoning.  But  the  product  of  the  reasoning  is  what  is 
accepted  or  rejected  when  a  choice  is  made.  Therefore 
choice  cannot  be  of  the  end  -  at  least,  not  of  the  same 
end  -  which  prompts  the  reasoning. 185 
However,  having  made  the  point  that  in  a  particular 
piece  of  practical  reasoning  choice  concerns  only  the 
means  to  achieve  a  given  end,  Aquinas  goes  on  to 
make  the  equally  important  point  that  although  ends 
as  such  are  not  a  matter  of  choice,  what  is  an  end  in 
one  piece  of  reasoning  may  be  the  means  in  another, 
and  then  it  may  be  a  matter  of  choice.  He  again 
draws  a  parallel  with  speculative  reasoning,  where 
the  principle  of  one  argument  may  be  the  conclusion 
of  another  earlier  argument.  In  practical  reasoning 
too,  the  end  to  which  means  are  currently  being 
considered  may  have  been  the  conclusion  of  an 
earlier  argument.  So: 
Al.  I  want  to  go  to  London; 
A2.  The  quickest  way  to  London  is  to  fly; 
A3.  I  shall  fly  to  London. 
B1.  I  shall  fly  to  London; 
B2.  To  fly  to  London,  I  need  to  book  tickets; 
B3.  I  shall  go  to  the  travel  agency  today. 
The  conclusion  of  argument  A  has  become  the 
principle  or  starting  point  of  argument  B;  that  is,  it 
has  established  the  end  for  which  means  are  to  be 
found  in  argument  B.  That  end  "I  shall  fly  to  London" 
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could  after  all  have  gone  to  London  by  some  other 
means.  18 
In  a  similar  way,  the  end  which  drove  argument  A,  "I 
want  to  go  to  London",  might  itself  have  been  the 
product  of  some  earlier,  more  general,  argument 
which  started,  say,  with  the  end  "I  want  to  go  on 
holiday".  This  process  of  inter-linking  arguments  can 
be  lengthy,  but  as  Aquinas  points  out,  it  does  not  go 
on  indefinitely.  Here  again  the  parallel  between 
speculative  and  practical  reasoning  is  drawn.  Just  as 
the  first  principles  of  thought  cannot  be  arrived  at  by 
demonstration,  so  the  first  end  in  practical  reasoning 
-  the  desire  for  the  complete  good  -  cannot  be  chosen. 
As  we  have  seen,  that  end  is  sought  necessarily  and 
is  not  subject  to  choice.  19 
All  other  ends  can,  however,  be  chosen  as  the 
conclusions  of  arguments  deriving  from  that  first  end. 
We  have  already  seen  the  importance,  in  general 
terms,  of  the  argument  that  only  the  final  end  is 
determined;  its  importance  here  in  relation  to  choice 
is  that  even  where  means  to  a  given  end  other  than 
the  final  end  are  restricted  or  even  necessary,  choice 
is  not  completely  denied,  for  that  end  may  itself  have 
been  chosen. 187 
One  other  important  point  about  the  role  of  choice  is 
that,  since  it  is  the  preference  of  one  thing  to  another 
as  a  means  to  an  end,  it  cannot  be  attributed  to 
animals.  As  we  have  already  seen,  animals  cannot  be 
said  to  know  an  end  as  an  end.  While  therefore  they 
may  do  things  for  a  purpose,  as  a  dog  digs  for  a 
buried  bone,  for  example,  this  is  not  an  act  done  for 
an  end  recognized  as  such.  They  cannot  then  order 
means  to  ends,  as  the  process  of  choice  requires. 
Further,  where  they  do  take  one  thing  in  preference 
to  another,  this  preference  is  determined  for  them, 
Aquinas  believes,  by  their  "natural  estimative 
power".  20  This  exclusion  of  animals  from  the  process 
of  choice  serves  to  underline  its  importance  in  the 
makeup  of  fully  voluntary  acts,  from  which  animals 
and  children  are,  as  we  have  seen,  excluded. 
B.  Deliberation 
Choice,  then,  is  an  act  of  will  in  which  the  will  moves 
towards  one  thing  in  preference  to  another.  Since 
choice  is  only  of  means,  and  since  nothing  is  willed 
without  previously  having  been  known,  the  thing 
chosen  must  previously  have  been  identified  by  the 
intellect  as  'good'in  the  sense  of  being  a  possible  way 
of  achieving  the  desired  end.  Further,  choice  is  said 
by  Aquinas  to  be  Informed'by  reason,  following  "a 
judgment  of  reason  about  what  is  to  be  done.  "21  There 188 
must  therefore  be  some  act  of  the  intellect  by  which 
means  M  have  been  decided  on. 
According  to  Aquinas,  this  decision  is  -  in  doubtful 
matters  at  least  -  the  result  of  an  investigation,  called 
deliberation  (consilium).  22Like  choice,  deliberation  is 
concerned  with  means,  not  ends,  since  it  is  an 
enquiry  into  how  something  may  be  achieved  and 
therefore  takes  that  something,  the  end,  for  granted. 
Equally,  however,  the  end  of  one  enquiry  may  be  the 
means  in  another  and  to  that  extent  may  be 
deliberated  about,  just  as  an  end  may  have  been  the 
product  of  an  earlier  choice.  23 
Like  choice  too,  deliberation  has  'something  of  both 
will  and  reason':  "the  reason's  act  of  deliberating 
displays  the  influence  of  the  will,  with  respect  both  to 
matter,  for  a  man  deliberates  about  what  he  wants  to 
do,  and  to  motive,  for  it  is  because  he  wants 
something  that  he  is  prompted  to  deliberate  about 
it.  "24Aquinas  highlights  the  comparison  by  repeating 
the  Aristotelian  authority  for  referring  to  choice  as 
"intellectus  appetitivuS"25and  citing  Damascene  as 
referring  to  deliberation  as  'appetitus  inquisitivus'"in 
order  to  show  how  it  is  a  function  both  of  the  will  and 
of  the  reason,  for  the  enquiry  is  conducted  on  behalf 
of  and  under  the  impulse  of  the  will,  and  is  pursued 
by  the  reason.  "26The  will,  then,  wants  to  know  how 189 
something  may  be  accomplished,  and  sets  the 
intellect  to  work  to  obtain  an  answer  to  this  question. 
It  can  be  seen,  therefore,  that  although  no  claim  is 
made  that  deliberation  is  composed  of  both  will  and 
reason  as  choice  is,  the  way  Aquinas  treats 
deliberation  and  choice  in  Questions  14  and  13 
respectively  highlights  the  similarity  and  close 
relationship  between  them. 
Deliberation  also  involves  a  further  act  of  will, 
consent.  This  is  the  will's  approval  to  the  means 
identified  by  deliberation  and  comes  before  choice.  27 
It  is  described,  interestingly,  by  Finnis  as  the  will's 
"responding  with  interest,  and  sustained  interest,  to 
one  or  more  of  these  [identified]  possibilities  as  an 
interesting  proposal,  a  live  option  or  options.  "28 
The  sequence  of  events  therefore  seems  to  be: 
(i)  desire  for  an  end; 
(ii)  deliberation  about  the  means  of  obtaining  it; 
(iii)  review  of  the  identified  means; 
(iv)  choice  of  means. 
Aquinas  maintains  that  (iii)  and  (iv)  are  separate 
stages,  since  deliberation  may  disclose  several  means, 
all  of  which  are  approved  of  but  only  one  of  which  is 
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preliminary,  conditional,  acceptance  of  possible 
means,  one  of  which  is  -  presumably  after  further 
input  from  reason  -  chosen  i.  e.  taken  in  preference  to 
the  others.  In  this  account,  deliberation  is  a  two  stage 
process,  and  consideration  of  it  as  such  shows  clearly 
the  extent  of  the  interaction  between  will  and 
intellect.  This  becomes  even  more  apparent  if  one 
supposes  that  consent  is  withheld  from  an  identified 
means.  Say,  for  example,  I  intend  to  go  to  London. 
Deliberation  about  how  I  might  do  so  identifies  train, 
plane,  bus  and  car  as  possible  means  of  transport. 
Since  I  have  a  great  dislike  of  driving,  'car'is 
immediately  ruled  out;  consent  is,  however,  given  to 
the  other  possibilities.  The  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  the  remaining  three  are  considered, 
'plane'judged  the  best  and  that  method  of  transport 
chosen.  Will  is  therefore  not  only  the  start  and  finish 
of  this  process  but  an  integral  part  of  it,  for  the  will 
keeps  deliberation  going,  through  selection  of  live 
options,  to  use  Finnis's  words,  to  the  point  where  a 
judgment  and  choice  can  be  made. 
Now,  this  description  of  the  ordered  sequence  for 
practical  action  raises  an  interesting  question  about 
how  far  the  role  of  'deliberation'  extends. 
One  possible  reading  of  Aquinas'  analysis  of  the  early 
stages  of  voluntary  action  is  that  there  are  three 191 
stages  which  can  be  described  as:  (a)  intention;  (b) 
deliberation  about,  and  judgment  of,  best  means  to 
the  intended  end;  and  (c)  choice  of  means.  Here 
choice  is  seen  as  the  will's  endorsement,  or  otherwise, 
of  the  means  identified  by  the  intellect  as  'best'. 
Another  reading  is  that  put  forward  by  Westberg3O 
which  sees  the  stages  as:  (a)  intention;  (b) 
deliberation  about  means;  (c)  decision,  comprising 
judgment  and  'clectio'.  Westberg  bases  his  description 
on  a  reading  of  Aristotle  which  distinguishes  two 
separate  and  different  reasoning  processes,  or 
practical  syllogisms,  one  for  deliberation  and  one  for 
decision.  He  rejects  the  view  that  decision  is  the 
conclusion  of  deliberation,  arguing  instead  that  "the 
function  of  deliberation  is  to  specify  the  means  to  a 
desired  end",  these  means  being  approved  of  by  the 
will,  in  its  consenting  to  them.  31  The  function  of 
decision,  on  the  other  hand,  is  to  "reason  about  a 
particular  means  or  action  in  relation  to  achieving  the 
end.  "32He  illustrates  the  difference  by  the  example  of 
someone  who  intends  to  become  physically  fit. 
Deliberation  about  how  this  might  be  achieved  "might 
eliminate  a  club  membership  as  too  costly,  bicycling 
as  too  dangerous  and  jogging  as  too  boring.  "  Getting 
up  early  and  walking  is  concluded  to  be  the  best 
solution.  At  this  point,  Westberg  argues,  there  is  a 
conclusion  to  deliberation,  but  no  action;  the  decision 
to  act  he  sees  as  coming  from  the  following  reasoning: 192 
"I  want  to  become  fit;  getting  up  early  is  the  best  way 
to  start;  Id  better  set  the  alarm  clock  for  6.00.  Therel" 
Westberg's  point  seems  to  be  that  the  purpose  of  the 
reasoning  employed  in  what  might  be  called  stage  1  is 
different  from  that  in  stage  2:  the  former  is  about 
establishing  what  means  will  achieve  end  E,  the  latter 
about  how  that  approved,  though  not  yet  chosen, 
means  can  be  realised.  Only  the  first  of  these  two 
stages  is,  he  argues,  what  Aquinas  calls  'deliberation'; 
the  second  Westberg  calls  'the  decision  to  act'  and 
consists  of  judgment  about  means  and  electio.  This 
would  seem  to  imply  that  a  choice  of  means  to 
achieve  E  is  not  actually  made  until  the  way  of 
realizing  the  means  has  been  worked  out. 
One  difficulty  with  Westberg's  analysis  is  that  by  his 
own  account,  the  conclusion  reached  at  the  end  of 
stage  1  is  that  'getting  up  early  and  walking  to  work 
is  the  best  solution'.  This  singling  out  of  one  option  in 
preference  to  the  others  would  seem  to  imply  both  a 
judgment  and  an  acceptance  by  the  will  -  in  other 
words,  a  'choice',  or  in  Westberg's  terms,  a  'decision 
to  act'.  Westberg  however  denies  that  the  decision  to 
act  comes  here  -  rather,  he  says,  the  decision  to  act 
comes  with  the  reasoning  about  the  alarm  clock.  This 
seems  inconsistent  with  his  own  account  of  a 
decision  to  act. 193 
Westberg's  illustration  might  equally  well,  however, 
be  regarded  as  two  linked  deliberations  each  of  which 
concludes  in  a  'decision  to  act',  or  'choice'.  'Getting  up 
early  and  walking  to  work'  (M)  is  the  choice  of  means 
to  achieve  the  end  of  becoming  fit  (E),  and  has  been 
arrived  at  after  an  enquiry  into  various  possibilities, 
which  enquiry  was  followed  by  a  judgment  that  M 
was  best.  To  Westberg's  point  that  there  is  no  act  at 
this  stage,  only  a  conclusion,  it  can  be  argued  that 
there  is  an  internal  act,  namely  the  choice  of  M. 
Having  chosen  to  get  up  early  to  walk  to  work 
however,  I  make  a  further  enquiry  about  what  needs 
to  be  done  to  achieve  that  end,  and  choose  to  set  the 
alarm.  Both  these  enquiries  -What  is  the  best  way  of 
achieving  ET  and  'What  needs  to  be  done  to  bring  M 
(and  hence  E)  about?  '  seem  to  fall  within  Aquinas' 
description  of  deliberation. 
Aquinas  certainly  seems  to  envisage  the  prospect  of 
such  serial  deliberation  in  his  discussion  in  STla 
llae.  14.2  where  he  says  that  the  end  assumed  in  one 
enquiry  may  be  treated  as  a  means  in  another.  33 
Further,  STIa  llae.  14.6  would  seem  to  imply  that  the 
process  of  deliberation  continues  until  the  first  thing 
to  be  done  to  achieve  the  desired  end  has  been 
arrived  at.  There  Aquinas  says  that  the  finish  of 
deliberation  is  that  which  can  be  done  at  once:  "That 194 
which  presents  itself  as  the  first  thing  to  be  done  has 
the  character  of  an  ultimate  conclusion,  and  at  this 
final  decision  deliberation  comes  to  a  Stop.  "34 
Further  consideration  of  whether  Westberg's 
interpretation  of  Aristotle,  and  so  of  Aquinas,  on  the 
scope  of  deliberation  is  defensible  is  beyond  the  ambit 
of  this  theSiS.  350ne  of  Westberg's  reasons  for 
separating  'decision'  from  deliberation  is  however 
relevant  here,  namely  the  argument  that  deliberation 
is  not  an  essential  stage  in  a  fully  voluntary  human 
action:  "For  Aquinas,  deliberation,  as  a  stage  in 
practical  reason,  is  not  even  a  necessary  part  of 
human  action.  It  is  choice  or  decision  that  provides 
the  essential  link  between  intention  and  action  .....  A 
great  many  ordinary  actions  are  intended,  chosen 
and  executed  (and,  are  fully  voluntary)  without 
deliberation.  "36 
It  does  seem  arguable  that  Aquinas  holds  that 
deliberation  is  not  a  necessary  stage  of  all  actions. 
Westberg  points  to  ST111a.  18.4,  Aquinas'  discussion  of 
whether  there  was  free  will  in  Christ,  where  the 
Objection  is  put  that  Christ  was  certain  of  everything, 
therefore  did  not  require  to  take  counsel  and 
therefore  had  no  free  will.  In  response,  Aquinas  says: 195 
"Choice  presupposes  the  taking  of  counsel,  but  it 
does  not  proceed  from  it  until  the  counsel  has  been 
brought  to  a  conclusion  by  a  judgment.  It  is  what  we 
judge  should  be  done,  after  we  have  pursued  the 
inquiries  of  counsel-taking,  that  we  choose. 
Consequently,  if  the  judgment  that  something  ought 
to  be  done  should  be  formed  without  preliminary 
hesitation  or  inquiry,  then  this  is  adequate  for  a 
choice  to  be  made.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  hesitation  or 
inquiry  are  not  essential  concomitants  of  choice.  They 
are  characteristic  of  it  exclusively  in  one  subject  to 
ignorance.  "37 
In  STla  Ilae.  14.4  also,  dealing  more  specifically  with 
human  acts,  he  makes  the  point  that  enquiry  is 
needed  into  matters  which  are  open  to  doubt.  There, 
endorsing  Aristotle,  he  gives  examples  of  two  kinds  of 
matters  which  are  not  deliberated  about:  trffles,  and 
those  which  have  to  be  done  in  a  pre-determined  way, 
since  such  matters  are  not  open  to  doubt.  When  it 
really  does  not  matter  whether  the  daffodil  bulbs  are 
planted  to  the  left  or  to  the  right  of  the  tree,  for 
example,  one  does  not  deliberate  but  just  gets  on  and 
does  it'.  Equally,  one  does  not  have  to  deliberate 
about  how  to  write  the  letter  'a':  there  is  an 
established  way  of  doing  thiS.  38 196 
There  are,  then,  in  Aquinas'  account,  actions  which 
do  not  have  the  'investigation  or  enquiry'  of 
deliberation  as  a  feature  of  them;  the  issue  is,  are 
these  fully  voluntary  i.  e.  human,  and  so  free, 
actions?  In  other  words,  is  deliberation  an  essential 
feature  of  a  free  act  and  hence  an  essential 
component  of  Aquinas'concept  of  freedom? 
Aquinas'earlier  discussion  of  voluntary  action  in 
general  seems  to  imply  that  deliberation  is  essential. 
In  STla  Ilae.  1.1,  for  example,  he  says  that  human  acts 
are  those  which  come  from  a  deliberated  will  -  "quae 
ex  voluntate  deliberata  procedunt"  -  and  in  STla 
llae.  6.2  that  fully  voluntary  action  is  "present  when  a 
person,  having  apprehended  and  deliberating  about 
an  end  and  the  steps  to  be  taken,  can  be  moved  to  it 
or  not.  "39Sftnilarly,  STla  llae.  14.1  would  seem  to 
imply  that  deliberation  is  an  essential  precursor  of 
choice,  since  choice  is  said,  following  Aristotle,  to  be 
"the  desire  of  what  has  previously  been  deliberated 
on.  "40 
But  restricting  'human  acts'  or  'fully  voluntary  acts' 
to  those  which  have  included  an  investigative  process 
or  enquiry  would  seem  to  exclude  a  great  deal  of 
everyday  action.  There  are  many  things  done  in  a  day 
which  do  not  seem  "doubtful  and  open  to  question", 
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deliberated  about.  In  having  breakfast  or  walking  to 
the  station,  for  example,  there  is  seldom  an 
investigative  process  about  how  these  things  might  be 
accomplished,  for  the  answer  is  obvious.  Indeed,  the 
question  of  how  such  acts  might  be  accomplished  is 
seldom  even  raised.  But  if  the  normal  everyday 
actions  do  not  count  as  free  acts,  does  this  not  then 
leave  very  little  which  would  fall  within  Aquinas' 
concept  of  freedom  of  action? 
This  seems  to  me  to  be  a  crucial  question  about 
Aquinas'concept  of  freedom,  for  a  concept  of  free 
action  which  excluded  most  human  activity  would 
seem  somewhat  jejune.  There  are,  I  believe,  three 
possible  approaches  in  dealing  with  the  issue  of 
deliberation  which  prompts  the  question. 
First,  one  can  say  that  an  investigative  process  is 
essential  to  a  free  act  and  that  acts  such  as  opening 
the  front  door  to  leave  the  house  or  of  writing  the 
letter  'a'  in  a  certain  way  are  not  therefore  properly 
described  as  free.  This  conclusion  is  not  however  as 
restrictive  as  it  seems,  for  the  purpose  of  the  concept 
of  freedom  is  to  attribute  responsibility,  and  if  an 
issue  of  responsibility  does  not  arise  the  question 
"Was  this  act  free  or  not?  "  will  not  arise  either.  "Did 
he  write  'a'  as  he  did,  freely?  "  is  an  Alice  in 
Wonderland  question  where  there  is  only  one  possible 198 
way  to  write  'a'.  So,  it  can  be  said  that  where  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  there  is  no  deliberation,  but  equally 
there  is  no  issue  of  resPonsibility,  and  hence  of 
freedom. 
Second,  one  can  take  the  line  that  deliberation  is 
essential,  but  that  Aquinas'  description  of 
'deliberation'  is  wide  enough  to  cover  the  situation 
where  one  apparently  does  things  without  thought.  If, 
for  example,  I  am  asked  by  a  colleague  to  countersign 
a  document  which  he  tells  me  is  a  passport 
application,  I  may  sign  immediately,  or  perhaps  after 
only  a  very  cursory  inspection.  And  this  despite 
knowing  well  that  I  should  never  sign  a  document 
without  reading  it  first.  Although  my  response  was 
immediate  i.  e.  I  did  not  stop  to  think  about  it  -I 
might  later  reply,  if  questioned  "Well,  it  looked  like  an 
official  form,  and  I  trust  A  and  I  was  prepared  to  be  a 
countersignatory,  so  I  didn't  feel  I  needed  time  to  read 
it,  and  just  signed.  "  Such  a  retrospective  analysis 
shows  the  thought  process  behind  my  action  and 
gives  the  reasons  why  I  did  what  I  did.  This  might 
count  as  a  sort  of  'unexpressed  deliberation'.  This 
kind  of  retrospective  analysis  could  be  made  of  many 
of  one's  everyday  actions,  even  if  the  process  is  not 
consciously  gone  through  before  one  makes  a  move. 
This  is  consistent  with  what  Scott  MacDonald  sayS41 
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ad  3:  "End-directed  action  is  not  restricted  to  actions 
done  for  some  reason  that  the  agent  actually 
considered  at  the  time  or  immediately  prior  to  acting. 
He  [Aquinas]  allows  for  example  that  each  step  of  a 
journey  results  from  deliberated  willing  despite  the 
fact  that  one  does  not  actually  deliberate,  either 
contemporaneously  or  at  any  preceding  time,  about 
each  step.  "42 
Third,  one  can  argue  that  deliberation  in  the  sense  of 
an  investigative  process  is  not  essential  to  a  human 
act,  but  what  is  essential  is  a  judgment  about  what  to 
do.  That  judgment  may  be  the  conclusion  of  a 
deliberation  or  of  some  other  reasoning  process.  This 
is  in  part  what  Westberg  is  saying,  I  believe,  and  it  is 
consistent  with  Aquinas'  statement  that  where  a 
conclusion  is  evident  without  enquiry  there  is  no 
need  for  deliberation.  Now,  a  conclusion  can  be 
reached  only  by  some  Idnd  of  reasoning  process,  but 
that  reasoning  process  need  not  be  an  Investigation'. 
This  seems  to  be  what  is  implied  by  Aquinas' 
response  to  STIa  Rae.  14.4  Objection  1,  where  he  says 
that  "When  a  judgment  or  decision  is  evident  without 
enquiry,  there  is  no  need  for  the  enquiry  of 
deliberation.  "43The  juridical  terms  Judicium'and 
'sententia'  (translated  as  judgment'  and  'decision' 
respectively)  both  imply  a  preceding  reasoning 
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may,  for  example,  be  able  to  judge  immediately  that 
the  case  in  front  of  me  is  absolutely  on  all  fours  with 
a  previously  decided,  and  binding,  case,  and  so  not 
have  to  deliberate  about  what  the  law  is.  But  a 
thinIdng  process  was  still  necessary  to  'match  up'the 
facts  now  in  front  of  me  and  those  of  the  earlier 
precedent  before  I  could  judge  that  the  cases  were  the 
same,  however  obvious  that  match  may  have  been.  A 
further,  non-legal,  example  is  when  I  open  the  car 
door,  put  the  key  into  the  ignition,  select  Drive'and 
move  off.  This  might  be  said  to  be  an  automatic 
sequence,  where  I  don't  think  about  it  at  all,  but  if 
questioned  about  why  I  had  selected  Drive',  I  would 
say  "Because  that's  how  one  usually  starts.  "  Now 
here,  arguably,  I  have  not,  even  on  a  retrospective 
analysis,  surveyed  the  alternatives  and  selected  one 
as  suitable.  What  I  have  done  can  however  be 
represented  as  the  swiftly-reached  conclusion  of  an 
argument  which  goes  "It  is  normal  to  select  Drive; 
there  is  no  reason  to  do  otherwise;  I  shall  select 
Drive.  "  That  represents  a  judgment  about  what  is  to 
be  done,  sealed  in  the  choice  of  D'.  The  emphasis  is 
now  put  on  judgment  rather  than  deliberation.  That 
would  be  consistent  with  Aquinas'  emphasis,  already 
noted,  on  judgment's  being  an  important 
distinguishing  factor  between  human  and  other 
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However,  regarding  judgment  +  electio'as  the  crucial 
stage,  and  deliberation  as  essential  only  in  some 
circumstances,  still  leaves  difficulties  with  Aquinas' 
view  in  STla  llae.  6.2.  Here  Aquinas  says  that  fully 
voluntary  activity  requires  full  knowledge  of  the  end, 
and  such  knowledge  requires  apprehension  of  the 
end  and  deliberation  about  the  steps  to  be  taken  to 
reach  it.  The  importance  of  deliberation  to  'full 
knowledge  of  the  end'perhaps  lies  in  the  focus  one 
inevitably  must  have  on  the  end  when  considering 
whether  various  means  would  meet  it  or  not.  In 
deliberating  about  whether  M  is  a  suitable  way  of 
achieving  E,  one  has  to  think  not  only  about  M  but 
also  about  E;  one  therefore  acquires  a  better 
appreciation  or  knowledge  of  E  and  can  be  said  to 
'know  what  one  is  doing'.  The  rapid  practical 
syllogism  which  delivers  the  conclusion  'Select  D' 
clearly  does  not  focus  so  deeply  on  either  means  or 
ends,  but  there  is  nevertheless  a  recognized 
relationship  between  the  means  and  the  end,  however 
automatically  the  conclusion  seems  to  have  been 
reached.  This  'tying  together'of  means  and  end 
means  that  here  also  I  can  be  said  to  understand 
what  I  am  doing,  in  a  way  which  a  child  or  a  dog 
cannot,  and  I  can  therefore  be  said  to  be  acting  in  a 
way  which  they  are  not  -a  fully  voluntary  way. 202 
It  seems  to  me  that  what  is  important  in  Aquinas' 
account  is  that  there  is  a  judgment,  formed  as  the 
result  of  some  reasoning  process,  about  what  to  do. 
That  the  reasoning  process  is  not  always  an 
Investigation  or  enquiry',  and  so  not  deliberation  in 
the  normally  understood  use  of  that  term,  seems  to 
be  implied  by  STla  llae.  14.4.  Whether  one  argues  that 
'consilium'can  include  the  kind  of  judgment  which  is 
Immediate'44or  whether  one  thinks  of  judgment  as  a 
self-contained  reasoning  process  distinct  from,  and 
independent  of,  deliberation  seems  to  me  less 
important  than  the  point  that  there  is  a  judgment,  of 
reason,  which  is  part  of  choice. 
C.  Freedom  of  choice 
We  have  now  reached  the  stage  where  it  can  be  said 
that  choice  is  an  act  of  will  which  follows  an  act  of 
reasoning,  whether  that  act  of  reasoning  is  described 
as  'deliberation'  or  otherwise.  What  is  not  yet  clear 
however  is  how  this  process  of  reasoning  and  willing 
can  be  said  to  be  'free'. 
Aquinas  deals  with  this  issue  in  relation  to  voluntary 
action  in  STIa  Rae.  13.6,  where  he  says  that  choice  is 
free,  not  necessary.  His  grounds  for  this  are  that 
choice  is  an  act  of  will,  and  so  man  can  choose  or  not 
choose,  and,  if  he  does  choose,  he  can  choose  this  or 
that  -just  as,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  will  can 203 
be  exercised  or  not  and  can  move  towards  this  or  that 
particular  object,  depending  on  whether  the  reason 
judges  it  good  or  bad.  Anything  the  will  can  be  moved 
towards,  or  can  reject,  can  be  chosen  or  not.  The 
passage  is  quoted  at  length  because  of  the 
importance  of  the  various  strands  that  go  to  show 
there  is  no  necessity: 
"Man  does  not  choose  of  necessity.  This  is  because  a 
possible-not-to-be  is  not  a  bound-to-be.  Why  it  is 
possible  for  a  man  to  choose  or  not  to  choose  may  be 
gathered  from  a  double  ability.  First,  to  be  able  to  will 
or  not  and  to  act  or  not;  second  to  will  and  act  thus 
or  thus. 
The  grounds  lie  in  the  very  range  of  reason.  Whatever 
the  reason  can  apprehend  as  good,  to  that  the  will 
can  stretch  out.  Now  the  reason  can  apprehend  as 
good,  not  only  willing  and  acting,  but  also  not  willing 
and  not  acting.  Again,  in  any  particular  good,  it  can 
attend  to  the  goodness  there,  but  also  to  the  lack  of 
some  goodness;  this  has  the  nature  of  an  evil. 
Accordingly  the  reason  can  apprehend  it  as 
something  to  be  sought  or  something  to  be  avoided. 
The  perfect  good  alone,  which  is  beatitude,  cannot  be 
apprehended  under  the  aspect  of  evil  or  as  displaying 
any  defect  .....  Now  since  ...  choice  is  of  the  means,  not 
the  end,  it  is  about  particular  goods,  not  the  perfect 204 
good....  On  these  grounds  we  say  that  choice  is  free, 
not  necessary.  "45 
We  have  already  examined  Aquinas'arguments  about 
the  will's  ability  to  be  moved  towards  'this  or  that', 
and  to  exercise  itself  or  not.  The  additional  interest  in 
STIa  Rae.  13.6  lies  in  the  Objections,  and  how  Aquinas 
deals  with  them,  for  they  say  a  great  deal  about  the 
practical  reasoning  which  lies  behind  choice. 
The  three  Objections  put  in  STIa  Ilae.  13.6  are  that  a 
man  chooses  necessarily,  not  freely,  because: 
(i)  inferences  drawn  from  principles  are  drawn 
necessarily;  in  relation  to  choice,  ends  are  like 
principles;  therefore  choices  are  made 
necessarily; 
(ii)  similarly,  reason  judges  some  matters 
necessarily  because  the  premisses  are 
necessary.  Since  choice  follows  reason's 
judgment,  the  choice  must  be  necessary; 
(iii)  less  eligible  objects  cannot  be  taken  in 
preference  to  more  eligible,  so  that  what  appears 
most  eligible  must  always  be  chosen,  and  the 
others  cannot  be  chosen.  Since  every  act  of 
choosing  is  about  what  seems  better  or  best,  the 
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The  response  to  Objection  1  is  that  conclusions  follow 
necessarily  from  principles  only  when  the  principles 
cannot  be  true  if  the  conclusion  is  not  true.  There 
are,  then,  cases  where  conclusions  do  not  follow 
necessarily  from  principles.  Aquinas  has  already 
considered  this  point  in  the  context  of  liberum 
arbitrium  earlier  in  the  ST,  in  STIa.  83.1,  where  he 
compares  practical  reasoning  and  'dialectical  and 
rhetorical  arguments'whose  conclusions  are  not 
necessary.  46  It  is  this  parallel  with  dialectical 
reasoning  rather  than  with  deductive  reasoning 
which  allows  for  reason's  taking  more  than  one  route: 
"And  so  in  regard  to  particular  acts  reason's 
judgment  is  open  to  various  possibilities,  not  fixed  to 
one.  "47And  so  just  as  the  conclusion  is  not 
necessitated  by  the  principles  in  dialectical  reasoning, 
the  means  are  not  necessitated  by  the  principle  i.  e. 
the  end,  in  practical  reasoning.  The  same  end  might 
have  been  served  by  other  means,  just  as  the 
principles  might  have  justified  another  conclusion. 
Aquinas  makes  a  further  point  in  STIa  llae.  13.6  ad  1: 
even  where  the  means  are  necessary,  they  may  not  be 
seen  to  be  such.  48This  follows  from  the  point  that 
what  is  not  wholly  good  may  be  perceived  as  not- 
good49  -  even  where  there  is  only  one  means  of 
achieving  one's  desired  end,,  one  may  not  recognize 
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unsuccessful,  means.  My  choice  of  M  as  the  way  to 
achieve  E  is,  therefore,  not  a  necessary  one  because: 
(i)  the  argument  which  produced  M  as  its 
conclusion  might  equally  have  produced  Z; 
(ii)  even  if  M  were  the  only  way  that  E  might  be 
achieved,  I  might  nevertheless  not  have 
recognized  M  as  a  means,  or  as  the  only  means, 
and  might  mistakenly  have  concluded  that  N 
would  also  produce  E. 
In  response  to  Objection  2,  Aquinas  makes  the  point 
that  in  practical  matters,  the  principles  from  which 
the  conclusions  are  derived  are  not  absolutely 
necessary  but  only  conditionally  necessary:  "In 
[practical  matters]  the  conclusion  does  not  follow 
from  categorically  necessary  principles,  but  from 
principles  necessary  given  a  condition,  as  in  the 
statement  If  he  is  running,  he  is  in  motion'.  "50  The 
end,  then,  which  is  driving  the  reasoning  process  is 
not  absolutely  necessary,  but  only  conditionally  so:  if 
I  am  to  be  in  London  tonight,  I  must  fly.  But  it  is  not 
absolutely  necessary  that  I  should  be  in  London,  so 
the  conclusion  'I  must  fly'is  not  absolutely  necessary. 
Further,  we  have  already  noted  Aquinas'points  that 
ends  may  themselves  have  been  chosen  in  a  previous 
deliberation5l  and  that  judgments  about  means  can 
be  reviewed.  52  The  necessity  of  the  ends  which  drive 
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indeed,  for  that  given  condition  can  be  changed  as  a 
result  of  my  ability  to  reflect  on  my  decisions. 
Objection  3,  however,  raises  a  further  difficulty,  for  it 
argues  that  whatever  is  best  must  be  chosen.  The 
argument  is  made  that  when  two  things  are  equal,  a 
man  is  not  moved  to  chose  one  rather  than  the  other; 
if  a  choice  cannot  be  made  between  two  equally  good 
objects,  a  fortiori  a  choice  cannot  be  made  of  the 
worse  of  two  objects.  If  the  worse  cannot  be  chosen, 
the  better  must  be  chosen. 
This  Objection  raises  several  interesting  points  -  how 
choice  may  be  made  between  equally  attractive 
things;  what  'best'means  in  this  context;  how  it  is 
assessed;  and  whether  'best'must  indeed  always  be 
chosen.  Aquinas'answer  does  not  appear  at  first 
sight  to  deal  with  these  points,  except  perhaps  to 
imply  that  'the  best'is  indeed  always  what  is  chosen, 
for  he  says  that  "The  objects  presented  may  both  be 
equal  from  one  point  of  view,  all  the  same  there'is 
nothing  to  forbid  us  fixing  on  some  superior 
attraction  in  one  of  them  so  that  the  will  turns  to  that 
one  rather  than  the  other  one.  "53This  seems  to 
sidestep  the  points  raised  by  the  Objection,  and  to 
raise  some  difficulties  of  its  own.  Aquinas  does  not, 
for  example,  seem  to  deny  that  man  cannot  choose 
between  two  equally  attractive  objects.  Experience 208 
shows  that  it  is  clearly  not  the  case  that  a  hungry 
man  faced  with  two  equally  attractive  dishes  starves 
to  death  because  he  cannot  choose  between  them  - 
he  certainly  does  take  at  least  one.  It  can  be  argued 
that  he  can  have  no  rational  grounds  for  choosing  x 
rather  than  y,  because,  if  x  and  y  are  equally 
attractive,  for  every  reason  in  favour  of  x  there  will  be 
the  same  or  an  equally  compelling  reason  in  favour  of 
y.  There  can  therefore  be  no  reason  to  choose  x  in 
preference  to  y.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  arguable  that 
the  hungry  man  is  not  choosing  x  rather  than  y,  but 
simply  choosing  to  eat,  and  so  taking  one  of  them.  If 
he  is  to  live,  he  must  have  one  of  them.  Even  if  he  has 
no  grounds  for  choosing  x  in  preference  to  y,  he  has 
very  good  grounds  for  choosing  rather  than  not 
choosing.  His  choice  may  therefore  be  to  eat,  and  the 
action  in  taking  x  not  a  choice,  of  x  but  simply  a 
'plumping  for'. 
But  Aquinas'response,  by  concentrating  on  the 
possibility  of  ranking  x  and  y,  seems  not  to  address 
the  issue  of  two  things  or  courses  of  action  being 
equally  attractive.  Unless  of  course  he  means  to  imply 
that  two  things  never  actually  are  equally  attractive. 
It  may  be  that  he  is  re-iterating  the  view  that 
everything  is  a  mixture  of  good  and  bad,  and  that 
careful  thought  will  show  that  x  and  y  are  not  equal 
in  every  respect,  even  if  they  first  appeared  so.  In 209 
practical  terms,  this  usually  is  the  case,  for  careful 
re-appraisal  of  alternatives  often  results  in  a  different 
assessment  of  their  relative  worth.  If  this  is  so,  it  will 
indeed  always  be  possible  to  find,  at  some  stage  of  the 
deliberation,  some  aspect  of  x  which  makes  it 
preferable  to  y.  Aquinas'  insistence  that  there  is 
always  some  point  of  view  from  which  this  can  be 
done  may,  therefore,  be  designed  to  show  that  there 
is  always  the  possibility  of  choice  between  x  and  y  i.  e. 
that  a  reason  can  always  be  found  on  which  to  base  a 
preference. 
Nevertheless,  Aquinas'  response  to  Objection  3 
apparently  confirms  that  it  is  always  what  appears 
best  (or  better)  which  must  be  chosen.  Further,  he 
does  not  explicitly  deny  in  that  response  that  what  is 
best  must  be  chosen  of  necessity.  But  in  the  light  of 
the  rest  of  the  Article  it  cannot  be  taken  that  he 
accepts  any  necessity  of  choice.  What  is  it,  then, 
about  practical  reasoning  which  makes  choice  a 
matter  of  both  will  and  reason,  but  avoids  the 
necessity  of  the  conclusions  of  that  reasoning  while 
apparently  still  ensuring  that  'the  best'is  always 
chosen?  To  answer  this,  it  is  necessary  to  look  more 
closely  at  the  differences  between  practical  and 
theoretical,  or  deductive,  reasoning. 210 
The  purpose  of  theoretical  reasoning  is  to  arrive  at  a 
new  piece  of  knowledge,  deduced  from  something 
already  known.  The  conclusion  must  therefore  be 
'correct'or  truthful,  and  the  rules  of  logic  which  apply 
to  this  reasoning  are  designed  to  ensure  that  if  the 
premisses  are  true,  the  conclusion  will  also  be  true: 
that  truth  is  preserved  in  moving  from  one  to  the 
other.  While  this  does  not  mean  that  only  one 
conclusion  can  ever  be  validly  drawn  from  a  set  of 
true  premisses,  it  does  mean  that  all  conclusions 
validly  drawn  from  these  premisses  are  true,  and 
none  can  be  rejected  as  false.  Similarly,  no 
conclusion  validly  drawn  from  these  premisses  can 
contradict  another  conclusion  so  drawn.  For  example, 
I  know  that  all  cocker  spaniels  are  dogs  with  long 
ears;  that  C  is  a  cocker  spaniel,  and  that  D  is  a  dog 
with  short  ears.  I  can  conclude  that  C  is  a  dog  and/or 
that  C  has  long  ears,  but  I  cannot  conclude  that  C  is 
a  dog  and  deny  that  he  has  long  ears,  nor  can  I 
conclude  that  D  is  a  cocker  spaniel. 
Now  clearly  practical  reasoning  operates  on  different 
lines  from  theoretical  reasoning.  For  example: 
q  need  to  be  in  London  tomorrow  morning; 
If  I  fly,  I  shall  be  there  in  time; 
Therefore  I  shall  go  by  plane.  ' 
is  a  standard,  and  apparently  sound,  piece  of 
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'P; 
If  Q  then  P; 
Therefore  Q' 
is  not,  however,  a  valid  piece  of  theoretical  reasoning. 
The  difference  is  that  the  purpose  of  practical 
reasoning  is  not  to  establish  a  new  item  of  knowledge, 
and  so  something  true,  but  to  settle  on  a  means  of 
achieving  a  desired  goal.  What  matters  is  not 
therefore  the  preservation  of  truth,  but  whether  the 
end  can  be  achieved  in  that  way.  Nevertheless,  this 
does  not  mean  that  M  identified  means  will  do,  for  I 
might  in  practice  reject  the  idea  of  flying  to  London.  54 
What  is  being  sought  is  a  satisfactory  solution,  one 
that  is  both  good  and  suitable,  one  which  achieves 
the  end  in  a  satisfactory  way.  Whether  something  is 
satisfactory  or  not  is  not  just  a  matter  for  intellect,  as 
whether  something  is  true  or  not  is:  it  is  a  matter  for 
will  also.  The  conclusion  has  to  be  'correct'in  the 
sense  that  it  does  have  to  be  (or  at  least  appear  to  be) 
something  which  is  capable  of  achieving  the  desired 
end,  but  it  has  to  be  something  more  than  that:  it  has 
to  be  acceptable,  to  me.  55 
Further,  as  Kenny  pointsoUt,  56  "An  assertion  is  either 
true  or  false;  but  a  plan  is  not  just  satisfactory  or 
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and  not  to  others,  satisfactory  for  some  purposes  and 
not  for  others.  "  Not  only,  therefore,  may  A  and  B 
draw  different  conclusions  from  the  same  set  of 
premisses  in  practical  reasoning,  each  rejecting  the 
others'  conclusion,  but  A  may  draw  different 
conclusions  on  different  occasions.  There  is  no  one 
objective  'best'  solution  but  only  a  solution  which  is, 
at  most,  best  in  relation  to  a  given  set  of  desires.  To 
take  the  example  of  going  to  London,  I  may  today 
reason: 
(i)  I  need  to  be  in  London  tomorrow; 
(ii)  Both  plane  and  train  will  get  me  there  in  time; 
(iii)  I  shall  fly. 
The  conclusion,  that  I  should  fly,  has  been  accepted 
as  'the  best  thing  to  do'.  Next  month,  however,  having 
spent  extravagantly,  I  can  no  longer  afford  the  flight 
and  conclude  that  I  should  travel  by  train.  What  I 
have  done  here  is  add  another  premiss  to  my 
argument,  which  has  now  become: 
(i)  I  need  to  be  in  London  tomorrow; 
(ii)  Both  plane  and  train  will  get  me  there  in  time; 
(iii)  I  need  to  travel  as  cheaply  as  possible; 
(iv)  I  shall  go  by  train. 213 
Practical  reasoning,  unlike  theoretical  reasoning,  is 
thus  shown  to  be  defeasible,  for  by  adding  a  further 
premiss  to  my  practical  argument,  I  have  changed  the 
rational  conclusion.  What  was  'the  best  thing  to  do' 
has  changed  as  the  circumstances  -  the  sum  of  the 
premisses  -  have  changed. 
This  process  may  be  thought  to  be  a  more  detailed  re- 
specification  of  the  end  rather  than  a  selection  of  the 
means  to  an  end.  In  the  example  above,  my  end  has 
become  the  need  to  travel  to  London  by  the  cheapest 
route,  rather  than  simply  the  need  to  travel  to 
London.  Such  re-  specification  is  often  in  practice 
necessary.  As  Wiggins  says  in  discussion  of  Aristotle's 
view  of  practical  reasoning,  one  may  often  have  only  a 
vague  description  of  something  one  wants  "and  the 
problem  is  not  to  see  what  will  be  causally  efficacious 
in  bringing  this  about,  but  to  see  what  really  qualifies 
as  an  adequate  and  practically  realizable  specification 
of  what  would  satisfy  this  want.  Till  the  specification 
is  available  there  is  no  room  for  means.  "  There  may 
also  be  a  further  re-iterative  process  once  the 
specification  is  available:  "When  this  specification  is 
reached,  means  -  end  deliberation  can  start,  but 
difficulties  that  turn  up  in  this  means  -  end 
deliberation  may  send  me  back  a  finite  number  of 
times  to  the  problem  of  a  better  or  more  practicable 
specification  of  the  end.  "57 214 
This  process  is  not  the  judgment  about  judgments'of 
DV24.2  considered  above,  for  we  are  not  now 
reflecting  on  whether  the  means  chosen  really  are 
appropriate,  but  trying  to  establish  what  means 
would  be  satisfactory.  Wiggins'point  is  that  the 
process  of  trying  to  establish  means  may  require  an 
even  more  precise  formulation  of  the  end.  This  raises 
interesting  issues  about  the  dynamic  interaction 
between  will  and  reason  in  the  selection  of  means, 
but  the  point  also  serves  to  illustrate  both  the 
conditional  nature  of  ends  and  the  flexibility  of 
conclusions  reached. 
It  seems  evident  therefore  that  the  'best  means'is  not 
some  objectively  correct  solution  to  the  practical 
problem  being  deliberated.  Further,  not  only  may  the 
conclusion  be  different  as  I  add  more  premisses,  but  I 
may  even  recognize  that  there  could  be  a  'better' 
solution  than  the  one  I  have  chosen.  In  the  example 
of  my  trip  to  London,  I  may  decide  to  fly.  Enquiries 
show  that  there  are  several  flight  times,  on  different 
airlines.  I  compare  two  airlines  and  choose  B.  I  may 
recognize  that  had  I  compared  all  5,  say,  I  might  have 
found  a  cheaper,  more  convenient,  more  pleasant  etc. 
Right,  but  I  am  prepared  to  choose  B  without  further 
deliberation  because  it  is  satisfactory.  It  meets  my 
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unexpressed  premiss  along  the  lines  "I  am  very  busy, 
so  I  must  streamline  the  decision  process".  But  this 
simply  highlights  the  point  that  what  is  best  is 
relative  to  what  one  wants  at  the  time  of  making  the 
decision.  This  relativity,  and  consequent  flexibilty,  is 
implied  by  Aquinas'response,  in  STla  tfae.  13.6  ad  3, 
that  there  is  always  some  point  of  view  from  which  x 
can  be  regarded  as  being  better  than  y. 
The  process  of  practical  reasoning,  then,  can  produce 
several  different  conclusions.  Whatever  conclusion  is 
finally  reached  has  not  therefore  been  arrived  at 
necessarily,  even  though  the  outcome  is  always  what 
is  seen  as  'best'in  the  particular  circumstances. 
However,  it  is  at  this  point  that  the  question  of  where 
the  real  root  of  freedom  lies  must  be  raised. 
D.  Relationship  between  will  and  Intellect  in 
choice 
The  reasoning  process  described  above  raises  two 
questions  about  the  relationship  between  will  and 
intellect.  First,  how  can  the  will  be  said  to  be  the  root 
of  freedom  if  it  is  the  intellect  which  assesses  what  is 
best  to  meet  the  specified  wants,  once  these  have 
been  established?  And,  second,  if  the  answer  to  the 
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solution  put  forward  by  intellect,  how  can  the  will  be 
said  to  be  Informed  by  reason? 
Certainly,  Aquinas  appears  to  reject,  in  DV22.15  for 
example,  the  claim  that  the  will  must  follow  intellect 
at  the  end  of  the  reasoning  process:  "For  however 
much  reason  puts  one  ahead  of  the  other,  there  is  not 
yet  the  acceptance  of  one  in  preference  to  the  other  as 
something  to  be  done  until  the  will  inclines  to  the  one 
rather  than  the  other.  The  will  does  not  of  necessity 
follow  reason.  "58 
But  of  course  the  will  can  incline  towards  some  thing 
only  if  that  thing  is  recognized  as  good  by  the 
intellect,  so  if  it  inclines  to  x  rather  than  y  it  can  only 
be  because  the  intellect  has  judged  that  x  would  be 
'better'in  the  circumstances.  It  seems  therefore  that 
what  really  matters  in  the  last  analysis  is  the 
conclusion  reached  by  intellect.  This  would  seem  to 
be  confirmed  by  what  Aquinas  says  about  the  crucial 
area  of  reflection  and  judgment. 
As  we  have  seen,  Aquinas  distinguishes  the  actions  of 
men  from  those  of  brute  animals  on  the  basis  of  their 
respective  powers  of  judgment.  Only  men  have  the 
ability  to  judge  their  own  judgments.  In  DV24.1 
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"But  man  judging  about  his  course  of  action  by  the 
power  of  reason  can  also  judge  about  his  own 
decision  inasmuch  as  he  knows  the  meaning  of  an 
end  and  of  a  means  to  an  end,  and  the  relationship  of 
the  one  with  reference  to  the  other.  Thus  he  is  his 
own  cause  not  only  in  moving  but  also  in  judging.  He 
is  therefore  endowed  with  free  choice  -  that  is  to  say, 
with  a  free  judgment  about  acting  or  not  acting.  "59 
This  is  spelled  out  further  in  DV24.2: 
"..  if  the  judgment  of  the  cognitive  faculty  is  not  in  a 
person's  power  but  is  determined  for  him 
extrinsically,  neither  will  his  appetite  be  in  his  power, 
and  consequently  neither  will  his  motion  or  operation 
be  in  his  power  absolutely.  Now  judgment  is  in  the 
power  of  one  judging  insofar  as  he  can  judge  about 
his  own  judgments,  for  we  can  pass  judgment  upon 
the  things  which  are  in  our  power.  But  to  judge  about 
one's  own  judgment  belongs  only  to  reason,  which 
reflects  upon  its  own  act  and  knows  the  relationship 
of  the  things  about  which  it  judges  and  of  those  by 
which  it  judges.  Hence  the  whole  root  of  freedom  is 
located  in  reason.  "60 
The  argument  that  Aquinas  is  putting  here  seems  to 
be  that  if  actions  are  to  be  in  one's  power,  then  the 
appetite  which  drives  them  must  be  in  one's  power. 
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intellect's  judgment  (of  the  apprehended  good  which 
moves  appetite)  is  extrinsically  determined.  Since 
actions  are,  he  believes,  in  one's  power,  one's 
intellectual  judgment  must  also  be  in  one's  power.  It 
is  in  one's  power  because  one  can  judge  about  one's 
own  judgment,  through  self-reflection. 
Now  clearly  not  all  one's  intellectual  judgments  are 
within  one's  own  power  in  this  way.  As  Gallagher 
points  out,  some  things  appear  as  they  do  without 
any  control  on  one's  own  part:  "Thus  on  the  level  of 
sensory  perception  it  does  not  seem  that  I  can  make  a 
red  barn  appear  as  anything  but  red  nor  the  smell  of 
burning  leaves  as  any  other  smell.  Even  at  the  level  of 
rational  cognition  there  are  ..  certain  areas  in  which 
the  knower  has  no  freedom.  This  is  especially  so  for 
scientia,  the  knowledge  of  necessary  truths  seen  in 
the  light  of  first  principleS.  "61  But  what  Aquinas  is 
interested  in  in  DV24.2  is  not  scientia  but  the 
cognition  of  something  as  'good';  it  is  this  key 
judgment  which  he  is  claiming  to  be  within  one's 
power. 
The  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  judgment  would 
however  seem  to  imply  that  intellect  is,  in  the  final 
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However,  there  is  a  danger  in  this  line  of  thought 
about  the  relative  importance  of  will  and  intellect, 
namely  that  one  begins  to  think  of  %vill'and  Intellect' 
as  two  distinct  things  inside  one's  head,  as  it  were, 
with  will  second-guessing  intellect,  'deciding'whether 
to  follow  it  or  not.  This  was  clearly  not  Aquinas'view, 
and  it  has  to  be  kept  closely  in  mind  that  for  Aquinas 
it  is  the  man  who  chooses  and  acts.  As  Gallagher 
puts  it:  "When  we  say  in  a  kind  of  shorthand,  that  the 
will  moves  the  intellect  or  the  intellect  moves  the  will, 
we  always  mean  that  the  person  voluntarily  exercises 
his  capacity  to  know  or  that  the  person,  through  an 
act  of  knowing,  determines  himself  to  choose  one  act 
or  another.  Thus  what  appears  to  be  several  distinct 
acts  when  described  in  terms  of  powers  of  the  soul,  is 
actually  a  single  personal  act.  "62  It  is  only  in  a 
manner  of  speaking,  then,  that  the  question  of  the 
primacy  of  reason  or  will  arises.  But  even  given  that 
caveat,  a  closer  examination  of  the  process  of 
practical  reasoning  will  show  that  for  Aquinas  the 
question  of  whether  action  is  'primarily'a  matter  for 
reason  or  for  will  is  beside  the  point.  Aquinas' 
account,  in  my  view,  shows  that  the  process  which 
ends  in  choice,  and  so  determines  action,  is 
ineluctably  an  inseparable  combination  of  intellect 
and  will,  where  both  act  and  react  on  each  other.  The 
inseparability  is,  I  believe,  implied  in  Aquinas'chosen 
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and  the  body.  And  the  action  and  reaction  becomes 
clear  when  one  examines  more  closely  how  what  is 
'best',  or  satisfactory,  is  determined. 
We  have  seen  how  the  possibility  of  an  object's 
appearing  good  in  some  ways  and  bad  in  others  yields 
the  possibility  of  one  object's  being  considered  better 
than  another  from  a  particular  point  of  view,  and 
have  seen  also  how  that  ranking  may  change  as  the 
point  of  view  changes.  This  explains  how  different 
assessments  may  be  made  and  so  how  choice  is 
possible.  What  is  missing  from  this  analysis,  however, 
is  how  intellect  comes  to  recognize  x  as  good,  or  some 
aspects  of  it  as  good  and  some  as  bad,  before  it  is 
presented  to  will.  Further  consideration  of  this  point 
shows  just  how  closely  interlinked  will  and  intellect 
are  in  the  process  which  ends  in  choice. 
The  understanding  of  the  universal  good  to  which  the 
will  is  naturally  inclined  is,  clearly,  a  matter  for 
intellect;  the  deliberation  which  produces  a  particular 
good  in  the  form  of  an  action  to  be  carried  out  is  also 
a  matter  for  intellect.  Before  the  process  of 
deliberation  starts,  the  will  will  have  been  involved  in 
forming  the  intention  to  do  x,  and  in  Instructing'the 
intellect  to  deliberate  about  how  it  might  be  done.  But 
the  will,  and  perhaps  the  emotions,  will  also  have 
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identified  as  good.  Strong  emotion  may  influence  how 
x  is  apprehended,  for  example,  as  may  taste.  63More 
complex  and  more  subtle  however  is  the  influence  will 
itself  has  on  intellect's  presentation  of  an  object  to  it 
as  good. 
In  the  first  place,  intellect's  thinking  about  the  object 
sufficiently  to  present  it  to  will  at  all  is  because  the 
intellect  has  been  moved  by  will.  Will  moves  all  the 
powers  of  the  soul  (except  the  vegetative  powers)  as 
an  efficient  cause.  64Similarly,  intellect's  focusing  on 
some  aspects  of  the  ob  ect  rather  than  others  is 
because  it  has  been  so  instructed  by  will  (intellect 
having  previously  identified  that  particular  course  of 
action  as  good).  Here  it  is  possible  to  see  not  just 
will's  action  on  intellect  but  also  how  closely  the  two 
are  interwoven.  Say,  for  example,  my  attention  has 
been  caught  by  a  CD  review  in  the  newspaper.  The 
CD  seems  interesting.  I  note  the  review,  and  the  high 
cost  of  the  disc.  I  close  my  mind's  eyes  to  the  cost  and 
continue  with  the  review  until  I  find  the  reference 
number,  then  make  a  note  of  that  so  that  I  can  buy 
the  disc.  This  would  seem  to  show  that  intellect  has 
presented  the  CD  to  me  as  something  I  might  enjoy 
owning  -a  good,  but  not  wholly  so,  because  it  costs 
more  than  I  ought  to  spend.  At  this  point,  I  might 
have  dwelled  (even  if  only  momentarily)  on  the  cost, 
then  turned  the  page.  Instead,  I  continued  with  the 222 
review  -I  had  willed  myself  to  continue  reading  so 
that  I  might  find  out  more  about  this  possible  good. 
My  intellect  continues  to  focus  on  the  enjoyable 
aspects  rather  than  on  the  cost,  which  q  refuse  to 
think  about'i.  e.  my  will  instructs  my  intellect  not  to 
think  about,  my  intellect  having  also  presented  such 
refusal  as  a  good  thing. 
It  seems  from  this  account  that  intellect's  initial 
identification  of  the  object  must  encompass  several 
different  descriptions  of  it,  several  different  ways  in 
which  it  might,  in  a  manner  of  speaking,  be  presented 
to  will  -  as  enjoyable  but  expensive,  for  example.  How 
intellect  arrives  at  these  descriptions  provides  a 
further,  and  critically  important,  illustration  of  how 
will  influences  intellect's  presentation  of  the  object  to 
it. 
In  describing  the  relationship  between  intellect  and 
will  in  STla.  82.4,  Aquinas  points  out  that  intellect 
and  will,  as  powers,  include  each  other  in  the  scope 
of  their  acts:  "For  the  understanding  knows  that  the 
will  wills  and  the  will  wills  the  understanding  to 
understand.  "65Similarly  in  STla.  16.4,  dealing  with 
the  relative  priority  of  good  and  truth:  "Will  and 
intellect  mutually  include  one  another;  for  intellect 
understands  will,  and  will  wills  intellect  to 
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is  commented  on  above;  what  is  important  here  is 
that  intellect  understands  will.  Intellect  understands 
that  I  want  and  what  I  want.  It  understands  both  that 
I  want  goodness  in  general  and  the  kind  of  particular 
good  I  want.  In  assessing  particular  objects  therefore, 
intellect  is  aware  of  what  I  want  and  this  will 
influence  how  things  are  presented.  This  point  is 
made  by  Brock  in  dealing  with  will  and  intellect  as 
separate  powers:  "The  will  plays  a  role  in 
determination  of  its  object  precisely  by  playing  a  role 
in  the  process  by  which  the  intellect  itself  comes  to 
provide  it  with  an  object.  It  does  this  in  two  ways:  by 
being  a  moving  principle  of  the  intellect's  own  act, 
and  by  being  an  object  of  understanding,  one  whose 
disposition  is  itself  a  potential  criterion  of  one's 
suitable  good.  "67 
Even  in  the  process  of  judging  about  one's  own 
judgments'  intellect  is  not  acting  alone,  but  is 
influenced  by  will.  Here,  intellect  reflects  on  whether 
x  really  does  meet  my  aims,  and  in  the  light  of  this 
decides  whether,  and  to  what  extent,  x  really  is  good. 
The  result  of  such  reflection  will  be  the  re- 
presentation  of  x,  under  some  description,  to  will.  In 
carrying  out  this  reflection,  intellect  is  both  operating 
under  will's  instruction  and,  crucially,  is  evaluating  x 
against  the  criteria  set  by  will  i.  e.  the  ends  willed. 224 
Again,  therefore,  intellect  is  not  acting  in  isolation  but 
against  the  parameters  set  by  will. 
An  account  of  the  relationship  between  will  and 
intellect  which  stresses  their  interdependence  raises, 
however,  the  prospect  of  an  infinite  regress.  Will 
instructs  intellect,  but  only  on  the  basis  of  intellect's 
input  that  such  an  instruction  would  be  a  good  thing. 
But  that  intellectual  judgment  came  about  as  a  result 
of  will's  instruction  to  think,  which  in  turn  could  only 
come  about  as  a  result  of  intellect's  input  -  and  so 
on.  This  point  is  put  in  STla.  82.4  Objection  3:  "Again 
we  cannot  will  anything  unless  given  an 
understanding  of  it.  So  if  the  will  causes 
understanding  by  willing  an  act  of  understanding, 
another  act  of  understanding  will  have  to  precede 
that  act  of  willing,  and  another  act  of  will  that  act  of 
understanding,  in  infinite  regress.  "  Aquinas'  response 
to  that  Objection  is  that  there  is  no  infinite  regress: 
"For  an  act  of  knowledge  must  precede  every 
movement  of  the  will,  but  there  does  not  have  to  be 
an  act  of  will  prior  to  every  act  of  knowledge.  "  The 
source  of  the  thoughts  not  brought  about  by  will  is 
"an  intellectual  principle  above  our  intellect,  and  this 
is  God.  "68This  appeal  to  God  as  the  originator,  and 
escape  from  the  regress,  is  an  elaboration  of  DV22.12 
ad  2  where  Aquinas  says  simply  that  "There  is  no 
necessity  of  going  on  to  infinity,  for  we  stop  at  the oocz 
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natural  appetite  by  which  the  intellect  is  inclined  to 
its  act.  "69Both  responses  express  the  view  that  the 
cycle  stops  with  the  intellect  and  the  intellect's  (God- 
given)  nature  to  think. 
The  arguments  about  regress  raise  interesting  issues, 
some  of  which  have  already  been  considered  in 
Chapter  3,  in  the  context  of  the  external  principle  of 
movement  of  the  will;  the  implications  of  the 
possibility  that  some  thoughts  may  be  unwilled  are 
considered  later  in  the  present  chapter.  At  this  point, 
it  is  simply  noted  that  Aquinas  denies  the  possibility 
of  an  infinite  regress  by  putting  the  starting  point 
firmly  with  the  intellect. 
That  the  process  starts  with  the  intellect  does  not 
necessarily  imply,  however,  that  the  outcome  is 
determined  by  the  intellect.  Aquinas'  accounts  of  how 
'good'is  apprehended,  judged,  presented  to  the  will 
and  deliberated  about  seem  clearly  to  imply  that  in 
the  process  of  choice,  will  and  intellect  are  acting  in 
concert,  affecting  and  effecting  each  other.  And  if  one 
considers  choice  as  a  substance  rather  than  a 
process,  it  can  be  seen  to  be  composed  of  both  will 
and  reason,  as  inextricably  interwoven  as  the  warp 
and  weft  of  cloth.  The  question  of  primacy  then 
indeed  seems  to  be  beside  the  point. 226 
E.  Is  choice  essential  to  a  free  act? 
So  far,  we  have  considered  the  roles  of  the  acts  of  will 
and  intellect  which  go  to  make  up  the  composite 
'choice',  one  of  the  elements  of  a  human  voluntary  act 
as  described  in  STIa  llae.  The  reason  for  this  extended 
consideration  was  the  presumed  importance  of  choice 
in  such  action,  and  hence  the  presumption  that 
choice  was  an  essential  element  of  Aquinas'concept 
of  freedom. 
One  obstacle  to  this  reading  of  STIa  Ilae  however  is 
the  line  Aquinas  takes  on  the  question  of  free  choice 
in  the  state  of  mortal  sin  in  DV24.12.  There  he 
considers  the  question  of  whether  man  sins  by 
necessity  or  whether,  on  the  other  hand,  he  can  avoid 
sin  without  God's  grace.  His  answer  reflects  the 
Church's  teaching,  saving  free  choice  but  not 
excluding  the  necessity  of  grace.  The  interesting  point 
in  this  answer,  in  the  context  of  free  action,  is  the 
discussion  of  how  something  may  be  outside  the 
power  of  free  choice.  How  Aquinas  deals  with  this 
raises  several  important  points  about  his  concept  of 
voluntary  action  and  so  merits  detailed  consideration. 
Since  free  choice  is,  according  to  DV24.12,  "a  power 
established  under  reason  and  over  the  executive 
power",  something  can  be  outside  the  power  of  free 
choice  because  it  exceeds  one's  motive  power  (for 227 
example,  flying)  or  because  "the  use  of  reason  does 
not  extend  to  it.  For  since  the  act  of  free  choice  is 
choosing  which  depends  on  counsel,  that  is,  the 
deliberation  of  reason,  free  choice  cannot  extend  to 
anything  that  escapes  the  deliberation  of  reason. 
Such  for  example  would  be  actions  which  occur 
without  premeditation.  "70  This  seems  to  be  a  strong 
indication  that  reasoning  and  choice  are  essential  for 
acts  to  be  regarded  as  free.  However,  Aquinas  goes  on 
to  say  that  some  (sinful)  actions  can  occur  "suddenly 
and  more  or  less  by  surprise,  thus  escaping  the 
election  of  free  choice,  even  though  by  directing  its 
attention  or  efforts  to  it  free  choice  could  commit  the 
sin  or  avoid  it.  "  One  way  in  which  this  can  come 
about  is  from  a  fit  of  passion: 
"For  the  movement  of  anger  or  concupiscence 
sometimes  anticipates  the  deliberation  of  reason. 
Tending  to  something  illicit  by  reason  of  the 
corruption  of  our  nature,  this  movement  constitutes  a 
venial  sin.  In  the  state  of  corrupt  nature  it  is 
accordingly  not  within  the  power  of  free  choice  to 
avoid  all  sins  of  this  sort,  because  they  escape  its  act, 
although  it  can  prevent  any  particular  one  of  these 
movements  if  it  makes  the  effort  againstit.  "71 
In  this  passage,  Aquinas  seems  to  be  saying  on  the 
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passion,  may  escape  reason,  but  on  the  other  hand 
that  these  actions  are  sins  -  venial  rather  than 
mortal,  but  sins  nevertheless.  And  only  voluntary 
acts  can  be  sins. 
On  the  basis  that  actions  which  escape  reason  cannot 
be  chosen  actions,  and  that  if  a  man  cannot  choose 
what  he  does,  he  cannot  do  otherwise,  Eleonore 
Stump  takes  this  Article  in  DV  as  showing  that 
Aquinas  did  not  believe  that  the  ability  to  do 
otherwise  was  necessary  to  freedom:  "If  Aquinas 
supposed  that  liberurn  arbitrium  were  identical  to 
free  will  or  if  he  thought  that  the  ability  to  do 
otherwise  were  essential  to  free  will,  he  should  go  on 
to  say  [here]  that  such  actions  aren't  sinful  or 
blameworthy  in  any  respect  since  they  occur 
unfreely.  "72And  he  doesn't  -  he  says  that  they  are 
venial  sins. 
Her  analysis  of  Aquinas'argument  here  seems  to  be 
as  foRows: 
(i)  Actions  done  in  a  fit  of  passion  are  not  freely 
chosen  because  they  escape  reason; 
(ii)  But  they  are  blameworthy; 
(iii)  Only  free  actions  are  blameworthy; 
Therefore  free  actions  need  not  be  chosen 
actions; 
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(vi)  Therefore  the  ability  to  do  otherwise  is  not 
necessary  to  freedom. 
Now,  conclusions  (v)  and  (vi)  do  seem  to  be  at  odds 
with  the  account  of  voluntary  action  in  STIa  llae, 
which  implies  that  deliberation  and  choice  are 
essential  for  fully  voluntary  acts.  That  choice  is  an 
element  of  free  will  also  seems  to  be  implied  by 
STla.  19.10,  where  Aquinas  deals  with  the  question  of 
whether  God  has  free  will.  In  response  to  the 
Objection  that  God  cannot  choose  evil,  and  so  there  is 
not  free  will  in  God,  Aquinas  agrees  that  God  cannot 
will  the  evil  of  sin  "but  he  can  still  choose  between 
opposites,  inasmuch  as  he  can  will  some  thing  to  be, 
or  not  to  be.  "73The  implication  of  both  Objection  and 
Response  is  that  the  ability  to  choose  is  necessary  for 
free  will.  And  in  ST  la.  Ilae.  76.3,  Aquinas  makes  it 
clear  that  voluntariness  is  essential  for  sin.  74  So 
choice  would  seem  to  be  essential  for  sin. 
It  might  be  thought  possible  to  reconcile  the  STla  Ilae 
and  the  DV  passages  on  the  basis  that  what  makes 
an  action  fully  voluntary  and  free  is  that  man  always 
has  the  ability  to  deliberate  and  hence  to  choose, 
since  he  has  reason.  The  ability  to  reason  is  certainly 
seen  by  Aquinas  as  an  important  test  of 
responsibility,  not  just  in  relation  to  the  difference 
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to  the  difference  between  men.  In  ST11a  llae.  189.5  for 
example,  dealing  with  the  question  whether  children 
should  be  received  in  religion,  he  says  that  religious 
vows  will  not  be  binding  if  made  by  someone  without 
the  use  of  reason: 
"..  there  are  two  kinds  of  vows  in  religious  life.  One  is 
a  simple  vow,  consisting  only  of  a  promise  made  to 
God,  proceeding  from  the  interior  deliberation  of  the 
mind.  This  vow  has  its  binding  force  from  divine  law, 
but  it  can  be  nullified  in  two  ways.  First,  by  lack  of 
deliberation,  as  in  the  case  of  the  insane,  whose  vows 
do  not  bind 
.....  The  same  is  true  of  children  who  do 
not  yet  have  sufficient  use  of  reason  to  be  capable  of 
fraud,  which  use  boys  attain,  as  a  rule,  at  about  the 
age  of  fourteen  and  girls  at  the  age  of  twelve...  0  0"75 
Now,  as  argued  above,  the  importance  of  reasoning 
and  judging  about  an  action  is  that  the  reasoning 
process  inevitably  focuses  one's  mind  on  the  end  to 
be  achieved,  and  ties  together  the  proposed  means 
and  the  end  to  be  achieved.  It  can  thus  be  said  to 
lead  to  full  knowledge  of  the  end.  Since  neither  the 
insane  nor  children  can  deliberate,  they  cannot  have 
full  knowledge  of  their  end  and  so  cannot  act 
voluntarily  in  the  full  sense  of  the  term.  They  cannot 
therefore  be  held  responsible  for  what  they  do,  since 231 
it  is  only  to  fully  voluntary  activity  that  praise  and 
blame  attach.  76 
While  the  ability  to  reason  is  therefore  obviously  a 
necessary  element  in  Aquinas'account  of  action  for 
which  one  may  be  held  responsible,  it  is  clearly  not 
sufficient  that  all  sane  men  above  the  age  of  reason 
have  that  ability,  for  not  all  the  actions  of  sane  men 
are  voluntary  actions  for  which  they  may  be  held 
responsible.  This  is  implied  by  the  distinction 
Aquinas  draws  (in  STla  llae.  1.1)  between  'human 
actions'and  'actions  of  a  man':  "Those  acts  alone  are 
properly  called  human  which  are  of  his  own 
deliberate  willing.  Others  that  may  be  attributed  to 
him  may  be  called  'acts  of  a  man',  but  not  'human 
acts',  since  they  are  not  his  precisely  as  a  human 
being.  "77  But  man,  over  the  age  of  14  and  sane, 
always  has  the  ability  to  reason  and  about  his 
actions,  whether  'human'or  not.  So  this  generalised 
ability  cannot  itself  be  the  ground  of  distinction 
between  human  acts  -  the  only  ones  for  which  man  is 
responsible  -  and  the  others.  So  it  seems  that  what 
matters  in  human  acts  is  not  the  ability  to  reason  but 
the  employment  of  that  reason.  The  fact  that  man  in 
general  has  the  ability  to  reason  would  not  therefore 
seem  to  be  sufficient  to  reconcile  the  DV24-12  and  ST 
passages. 232 
There  seems  no  question  that  in  the  ST,  Aquinas 
regards  the  use  of  reason  in  individual  actions  as 
necessary  to  ground  voluntariness.  If  reason  is 
necessary  however,  the  issue  now  becomes  whether 
an  action  done  in  a  fit  of  passion  does  escape  the  use 
of  reason.  In  DV24.12,  it  seems  that  Aquinas  takes  it 
that  it  does  (but  says  that  it  is  nevertheless 
blameworthy).  In  the  ST,  he  seems  to  take  a 
somewhat  different  view.  There,  however,  he  also 
makes  a  helpful  distinction  which  is  not,  overtly, 
made  in  DV24.12. 
In  STla  llae.  6.7,  he  deals  with  the  question  of  whether 
lust  makes  an  action  involuntary,  responding  that  it 
does  not.  At  least,  not  usually.  In  reply  to  Objection  3 
of  that  Article,  he  says  that  if  lust  completely  destroys 
knowledge  of  the  end,  the  action  will  not  be 
voluntary:  "When  lust  swamps  knowledge  entirely,  as 
happens  with  people  out  of  their  minds  because  of  it, 
there  is  no  question  of  the  action  being  voluntary.  "78 
(Temporary)  insanity  brought  about  by  lust,  or  anger, 
would  make  an  action  arising  from  that  lust  or  anger 
non-voluntary  and  hence  blameleSS.  79 
However,  Aquinas  goes  on  to  say: 
"Sometimes  however  in  people  swayed  by  lust, 
knowledge  is  not  entirely  taken  away;  they  keep  their 
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concentration  about  a  particular  course  of  action.  Yet 
even  this  is  to  be  accounted  voluntary  as  lying  within 
the  will's  capability;  for  as  it  can  be  responsible  for 
not  willing  or  not  acting,  so  also  for  not 
considering.  "80 
The  point  is  put  even  more  directly  in  STla  Ilae.  10.3. 
The  last  sentence  of  this  passage  seems  particularly 
important: 
"There  are  degrees  in  being  transformed  by  passion.  It 
may  go  so  far  as  to  bind  the  reason  completely,  as 
happens  when  vehement  rage  or  concupiscence 
makes  a  man  beside  himself  or  out  of  his  mind;  this 
may  also  come  from  some  physical  disorder.  In  this 
condition  men  become  like  the  beasts,  driven  of 
necessity  by  passion;  they  are  without  the  motion  of 
reason  and  consequently  of  will.  Sometimes  however 
the  reason  does  not  completely  surrender  but  keeps 
some  of  its  independence  and  power  of  decision.  And 
to  that  extent  its  motion  of  will.  To  the  extent  that  the 
reason  remains  free  and  not  subject  to  passion  the 
motion  of  will  survives  and  is  not  of  necessity  driven. 
In  brief,  either  there  is  no  motion  of  will  in  a  man 
because  he  is  dominated  by  passion,  or  if  there  is, 
then  it  is  not  bound  to  follow  the  passion.  "81  (my 
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In  the  ST,  therefore,  Aquinas  distinguishes  the  cases 
where  reason  is  completely  destroyed  by  passion  from 
those  where  it  is  still  functioning,  albeit  heavily 
influenced  by  passion.  In  the  former  case,  he  seems 
quite  clear  that  there  is  no  praise  or  blame  attached 
to  the  resulting  act;  in  the  latter,  he  seems  equally 
clear  that  there  is.  It  seems  unlikely  that  in  DV24.12 
Aquinas  has  in  mind  the  case  where  reason  is 
completely  destroyed  by  passion,  given  that  he  says 
earlier  in  the  Question  (at  24.2)  that  the  whole  root  of 
freedom  is  located  in  reason  -  which  seems  to 
indicate  that  where  there  is  no  reason  at  all,  there  is 
no  freedom  at  all.  In  DV24.12  itself,  he  says  that 
greater  effort  could  have  avoided  the  sin.  This  seems 
to  imply  that  reasoning  could  have  taken  place,  but 
that  the  strength  of  the  passion  thrust  reason  aside. 
In  DV24.8,  he  seems  to  be  regarding  reason  as  being 
interrupted  or  hindered  by  passion,  not  by-passed 
completely,  for  he  explains  there  that  the  will  cannot 
tend  to  evil  unless  there  has  been  a  deficiency  in 
reason  which  results  in  something  evil's  being 
presented  as  good.  One  way  in  which  such  a 
deficiency  can  arise  is  because  "the  lower  powers  are 
drawn  to  something  intensely  and  the  act  of  reason  is 
consequently  interrupted  so  that  it  does  not  propose 
to  the  will  its  judgment  about  the  good  clearly  and 
firmly.  "  Aquinas  says  there  also  that  "the  judgment  of 
reason  is  fettered  by  concupiscence.  "82 235 
Further,  in  DV24.10,  he  describes  the  judgment  of 
reason  as  being  hindered  by  passion: 
"The  first  is  the  surge  of  passion,  such  as 
concupiscence  or  anger,  by  which  the  judgment  of 
reason  is  hindered  from  actually  judging  in  particular 
what  it  habitually  holds  in  general,  but  is  moved 
rather  to  follow  the  inclination  of  passion  so  that  it 
consents  to  that  to  which  passion  is  tending  as  good 
in  itself.  "83 
These  passages  from  DV24  seem  to  support  the  view 
that  in  DV24.12,  the  Article  which  gives  rise  to  the 
difficulty  about  freedom  and  choice,  Aquinas  had  in 
mind  the  case  where  passion  does  not  overcome 
reason  completely,  but  rather  the  case  where  the 
reasoning  process  starts  but  does  not  follow  its 
normal  course.  If  this  is  so,  we  can  now  dismiss  the 
thought  that  Aquinas  might  have  been  saying  that 
there  can  be  fully  voluntary  (human)  action  without 
reason.  But  if  there  is  some  element  of  reason,  is 
there  not  also  an  element  of  choice,  since  what  the 
will  is  doing  is  refusing  to  consider  further  and 
thrusting  reason  aside? 
Take,  for  example,  A,  who  comes  home  early  to  find 
his  wife  spring  cleaning  and  burning  all  his  books. 236 
His  anger  at  this  event  prompts  him  to  hit  his  wife. 
Now,  assuming  that  his  reason  is  not  "quite  absorbed 
in  passion  as  in  those  out  of  their  mind"  but  is  only 
"clouded  over  by  passion",  it  will  maintain  some  play 
and  to  that  extent  A  can  "repel  passion  or  at  least 
keep  it  in  check.  "84The  idea  of  hitting  his  wife  having 
come  into  A's  head,  reason  -  even  though  clouded- 
will  begin  to  hint  that  this  has  some  bad  aspects.  But 
A,  maddened,  metaphorically,  by  the  sight  of  his 
books  going  up  in  flames,  thinks  no  further  and 
proceeds  to  beat  his  wife. 
Such  action  is  voluntary  in  terms  of  STla  llae.  6,  for  it 
has  an  internal  source  and  is  done  with  knowledge  of 
the  end.  Even  though  A  is  acting  in  a  fit  of  passion, 
he  can  still  have  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  end.  But 
is  the  action  chosen?  At  the  point  where  intellect. 
perceived  that  wife-beating  had  both  good  and  bad 
aspects,  A  could  have  reflected  on  both  aspects,  and 
could  have  decided  for  or  against  hitting  his  wife. 
With  sufficient  determination  (or  %villpowerl,  he  could 
continue  to  reason  about  what  to  do.  Instead,  tired 
"because  of  the  many  cares  with  which  the  human 
mind  is  occupied"85  he  shuts  reason  off  and  gives  way 
to  his  anger.  At  this  point,  passion  influencing  his 
will,  he  wills  not  to  consider  the  bad  aspects  further 
and  commands  reason  to  ignore  them  and  to 
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that  because  his  reason  is  not  destroyed,  only 
clouded,  it  begins  to  work.  And  because  the  process 
begins,  A  can  consider  further,  or  he  can,  as  he  does, 
bring  the  process  to  a  swift  conclusion  by  focussing 
exclusively  on  the  'good'aspects  of  hitting  his  wife.  He 
could  therefore  have  done  otherwise  than  he  did. 
The  story  of  A  is  not  difficult  to  construct  from  what 
Aquinas  says  in  STla  llae  about  voluntary  action  and 
the  influence  of  the  passions.  However,  even  though  it 
seems  that  Aquinas  was  dealing  in  DV24.12  only  with 
the  case  where  reason  is  not  completely  destroyed  by 
passion,  it  is  difficult  to  read  into  that  passage  a 
recognition  that  there  is  a  moment  of  choice  without 
the  benefit  of  the  hindsight  provided  by  STla  llae.  This 
implies  that  Aquinas  is  saying  in  DV24  that  even 
though  reason  is  operating,  there  is  no  prospect  of 
choosing,  or  of  doing  otherwise.  Such  a  conclusion 
would  be  difficult  to  reconcile  with  what  he  says 
elsewhere. 
But  DV24.12  and  DV25.5  also  raise  a  further 
problem  in  relation  to  the  concept  of  voluntary  action 
and  choice.  It  would  seem  from  what  is  said  in 
DV24.12  that  not  only  an  act  done  in  a  fit  of  anger, 
but  also  angry  thoughts  themselves  may  anticipate 
the  deliberation  of  reason  but  nevertheless  be  sinful. 
This  is  more  explicit  in  DV25.5  ad  5:  "When  the 238 
movement  of  sensuality  precedes  the  judgment  of 
reason,  there  is  no  consent  either  interpreted  or 
expressed,  but  from  the  very  fact  that  sensuality  is 
able  to  be  subjected  to  reason  its  act,  even  though  it 
precedes  reason,  has  the  character  of  sin.  "86 
Interestingly,  Weisheipl  is  quite  clear  that  this  was 
always  Aquinas'position,  even  if  it  was  not  in 
agreement  with  others'.  In  contrasting  Aquinas' 
position  with  that  of  Albert,  who  latterly  took  the  view 
that  first  movements  of  the  sense  appetite  arose 
spontaneously  and  were  not  under  the  domain  of  free 
will,  Weisheipl  says:  "Thomas,  on  the  other  hand, 
maintained  his  original  position  taken  in  the  Sctiptum 
super  Sententias  that  all  such  initial  movements  of 
the  sense  appetite  toward  an  illicit  object  are 
sufficiently  under  the  domain  of  free  will  to  constitute 
them  venially  sinful,  but  the  lightest  of  all.  There  was 
no  change  whatever  in  the  teaching  of  Thomas  on  the 
sinfulness  of  secundo  primi  movements  in  the  sense 
appetite  (initial  emotions  or  temptations  of  the  flesh) 
even  antecedent  to  conscious  awareneSS.  "87 
According  to  Weisheipl,  Aquinas'reason  for  holding 
such  actions  to  be  sinful  was  that  the  movements 
could  have  been  avoided:  "For  Thomas  these 
movements  of  emotion  prior  to  deliberation  or  even 
awareness  could  each  have  been  prevented  if  the 239 
mind  had  been  thinking  of  something  else,  and  this 
possibility  indicates  sufficient  freedom  to  constitute 
sin.  "88This  is  consistent  with  the  view  expressed  in 
STIa  llae.  74.3  where  Aquinas  says  that  the  effect  of 
original  sin  does  not  "prevent  man  from  using  his 
reason  and  will  to  check  inordinate  sensual 
movements,  if  he  is  aware  of  them  in  advance,  for 
instance  by  turning  his  thoughts  to  other  things.  "  - 
scientific  speculation  for  example.  Further,  in  an  echo 
of  DV24.12,  he  says  that  man  cannot  avoid  all  such 
movements  but  that  "it  is  sufficient,  for  it  to  count  as 
a  voluntary  sin,  that  he  can  avoid  each  single  one.  "89 
Now,  this  seems  to  indicate  that  Aquinas  took  the 
view  that  there  is  in  each  individual  case  the 
possibility  of  doing  otherwise  and  that  it  is  precisely 
this  which  makes  the  thought  voluntary.  But  it  is  not 
clear  how  that  possibility  comes  about  if  the  lustful 
thoughts,  for  example,  have  appeared  unbidden. 
Further,  it  seems  from  Aquinas'  account  that  the 
sinfulness  arises  not  from  failure  to  banish  the  lustful 
thought  once  it  appears  but  from  its  appearing  at  all. 
The  mere  appearance  of  the  thought  must  therefore 
in  some  sense  be  voluntary. 
It  may  be  that  Aquinas  has  in  mind  that  the  thought 
is  voluntary  in  a  very  restricted  sense.  Since  his  use 
of  the  term  'voluntary'  covers  a  range  from  the 
voluntariness  of  animals  to  that  involved  in  fully 240 
human  action,  it  may  be  that  he  sees  such  sinful 
thoughts  as  voluntary  only  in  the  partial  sense  that 
applies  to  children  and  animals.  This  would  be 
consistent  with  Aquinas'  response  to  the  question  of 
whether  ignorance  lessens  sin.  There  his  reply  opens: 
"Since  all  sin  is  voluntary,  ignorance  diminishes  sin 
only  in  so  far  as  it  lessens  free  will,  and  if  it  does  not 
lessen  freedom  it  does  not  lessen  sin.  "90  Since  there 
are  some  sins  which  ignorance  lessens,  these  must  be 
voluntary  in  some  restricted  sense  which  means  that 
they  are  not  wholly  free.  The  response  in  STIa 
llae.  76.4  is  consistent  with  the  description  of  the  sin 
in  DV24.12  as  venial  rather  than  mortal,  since  mortal 
sin  is,  according  to  the  catechism  of  the  Catholic 
Church,  "sin  whose  object  is  grave  matter  and  which 
is  also  committed  with  full  knowledge  and  deliberate 
consent.  "  Venial  sin  is  committed  "when  one  disobeys 
the  moral  law  in  a  grave  matter,  but  without  full 
knowledge  or  without  complete  consent.  "91  It  is 
perhaps  recognized  in  DV24  and  25  therefore  that  the 
sin  being  committed  is  done  without  full  knowledge  or 
consent,  and  so  voluntary  only  in  a  limited  sense, 
with  responsibility  being  reduced  accordingly.  One 
could  then  perhaps  agree  that  choice  is  not  an 
essential  element  in  this  very  limited  kind  of 
voluntary  action  -  it  is  not,  after  all,  an  element  in  the 
voluntary  action  of  children  or  animals  -  but  argue 
that  it  is  an  essential  element  in  fully  voluntary 241 
actions.  This  would  allow  DV24-12  to  stand,  but  with 
such  sinful  actions  being  regarded  as  voluntary  only 
in  a  very  restricted  sense. 
But  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Aquinas  can  regard  such 
thoughts  as  voluntary  in  any  sense  at  all. 
What  is  willed  must  first  be  known.  Aquinas  is  quite 
clear  that  there  is  no  willing  without  previous 
cognition.  For  example,  in  STIa  Ilae.  6.8,  in 
considering  whether  ignorance  renders  an  act 
involuntary,  he  says:  "that  which  is  not  known 
cannot  be  willed.  "92Specifically  in  relation  to  sin, 
there  is  STIa  llae.  76.1  Objection  3:  "Furthermore  all 
sin  is  willed....  But  nothing  is  willed  that  is  not  first 
known,  for  the  object  of  the  will  is  the  good  as 
perceived.  Therefore  ignorance  cannot  cause  sin.  " 
And  the  reply:  "Although  the  totally  unknown  cannot 
be  desired,  what  is  partially  known  and  partially 
unknown  can.  "93 
Therefore,  to  be  a  sin,  x  must  be  willed;  to  be  willed,  x 
must  be  known,  at  least  partially,  and  must  be 
recognized  as  something  at  least  partially  good.  This 
however  poses  an  immediate  problem  in  relation  to 
supposedly  sinful  thoughts.  Thought  x  must  have 
been  recognized  as  something  apparently  good  before 
it  is  willed  and  so  before  it  is  a  voluntary,  sinful, 242 
thought.  But  in  order  for  it  to  be  known  as  something 
good,  it  must  already  have  been  thought.  I  cannot 
recognize  thought  x  as  good  -  or  bad  -  without 
actually  having  had  thought  x. 
It  would  seem  on  this  account  that  it  is  impossible  for 
a  thought  to  be  voluntary  at  the  point  when  it  first 
enters  one's  head,  as  it  were.  But  that  a  thought  is 
voluntary  at  this  stage  seems  to  be  the  implication  of 
DV24.12  and  25.5  -  for  it  seems  that  the  thought 
provoked  by  passion  is  sinful  as  soon  as  it  arises.  If 
that  is  so,  the  concept  of  'voluntary'  being  employed 
here  would  seem  to  be  one  which  does  not  require 
cognition,  and  so  one  obviously  at  variance  with 
Aquinas'  accounts  elsewhere. 
But  even  in  the  ST,  Aquinas  seems  to  endorse  the 
view  that  thoughts  per  se  can  be  sinful,  and  further 
distinguishes  among  the  thought,  delight  in  the 
thought  and  consent  to  the  thought.  In  STla  llae.  72.7, 
he  accepts,  following  Jerome,  that  there  are  sins  of 
thought,  word  and  deed,  and  describes  all  sins  of 
thought  as  sharing  the  common  characteristic  of 
secrecy,  and  constituting  "one  grade  of  sin,  even 
though  they  are  three  different  things,  either  thought, 
delight  or  consent.  "94Since  sins  must  be  voluntary,  it 
seems  again  that  the  thought  of  something  sinful 
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a  thought  can  be  willed  without  first  being  thought,  if 
willing  requires  previous  cognition. 
We  have  already  seen  how  Aquinas  tackles  the 
question  of  the  potential  infinite  regress  caused  by 
will's  moving  intellect  and  intellect's  moving  will  by 
arguing  that  there  does  not  have  to  be  an  act  of  will 
prior  to  every  act  of  knowledge.  95  Some  acts  of 
knowledge  can  therefore  be  involuntary;  but  these 
cannot  be  sinful.  Equally,  however,  Aquinas'answer 
implies  that  at  least  some  acts  of  knowledge  must  be 
willed.  The  Sed  Contra  to  the  Objections  in  STla.  82.4 
perhaps  gives  an  indication  of  the  kind  of  voluntary 
thought  which  might  be  in  mind  here: 
"On  the  other  hand  Damascene  notes  that  it  is  in  our 
power  to  attend  or  not  attend  to  whatever  discipline 
we  wish.  Now  it  is  through  our  will  that  a  thing  is  in 
our  power,  while  it  is  through  our  understanding  that 
we  attend  to  a  branch  of  learning.  So  the  will  affects 
the  understanding.  "96 
The  kind  of  situation  this  would  seem  to  cover  is,  for 
example,  one  where  I  sit  down  to  think  about  how  I 
shall  prepare  a  paper  I  have  already  agreed  to  give, 
or,  having  started  such  a  train  of  thought  I  find  my 
mind  wandering  and  deliberately  force  my  thoughts 
back  to  the  paper.  This  is  not  however  the  situation 244 
at  issue  in  DV24  and  25,  where  a  thought  suddenly 
appears  in  my  head,  "taking  me  more  or  less  by 
surprise.  " 
One  then  seems  forced  to  conclude  that  such 
'surprise'  thoughts  are  involuntary.  But  if  so,  how  can 
they  be  sinful? 
A  possible  approach  to  this  dilemma  lies  in  the  line 
Aquinas  takes  in  STIa  Ilae.  74.8,  where  he  is 
considering  whether  consent  to  delight  can  be  a 
mortal  sin.  He  takes  the  view  that  mere  thinking  of  a 
sinful  object  is  not  necessarily  a  sin;  what  makes  it 
sinful  is  the  attitude  taken  to  the  object  of  the 
thought: 
"A  man  thinking  about  fornication  can  delight  in  two 
ways:  either  in  the  thinking  itself  or  in  the  fornication 
thought  of.  However  delight  in  the  thinking  itself 
follows  an  affective  inclination  towards  the  thinking 
as  such.  Mere  thinking  is  not  a  mortal  sin;  sometimes 
it  is  only  a  venial  sin  e.  g.  idle  thoughts  on  the  subject, 
and  sometimes  it  is  no  sin  at  all  e.  g.  thoughts  on  the 
subject  useful  for  preaching  or  teaching. 
Consequently  affection  for  and  delight  in  thinking 
about  fornication  is  not  categorically  a  mortal  sin; 
sometimes  it  is  venial  and  sometimes  it  is  no  sin  at 
all.  "97 245 
This  passage  seems  to  distinguish  between  the 
thought  itself  and  the  continuation  of  it,  and  between 
reasons  for  continuation.  A  similar  division  between 
the  thought  and  its  continuation  is  found  in  the 
consideration  of  the  sin  of  Ungering  delight',  in  STIa 
Ilae.  74.6.  In  replying  to  Objection  3,  Aquinas  says 
that  "Delight  is  described  as  lingering  not  simply 
because  of  the  passage  of  time  but  because  judgment 
is  not  prompt  in  inhibiting,  deliberately  holding  and 
turning  over  what  should  have  been  cast  aside  as 
soon  as  it  touched  the  mind,  as  St  Augustine  says.  "98 
It  is  not  difficult  to  see  how  a  distinction  might  be 
made  between  the  occurrence  of  the  thought  and  its 
continuation,  and  to  argue  that  only  continuation  (for 
the  wrong  reasons)  is  sinful.  If  one  took  that 
approach,  there  would  be  no  need  to  worry  about 
whether  the  thought  itself  were  voluntary  or  not.  But 
the  thought  itself  is  supposed  also  to  be  sinful,  for 
Aquinas,  as  we  have  seen,  maintained  that  the 
thought,  the  delight  and  the  consent  to  that  delight 
are  three  different  things,  all  of  which  are  sinful. 
Even  in  relation  to  the  thinking  of  the  thought, 
however,  a  distinction  could  be  drawn  between  the 
origination  of  the  thought,  when  it  first  touched  the 
mind,  and  the  continuation  of  it  in  existence.  Then 246 
the  origination  of  the  thought  might  be  involuntary, 
because  lack  of  prior  cognition  of  it  made  it 
impossible  for  it  to  be  willed,  but  its  continuation 
voluntary  and  hence  possibly  sinful.  The  continuation 
of  the  thought  would  be  voluntary  because  I  have 
become  aware  of  it  lurking  at  the  edge  of  my  mind 
and  so  I  am  in  a  position  to  assess  it  as  good  to  focus 
on  -  or  not. 
It  now  becomes  possible  to  see  how  A  might  be  held 
responsible  for  a  passionate  thought.  At  the  very  first 
inkling  that  the  thought  was  forming  at  the  edge  of 
his  mind,  he  could  turn  his  mind  to  scientific 
speculation  ,  as  STla  llae.  74.3  suggests,  or  he  can 
focus  on  the  partially  formed  thought,  allowing  it  to 
develop  fully.  At  that  point,  if  the  intellect  does 
develop  it  fully,  it  has  become  a  willed  thought.  And  it 
has  become  a  chosen  thought,  because  the  will  could 
have  acted  otherwise:  it  might  have  willed  thoughts  of 
scientific  speculation  or  at  least  it  might  not  have 
prompted  the  intellect  to  develop  the  passionate 
thought  further. 
It  is  therefore  possible  to  see  how  a  sudden  thought 
can,  consistently  with  the  analysis  of  voluntary  in 
STla  llae,  be  said  to  be  voluntary  and  so  potentially 
sinful.  The  very  first  appearance  of  the  thought, 
whether  arising  suddenly  from  passion  or  otherwise, 247 
must  be  involuntary  since  voluntariness  requires 
prior  cognition,  but  the  development  of  the  thought 
can  be  voluntary  because  there  is  knowledge,  albeit 
partial,  of  it.  Such  an  approach  to  the  problem  of  how 
a  thought  might  be  voluntary  is  taken  by  Scotus,  who 
considers  that  thoughts  might  first  appear 
"indistinctly  and  imperfectly"  and  then  be 
strengthened  by  the  will  if  the  will  takes  pleasure  in 
them: 
"I  say  therefore  that  for  one  intellection  that  exists 
perfectly  in  the  intellect,  many  confused  and 
imperfect  intellections  can  also  be  there,  unless  one 
is  so  perfect  and  actual  that  it  suffers  no  other  to  co- 
exist  with  it.  Hence,  by  means  of  those  confused  and 
imperfect  intellections  present  there,  the  will  ....  can 
take  complacency  in  any  one  of  them,  even  though 
that  intellection  was  not  known  actually  as  a 
[distinct]  object,  and  by  taking  pleasure  in  one,  the 
will  confirms  and  intends  that  intellection.  Hence  that 
which  was  imperfect  and  disregarded  becomes  perfect 
and  intense  through  this  complacency,  and  thus  the 
will  can  command  thought  and  turn  the  intellect 
towards  it.  But  by  not  willing  some  other  intellection 
or  taking  no  pleasure  in  it,  that  intellection 
diminishes  in  intensity  and  ceases  to  exist.  "99 248 
Such  perfected  thoughts  are,  then,  willed  and  as  such 
may  be  sinful,  depending  on  their  subject.  100 
Although  a  similar  approach  to  sinful  thought  might 
be  constructed  from  Aquinas'own  resources  in  the 
ST,  it  is  a  considerable  way  from  the  face  of  the 
argument  in  DV24.12.  Nevertheless,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how,  without  some  such  construction  of  partially- 
formed  and  fully-formed  thoughts,  Aquinas  can 
explain  satisfactorily  how  a  sudden  thought  can  be 
voluntary  while  also  maintaining  that  there  can  be  no 
act  of  will  without  a  preceding  act  of  knowledge.  101 
There  does  therefore  seem  to  be  a  tension  between 
what  Aquinas  says  about  sudden  or  sinful  thoughts 
and  his  analysis  of  fully  voluntary,  human  action  in 
STIa  llae.  6-17. 
It  is  doubtful  however  that  what  is  said  in  DV24.12  is 
sufficient  to  support  an  argument  that  choice  is  not 
an  element  of  fully  voluntary,  human,  action,  for 
what  this  lengthy  examination  of  the  various  texts 
does,  seem  to  show  is  that  in  Aquinas'account  reason 
must  always  operate.  And  that  when  reason  operates, 
the  interaction  of  intellect  and  will  ensures  that  there 
is  always  a  point  when  a  thought  can  develop  in 
different  directions,  depending  on  the  aspects  which 
will  instructs  intellect  to  focus  on.  There  is  therefore 
always  the  prospect  of  choice.  If  that  is  so,  the  ability 249 
to  do  otherwise  would  seem  to  be  an  essential  feature 
of  Aquinas'concept  of  freedom.  Before  coming  to  a 
conclusion  on  this  point  however,  it  is  necessary  to 
return  to  Aquinas'  treatment  of  God's  knowledge  of 
future  contingents  to  look  at  an  issue  which  could 
have  a  major  bearing  on  what  Aquinas'concept  of 
freedom  is  thought  to  be. 
I  STIa  Ilae.  12.1  ad  4:  'Intentio  est  actus  voluntatis  respectu  finis.  Sed 
voluntas  respicit  finem  tripliciter:  ....  tertio  modo  consideratur  finis 
secundum  quod  est  terminus  alicujus  quod  in  fpsum  ordinatur;  et  sic 
intentio  respicit  finem.  Non  enim  solum  ex  hoc  intendere  decimur 
sanitatem,  quia  volumus  earn,  sed  quia  volumus  ad  earn  per  aliquid  aliud 
pervenire.  " 
2  See,  for  example  Anscombe  12000];  Kenny  [  1975].  See  also  Lang  v  Lang 
1955  AC  p.  402  and  Rv  Hyam  1974  1QBD  p.  99 
3  STIa  llae.  13  -  Introduction:  'Considerandurn  est  de  actibus  voluntatis  qui 
sunt  in  comparatione  ad  ea  quae  sunt  ad  finern;  et  sunt  tres  eligere, 
consentire  et  uti..  '  I  consider  consent  in  the  context  of  choice,  but  do  not 
deal  with  usus  since  it  does  not  feature  in  that  aspect  of  an  action  which 
relates  to  its  freedom. 
4  STIa  Ilae.  13  Introduction:  "Electionem  autem  praecedit  consilium.  Primo 
ergo  considerandurn,  est  de  electione;  secundo,  de  consilio.  ' 
5  Westberg  [  19941  p.  147 
6  The  etymology  of  'electio'would  indeed  seem  to  suggest  a  combination  of 
reason  and  will,  given  its  connection  with  'eligere,  ex+legere,  whose  uses 
are  given  by  the  Oxford  Latin  Dictionary  as  equivalent  to  the  English  *to 
pick  our;  "to  choose";  "to  select'.  Such  usage  would  seem  to  Imply  a 
rationally  informed  discrimination  or  preference  rather  than,  say,  picking 
out  with  a  pin. 
7  STIa  Ilae.  13.1c:  ODicendum  quod  in  nomine  electionis  importatur  aliquid 
pertinens  ad  rationern  sive  ad  intellectum  et  aliquid  pertinens  ad 
voluntatern.  Dicit  enim.  Philosophus  in  Ethic.,  quod  electio  est  appetitivus 
intellectus,  vel  appetitus  intellectivus.  Quandocumque  autem  duo 250 
concurrunt  ad  aliquid  unum  constituendem,  unum  eorum  est  ut  formale 
respectu  alterius.  Unde  Gregorianus  Nyssenus  vel  Nemesius  dicit  quod 
electio  neque  est  appetitus  secundum  seipsam,  neque  consilium  solum,  sed 
ex  lüs  aliquod  compositum.  Sicut  enim  dicimus  animal  ex  anima  et  corpore 
compositum  esse,  neque  vero  corpus  esse  secundum  seipsum  neque 
animam  solam  sed  utrumque,  ita  et  electionem.  » 
8  STla.  83.2  Obj.  2:  *liberum  arbitrium  dicitur  esse  facultas  voluntatis  et 
rationis.  ' 
9  STIa.  83.3c:  "Dicendum  quod  proprium  liberi  arbitrii  est  electio.  Ex  hoc 
enim  liberi  arbitrii  esse  dicimur,  quod  possumus  unum  recipere  alio 
recusato,  quod  est  eligere.  Et  ideo  naturam  liberi  arbitril  ex  electione 
considerare  oportet.  Ad  electionem  autem  concurrit  aliquid  ex  parte 
cognitivae  virtutis  et  aliquid  ex  parte  appetitivae.  ' 
10  DV22.15c:  "electio  habet  in  se  aliquid  voluntatis  et  aliquid  rationis. 
Utrum  autem  sit  actus  proprie  voluntatis  vel  rationis,  philosophus  videtur 
relinquere  sub  dubio  in  vi  cthicorum  ubi  dicit,  quod  'electio  vel  est 
appetitus  intellcctivi,  idest  appetitus  in  ordine  ad  intellectum,  vel 
intellcctus  appetivi,  idest  intellectus  in  ordine  ad  appetitum'.  Primum 
autem  verius  est  scilicet  quod  sit  actus  voluntatis  in  ordine  ad  rationcm 
quod  enim  sit  directe  actus  voluntatis,  patet  ex  duobus.  Primo  ex  ratione 
objecti  .....  secundo  ex  ratione  ipsius  actus.  Electio  enim  est  ultima  acceptio 
qua  aliquid  accipitur  ad  prosequendum...  " 
11  STla..  83.3  ad  1:  "Ad  primo  ergo  dicendum  quod  potentiae  appetitivae 
concomitantur  apprehensivas.  "  Ad  2:  "Determinatur  autem  consilium 
primo  quidem  per  sententiam  rationis,  et  secundo  per  acceptationem 
appetitus;...  Et  hoc  modo  ipsa  electio  dicitur  quoddam  judicium 
...  I  Ad  3: 
"Appetitus  enim,  quamvis  non  sit  collativus,  tamen  inquantum  aA 
cognitiva  conferente  movetur,  habet  quandam  collationis  similitudinem 
dum  unum  alteri  praeoptat.  " 
12  STla.  83.3c  "Hoc  autem,  inquantum  hujusmodi,  habet  rationem  boni 
quod  dicitur  utile.  Unde  cum  bonum,  inquantum  hujusmodi,  sit  objectum 
appetitus,  sequitur  quod  electio  sit  principaliter  actus  appetitivae  virtutis., 
13  STIa  Ilae.  13.1c:  "  perficitur  enim  electio  in  motu  quodam  animae  ad 
bonum  quod  eligitur.  Unde  manifeste  actus  est  appetitivae  potentiae.  ' 
14  See,  for  example,  Lottin  [  1942]  p.  2  16:  "Saint  Thomas  notait  quelque 
h6sitation  dans  la.  pensee  dAristote.  Mais  ds  le  Commentaire  des 
Sentences  R  prend  position:  le  choix  est  un  acte  de  volonte,  mais  cependant 
p6n6tre  de  raison.  Et  sur  ce  point,  le  saint  Docteur  ne  West  jamais 
dementi.  " 251 
15  STIa  Ilae.  8.2c:  "Ornnis  enim  actus  denominatus  a  potentia  nominat 
simplicern  acturn  illius  potentiae,  sicut  intelligere  nominat  simplicern 
acturn  intellectus.  Simplex  autem  actus  potentiae  est  in  id  quod  est 
secundum  se  objecturn  potentiae.  Id  autem  quod  est  propter  se  bonum  et 
voliturn  estfinis,  unde  voluntas  proprie  est  ipsius  finis.  "  Trans.  Oesterle 
16  In  Ethics  111,2 
17  STla  llae.  13.3c:  "Unde  finis,  inquanturn  est  hujusmodi,  non  cadit  sub 
electione.  " 
18  The  implications  of  this  kind  of  practical  reasoning  are  considered 
further  below,  in  Sections  B  and  C 
19  STIa.  lIae.  13.3c:  "But  just  as  with  speculative  argument,  nothing  prevents 
the  principle  of  one  demonstration  or  of  one  science  from  being  the 
conclusion  of  another  -  though  a  first  indemonstrable  principle  cannot  be 
the  conclusion  of  any  demonstration  or  science  -  so  also  what  is  the  end  of 
one  operation  may  be  the  means  for  something  else.  And  in  that  way  It  Is 
an  object  of  choice....  But  the  ultimate  end  in  no  way  falls  to  be  a  matter  of 
choice.  " 
"Sed  sicut  in  speculativis  nihil  prohibet  id  quod  est  unius  demonstrationis 
vel  scientiae  principium  esse  conclusionern  altcrius  demonstrationis  vcl 
scicntiae  -  primum  tamen  principium  indemonstrabilc  non  potest  esse 
conclusio  alicujus  demonstrationis  vel  scientiae-  ita  etiarn  contingit  Id  quod 
est  in  una  operatione  ut  finis  ordinari  ab  aliquid  ut  ad  finem.  Et  hoc  modo 
sub  electione  cadit  ......  Sed  ultimus  finis  nullo  modo  sub  electione  cadit.  ' 
Trans.  Oesterle. 
20  STla  Ilae.  13.2  ad  2:  "Ad  secundurn  dicendurn  quod  brutum  animal 
accipit  unum  prae  allo,  quia  appetitus  ejus  est  naturaliter  determinatus  ad 
ipsum;  unde  statim  quando  per  sensum,  vel  per  imaginationern 
repraesentatur  ei  aliquid  ad  quod  naturaliter  inclinatur  ejus  appetitus, 
absque  electione  movetur  ad  ipsum;  sicut  etiam  absque  electione  ignis 
movetur  sursum  et  non  deorsum.  " 
21  STIa  Ilae.  14.  lc:  "Dicendum  quod  electio,  sicut  dictum  est,  ISTIa  llae.  13.1 
ad  21  consequiturjudiciurn  rationis  de  rebus  agendis.  ' 
22  STIa  Hae.  14.1  c:  "In  rebus  autem  dubiis  et  incertis  ratio  non  profert 
judicium  absque  inquisitione  praecedente;  et  ideo  necessaria  est  inquisitio 
rationis  ante  judicium  de  eligendis.  Et  haec  inquisitio  consilium  vocatur.  ' 
23  STIa  Rae.  14.2 
24  STIa  Rae.  14.1  ad  1:  "..  in  consilio  quod  est  actus  rationis  apparet  aliquid 
voluntatis,  sicut  materia,  quia  consiliurn  est  de  his  quae  homo  vult  facere, 252 
et  etiam  sicut  motivum,  quia  ex  hoc  quod  homo  vult  finem,  movetur  ad 
consilium  de  his  quae  sunt  ad  finem.  " 
25  Ethics  vi,  2.1139b4 
26  STla,  Hae.  14.  Lad  1:  "ita,  Damascenus  dicit  quod  consilium  est  uppetitus 
inquisitivus,  ut  consilium  aliquomodo  pertinere  ostendat  et  ad  voluntatem, 
circa  quam  et  ex  qua  fit  inquisitio  et  ad  rationem  inquirentem., 
27  Or  perhaps  instead  of,  where  only  one  possible  means  is  identified:  STIa 
Ilae.  15.3  ad  3 
28  Finnis  [19981  p.  66 
29  STIa  llae.  15.3  ad  3:  "Potest  enim,  contingere  quod  per  consilium 
inveniantur  plura  ducentia  ad  finem,  quorum  dum  quodlibet  placet  in 
quodlibet  corum  consentitur,  sed  ex  multis  quae  placent  praeaccipimus 
unum  eligendo.  ' 
30  Westberg  [  1994]  pp.  147-174 
31  Westberg  op.  cit.  at  p.  168 
32  Westberg  op.  cit.  at  p.  149 
33  STIa  Ilae.  14.2c  "..  id  quod  accipitur  ut  finis  in  una  inquisitione,  potest 
accipi  ut  adfinem  in  alia  inquisitione.  ' 
34  STIa  Ilae.  14.6c:  "Terminus  autem  inquisitionis  est  Id  quod  statim  est  in 
potestate  nostra  ut  faciamus.  Sicut  enim,  finis  habet  rationem  principfi,  ita 
id  quod  agitur  propter  finem  habet  rationem  conclusionis.  Unde  id  quod 
primo  agendum  occurrit,  habet  rationem  ultimae  conclusionis,  ad  quam 
inquisitio  terminatur.  " 
35  The  process  of  practical  reasoning  is,  however,  considered  further  below, 
in  Section  C. 
36  Westberg  [  19941  p.  165 
37  ST111a.  18.4  ad  2:  "Ad  secundum  dicendum  quod  electio  praesupponit 
consilium,  non  tamen  sequitur  ex  consilio,  nisi  jam  determinato  per 
judicium;  Mud  enim  quod  judicamus  agendum  post  inquisitionem  consilif, 
eligimus,  ut  in  Ethic.  dicitur.  Et  ideo  si  allquid  judicetur  ut  agendum 
absque  dubitatione  et  inquisitione  praccedente,  hoc  sufficit  ad  electionem. 
Et  sic  patet  quod  dubitatio  sive  inquisitio  non  per  se  pertinet  ad 
electionem,  sed  solum  secundum  quod  est  in  natura  ignorante., 
u  Assuming,  for  the  sake  of  this  argument,  that  there  is  no  question  of 
which  alphabet  to  use,  or  whether  upper  or  lower  case  is  appropriate.  If 
there  were,  how  'a'was  to  be  written  would  then  be  'a  matter  open  to 
doubt'. 
39  STIa  Ilae.  6.2c:  "Perfectam  igitur  cognitionem  finis  sequitur  voluntarium 
secundurn  rationern  perfectam,  prout  scilicet  apprehenso  fine  aliquis  potest 253 
deliberans  de  fine  et  de  his  quae  sunt  ad  finern,  moveri  in  finern  vel  non 
moveri.  " 
40  STIa  Ilae.  14.1  "Philosophus  dicit  in  Ethic.,  quod  electio  est  appetitus 
pracconsiHati.  "  [Ethics  iii,  3.1113al  11 
41  MacDonald  [1991a]  p.  38 
42  STIa  Ilae.  1.6  ad  3:  "Ad  tertium  dicendum  quod  non  oportet  ut  semper 
aliquis  cogitet  de  ultimo  fine  quandocumque  aliquid  appetit  vel  operatur: 
sed  virtus  primae  intentionis,  quae  est  respectu  ultimi  finis,  manet  in 
quolibet  appetitu  cujuscumque  rei,  etiam  si  de  ultimo  fine  actu  non 
cogitetur.  Sicut  non  oportet  quod  qui  vadit  per  viam,  in  quolibet  passu 
cogitet  de  fine.  " 
43  STIa  Ilae.  14.4  ad  1:  "Unde  quando  judicium  vel  sententia  manifesta  est 
absque  inquisitione  non  requiritur  consilii  inquisitio.  '  Trans  Oesterle 
44  See  STIa  Ilae.  14.4  ad  2:  "ratio  in  rebus  manifestis  non  inquirit,  sed 
statim  judicat.  " 
45  STIa  Ilae.  13.6c:  "Dicendum  quod  homo  non  ex  necessitate  eligit;  et  hoc 
ideo,  quia  quod  possibile  est  non  esse  non  necesse  est  esse.  Quod  autem 
possibile  sit  non  eligere  vel  eligere,  hujus  ratio  ex  duplici  hominis  potestate 
accipi  potest.  Potest  enirn  homo  velle  et  non  velle,  agere  et  non  agere; 
potest  etiam  velle  hoc  aut  illud,  et  agere  hoc  aut  illud.  Cujus  ratio  ex  fpsa 
virtute  rationis  accipitur.  Quidquid  enim  ratio  potest  apprehendere  ut 
bonum  in  hoc  voluntas  tendere  potest.  Potest  autem  ratio  apprehendere  ut 
bonum,  non  solum  hoc  quod  est  velle  aut  agere,  sed  hoc  etiam  quod  est 
non  velle  et  non  agere.  Et  rursum  in  omnibus  particularibus  bonis  potest 
considerare  rationem  boni  alicujus,  et  defectum  alicujus  boni  quod  habet 
rationem  mali;  et  secundum  hoc  potest  unumquodque  hujusmodi  bonorum 
apprehendere  ut  eligibile  vel  fugibile.  Solum  autem  perfectum  bonum,  quod 
est  beatitudo,  non  potest  ratio  apprehendere  sub  ratione  mali  aut  alicujus 
defectus.  ....  Electio  autem,  cum  non  sit  de  fine,  sed  de  his  quae  sunt  ad 
finem....  non  est  perfecti  boni,  quod  est  beatitudo,  sed  aliorum 
particularium  bonorum.  Et  ideo  homo  non  ex  necessitate,  sed  libere,  eligit.  ' 
46STIa.  83.  lc:  "Ratio  enim  circa  contingentia  habet  viam  ad  opposita,  ut 
patet  in  dialecticis  syllogismis  et  rhetoricis  persuasionibus., 
47STIa.  83.  lc:  "Et  ideo  circa  ea  judicium  rationis  ad  diversa  se  habet,  et 
non  est  determinatum  ad  unum.  "  See  also  Scott  MacDonald  [19991 
pp.  148-153 
48STIa  Ilae.  13.6  ad  1:  "Et  similiter  non  oportet  quod  semper  ex  fine  insit 
homini  necessitas  ad  eligendum  ea  quae  sunt  ad  finem,  quia  non  omne 254 
quod  est  ad  finem  tale  est  quod  sine  eo  finis  haberi  non  possit;  aut  si  tale 
sit,  non  semper  sub  tali  ratione  consideratur.  ' 
49  STIa  Ilae.  10.2 
,0  STIa  Hae.  13.6  ad  2:  11  ...  conclusiones  non  ex  necessitate  sequuntur  ex 
principfis  necessaxiis  absoluta  necessitate,  sed  necessarfis  solum  ex 
conditione:  ut,  si  currit,  movetur.  " 
51  STIa  Ilae.  13.3 
52  DV24.2 
53  STIa  Ilae.  13.6  ad  3:  "Ad  tertiam  dicendum  quod  nihil  prohibet,  si  aliqua 
duo  aequalia  proponantur  secundum  unam  considerationem,  quin  circa 
alterum  consideretur  aliqua  conditio  per  quam  emineat,  et  magis  flectatur 
voluntas  in  ipsum  quam  in  aliud.  " 
54  Aquinas'  requirement  that  the  will  give  consent  to  identified  means  in  the 
process  of  deliberation  covers  this  point.  See  above. 
55  For  the  logic  which  applies  to  practical  reasoning  to  ensure  that 
satisfactoriness,  as  opposed  to  truth,  is  achieved,  see  Kenny  [1975]  pp.  70- 
96.  Consideration  of  this  logical  aspect  is  peripheral  to  the  issues  I  wish  to 
take  up  here,  and  is  not  pursued  further. 
56  Kenny  [19921  p.  44 
57  Wiggins  [19801  p.  228 
58  DV22.15c:  "Nam  quantumcumque  ratio  unum  alteri  praefert,  nondum 
est  unum  alteri  praeacceptatum  ad  operandum,  quousque  voluntas 
inclinetur  in  unus  magis  quam  in  aliud;  non  enim.  voluntas  de  necessitate 
sequitur  rationem.  " 
59  DV24.1  c:  "Homo  vero  per  virtutem  rationis  iudicans  de  agendis,  potest 
de  suo  arbitrio  iudicare,  in  quantum  cognoscit  rationem  finis  et  eius  quod 
est  ad  finem,  et  habitudinem  et  ordinem  unius  ad  alterum:  et  ideo  non  est 
solum  causa  sui  ipsius  in  movendo,  sed  in  iudicando;  et  ideo  est  liberi 
arbitrii,  ac  si  diceretur  liberi  iudicii  de  agendo  vel  non  agendo., 
60  DV24.2c:  "et  ideo  si  iudicium  cognitivae  non  sit  in  potestate  alicuius,  sed 
sit  aliunde  determinatum,  nec  appetitus  erit  in  potestate  eius,  et  per 
consequens  nec  motus  vel  operatio  absolute.  ludicium  autem  est  in 
potestate  iudicantis  secundum  quod  potest  de  suo  iudicio  iudicare:  de  eo 
enim  quod  est  in  nostra  potestate,  possumus  iudicare.  Iudicare  autem  de 
iudicio  suo  est  solius  rationis,  quae  super  actum  suum  reflectitur,  et 
cognoscit  habitudines  rerum  de  quibus  iudicat,  et  per  quas  iudicat;  unde 
totius  libertatis  radix  est  in  ratione  constituta.  " 
61  Gallagher  [1994]  p.  248 
62  Gallagher  [1994]  p.  276 255 
63  ST1a  Ilae.  9.2c:  «Quod  autem  aliquid  videatur  bonum  et  conveniens,  ex 
duobus  contingit,  scilicet  ex  conditione  ejus  quod  proponitur,  et  ejus  cui 
proponitur;  conveniens  enim  secundum  relationem  dicitur,  unde  ex 
utroque  extremorum  dependet.  Et  inde  est  quod  gustus  diversimode 
dispositus  non  eodem  modo  accipit  aliquid  ut  conveniens,  et  ut  non 
conveniens.  Unde  Philosophus,  Qualis  unusquisque  est,  talis  videtur  ei. 
jEthics  iii,  5.11  14a321  Manifestum  est  autem  quod  secundum  passionem 
appetitus  sensitivi  immutatur  homo  ad  aliquam  dispositionem:  unde 
secundum  quod  homo  est  in  passione  aliqua  videtur  ipsi  aliquid 
conveniens  quod  non  videtur  ei  extra  passionem  existenti,  sicut  irato 
videtur  bonum  quod  non  videtur  quieto.  » 
64STla.  82.4c:  «in  omnibus  potentlis  activis  ordinatis  illa  potentia  quae 
respicit  rinem  universalem  movet  potentias  quae  respiciunt  rines 
particulares  ....  Et  ideo  voluntas  per  modum  agentis  movet  omnes  animae 
potentias  ad  suos  actus  praeter  vires  naturales  vegetativae  partis  ...  » 
65  STla.  82.4  ad  1:  «Quia  intellectus  intelligit  voluntatem  velle  et  voluntas 
vult  intellectum  intelligere.  " 
66  STIa.  16.4  ad  1:  "Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  voluntas  et  intellectus 
se  mutuo  includunt;  nam  intellectus  intelligit  voluntatem,  et  voluntas  vult 
intellectum  intelligere.  " 
67  Brock  [  19981  p.  170 
68  STIa.  82.4  Obi  3:  "nihil  velle  possumus  nisi  sit  intellectum.  Si  fgitur  ad 
intelligendum  movet  voluntas  volendo  intelligere,  oportebit  quod  etlam  illud 
veHe  praecedat  aliud  intelligere,  et  illud  intelligere  aliud  velle,  et  sic  in 
infinitum.  " 
Ad  3:  "Ad  tertium  dicendum  quod  non  oportet  procedere  in  infinitum  sed 
statur  in  intellectu  sicut  in  primo.  Omnem  enim  voluntatis  motum  necesse 
est  quod  praecedat  apprehensio,  sed  non  omnem  apprehensionem 
praecedit  motus  voluntatis.  Sed  principium  consiliandl  et  Intelligendi  est 
aliquod  intellectivum  principium  altius  intellectu  nostro,  quod  est  Deus.  ' 
69  DV22.12  ad  2:  "  non  est  procedere  in  infinitum;  statur  enim  in  appetitu 
naturali,  quo  inclinatur  intellectus  in  suum  actum.  " 
70  DV24.12c:  "cum  liberum  arbitrium  sit  quaedam  potentia  constituta  infra 
rationem,  et  supra  motivarn  exequentem,  dupliciter  aliquid  extra  potestam 
liberi  arbitrii  invenitur.  Uno  modo  ex  hoc  quod  excedit  efficaciam  motivae 
exequentis,  quae  ad  imperium  liberi  arbitrif  operatur  ....  Alio  modo  aliquid 
est  extra  potestatem  liberi  arbitril,  quia  ad  ipsum  rationis  actus  non  se 
extendit.  Cum  enim  actus  liberi  arbitrii  sit  electio,  quae  consilium,  id  est 
deliberationern  rationis,  sequitur,  ad  illud  se  liberum  arbitrium  extendere 256 
non  potest  quod  deliberationem  rationis  subterfugit,  sicut  sunt  ea  quae 
impmemeditate  occurrunt.  " 
71  DV24.12c:  'Sed  secondo  modo  pcccatum  vel  eius  vitatio  potest  exccdcrc 
liberi  arbitrii  potestatem.  Eo  scilicet  quod  aliquod  peccatum  subito  ct  quasi 
repente  occurrit,  et  sic  electionem  liberi  arbitrii  subterfugit,  quamvis 
liberum  arbitrium  hoc  possit  facere  vel  vitare  si  ad  hoc  suam  attcntioncm 
vel  conatum  dirigeret.  Dupliciter  autem  aliquid  in  nobis  quasi  repcntine 
accidit.  Uno  modo  ex  impetu  passionis:  motus  enim  ime  et  concupiscentiae 
interdum  dcliberationem  rationis  pmevcnit.  Qui  quidem  motus  in  illicitum 
tcndcns  ex  corruptione  naturac,  pcccatum  veniale  est.  Et  ideo  post  statum 
naturae  corruptac  non  est  in  potestate  liberi  arbitrii  omnia  hufusmodl 
peccata.  vitare  quia  eius  actum  effugiunt,  quamvis  possit  impcdire  aliquem 
istorum  motuum,  si  contra  conetur.  ' 
72  Stump  [1997]  p.  589 
73  STIa.  19.10  ad  2:  "Ad  secundum  dicendum  quod  cum  malum  culpae 
dicatur  per  aversionem  a  bonitate  divina,  per  quam  Deus  omnia  vult,  ... 
manifestum  est  quod  impossibile  est  eum  malum  culpae  velle;  et  tamen  ad 
opposita  se  habet  inquantum  velle  potest  hoc  esse  vel  non  esse;  "  Trans., 
my  own. 
74  STIa  Ilae.  76.3c:  "But  ignorance  which  is  responsible  for  an  act  of  its  very 
nature  excuses  from  sin  because  it  causes  a  thing  to  be  involuntary,  and  a 
sin  must  always  be  voluntary.  ' 
'Sed  ignorantia  quae  est  causa  actus,  quia  causat  involuntarium,  de  se 
habet  quod  excuset  a  peccato:  eo  quod  voluntarium  est  de  ratione  peccati.  ' 
75  STIla  Rae.  189.5c:  "  Auplex  est  religionis  votum.  Unum  simplex,  quod 
consistit  in  sola  promissione  Deo  facta,  quae  ex  interiori  mentis 
deliberatione  procedit.  Et  hoc  votum  habet  efficaciam  exjure  divino.  Quae 
tamen  dupliciter  tolli  potest.  Uno  modo,  per  defecturn  deliberationis:  ut 
patet  in  furiosis,  quorum  vota  non  sunt  obligatoria  ....  Et  eadem  est  ratio  de 
pueris  qui  nondum  habent  debitum  usum  rationis,  per  quem  sunt  doli 
capaces....  " 
76  STIa  llae.  6.2  ad  3:  "...  Laus  et  vituperium  consequuntur  acturn 
voluntarium  secundum  perfectarn  voluntaril  rationem  ...... 
77  STIa  Ilae.  1.1  c:  "Illae  ergo  actiones  proprie  humanae  dicuntur  quae  ex 
voluntate  deliberata.  procedunt.  Si  quae  autem  aliae  actiones  homini 
conveniant,  possunt  dici  quidern  hondnis  actiones;  sed  non  proprie 
humanae,  cum  non  sint  hominis  inquanturn  est  homo.  ' 257 
78  STla  llae.  6.7  ad  3:  "Ad  tertium  dicendurn  quod  si  concupiscentia  totaliter 
cognitionern  auferrit,  sicut  contingit  in  illis  qui  propter  concupiscentlarn 
flunt  amentes,  sequeretur  quod  concupiscentia  voluntarium  tolleret., 
79  'Non-voluntary'mther  than  Involuntary',  since  Aquinas  points  out  in 
STla  Hae.  6.7  ad  3  that  the  terms  Voluntary'and  Involuntary'  apply  only  to 
things  having  the  use  of  reason  and,  crucially,  the  man  maddened  by  lust 
has  not  the  use  of  reason. 
80  STIa  Hae.  6.7  ad  3:  "Sed  quandoque  in  his  quae  per  concupiscentiam 
aguntur,  non  totaliter  tollitur  cognitio,  quia  non  tollitur  potestas 
cognoscendi,  sed  solum  consideratio  actualis  in  particulari  agibili;  et  tamen 
hoc  ipsum  est  voluntarium,  secundum  quod  voluntarium  dicitur  quod  est 
in  potestate  voluntatis,  ut  non  agere  et  non  velle;  similiter  autem  et  non 
considerare.  ' 
81  STIa  Ilae.  10.3c:  "Hujusmodi  autem  immutatio  hominis  per  passionem 
duobus  modis  contingit.  Uno  modo  sic  quod  totaliter  ratio  ligatur,  ita  quod 
homo  usum  rationis  non  habet;  sicut  contingit  in  fis  qui  propter 
vehementem  iram  vel  concupiscentiam  furiosi  vel  amentes  flunt,  sicut  et 
propter  aliquam  perturbationem  corporalem:  hujusmodi  enim  passiones 
non  sine  corporali  transmutatione  accidunt.  Et  de  talibus  eadem  est  ratio 
sicut  et  de  animalibus  brutis,  quae  ex  necessitate  sequuntur  impetum 
passionis;  in  his  enim  non  est  aliquis  rationis  motus,  et  per  consequens 
nec  voluntatis.  Aliquando  autem  ratio  non  totaliter  absorbetur  a  passione 
sed  remanet  quantum  ad  aliquid  judicium  rationis  liberum;  et  secundum 
hoc  remanet  aliquid  de  motu  voluntatis.  Inquantum  ergo  ratio  manet  libera 
et  passioni  non  subjecta,  intantum  voluntatis  motus,  qui  manet,  non  ex 
necessitate  tendit  ad  hoc  ad  quod  passio  inclinat.  Et  sic  aut  motus 
voluntatis  non  est  in  homine,  sed  sola  passio  dominatur,  aut,  si  motus 
voluntatis  sit,  non  ex  necessitate  sequitur  passionem., 
82  DV24.8c:  "Sed  ex  aliquo  extrinseco  ratio  deficit,  cum  propter  vires 
inferiores  quae  intense  moventur  in  aliquid,  intercipitur  actus  rationis,  ut 
non  limpide  et  firmiter  suum  iudicium  de  bono  voluntati  proponat;  sicut 
cum  aliquis  habens  rectam  existimationem  de  castitate  servanda,  per 
concupiscentiam.  delectabilis  appetit  contrarium  castitati,  'Propter  hoc 
quod  iudicium  rationis  aliqualiter  a  concupiscentia  ligatur,  ut  philosophus 
dicit  in  vii  ethic..  " 
83  DV24.10c:  'in  qua  quidem  aestimatione  tria  pensanda  sunt,  quorum 
primum,  est  ipse  impetus  passionis,  puta  concupiscentiae  vel  irae  per  quam 
intercipitur  iudicium  rationis,  ne  actu  iudicet  in  particulari  quod  in 258 
universali  habitu  tenet,  sed  sequatur  passionis  inclinationem,  ut 
consentiat  in  illud  in  quod  passio  tendit  quasi  per  se  bonum.  " 
84  STIa  Ilae.  10.3  ad  2 
85  DV24.12 
86  DV25.5  ad  5:  "quando  enim  motus  sensualitatis  praevenit  fudicium 
rationis,  non  est  consensus  nec  interpretatus  nec  expressus;  sed  ex  hoc 
ipso  quod  sensualitas  est  subiicibilis  rationi,  actus  eius  quamvis  rationem 
praeveniat,  habet  rationem  peccati.  " 
87  Weisheipl  [  19741  p.  74 
118  Weisheipl  op.  cit.  p.  74 
89  STIa  Ilae.  74.3  ad  2:  "Sed  talis  corruptio  fomitis  non  impedit  quin  homo 
rationabili  voluntate  possit  reprimere  singulos  motus  inordinatos 
sensualitatis,  si  praesentiat:  puta  divertendo  cogitationem  ad  alia  .......  Et 
ideo  non  potest  homo  vitare  omnes  hujusmodi  motus,  propter 
corruptionem  praedictarn:  sed  hoc  solum  sufficit  ad  rationem  peccati 
voluntarii  quod  possit  vitare  singulos.  "  Trans.,  my  own. 
90  STIa  Ilae.  76.4c:  "quia  omne  peccatum  est  voluntarium,  intantum 
ignorantia  potest  diminuere  peccatum  inquantum  diminuit  voluntarium:  si 
autem  voluntarium  non  diminuat,  nullo  modo  diminuet  peccatum.  ' 
91  Chapman  [  1994]  pp.  410,411 
92  STIa  Ilae.  6.8c:  "non  potest  esse  actu  volitum  quod  ignorantum  est.  " 
93  STIa  Ilae.  76.1  Obj  3:  "Praeterea,  omne  peccatum  in  voluntate  consistit... 
Sed  voluntas  non  fertur  nisi  in  aliquod  cognitum:  quia  bonum 
apprehensum  est  objectum  voluntatis.  Ergo  ignorantia  non  potest  esse 
causa  peccati.  " 
Ad  3:  "Ad  tertium  dicendum  quod  in  illud  quod  est  quantum  ad  omnia 
ignotum  non  potest  ferri  voluntas,  sed  si  aliquid  est  secundum  aliquid 
notum  et  secundum  aliquid  ignotum,  potest  voluntas  iflud  velle., 
94  STIa  Hae.  72.7  ad  1:  "..  omne  peccatum  cordis  convenit  in  ratione  occulti: 
et  secundum  hoc  ponitur  unus  gradus.  Qui  tamen  per  tres  gradus 
distinguitur,  scilicet  cogitationis,  delectationis  et  consensus.  ' 
95  STIa.  82.4,  above. 
96  STIa.  82.4  s-c:  "Sed  contra  est  quod  Damascenus  dicit  quod  in  nobis  est 
percipere  quamcumque  volumus  artem,  et  non  percipere.  In  nobis  autem 
est  aliquid  per  voluntatem;  percipimus  autem  artes  per  intellectum. 
Voluntas  ergo  movet  intellectum.  " 
97  STIa  Hae.  74.8c:  'Sic  igitur  aliquis  de  fornicatione  cogitans,  de  duobus 
potest  delectari:  uno  modo,  de  ipsa  cogitatione,  alio  modo  de  fornicatione 
cogitata.  Delectatio,  autem  de  cogitatione  ipsa  sequitur  inclinationem 259 
affectus  in  cogitationem  ipsam.  Cogitatio  autem  ipsa  secundum  se  non  est 
peccatum  mortale:  immo  quandoque  est  veniale  tantum,  puta  cum  aliquis 
inutilitcr  cogitat;  quandoquc  autem  sine  peccato  omnino,  puta  cum  aliquis 
utiliter  de  ea  cogitat,  sicut  cum  vult  de  ea  praedicare  vel  disputare.  ' 
98  STIa  llae.  74.6  ad  3:  "Ad  tertium  dicendum  quod  delectatio  dicitur  morosa 
non  ex  mora  temporis,  sed  ex  eo  quod  ratio  deliberans  circa  eam 
immoratur,  nec  tamen  eam  repellit,  tenens  et  volvens  libenter  quae  statim 
ut  attigerunt  animum  respui  debuerunt,  ut  Augustinus  dicit.  " 
99  Opus  oxonienseff  dist.  42  qq  1-4,  in  Wolter  [  19971  p.  151 
100  See  Broadie  [1996] 
101  Some  support  to  the  idea  of  partially  and  fully  formed  thoughts  may  be 
thought  to  be  given  by  Aquinas'  approach  to  the  compulsion  exercised  by 
the  totally  good.  We  considered  in  Chapter  3  Aquinas'  argument  that  the 
exercise  of  the  will  cannot  be  compelled  even  by  a  totally  good  object, 
because  a  man  may  always  think  of  something  else,  and  concluded  that 
that  argument  was  difficult  to  defend  because  it  seemed  that  as  soon  as  the 
totally  good  was  recognized  as  such,  the  will  would  be  compelled  to  will  it. 
But  if  the  thought  is  not  allowed  to  develop  even  as  far  as  recognizing  x  as 
totally  good,  it  is  easier  to  see  how  the  will  might  move  to  think  of 
something  else. 260 
Chapter  5 
GOD'S  KNOWLEDGE  AS  THE  CAUSE  OF  THINGS 
"So  boundless  an  ocean  of  doubt  uncertainty  and 
contradictionl" 
David  Hume,  on  the 
difficulties  arising  from  God's  being  "the  mediate  cause  of  all 
the  actions  of  men.  " 
Introduction 
From  the  analysis  so  far  of  voluntary  human  action, 
the  picture  of  freedom  painted  by  Aquinas  seems  to 
be  one  in  which  I,  by  means  of  my  intellect  and  will 
working  together,  decide  what  to  do  to  achieve  what  I 
consider  to  be  good.  Although  I  am  naturally  inclined 
towards  the  good,  and  cannot  choose  other  than  what 
appears  good,  my  natural  inclination  -  however 
strong  -  is  towards  only  the  good  in  general.  It  is  up 
to  me  to  decide  what  particular  goods  form  part  of,  or 
will  lead  to,  the  ultimate  good.  Since'everything  can 
be  seen  as  good  in  some  respect  or  other,  it  seems 
that  I  always  have  a  choice  in  deciding  what  to  do,  for 
it  is  possible  for  me  to  see  x  and/or  y  as  good  in  the 
particular  circumstances  of  my  choosing.  This  comes 
about  because  the  process  of  deliberation  which 
precedes  choice  may  result  in  a  number  of  different 261 
conclusions  depending  on  my  specification  of  the 
premisses.  Further,  even  something  completely  good 
does  not  compel  me  to  choose  it,  for  I  can  always 
switch  my  mind  to  other  things. 
This  picture  seems  to  convey  a  wide-ranging  freedom, 
including  not  just  a  negative  element  of  lack  of 
constraint  (no  one  has  compelled  me)  and  a  positive 
attribution  (it  is  My  decision  because  made  by  my 
intellect  and  will)  but  also  a  third  factor:  being  able  to 
make  a  different  choice  from  the  one  in  fact  made  and 
to  do  so  in  the  very  same  circumstances.  This  concept 
of  freedom  might  be  characterized  as  liberty  of 
indifference  rather  than  liberty  of  spontaneity. 
'Liberty  of  indifference'  may  be  thought  a  somewhat 
misleading  term  however,  for  it  seems  to  imply  that 
the  will  is  impartial  between  alternatives  or  among 
options.  On  Aquinas'  account,  the  will  is  naturally 
drawn  towards  that  which  seems  in  all  the 
circumstances  at  the  time  to  be  the  good;  the  only 
impartiality  is  that  all  things  may  appear  good. 
Characterizing  Aquinas'  concept  of  freedom  as  'wide' 
or  'narrow'  would  therefore  seem  more  appropriate,  a 
'wide'  concept  being  one  which  includes  the 
possibility  of  being  able,  in  the  same  circumstances, 
to  make  a  different  choice. 
Such  a  wide  concept  of  freedom  could  arguably  be  the 262 
one  which  is  assumed  in  Aquinas'  consideration  of 
the  problem  of  God's  knowledge  of  future  contingents. 
As  we  saw  in  Chapter  1,  Aquinas  argues  that  since 
God's  knowledge  is  eternal,  it  is  outside  time; 
therefore,  it  is  incorrect  to  say  that  God  knows  before 
I  sit  that  I  shall  sit.  Rather,  one  must  say,  in  human 
temporal  terms,  that  he  knows  at  the  time  I  sit  that  I 
sit.  His  knowledge  of  this  event  is  as  though  it  were 
present  in  human  terms  (Present*  perhaps,  since 
eternity  no  more  has  an  equivalent  of  the  temporal 
present  than  it  has  of  past  or  future).  Knowledge  that 
I  am  sitting  when  I  am  sitting  does  not  of  course 
mean  that  I  could  not  have  chosen  to  remain 
standing.  If  I  am  sitting,  clearly  I  must  be  sitting, 
otherwise  there  is  a  contradiction  -  but  at  the  point 
when  I  was  offered  a  seat  I  could  have  refused  it.  As 
we  saw,  Aquinas  makes  this  point  in  In  Peri 
Hermeneias  1.14: 
God's  knowing,  however,  is  altogether  outside  time, 
as  if  he  stands  on  the  summit  of  eternity  where 
everything  exists  together,  looking  down  in  a  single 
simple  glance  on  the  whole  course  of  time.  So  in  his 
one  glance  he  sees  everything  going  on  throughout 
time,  and  each  as  it  is  in  itself,  not  as  something 
future  to  himself  and  his  seeing  and  visible  only  as  it 
exists  within  its  causal  situation  (although  he  sees 
that  causal  situation).  But  he  sees  things  altogether 263 
eternally,  each  as  it  exists  in  its  own  time,  just  as  our 
own  human  eye  sees  John  sitting  there  himself,  not 
just  as  something  determined  by  causes.  Nor  does 
our  seeing  John  sitting  there  stop  it  being  an  event 
that  might  not  have  been  when  regarded  just  in 
relation  to  its  causes.  And  yet  while  he  is  sitting 
there,  we  see  him  sitting  there  with  certainty  and 
without  doubt,  since  when  a  thing  exists  in  itself  it  is 
already  determined.  In  this  way  then  God  knows 
everything  that  happens  in  time  with  certainty  and 
without  doubt,  and  yet  the  things  that  happen  in  time 
are  not  things  that  must  exist  or  must  come  to  exist, 
but  things  that  might  be  or  might  not  be.  "' 
As  we  have  also  seen,  there  are  difficulties  with  this 
solution.  But  even  if  one  accepts  that  God's  knowing 
that  I  am  doing  x  rather  than  that  I  shall  do  x  solves 
the  problem  of  the  temporal  necessity  of  what  I  do 
and  so  makes  room  for  the  possibility  of  my  choosing 
to  do  x  or  not,  there  is  still  a  problem  arising  from 
God's  knowledge  that  I  am  doing  x.  That  problem  will 
be  considered  in  this  chapter.  Although  it  seems  to  be 
resolvable,  the  solution  raises  doubts  about  whether 
Aquinas'concept  of  freedom  is  indeed  the  wide  one. 
That  issue  is  therefore  given  further  consideration. 
The  conclusion  reached  is  that  Aquinas'  concept  is 
the  wide  one,  but  it  is  recognized  that  such  a  concept 
leaves  unresolved  tensions  with  his  views  in  other 264 
areas. 
A.  Cause  of  God's  knowledge 
In  dealing  with  God's  knowledge  in  both  DV  and  STla, 
Aquinas  makes  the  point  that  God's  knowledge  is  the 
cause  of  things  whereas  for  humans,  things  are  the 
cause  of  the  knowledge  of  these  things.  In  both 
DV2.14  and  STla.  14.8,  he  starts  the  discussion  by 
raising  an  objection  based  on  Origen's  text  "A  thing 
will  not  happen  in  the  future  because  God  knows  it 
will  happen,  but  because  it  is  going  to  happen 
therefore  it  is  known  by  God  before  it  does  happen.  112 
-a  particularly  relevant  point  in  relation  to  God's 
knowledge  of  future  contingents.  In  both  works, 
Aquinas  denies  that  this  authoritative  text  means 
that  things  are  the  cause  of  God's  knowledge  of  them. 
Somewhat  charitably  perhaps,  he  says  in  DV2.14  ad 
1  that  Origen's  words  'Because  it  is  going  to  happen 
therefore  it  is  known  by  God  before  it  does  happen' 
are  meant  to  give  the  reason  for  concluding  that  God 
knows  it,  and  are  not  intended  to  say  that  it  is  the 
cause  of  God's  knowledge.  This  is  expressed  in 
STla.  14.8  in  terms  of  logical  causality  and  'the 
causality  which  produces  existence': 
"Origen  in  the  passage  quoted  is  taking  knowledge  in 
the  sense  in  which  it  is  not  formally  a  cause  except  in 
conjunction  with  the  will,  as  we  have  said  [in  the 265 
body  of  the  article].  His  saying  that  God  foreknows 
certain  things  because  they  are  going  to  happen,  is  to 
be  understood  of  the  causality  of  logical  consequence, 
not  of  the  causality  which  produces  existence.  For  it 
follows  logically  that  if  certain  things  are  going  to 
happen  God  foreknows  them;  but  the  things  that  are 
going  to  happen  are  not  themselves  the  cause  of 
God's  knowledge.  "3 
The  reasons  Aquinas  gives  in  DV2.14  for  concluding 
that  God's  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  things  are,  first, 
that  things  are  temporal  but  God's  knowledge  is 
eternal  and  what  is  temporal  cannot  be  the  cause  of 
something  eternal.  Second,  it  cannot  be  the  case  that 
some  third  thing  causes  both  x  and  God's  knowledge 
of  x,  for  nothing  can  be  caused  in  God  since  there  is 
no  potentiality  in  him. 
Aquinas  simply  states  without  explanation  that 
something  temporal  cannot  be  the  cause  of  God's 
eternal  knowledge.  This  is  perhaps  puzzling  since,  as 
Craig  pointsoUt,  4all  temporal  things  are  present  to 
God  in  eternity  and  so  could  arguably  be  the  cause  of 
eternal  knowledge.  But  in  any  event,  the  argument 
that  things  cannot  be  caused  in  God  because  there  is 
no  potency  in  God  would,  in  Aquinas'  view,  be 
sufficient  in  itself  to  prevent  x's  being  the  cause  of 
God's  knowledge  of  x,  even  if  x  were  also  eternal. 266 
Whatever  the  strength  of  his  arguments,  Aquinas' 
conclusion  is  nevertheless  clear:  God's  knowledge  is 
the  cause  of  things:  "there  is  left  only  one  possibility: 
his  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  things.  Conversely  our 
knowledge  is  caused  by  things  inasmuch  as  we 
receive  it  from  things.  "5 
In  STla.  14.8,  Aquinas'  conclusion  is  the  same  but  the 
reasoning  different.  He  opens  his  response  with  the 
positive  statement  that  "God's  knowledge  is  the  cause 
of  things.  "  The  reason  now  given  is  not  that  nothing 
can  be  caused  in  God,  but  the  argument  from  God  as 
creator  -  God's  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  all  the 
things  he  has  created  just  as  a  craftsman's 
knowledge  is  the  cause  of  what  he  produces.  6  So,  the 
thought  of  the  bowl  in  the  potter's  head  is  the  cause 
of  what  takes  shape  on  the  wheel.  In  this  sense  the 
potter  knows  the  bowl  before  he  makes  it,  and  it  is 
this  knowledge  which  is  the  efficient  cause  of  the 
finished  article.  And  just  as  the  potter's  knowledge 
precedes  and  causes  his  making  of  the  bowl,  so  God's 
knowledge  precedeS7and  causes  what  he  makes. 
Which  is,  of  course,  everything. 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  qualify  his  statement  that  God's 
knowledge  is  the  cause  of  things  by  pointing  out  that 
intellect  by  itself  does  not  lead  to  activity:  activity 267 
results  only  where  there  is  also  will.  The  potter's 
knowledge  of  the  bowl  will  not  by  itself  cause  the  bowl 
to  be  made  -  that  needs  the  potter  to  want  to  make 
the  bowl.  So  God's  knowledge  by  itself  is  not  the 
cause  of  things:  it  is  his  knowledge  together  with  his 
will: 
"Now  it  is  clear  that  God  causes  things  through  his 
intellect,  since  his  existence  is  his  act  of  knowing.  His 
knowledge  therefore  must  be  the  cause  of  things 
when  regarded  in  conjunction  with  his  will.  Hence 
God's  knowledge  as  the  cause  of  things  has  come  to 
be  called  the  knowledge  of  approbation.  "8 
This  combination  of  intellect  and  will  is  expanded  on 
in  STla.  19.4,  where  Aquinas  is  considering  whether 
God's  will  is  the  cause  of  things.  His  opening 
statement  is  that  God's  will  is  indeed  the  cause  of 
things  -  and,  further,  that  it  is  through  his  will  rather 
than  any  necessity  of  his  nature  that  he  causes 
things.  To  the  Objection  that  he  has  already  said  that 
it  is  God's  knowledge  which  is  the  cause  of  things, 
Aquinas  responds  that  both  mind  and  will  are 
involved  in  any  activity.  This  is  true  of  both  humans 
and  God,  though  in  God's  case  intellect  and  will  are, 
of  course,  one: 
"Even  with  us  one  and  the  same  effect  has  both  mind 268 
and  will  as  shaping  causes,  the  first  as  conceiving  the 
meaning  of  what  we  do,  the  second  as  executively 
commanding  it.  Whether  an  idea  conceived  in  the 
mind  is  or  is  not  realized  in  fact  depends  on  the  will. 
Theoretical  understanding  is  not  committed  to  doing 
something.  "9 
Aquinas  therefore  holds  that  God's  knowing  and 
willing  x  is  the  cause  of  x.  He  thus  seems  to  be 
saying  that  it  is  not  my  sitting  down  which  causes 
God  to  know  that  I  am  sitting  down,  but  quite  the 
reverse:  it  seems  that  I  am  sitting  down  because  he 
knows  and  wills  that  I  should  do  so.  Of  course, 
Aquinas'  argument  in  STla.  14.13  about  the  non- 
temporal  nature  of  God's  knowledge,  considered  in 
Chapter  1,  also  applies  to  his  willing.  His  willing  me 
to  sit  down  is  eternal,  not  'before'  I  do  so. 
Unfortunately,  however,  the  consequence  of  God's 
eternally  willing  me  to  sit  down  seems  less  likely  to 
allow  a  wide  sense  of  freedom  than  did  the 
consequences  of  his  eternally  knowing  that  I  sit  when 
one  considered  his  knowing  without  considering  its 
source.  God's  knowing  that  I  sit  when  I  sit  does  not 
make  it  absolutely  necessary  that  I  should  sit  and  I 
could  have  decided  to  do  otherwise.  But  God's 
knowing  that  I  sit  because  he  causes  my  sitting 
seems  to  give  me  no  choice  about  whether  to  sit  or 
not,  given  that  his  will  is  irresistible  and  cannot  be 269 
impeded.  It  is  true  that  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary 
that  I  sit,  in  the  sense  that  God  could  have  willed 
other  than  he  did,  since  his  will  is  free.  10  Given, 
however,  that  he  does  will  that  I  sit,  my  freedom 
seems  very  limited  indeed,  for  the  necessity  or 
otherwise  depends  on  whether  God  wills  it,  not  on 
whether  I  decided  to  do  it. 
Nevertheless,  Aquinas  does  maintain  that  I  am  free 
despite  the  causal  nature  of  God's  knowledge.  The 
arguments  he  uses  in  seeking  to  establish  this  are 
therefore  important  in  showing  what  his  concept  of 
freedom  is,  and  in  particular  whether  it  is  possible  to 
sustain  the  wider  concept  when  the  causal  aspect  is 
taken  into  account. 
B.  Primary  and  secondary  causes 
We  have  already  seen  in  Chapter  3  that  Aquinas 
addresses  the  issue  of  God's  being  an  external,  first 
cause  of  the  will's  movement,  and  that  he  concludes 
that  God's  movement  of  my  will  does  not  prevent  its 
being  a  self-mover,  since  God  moves  it  only  as  he 
designed  it  to  be  moved  i.  e.  freely.  God's  movement  of 
my  will  does  not  therefore  determine  it  to  any 
particular  good.  We  also  noted,  however,  that 
Aquinas'  position  raised  a  difficulty  about  the 
relationship  between  God's  will  as  primary  cause  and 
mine  as  secondary  cause,  in  particular  how  my  will 270 
as  secondary  cause  can  produce  a  contingent  effect 
when  the  primary  cause,  God,  produces  necessary 
effects. 
The  question  of  necessary  and  contingent  effects,  and 
primary  and  secondary  causes,  arises  in  relation  to 
God's  knowledge  as  the  cause  of  things  in  DV2.14.  In 
that  discussion,  two  difficulties  are  raised  which 
suggest  that  if  God's  knowledge  is  the  cause  of 
things,  everything  will  be  necessary.  Aquinas  answers 
these  difficulties  by  arguing  first  that  an  effect  follows 
the  necessity  of  its  proximate  cause.  It  need  not 
follow  the  necessity  of  the  first  cause,  for  the  effect 
can  be  impeded  by  a  secondary  cause.  "  The  second 
argument  concems  the  relative  power  of  the  two 
causes.  Aquinas'  response  is  that: 
"Although  the  first  cause  influences  an  effect  more 
powerfully  than  a  secondary  cause  does,  the  effect 
does  not  take  place  without  the  operation  of  the 
secondary  cause.  Hence  if  it  is  possible  for  the 
secondary  cause  to  fail  in  its  operation,  it  is  possible 
for  the  effect  not  to  take  place,  even  though  the  first 
cause  itself  cannot  fail 
......  Since  both  causes  are 
required  for  the  existence  of  an  effect  a  failure  of 
either  will  result  in  a  failure  of  the  effect.  Hence  if 
contingency  is  affirmed  of  either  cause,  the  effect  will 
be  contingent.  "12 271 
What  is  being  said  here  is  that  while  God's  knowledge 
is  the  cause  of  things,  these  things  are  not  always 
necessary,  because  God's  knowledge  is  only  the 
primary  cause.  Things  are  also  brought  about  by 
secondary  causes,  and  secondary  causes  may  impede 
the  effects  of  primary  causes. 
Now,  while  this  argument  about  primary  and 
secondary  causes  may  hold  in  general,  it  surely 
cannot  be  true  if  God  is  the  primary  cause.  This  point 
is  put  in  DV23.5,  at  Objection  3: 
"When  the  effect  is  contingent  because  of  the 
contingency  of  the  second  cause,  given  a  necessary 
first  cause,  the  non-existence  of  the  effect  is 
compatible  with  the  existence  of  the  first  cause.  Thus 
the  non-blossoming  of  a  tree  in  spring  is  compatible 
with  the  motion  of  the  sun.  But  the  non-existence  of 
what  is  willed  by  God  is  not  compatible  with  the 
divine  will.  For  these  two  things,  God's  willing 
something  to  be  and  its  not  being,  are  irreconcilable. 
Consequently  the  contingency  of  second  causes  does 
not  prevent  the  things  willed  by  God  from  being 
necessary  because  of  the  necessity  of  the  divine 
Will.  1113 
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necessity  on  everything.  Although  what  God  wills  to 
happen  does  indeed  happen,  God's  will  is  so  powerful 
that  it  can  make  things  come  about 
"in  the  manner  in  which  God  wants  it  to  come  about  - 
necessarily  or  contingently,  quickly  or  slowly  ....  The 
divine  will  determines  this  manner  for  things 
beforehand  in  the  order  of  God's  wisdom  ........  We 
accordingly  say  that  some  of  the  divine  effects  are 
contingent  not  merely  because  of  the  contingency  of 
secondary  causes  but  rather  because  of  the 
appointment  of  the  divine  will,  which  saw  to  such  an 
order  for  things.  "14 
This  line  is  developed  further  in  an  important  passage 
in  In  Peri  Hermeneias  1.14.  Dealing  with  the  point 
that  if  God's  providence  is  the  cause  of  everything 
that  happens  (or  at  least  of  all  good  things)  then  it 
seems  that  everything  must  happen  as  it  does, 
Aquinas  says  that  this  point  is  based  on  a 
misconception  of  how  God's  knowledge  and  will 
operate:  , 
"...  God's  will  is  to  be  thought  of  as  existing  outside 
the  realm  of  existents,  as  a  cause  from  which  pours 
forth  everything  that  exists  in  all  its  variant  forms. 
Now  what  can  be  and  what  must  be  are  variants  of 
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derive  whether  they  must  be  or  may  or  may  not  be 
and  the  distinction  of  the  two  according  to  the  nature 
of  their  immediate  causes.  For  he  prepares  causes 
that  must  cause  for  those  effects  that  he  wills  must 
be,  and  causes  that  might  cause  but  might  fail  to 
cause  for  those  effects  that  he  wills  might  or  might 
not  be.  "15 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  say  that  whether  things  are 
necessary  or  contingent  depends  on  the  nature  of 
their  immediate  causes,  though  all  causes  depend  on 
God's  will  as  the  primary  cause  -  and  this  cause 
transcends  the  distinction  between  necessary  and 
contingent:  "But  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  human 
will  or  of  any  other  cause,  since  every  other  cause 
exists  within  the  realm  of  must  and  might  not.  So  of 
every  other  cause  it  must  be  said  either  that  it  can 
fail  to  cause  or  that  its  effect  must  be  and  cannot  not 
be;  God's  will  however  cannot  fail  and  yet  not  all  his 
effects  must  be,  but  some  can  be  or  not  be.  "16 
What  Aquinas  seems  to  be  saying  here  is  that  causes 
other  than  God  (for  example,  me  or  the  sun)  can  have 
either  necessary  or  contingent  effects;  if  the  effect  is 
necessary,  it  cannot  fail,  and  only  if  it  is  contingent 
can  it  be  in  the  category  'maybe/  maybe  not'.  But  I 
cannot  determine  whether  my  effect  will  be  necessary 
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happen  or  he  can  will  that  x  may  or  may  not  happen. 
This  is  because  'necessary'  and  'contingent'  are 
modes  of  being,  and  only  God  can  give  being  as  such. 
Since  whatever  he  wills  necessarily  happens,  if  he 
wills  '(x  or  not-x)'  x's  being  will  then,  necessarily,  be 
contingent.  Whether  x  actual  comes  about  or  not 
would  therefore  seem  to  be  up  to  me  as  the  secondary 
cause,  and  so  I  determine  whether  x  happens  or  not. 
And  so  my  freedom  has  been  preserved. 
C.  Craig's  arguments 
This  might  seem  a  satisfactory  solution,  for  it 
preserves  the  idea  of  God's  irresistible  will  but  seems 
also  to  leave  room  for  some  kind  of  human  freedom. 
William  Lane  Craig,  however,  denies  that  Aquinas  has 
solved  the  problem.  In  Divine  Knowledge  and  Future 
Contingents,  he  argues,  citing  SCG3.2.89,  that  since 
God  knows  the  movements  of  the  human  will  and 
must  therefore  be  the  cause  of  these  movements,  it 
cannot  be  the  case  that  the  will's  choices  are 
contingent.  17His  argument  is  worth  quoting  at  length 
because  of  the  importance  of  the  points  raised.  On 
Aquinas'  account,  Craig  says,  God  does  not  "simply 
foreknow  an  event  to  take  place  as  it  does  [i.  e. 
contingently].  It  is  God  in  His  eternity  who  determines 
which  possible  motion  of  the  will  shall  be  actualized, 
and  in  so  knowing  it  He  causes  it. 
..  The  event  is, 
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it  is  contingent  means  that  it  is  not  causally 
determined  by  its  proximate  causes  in  the  temporal 
series.  But  this  seems  entirely  irrelevant;  for  the 
event,  whatever  its  relation  to  its  proximate  causes,  is 
still  causally  determined  to  occur  by  the  divine 
scientia  approbationis.  Worse  still,  Thomas  seems  to 
have  forgotten  that  those  secondary  causes  are 
themselves  also  similarly  determined,  so  that  even  on 
this  level  contingency  seems  squeezed  out.  Thus  it  is 
futile  for  him  to  contend  that  God's  knowledge  does 
not  necessitate  an  effect  because  the  effect  may  be 
impeded  by  its  secondary  cause,  for  this  secondary 
cause  is  itself  determined  causally  by  God.  "  From 
this,  Craig  concludes  that  there  is  no  human  freedom 
at  all:  "In  maintaining  that  God's  knowledge  is  the 
cause  of  everything  God  knows,  Thomas  transforms 
the  universe  into  a  nexus  which,  though  freely 
chosen  by  God,  is  causally  determined  from  above, 
thus  eliminating  human  freedom.  "18 
Craig's  arguments  raise  two  issues  about  Aquinas' 
account  -  first,  whether  he  has  indeed  'transformed 
the  universe  into  a  nexus  causally  determined  from 
above'  and,  second,  whether  if  God  does  so  causally 
determine  human  actions,  freedom  is  eliminated.  To 
deal  first  with  the  causal  element,  Craig's  argument 
seems  to  be  that  even  if  God  has  willed  that  some 
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God  knows  eternally  that  I  decide  x  (or  not-x)  when 
faced  with  the  choice  means  that  it  is  God  who 
causes  x,  through  his  knowledge  and  his  will.  There 
can  therefore  be  no  contingency  about  x,  and  it  is 
irrelevant  to  say  that  I  have  brought  it  about 
contingently  as  a  secondary  cause. 
Now,  it  seems  clear  that  Aquinas  does  not  believe  that 
God's  knowledge  of  the  motion  of  my  will 
automatically  makes  him  the  cause  of  what  I  then 
will  to  do:  God  knows  that  Cain  wills  to  kill  Abel,  but 
it  is  not  God  who  causes  Abel's  death.  It  is  unlikely 
that,  as  Craig  seems  to  suggest,  Aquinas  failed  to  see 
the  supposed  implication  that  the  causal  nature  of 
God's  knowledge  eliminated  human  freedom;  it  is 
even  more  unlikely  that  he  did  not  realise  that  such 
knowledge  would  also  make  God  solely  accountable 
for  evil. 
The  issue  of  God  as  the  cause  of  sinful  action  is  a 
complex  one,  and  detailed  consideration  of  it  is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  It  is  clear  however 
that  Aquinas  recognized  the  difficulty  which  could 
arise  from  holding  that  God  is  the  first  cause  of 
human  actions  and  he  deals  with  this  specifically 
(though  not  perhaps  entirely  satisfactorily)  in  DM3.2. 
There  he  takes  the  view,  for  two  reasons,  that  sinful 
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he  is  the  source  of  everything  which  exists:  "Clearly 
then,  since  a  sinful  action  exists  in  some  sense  and 
belongs  in  one  of  the  categories  of  being,  it  comes 
from  God.  "19  His  second  reason  is  particularly 
important  in  the  present  context: 
"Secondly,  this  [i.  e.  that  God  is  the  cause  of  sinful 
actions]  is  also  true  for  a  special  reason.  All 
movements  of  secondary  causes  must  be  caused  by  a 
primary  cause  ....  so  God  is  the  first  source  of  all 
movement  whatever,  bodily  and  spiritual.  Since  then 
sinful  actions  are  certain  freely  chosen  movements, 
we  have  to  say  that  sinful  actions,  as  actions,  come 
from  God.  "20 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  say,  however,  that  God  is  not  the 
cause  of  the  sinfulness  of  the  action,  because  the 
defect  in  the  action  which  renders  it  sinful  results 
from  my  failure  to  act  properly.  He  draws  a  parallel 
with  an  injured  animal  -  its  walking  with  a  limp 
comes  in  some  sense  from  its  ability  to  walk,  but  the 
limpin  walk  is  not  caused  by  that  ability  but  by  the 
injury  which  prevents  the  ability's  being  used 
properly: 
"What  we  must  say  then  is  that  God  is  the  first 
source  of  all  movements,  and  that  some  things  are  so 
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free  choice.  If  such  things  are  rightly  disposed  and 
ordered  in  the  way  needed  to  receive  God's 
movements  there  will  result  good  actions  that  can  be 
totally  traced  back  to  God's  causality;  but  if  they  are 
not  properly  ordered  then  there  will  result  a 
disordered  or  sinful  action,  in  which  what  there  is  of 
action  can  be  traced  back  to  God's  causality  but  what 
there  is  of  disorder  and  deformity  does  not  have  God 
as  cause  but  our  free  choice.  "21 
Now,  this  passage  raises  difficulties  relating  to  the 
need  for  God's  grace  to  avoid  sin,  an  issue  which  is 
also  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  The  passage's 
importance  for  present  purposes  is  however  that  it 
shows  that  Aquinas  is  alive  to  the  problems  raised  by 
God's  being  the  cause  of  things,  and  that  he  is  still, 
some  12  years  or  so  after  the  date  of  the  DV 
passages22  of  the  view  that  effects  of  human 
secondary  causes  are  not  necessitated  by  the  first 
cause,  God  -  that  human  causes  are,  somehow, 
contingent. 
As  we  have  seen  from  In  Peri  Hermeneias  1.14, 
Aquinas'  explanation  of  how  secondary  causes  can  be 
said  to  be  contingent  is  that  God's  will  is  so  powerful 
that  it  can  determine  whether  things  come  about 
necessarily  or  contingently.  In  the  case  of  contingent 
effects,  God  has  willed  only  (x  or  not-x);  if  x  is  to 279 
happen  therefore  there  must  be  something  else  which 
brings  it  into  effect  i.  e.  there  must  be  another  cause. 
This,  Aquinas'  account  says,  is  'me'  when  x  is  a 
human  action  rather  than  a  natural  event;  by  my 
intellect  and  will,  I  cause  x  to  happen  or  not.  Craig 
argues,  however,  that  since  God  knows  and 
determines  eternally  that  I  decide  V  (or  'not-x')  when 
faced  with  the  choice,  it  is  God  who  causes  x.  In 
Craig's  argument,  it  seems  that  God's  causing  x 
simply  leaves  no  room  for  me  to  be  a  cause  of  x  in  any 
way  which  allows  a  meaningful  concept  of  freedom, 
for  what  determines  the  outcome  (i.  e.  that  x  will 
happen)  is  obviously  God's  irresistible  will  rather  than 
my  will.  In  Aquinas'  argument,  on  the  other  hand,  as 
we  have  seen  in  Chapter  3  in  relation  to  God's 
movement  of  my  will,  it  is  clear  that  he  believes  that 
there 
-is  room  for  me  to  be  a  cause  as  well  as  God.  In 
SCG  3.69,  Aquinas  gives  a  detailed  rebuttal  of  the 
Mutakallimum.  arguments  thatno  creature  has  an 
active  role  in  the  production  of  natural  effects', 
concluding:  "Therefore  we  do  not  take  away  their 
proper  actions  from  created  things,  though  we 
attribute  all  the  effects  of  created  things  to  God,  as  an 
agent  working  in  all  things.  1123The  gist  of  these 
arguments  appears  also  in  STla.  105.5,  where 
Aquinas  says: 
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everything  that  acts  to  mean  that  no  created  power 
effects  anything  in  the  world,  but  that  God  alone  does 
everything  without  intermediaries.  For  example,  it 
would  not  be  the  fire  giving  heat,  but  God  in  the  fire 
and  similarly  in  other  instances.  But  this  is 
impossible" 
... 
[because  creation's  pattern  of  cause 
and  effect  would  be  taken  away,  and  because  there 
would  be  no  point  in  creatures'  having  the  power  they 
obviously  do  have  if  these  powers  did 
nothing]....  "God's  acting  in  creatures,  therefore,  must 
be  understood  in  such  a  way  that  they  themselves 
still  exercise  their  own  operations.  1124 
Similarly  in  de  Potentia  3.7,  Aquinas  states  that  God 
is  at  work  in  all  activity,  but  that  this  does  not  mean 
that  things  do  nothing  by  their  own  power.  He 
explains  at  some  length  why  the  view  that  things  do 
nothing  by  their  own  power  would  be  wrong,  and 
concludes:  "So  one  must  not  understand  the 
statement  that  God  is  at  work  in  everything  in  nature 
as  if  that  meant  the  thing  itself  did  nothing;  rather  it 
means  that  God  is  at  work  in  the  very  activity  of 
nature  and  freewill.  "25  Having  explained  how  God  is 
at  work  in  nature  and  free  will,  he  finishes:  "it  follows 
that  [God]  is  at  work  without  intermediary  in 
everything  that  is  active,  but  without  excluding  the 
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So,  Aquinas  holds  that  there  is  room  for  me  to  be  a 
cause,  albeit  a  secondary  one.  But  this  of  course 
merely  raises  again  the  problem  of  how  a  secondary 
cause  can  be  said  to  be  a  free  cause  when  the  first 
cause  is  God  -  how  can  the  effects  of  that  secondary 
cause  be  contingent  when  the  actions  of  that 
secondary  cause  are  known  to,  and  so  caused  by, 
God? 
Aquinas'  answer  seem  to  depend  on  how  God  is  said 
to  cause  x. 
D.  God's  causation 
The  problem,  as  Craig  sees  it,  is  that  God  knows  I  do 
x  because  he  causes  x;  Aquinas  says  he  causes  x  as 
the  primary  cause  and  I  also  cause  x,  as  the 
secondary  cause,  and  my  nature  is  such  that  I  can 
cause  x  freely  and  contingently.  But,  Craig  argues, 
the  primary  cause  in  this  case  is  so  powerful  that  it 
seems  to  leave  no  room  for  the  secondary  cause  to 
have  any  effect  other  than  that  willed  by  the  primary 
cause,  whose  effects  cannot  be  impeded.  Such  an 
analysis,  however,  assumes  that  God's  causation  is 
just  like  mine  only  much  more  powerful  -  in  other 
words,  that  the  term  'causes'  is  being  used  univocally 
of  God  and  of  man. 
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significantly  different  from  that  of  humans. 
In  de  Potentia  3.7,  God's  way  of  causing  another's 
activity  is  summarized  as  follows:  "God  then  causes 
everything's  activity  inasmuch  as  he  gives  the  power 
to  act,  maintains  it  in  existence,  applies  it  to  its 
activity  and  inasmuch  as  it  is  by  his  power  that  every 
other  power  acts.  "27Up  to  a  point,  one  might  apply 
Aquinas'  description  of  God's  causation  to  human 
causation:  one  might  say  that  A  causes  the  axe  to  cut 
because  he  has  given  it  the  power  to  do  so,  by  making 
an  appropriate  blade  and  shaft;  he  maintains  these  in 
the  sort  of  condition  necessary  to  enable  the  axe  to 
cut  efficiently;  he  applies  it  to  the  cutting  of  wood; 
and  it  is  by  A's  power  to  wield  the  axe  that  it  is  able 
to  perform  its  function.  And  here  both  A  and  the  axe 
are  said  to  cut  the  wood  -  not  A  doing  one  part  of  the 
job  and  the  axe  another,  but  both  causing  the  cutting 
together,  though  in  a  different  way.  The  same  thing  is 
said  of  God's  causation:  "the  same  effect  is  not 
attributed  to  a  natural  cause  and  to  divine  power  in 
such  a  way  that  it  is  partly  done  by  God  and  partly  by 
the  natural  agent;  rather  it  is  wholly  done  by  both, 
according  to  a  different  way,  just  as  the  same  effect  is 
wholly  attributed  to  the  instrument  and  also  wholly  to 
the  principal  agent.  1128 
When  A  makes  the  axe,  however,  he  creates  this  new 283 
thing  from  pre-existing  materials:  he  does  not  create 
the  wood  and  the  iron  but  merely  gives  them  a  new 
form.  The  same  is  true  of  more  abstract  things  than 
an  axe  -  in  'The  Will'  John  Donne  has  created 
something  new,  a  poem,  by  giving  different  form  to 
pre-existing  words;  Gand's  portrait  of  Saint  Thomas 
Aquinas  gives  new  form  to  pre-existing  shapes  and 
colours.  And  the  paint  and  canvas  are  previously 
existing  matter.  God,  on  the  other  hand,  creates  the 
matter  and  gives  it  form.  The  significant  difference 
between  God's  causing  and  the  craftsman's  causing  is 
therefore  that  the  artist  and  the  manufacturer  can 
only  modify  in  some  way  or  other  what  has  previously 
existed;  God  gives  existence  itself.  So,  God's 
knowledge  and  the  craftsman's  knowledge  may  both 
be  the  cause  of  things,  but  how  they  cause  is 
different:  "God's  knowledge  is  like  the  artist's  insofar 
as  the  artist  knows  his  work  prior  to  his  creation,  the 
effect  in  its  cause.  But  the  artist's  knowledge  of  his 
product  extends  only  to  its  form  -  God  is  the  cause  of 
both  the  matter  and  the  form  of  the  individual.  "29 
Further,  both  the  axe's  power  to  cut  and  A's  power  to 
cause  the  axe  to  cut  are  derivative,  on  Aquinas' 
description  of  man's  and  God's  causation:  A  can 
cause  something  only  because  he  has  been  given  the 
power  to  do  so.  But  God's  power  to  cause  is, 
obviously,  not  derivative.  And  my  being  given  power 284 
to  cause  by  God  is  not  the  same  as  my  giving  the  axe 
the  power  to  cut.  My  power  to  cause  is  part  of  my 
being,  which  can  be  given  only  by  God.  Just  as  I 
depend  on  him  for  my  bding  (and  maintenance  of  that 
being)  so  I  depend  on  him  for  my  ability  to  cause.  If  I 
am  by  participating  in  God's  being,  as  Aquinas  holds, 
then  I  cause  by  participating  in  God's  causation.  And 
without  God's  being  and  causation  there  is  no  being 
and  causation  at  all. 
The  way  God  causes  therefore  goes  far  beyond  the 
way  man  causes  -  just  as  the  being  of  God  is  like,  but 
more  perfect  than,  the  being  of  humans.  The 
significant  difference  in  how  God  and  humans  cause 
means  however  that  'cause'  cannot  be  used 
univocally  of  God  and  man.  30  Goris  makes  this  point 
in  his  discussion  of  God's  causation:  "In  short,  the 
unique  mode  of  causation  which  is  proper  to  the  First 
cause,  indicates  that  the  term  'cause'  is  used 
analogically  when  said  of  God.  "31 
Now,  if  Aquinas  is  indeed  using  'cause'  analogically  of 
God  and  man,  it  follows  that  God's  causation  and 
human  causation  cannot  just  be  different  grades  in 
one  and  the  same  hierarchy  of  causes.  Since  God's 
causing  is  outside  the  realm  of  human  causing,  the 
different  causes  cannot  be  compared  or  ranked,  or 
considered  as  being  in  competition  with  each  other.  It -  285 
thus  makes  no  sense  to  ask  how  I  can  cause  x 
contingently  when  God  causes  it  necessarily.  Such  a 
comparison  of  causes  would  be  legitimate  only  in 
relation  to,  say,  two  human  causes,  where  like  is 
properly  compared  with  like.  The  important  point  is, 
therefore,  not  to  try  to  provide  an  explanation  of  how 
human  effects  can  be  contingent  when  God's  effects 
are  necessary,  but  to  recognise  that  God's  causation 
is  a  different  kind  of  thing  from  human  causation  and 
so  cannot  be  compared,  or  compete,  with  it.  This 
point  is  made  by  Goris  in  relation  to  God's  will  as  the 
cause  of  being:  "Because  God's  will  is  the  cause  of 
being  as  such,  His  causation  does  not  compete  with 
the  causation  of  creatures,  but  rather  supports  and 
groundsit.  "  32God's  particular  way  of  causing  enables 
me  continuously  to  cause,  just  as  he  enables  me 
continuously  to  be,  and  because  he  gives  being  as 
such  to  the  thing  I  am  trying  to  cause,  namely  x. 
God's  way  of  causing  x  therefore  does  not  over-ride 
my  causing  x,  or  determine  that  I  shall  cause  x  and 
so  I  can  still  be  a  real  cause  of  x.  As  Goris 
summarises  the  argument:  "The  notion  of  'cause' 
means  that'being'  (esse)  is  given  to  the  effect.  As  no 
created  being  can  give  being  as  such,  but  only 
(substantial  or  accidental)  determinations  of  being, 
creaturely  causation  depends  on  divine  causation. 
Without  the  efficacy  of  the  latter,  there  would  be  no 
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way,  the  irresistibility  of  the  efficacy  of  the  divine 
cause  does  not  jeopardize  the  contingency  of 
creaturely  causation.  "33Such  a  conclusion  is 
consistent  with  the  point  made  in  In  Peri  Hermeneias 
1.14,  considered  above,  that  God's  knowledge  and 
will,  the  cause  of  things,  operate  fundamentally 
differently  from  human  knowledge  and  will. 
There  are  therefore,  I  believe,  good  grounds  for  saying 
that  the  term  'causes'  has  to  be  used  analogically  of 
God  and  man.  That  being  so,  God's  causation  would 
not  bar  human  causation  from  being  contingent.  So 
God's  knowing  x  because  he  causes  x  need  not 
causally  determine  my  doing  x  and  I  can  still  act 
contingently  and  freely.  The  analogical  use  of  'cause', 
with  its  consequence  that  God's  and  man's  causation 
are  not  in  a  competing  hierarchy,  is  not  considered  by 
Craig,  however.  This  seems  to  me  to  be  an  important 
defect  in  his  case  for  the  irresistibility  of  God's 
causation. 
If  this  analysis  is  accepted,  Aquinas  still  has  -  despite 
Craig's  arguments  -a  coherent  concept  of  freedom 
wide  enough  to  include  the  possibility  of  doing 
otherwise,  for  God  causes  in  such  a  way  that  I  also 
am  a  cause  and  I  determine  whether  x  happens.  On 
this  account,  God  knows  eternally  that  at  time  tI  do  x 
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however,  I  was  still  free  to  choose  between  x  and  Y-I 
could  have  sat  down  or  continued  to  stand.  Had  I 
chosen  to  stand,  then  God  would  of  course  have 
known  eternally  that  at  tI  choose  y.  Although  he 
causes  my  choice  between  x  and  y,  his  peculiar  way 
of  doing  so  means  that  it  can  be  said  that  I  choose. 
There  is,  however,  a  problem  with  such  an  account, 
for  it  seems  to  imply  that  God's  knowledge  is 
somehow  dependent  on  what  I  choose  to  do.  For  if 
God  wills  only  (x  or  not-xj  and  causes  x  in  such  a  way 
that  I  determine  whether  x  happens  or  not,  what  is  it 
that  grounds  God's  knowledge  that  x  actually  does 
happen?  It  would  seem  to  be  that  this  is  my  doing  x. 
So,  the  problem  now  seems  to  be: 
(i)  God  causes  x  in  such  a  way  that  he  does  not 
determine  that  x  happens; 
(ii)  I  determine  whether  or  not  x  happens;  until  I  do, 
x  is  indeterminate; 
(iii)  God  knows  that  I  do  x; 
(iv)  Only  determinate  things  can  be  known  with 
certainty; 
(v)  Therefore  God's  knowledge  that  x  happens 
depends  on  my  making  x  determinate. 
Now,  the  cause  of  x's  being  made  determinate,  and 
thus  knowable  by  God,  is  not  just  me  but  God  in  his 288 
particular  way  of  causing.  It  seems  therefore  that  it 
can  be  said  that  God  himself  causes  his  knowledge 
that  I  do  x,  and  so  Aquinas'  view  that  knowledge  is 
not  caused  in  God  by  created  things  can  be 
preserved.  Nevertheless,  there  seems  to  be  some  kind 
of  dependency,  for  God's  causation  would  not  bring 
about  my  determination  to  do  x  without  my  also 
making  the  determination.  This  seems  to  point  to 
some  kind  of  potentiality  in  God,  and  so  be 
inconsistent  with  Aquinas'  views  on  the  simplicity 
and  unchangeableness  of  God.  34 
There  are  several  possible  ways  of  resolving  this 
difficulty  of  identifying  precisely  what  it  is  that 
grounds  God's  knowledge  that  I  do  x.  It  is  possible, 
for  example,  to  argue  that  God  knows  I  choose  and  do 
x  because  his  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  all  his 
creatures  enables  him  to  know  what  they  do  in  all 
circumstances,  a  sort  of  perfect  prediction  as  it  were. 
One  might  simply  concede  that  God  knows  what  I 
determine  in  some  other  unique  but  inexplicable  way. 
One  might  widen  the  search  and  try  to  tailor  the 
concept  of  God's  omniscience  to  exclude  the  detailed 
outcome  of  contingencies,  though  this  certainly 
seems  not  to  be  an  option  for  Aquinas.  It  seems  clear, 
for  example,  that  he  sees  God's  knowledge  and  his 
providence  as  extending  far  wider  than  simply  the 
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he  knows  the  motion  of  the  human  will,  he  knows 
that  "even  one  sparrow  falls".  A  further  possibility  is 
that  one  might  even  consider  whether  such 
dependence  really  is  fatal  to  the  concept  of  a  simple 
God.  35 
While  there  undoubtedly  is  a  difficulty  with  Aquinas' 
account  here,  my  concern  now  is  not  with  the 
possible  ways  of  resolving  it,  but  with  what  happens 
if  it  is  conceded  that  Aquinas'  arguments  taken 
together  force  one  to  the  conclusion  that  it  must  be 
the  case  that  God  determines  whether  I  do  x  or  y 
even  if  I  can  be  said  to  be  a  cause  in  some  respect. 
This  leads  to  the  second  of  the  issues  raised  by 
Craig's  arguments. 
Craig  says  that  since  God  knows  that  I  do  x  and  not 
in  bringing  x  about,  and  so  determines  that  I  do  x, 
Aquinas  has  left  no  room  for  freedom.  Now,  it  is 
possible,  as  Craig  suggests  -  though  unlikely  -  that 
Aquinas  may  not  have  realised  that  a  consequence  of 
his  views  on  the  causal  nature  of  God's  knowledge 
was  that  there  was  no  room  for  human  freedom.  But 
since  Aquinas  so  obviously  believes  that  there  is 
human  freedom,  it  is  at  least  equally  possible  that  his 
line  of  argument  shows  that  he  has  a  concept  of 
freedom  consistent  with  God's  determining  that  I  do 
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I  have  considered  in  earlier  chapters  how  Aquinas 
has  described  how  nothing,  including  God  or  my  own 
nature,  compels  me  to  will  x.  Even  more 
importantly,  he  has  described  how  even  my  strong 
inclinations  to  do  x  can  in  different  circumstances  be 
followed  or  not.  I  am  not  constrained  therefore  by  my 
nature  or  compelled  by  any  other  source  to  do  as  I  do. 
Further,  Aquinas  has  argued  that  I  am  a  cause  of 
what  I  do  even  though  there  is  another  cause  -I  move 
my  will,  even  though  there  is  also  a  First  Mover;  I 
choose  to  do  x,  having  deliberated  about  my  ends  and 
means,  even  if  I  do  not  actually  consider  what  I  am 
doing  in  quite  these  terms.  These  things  go  to  make 
what  might  otherwise  be  random  movements  into  a 
human  voluntary  act.  Further,  it  is  My  human  act, 
for  it  can  be  explained  by  reference  to  my  will  and 
intellect. 
I  have  also  argued  that  Aquinas'  primary  concern 
with  freedom  is  in  the  context  of  personal 
responsibility,  legal  and/or  moral:  in  what 
circumstances  am  I  to  be  held  responsible  for  what 
has  happened?  In  such  a  context,  it  is  arguably 
sufficient  that  an  act  can  be  shown  to  be  mine  and 
not  that  of  any  other  creature,  done  without 
compulsion,  as  described  above.  Such  a  concept  of  a 
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determining  that  I  do  x  if  the  act  can  also  be  said  to 
be  mine  in  some  way.  The  question  is,  is  it  Aquinas' 
concept  of  freedom? 
E.  Possibility  of  doing  otherwise 
A  concept  of  freedom  which  included  God's 
determining  that  I  do  x  would  seem  to  rule  out  the 
possibility  of  my  being  able  to  do  y-  a'narroW 
concept  of  freedom.  If  that  is  indeed  Aquinas' 
concept,  he  would  therefore  seem  to  deny  that  the 
ability  to  do  otherwise  is  a  necessary  ingredient  of 
freedom.  That  he  does  so  deny  is  the  conclusion 
Eleonore  Stump  comes  to  (though  not  on  the  grounds 
that  God  determines  that  I  do  x)  in  her  article  on 
Aquinas'  account  of  freedom,  considered  in  Chapter 
4. 
She  bases  her  conclusion  on  the  premisses  that  (i) 
sinful  thoughts  may  be  free  voluntary  actions  even 
though  they  may  involve  no  possibility  of  deliberation 
and  hence  of  choosing  to  do  otherwise;  and  (ii) 
Aquinas  recognises  a  natural  necessity  which  does 
not  take  away  freedom  of  the  will.  She  therefore 
concludes:  "Clearly,  then,  Aquinas  doesn't  suppose 
that  human  freedom  even  as  regards  willing  consists 
in  or  depends  on  the  ability  to  do  otherwise.  "  Further, 
she  says,  Aquinas  would  reject  the  principle  of 
alternative  possibilities  [that  a  person  has  free  will 292 
with  regard  to  doing  an  action  x  only  if  he  could  have 
done  otherwise  than  xI  "not  only  for  bodily  actions 
but  even  for  actsof 
Will.  "36 
A  similar  conclusion  is  reached,  on  different  grounds, 
by  Normore  in  The  Cambridge  History  of  Later 
Mediaeval  Philosophy.  37There  he  says:  "Like  Anselm 
[Aquinas]  denies  that  being  able  not  to  choose  A  is  a 
necessary  condition  for  choosing  A  freely,  and  so  he 
can  hold  that  a  particular  outcome  is  freely  chosen  by 
me  even  if  God's  activity  guarantees  its  coming  to 
pass.  "  In  support  of  this  view,  Normore  cites 
STIa.  62.8,  saying  that  "Aquinas  argues  that  the  good 
angels  have  free  will  though  they  cannot  sin.  " 
Stump  points  out,  as  does  Linda  Trinkhaus 
Zagzebski,  38that  there  is  modem  support  for  the  view 
that  alternative  possibilities  are  not  necessary  for 
freedom.  The  standard  support  often  invoked  is  the 
'Frankfurt  counter-examples',  as  elaborated  by,  for 
example,  Fischer.  39Fischer's  example  suggests  a  case 
where  Black  inserts  a  mechanism  into  Jones's  brain, 
which  mechanism  allows  Black  to  monitor  and 
control  Jones's  brain  activity.  If  Jones  is,  for  example, 
subsequently  going  to  vote  for  Carter  (a  then  current 
choice)  in  the  presidential  elections,  Black  can 
intervene  via  the  mechanism  and  make  him  vote  for 
Reagan  instead;  but  if  Jones  is  going  to  vote  for 293 
Reagan,  Black  does  nothing.  In  the  event,  Jones 
decides  without  any  interference  from  the  Black 
mechanism  to  vote  for  Reagan.  Both  Frankfurt  and 
Fischer  claim  that  in  these  circumstances  Jones  acts 
"responsibly  and  freely"  -  even  though  he  had,  in  fact, 
no  other  possible  course  of  action  (although  he  no 
doubt  believed  that  he  had).  Both  Stump  and 
Zagzebski  support  the  Frankfurt/  Fischer  conclusion 
that  Jones's  action  is  a  free  one.  40 
A  concept  of  freedom  which  does  not  include  the 
possibility  of  doing  otherwise  therefore  seems  to  be  at 
least  plausible,  and  there  is  support  from  Stump  and 
from  Normore  that  that  was  Aquinas'  concept. 
One  further  point  can  be  drawn  from  the 
Frankfurt/  Fischer  examples.  It  is  arguable  that 
Black,  in  implanting  the  mechanism,  is  determining 
that  Jones  will  vote  for  Reagan,  for  that  inevitably  will 
be  the  outcome.  41  It  is  therefore  possible  to  draw  a 
parallel  (albeit  a  limited  one)  with  God's  eternally 
determining  that  I  do  x.  The  crucial  point  about  the 
argument  that  Jones  acts  freely  when  he  can  in  fact 
do  no  other  than  vote  for  Reagan  and  even  when  that 
outcome  is  determined  by  Black,  seems  to  be  that 
that  determination  was  not  the  cause  of  Jones's 
decision.  The  cause  of  Jones's  decision  is  Jones. 
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not  Black's,  because  he,  Jones,  thought  about  the 
relevant  factors  then  decided  to  cast  his  vote  that 
way.  At  least,  if  asked  why  he  had  voted  for  Reagan, 
he  could  explain  it  that  way.  Now,  on  Aquinas' 
account,  the  cause  of  my  doing  x  is  not  that  God 
willed  in  creating  the  world  that  I  should  do  x  at  t 
but  that  I  had  thought  about  the  relevant  factors  etc. 
If  therefore  it  is  accepted  that  God  causes  x  in  such  a 
way  that  there  is  at  least  room  for  me  also  to  be  a 
cause  of  x,  it  is  possible,  by  analogy  with  the  Jones 
example,  to  see  how  God  could  determine  that  I  do  x 
but  I  could  still  be  said  to  do  it  freely. 
F.  The  argument  so  far 
The  position  now  reached  can  be  summarised  in  the 
following  steps: 
(i)  God  knows  all  future  things  as  Present*  to  him; 
(ii)  God's  knowledge,  together  with  his  will,  is  the 
cause  of  what  he  knows; 
(iii)  God's  will  is  irresistible; 
I 
(iv)  But  this  does  not  mean  that  everything  happens 
necessarily,  because  God  can  will  that  things 
happen  contingently; 
(v)  Where  God  wills  that  x  happens  contingently, 
what  brings  about  x's  happening  must  be  me; 
However,  God  also  knows  eternally  that  I  do  in 
fact  bring  about  x;  therefore  God  must  know 295 
that  x  happens  and  so  must  be  the  cause  of  x, 
again  making  x  necessary; 
(vii)  But  even  this  does  not  prevent  my  bringing 
about  x  freely  on  Aquinas'  account,  for  his 
concept  of  God's  causation  as  being  significantly 
different  from  human  causation  means  that  I 
also  am  a  real,  and  contingent,  cause  of  r, 
(viii)  This  seems  to  imply  however  that  x  is  not 
determined,  and  so  cannot  be  known  by  God, 
until  I  bring  it  about.  But  God's  knowledge 
cannot  depend  on  what  I  do,  and  so  it  must  be 
the  case  that  God  determines  that  I  do  x; 
(ix)  It  is  therefore  arguable  that  if  Aquinas  is  to  be 
consistent  in  saying  (a)  that  God  is  omniscient 
and  his  knowledge/will  is  the  cause  of  what  he 
knows,  and  (b)  that  man  acts  freely,  Aquinas' 
concept  of  freedom  must  be  compatible  with 
God's  determining  that  I  dor, 
(x)  If  God  determines  that  I  do  x,  I  cannot  do 
otherwise.  It  is  arguable  that  Aquinas'  concept 
of  freedom  does  not  require  that  I  should  be  able 
to  do  otherwise,  and  that  such  a  concept  is 
sustainable. 
However,  I  believe  that  Aquinas'  concept  of  freedom  is 
wider  than  this,  and  does  include  the  possibility  of 
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G.  A  wider  concept  of  freedom 
Eleonore  Stump  and  Calvin  Normore  both  argue  that 
Aquinas'  concept  of  freedom  does  not  include  the 
possibility  of  doing  otherwise.  I  believe  that  the 
arguments  they  put  forward  for  their  respective 
conclusions  are  open  to  question  and  do  not  justify 
that  conclusion.  Further,  I  believe  that  what  Aquinas 
says  about  deliberation  and  reflection  indicates  that 
he  believes  that  free  actions  always  include  the 
possibility  of  doing  otherwise. 
To  deal  first  with  the  arguments  put  forward  by 
Eleonore  Stump  as  evidence  that,  for  Aquinas, 
human  freedom  neither  consists  in  nor  depends  on 
the  ability  to  do  otherwise.  Her  argument  that 
Aquinas'view  (in  DV24.12)  that  actions  done  under 
the  sudden  impulse  of  passion  can  be  sinful  shows 
that  he  considers  such  actions  to  be  free,  despite  the 
fact  that  "the  agent  in  acting  on  such  a  passion 
is 
...  unable  to  do  otherwise  on  that  occasion",  was 
considered  in  Chapter  4  above. 
Her  second  argument  is  that  Aquinas  believes  that 
the  will  can  be  free  even  when  acting  under  the 
necessity  of  natural  inclination.  Here  she  cites 
DV22.5:  "Freedom  is  opposed  to  the  necessity  of 
force,  according  to  Augustine,  but  not  to  the  necessity 
of  natural  inclination.  "42and  STIa.  82-1:  "natural 297 
necessity  doesn't  take  away  the  freedom  of  theWill.  "43 
Her  assumption  therefore  seems  to  be  that  if  natural 
necessity  is  compatible  with  free  will,  choice  cannot 
be  a  necessary  element  of  free  will. 
In  STla.  82.1,  Aquinas  takes  the  view  that  the 
necessity  of  the  end  is  not  contrary  to  freedom  and 
that  necessity  of  natural  inclination  is  similar  to 
necessity  of  the  end.  But  the  reason  why  necessity  of 
the  end  is  not  contrary  to  freedom  is  that  necessity  of 
the  end  is  only  conditional:  if  I  wish  to  cross  the  sea,  I 
must  take  a  ship,  but  I  could  reject  the  end  of 
crossing  the  sea  and  so  could  do  other  than  board  the 
ship.  So  that  even  when  acting  under  the  necessity  of 
the  end,  I  could  in  fact  have  done  something  else. 
Now  it  is  arguable  that  the  necessity  of  natural 
inclination  is  also  compatible  with  freedom  because 
that  necessity  is  likewise  not  an  absolute  necessity. 
Natural  inclinations  -  even  the  strongest,  to  maintain 
life  -  can  be  rejected,  because  something  other  than 
that  inclination  can  be  seen  as  the  greater  good  in  the 
circumstances.  In  other  words,  there  is  still  the 
possibility  of  doing  other  than  what  is  proposed  by 
the  'natural  inclination'.  And  so  in  following  that 
inclination,  or  natural  necessity,  I  act  freely  because  I 
could  have  done  something  else. 
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inclination  towards  the  ultimate  end  of  the  'totally 
good',  for,  as  we  have  already  seen,  Aquinas  holds 
that  even  here  the  will  can  'act  or  not  act',  since  a 
man  always  has  the  power  not  to  think  about  the 
'totally  good'  and  so  notto  Will  it.  44Aquinas  does 
seem  to  say  in  DV24.1  ad  20  that  there  is  no  choice 
but  that  there  is  nevertheless  free  will  in  relation  to 
the  object  of  the  will: 
"...  when  there  is  the  question  of  the  objects  of 
appetite,  we  do  not  judge  about  the  last  end  by  any 
judgment  involving  discussion  and  examination,  but 
we  naturally  approve  of  it.  Concerning  it  there  is 
accordingly  no  choice,  but  there  is  will,  since 
according  to  Augustine  the  necessity  of  natural 
inclination  is  not  repugnant  to  freedom;  but  not  a  free 
judgment,  properly  speaking,  since  it  does  not  fall 
under  our  choice.  1145 
But  of  course,  before  an  object  of  appetite  is 
entertained,  the  will  has  to  exercise  itself  -  and  we 
have  seen  that  here  there  is  the  possibility  of 
something  else  being  thought  of.  And  it  seems  clear 
from  what  Aquinas  says  in  the  ST  and  DM  that  what 
freedom  there  is  in  relation  to  the  final  end  lies  in  the 
possibility  of  choice  of  those  things  which  are  'for  the 
sake  of  the  end'.  These  are  the  only  things  over  which 
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which  there  really  is  freedom.  This  seems  to  be  the 
implication  of  what  Aquinas  says  in  STIa.  82.1  ad  3: 
"We  are  master  of  our  acts  in  that  we  can  choose  this 
or  that.  But  we  choose,  not  the  end,  but  things  for 
the  sake  of  the  end  ....  Hence  our  desire  for  ultimate 
fulfilment  is  not  one  of  the  things  we  are  masterof.  1146 
It  seems  doubtful  therefore  that  what  Aquinas  says 
about  natural  necessity's  being  compatible  with 
freedom  justifies  the  conclusion  that  his  concept  of 
free  action  does  not  include  the  possibility  of  doing 
otherwise. 
The  argument  put  forward  by  Normore  is  that 
Aquinas  argues  that  angels  have  free  will  although 
they  cannot  sin  and  so  must  hold  that  being  able  to 
choose  not-x  is  not  essential  to  choosing  x  freely. 
(Stump  also  draws  support  from  Aquinas'  view  that 
the  redeemed  in  heaven  are  unable  to  sin.  ) 
In  my  view,  the  Article  cited  by  Normore  seems  rather 
to  emphasise  the  importance  of  alternatives  (whilst 
,  also  reiterating  the  compulsion  of  the  wholly  good).  In 
STIa.  62.8,  Aquinas  says  that  angels  cannot  sin, 
because  they  see  God's  essence  which  is  goodness 
itself;  since  one  cannot  reject  goodness  itself,  angels 
can  "only  will  or  do  anything  for  God's  sake"  and  that 
means  they  cannot  sin.  Aquinas  also  says  in  response 300 
to  Objection  2: 
"Thus  the  mind  cannot  not  assent  to  principles  that  it 
apprehends  of  its  very  nature;  and  similarly  the  will 
cannot  help  cleaving  to  the  good  qua  good,  for  this  is 
what  it  tends  to  of  its  nature.  The  will  then  of  an 
angel  stands  between  opposites  in  doing  a  number  of 
things,  but  not  in  respect  of  loving  God  himself  whom 
he  sees  to  be  very  goodness  itself.  Whatever 
alternatives  he  may  choose,  God  is  always  the  motive; 
and  to  act  thus  is  to  be  without  sin.  1147 
This  Article  seems  to  me  to  say  that  angels  do  have  a 
choice  in  everything  they  do,  except  in  loving  God  - 
who  is  the  complete  good,  to  which  everything 
necessarily  tends.  I  do  not  wish  to  argue  that 
Aquinas'  concept  of  freedom  must  include  the  ability 
to  sin  (and  indeed  that  would  seem  an  unlikely  stance 
for  Aquinas  to  take),  only  the  ability  to  do  otherwise 
than  one  does  in  any  particular  circumstance.  That 
ability  may  have  the  consequence  for  humans,  if  not 
for  angels,  that  they  are  able  to  sin. 
For  the  reasons  set  out  above,  I  believe  that  there  is 
some  doubt  over  the  justification  of  Stump's  and 
Normore's  conclusions  about  Aquinas'  concept  of 
freedom.  More  importantly,  however,  I  believe  that 
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shows  that  his  concept  must  include  alternative 
possibilities. 
I  have  argued  in  Chapter  4  that,  for  Aquinas,  for  an 
act  to  be  free  it  must  be  deliberated  and  chosen,  in  a 
wide  sense  of  those  terms  which  include  post-hoc 
explanation  ("I  put  the  car  into  2nd  gear  without 
thinking,  but  now  that  you  ask,  I  did  it  because  I 
wanted  to  turn  left  and  I  know  I  can't  get  round  that 
comer  in  3rd.  ").  Aquinas  is  insistent  that  deliberation 
is  a  process  which  can  produce  more  than  one  result, 
and  Chapter  4  also  considers  how  this  comes  about. 
But  if  there  is  no  possibility  of  my  doing  other  than  x, 
how  could  my  deliberation  produce  any  other 
outcome  than  "Do  x  "?  In  the  Fischer  example,  the 
point  is  precisely  that  although  the  conclusion  is 
bound  to  be  "Vote  for  Reagan",  the  action  is  said  to  be 
free  because  Jones  decided  this  for  himself.  But  could 
the  process  which  Jones  underwent  properly  be 
described  as  a  'deliberation  and  decision'  as  Aquinas 
understands  these  terms?  In  my  view,  this  must  be 
doubtful,  just  because  there  was  no  possibility  of 
Jones's-  thinking  process  having  any  other  outcome, 
for  any  time  he  appeared  to  be  about  to  consider  the 
merits  of  Carter,  Black's  mechanism  would  move  his 
thoughts  back  to  Reagan.  Deliberation  must  surely 
admit  of  at  least  the  possibility  that  more  than  one 
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therefore  that  if  it  is  accepted  -  pace  Stump  -  that  on 
Aquinas'  account  deliberation  and  decision  are 
essential  elements  of  a  free  act,  it  must  always  be 
possible,  on  his  account,  for  me  to  do  otherwise  than 
I  do,  given  the  interaction  of  will  and  intellect, 
considered  in  Chapter  4. 
It  might  of  course  be  argued  that  Aquinas'  statement 
that  deliberation  can  reach  different  conclusions 
means  no  more  than  that  God  might  have  determined 
that  I  do  y  rather  than  x  and  so  my  deliberation  could 
have  had  the  different  conclusion  "Do  y  ".  One  might 
think  that  this  makes  deliberation  a  pointless 
process,  if  the  outcome  is  fixed,  and  so  contrary  to 
Aquinas'  view  that  God  would  not  give  creatures 
powers  they  obviously  do  have  if  the  powers  did 
nothing.  48Against  that,  it  could  be  argued  that 
deliberation  does  indeed  have  a  point  -  but  its  point 
is  not  to  determine  the  outcome,  but  to  internalise 
the  action  and  make  it  my  action  for  the  purpose  of 
deciding  responsibility.  Be  that  as  it  may,  I  do  not 
think  it  is  what  Aquinas  wishes  to  say,  particularly  in 
view  of  what  he  says  in  DV24.1  about  man's  ability  to 
reflect  on  his  judgments.  In  that  passage,  which  has 
already  been  considered  in  other  contexts,  he  says: 
"But  man,  judging  about  his  course  of  action  by  the 
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decision  inasmuch  as  he  knows  the  meaning  of  an 
end  and  of  a  means  to  an  end,  and  the  relationship  of 
the  one  with  reference  to  the  other.  Thus  he  is  his 
own  cause  not  only  in  moving  but  also  in  judging.  He 
is  therefore  endowed  with  free  choice  -  that  is  to  say, 
with  a  free  judgment  about  acting  or  not  acting.  1149 
And  in  DV24.2: 
"..  if  the  judgment  of  the  cognitive  faculty  is  not  in  a 
person's  power  but  is  determined  for  him 
extrinsically,  neither  will  his  appetite  be  in  his  power; 
and  consequently  neither  will  his  motion  or  operation 
be  in  his  power  absolutely.  Now  judgment  is  in  the 
power  of  the  one  judging  in  so  far  as  he  can  judge 
about  his  own  judgment;  for  we  can  pass  judgment 
upon  the  things  which  are  in  our  power.  But  to  judge 
about  one's  own  judgment  belongs  only  to  reason, 
which  reflects  upon  its  own  act  and  knows  the 
relationships  of  the  things  about  which  it  judges  and 
of  those  by  which  it  judges.  "50 
So,  I  do  x  because  I  judge  it  good  or  as  a  satisfactory 
way  of  achieving  my  end.  I  come  to  this  conclusion 
freely  because  I  am  able  to  understand  what  my  end 
is  (and  that  it  is  an  end)  and  the  relationship  between 
what  I  do  and  that  end.  Further,  I  can  judge  whether 
what  I  propose  to  do  really  does  achieve  that  end,  by 
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which  produced  it.  Now,  one  of  the  important  things 
about  being  able  to  reflect  on  one's  judgments  is  that 
one  can  reconsider  them  -  and  change  one's  mind.  I 
can  come  to  the  conclusion  that  after  all  it  would  not 
be  a  good  thing  to  do  x,  and  so  do  not  do  x,  even  at 
the  point  when  I  am  making  preparations  to  do  x. 
Reflection  also  increases  the  uncertainty  of  the 
deliberation  process,  and  ensures  that  it  may  turn 
out  in  more  than  one  way,  for  not  only  may  the 
deliberation  process  result  in  my  choosing  x  or  y,  my 
reflection  on  that  process  itself,  before  I  have 
activated  my  choice,  may  produce  yet  another  result. 
Aquinas'  emphasis  on  this  uniquely  human  ability  to 
reflect  on  one's  judgment  therefore  seems  to  me  to 
imply  that  an  essential  element  in  a  free  act  is  the 
ability  to  come  to  different  conclusions  and  hence  to 
have  the  possibility  of  acting  in  different  ways.  If 
there  is  an  intuition  that,  contrary  to  what  Frankfurt 
and  Fischer  say,  Jones  is  not  acting  freely,  it  is  surely 
because  he  could  not  change  his  mind. 
There  is  one  further  important  aspect  of  Aquinas' 
account  which  distinguishes  it  from  the 
Frankfurt/  Fischer  examples  and  contributes  to  the 
view  of  his  holding  a  'wide'  concept  of  freedom.  Jones, 
in  Fischer's  example,  has  the  apparent  choice  of 
voting  for  Carter  or  Reagan,  but  it  seems  that  he  has 
no  choice  because  Black  will  ensure  that  he  votes  for I 
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Reagan;  but  this  account  does  not  allow  for  the 
possibility  of  Jones's  deciding  to  abstain,  or  of  simply 
not  getting  round  to  making  a  decision.  Yet  Aquinas, 
as  we  have  seen,  lays  emphasis  on  the  will's  ability 
not  to  will,  as  well  as  to  will  x  or  y.  Aquinas'  account, 
with  its  distinction  between  exercise  and  specification 
of  the  will,  would  therefore  seem  to  give  him  the 
resources  to  say  that  Jones  did  indeed  act  freely  - 
because  there  was  another  possibility  open  to  him, 
namely  not  voting  at  all.  51 
Even  if  Aquinas'  account  of  free  human  action  does 
make  the  possibility  of  an  alternative  course  of  action 
an  essential  element,  however,  it  would  seem  that 
that  possibility  is  not  by  itself  sufficient  for  freedom. 
In  the  article  considered  above,  Eleonore  Stump 
produces  an  example,  based  on  The  Puppetmaster, 
designed  to  show  that  the  ability  to  do  otherwise  does 
not  of  itself  produce  freedom.  She  sets  a  scene  where 
part  of  an  alien  plan  to  take  over  the  earth  is  the 
undetected  'hi-jacking'  of  human  beings.  Each 
human  is  taken  over  by  an  alien,  who,  wishing  to 
remain  undetected,  ensures  that  his  human  host 
behaves  just  as  he  would  have  done  without  the  alien 
presence.  The  human  has  within  himself  both  his 
own  and  the  alien's  consciousness.  So,  when  one 
human,  say  Sam,  "does  some  action  A,  it  is  also  true 
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in  his  unfettered  state  to  do  not-A,  the  alien  would 
have  brought  it  about  that  Sam  in  his  infected  state 
did  not-A.  In  this  case,  then,  there  is  a  possible  world 
in  which  Sam  does  otherwise  than  A.  Sam  has  the 
ability  to  do  otherwise  then;  nonetheless,  Sam  isn't 
free  with  respect  to  his  doing  A.  "52 
The  conclusion  that  Sam  does  not  act  freely  would 
seem  to  be  a  correct  reflection  of  Aquinas'  account  of 
free  actions,  for  on  that  account  the  actions  are  not 
Sam's  at  all,  for  they  are  not  the  product  of  his  will 
and  intellect.  The  alien  has  produced  them  because  it 
knows  that  if  Sam's  intellect  and  will  had  been  acting 
that  is  what  they  would  have  done.  Stump  concludes: 
"In  order  to  determine  whether  or  not  an  agent  is  free, 
it  is  important  to  determine  whether  the  intellect  and 
will  on  which  he  acts  are  his  own,  not  whether 
alternative  possibilities  are  present  or  absent  for 
him.  1153 
My  reading  of  Aquinas'  concept  of  freedom  would 
agree  with  the  first  part  of  Stump's  conclusion;  I  do 
not,  however,  see  'alternative  possibilities'  as  a 
different  way  of  determining  whether  or  not  an  agent 
is  free.  In  my  view,  the  way  in  which  Aquinas  shows 
that  an  act  is  the  product  of  my  will  and  intellect 
ensures  that  there  will  always  be  the  possibility  of  my 
being  able  to  do  other  than  I  do,  for  I  shall  always  be 307 
able  to  will  x  or  y-  or  neither.  I  may  not  always  in 
fact  be  able  to  put  my  willed  choice  into  action,  for 
example  because  something  I  had  believed  possible 
turns  out  to  be  impossible,  but  on  the  assumption 
that  there  is  no  such  impediment,  I  shall  always  have 
the  possibility  of  doing  otherwise  than  I  in  fact  do. 
If  Aquinas'  concept  of  free  action  does  indeed  include 
the  possibility  of  doing  otherwise,  it  would  seem  that 
my  doing  x  must  be  determined  by  me  and  not  by 
God.  It  would  also  seem  then,  however,  that  there  is 
the  problem  that  God's  knowledge  of  x's  happening  is 
dependent  on  my  bringing  it  about.  That  problem 
may  be  resolvable,  but  it  must  be  conceded  that  there 
is  at  least  some  tension  between  this  wide  sense  of 
human  freedom  of  action  and  Aquinas'  views  on  the 
omniscience  and  simplicity  of  God. 
Notes 
I  In  Peri  Hermeneias  1.14:  "Sed  deus  est  omnino  extra  ordinem  temporis 
quasi  in  arce  aeternitatis  constitutus,  quae  est  tota  simul,  cui  subiacet 
totus  temporis  decursus  secundum  unum  et  simplicem  eius  intuitum;  et 
ideo  uno  intuitu  videt  omnia  quae  aguntur  secundum  temporis  decursum, 
et  unumquodque  secunclum  quod  est  in  seipso  existens,  non  quasi  sibi 
futurum  quantum  ad  eius  intuitum  prout  est  in  solo  ordine  suarum 308 
causarum  (quamvis  et  ipsum  ordinem  causarum  videat),  sed  omnino 
aeternaliter  sic  videt  unumquodque  eorum  quae  sunt  in  quocumque 
tempore,  sicut  oculus  humanus  videt  socratem  sedere  in  seipso,  non  in 
causa  sua.  Ex  hoc  autem  quod  homo  videt  socratem  sedere,  non  tollitur 
eius  contingentia.  quae  respicit  ordinem  causae  ad  effectum;  tamen 
certissime  et  infallibiliter  videt  oculus  hominis  socratem  sedere  dum  sedet, 
quia  unumquodque  prout  est  in  seipso  iam,  determinatum  est.  Sic  igitur 
relinquitur,  quod  deus  certissime  et  infallibiliter  cognoscat  omnia  quae 
flunt  in  tempore;  et  tamen  ea  quae  in  tempore  eveniunt  non  sunt  vel  flunt 
ex  necessitate,  sed  contingenter.  " 
2  Origen,  Commentarii  in  Epistolam  ad  Romanos,  vii,  8 
3  STIa.  14.8  Obj  1:  "Videtur  quod  scientia  Dei  non  sit  causa  rerum.  Dicit 
enim,  Origenes:  non  propterea  aliquid  erit  quia  id  scit  Deus  futurum;  sed  quia 
futurum  est,  ideo  scitur  a  Deo  antequam  fiat.  "Ad  1:  "Ad  primum  ergo 
dicendum  quod  Origenes  locutus  est  attendens  rationem  scientiac  cui  non 
competit  ratio  causalitatis  nisi  adjuncta  voluntate,  ut  dictum  est.  Sed  quod 
dicit  ideo  praescire  Deum  aliqua  quia.  futura  sunt,  intelligendum  est 
secundum  causam.  consequentiae,  et  non  secundum  causam  essendi. 
Sequitur  enim,  si  aliqua  sunt  futura,  quod  Deus  ea  praescierit;  non  tamen 
res  futurae  sunt  causa  quod  Deus  sciat.  "  Note  that  at  this  point  in  the  ST, 
Aquinas  has  not  yet  dealt  with  the  issue  of  God's  knowledge  of  future 
contingents,  so  'God  foreknows  x'  is  simply  stated  without  the  eternity  of 
God's  knowledge  or  the  issue  of  necessity  being  considered.  It  is  otherwise 
in  DV2.14,  where  the  issue  of  God's  knowledge  of  future  contingents  has 
already  been  addressed.  This  perhaps  explains  why,  as  will  be  seen, 
DV2.14  lays  an  emphasis  which  STIa.  14.8  does  not  on  the  question  of 
whether  necessity  arises  from  God's  act  of  knowledge  being  the  cause  of 
things.  The  problem  arising  from  the  causal  nature  of  God's  knowledge 
occurs  however  whether  God's  knowledge  is  eternal  or  not. 
4  Craig  [  19931  p.  122 
5  DV2.14c:  "Unde  relinquitur  quod  scientia  eius  sit  causa  rerum.  Sed  e 
converso  scientia  nostra  causata  est  a  rebus,  inquantum,  scilicet,  eam  a 
rebus  accipimus.  " 
6  STIa.  14.8c:  *scientia  Dei  est  causa  rerum.  Sic  enim  scientia  Dei  se  habet 
ad  omnes  res  creatas,  sicut  scientia.  artificis  se  habet  ad  artificiata.  Scientia 
autem  artificis  est  causa  artificiatorum,  eo  quod  artifex  operatur  per  suum 
intellectum;  unde  oportet  quod  forma  intellectus  sit  principium  operationis, 
sicut  calor  est  principium.  calefactionis.  " 
7  In  a  logical  sense  only,  since  there  is  no  before  or  after  in  Aquinas'  eternal 309 
God. 
8  STIa.  14.8c:  "Manifestum,  est  autem  quod  Deus  per  suum  intellectum 
causat  res,  cum  suum.  esse  sit  suum  intelligere.  Unde  necesse  est  quod  sua 
scientia  sit  causa  rerum,  secundum  quod  habet  voluntatem 
conjunctam.  Unde  scientia  Dei,  secundum  quod  est  causa  rerum,  consuevit 
nominari  scientia  approbationis.  " 
9  STIa.  19.4  ad  4:  "Ad  quartum  dicendum  quod  unius  et  ejusdem  effectus 
etiam  in  nobis  est  causa  scientia  ut  dirigens,  qua  concipitur  forma  operis, 
et  voluntas  ut  imperans;  quia  forma  ut  est  in  intellectu  tantum  non 
determinatur  ad  hoc  quod  sit  vel  non  sit  in  effectu,  nisi  per  voluntatem. 
Unde  intellectus  speculativus  nihil  dicit  de  operando.  " 
10  See  for  example  STIa.  19.3c:  "Hence  since  God's  goodness  subsists  and  is 
complete  independently  of  other  things,  and  they  add  no  fulfilment  to  him, 
there  is  no  absolute  need  for  him  to  will  them.  " 
"Unde  cum  bonitas  Dei  sit  perfecta  et  esse  possit  sine  alfis,  cum  nihil  ei 
perfectionis  ex  alfis  accrescat,  sequitur  quod  alia  a  se  eum  velle  non  sit 
necessarium  absolute.  " 
11  DV2.14  ad  3:  "Effectus  sequitur  necessitatem  causae  proximae,  quae 
etiam.  potest  esse  medium  ad  demonstrandum  effectum:  non  autem  oportet 
quod  sequatur  necessitatem  causae  primae  quia  potest  impediri  effectus  ex 
causa  secunda  si  sit  contingens;  ' 
12  DV2.14  ad  5:  "quamvis  causa  prima  vehementius  influat  quam  secunda 
tamen  effectus  non  completur  nisi  adveniente  operatione  secundae;  et  ideo, 
si  sit  possibilitas  ad  deficiendum  in  causa  secunda,  est  etiam  eadem 
possibilitas  deficiendi  in  effectu,  quamvis  causa  prima  deficere  non 
possit  ....  Quia  ergo  ad  esse  effectus  requiritur  utraque  causa,  utrisque 
defectus  inducit  defectum.  in  effectu;  et  ideo  quaecumque  earum  ponatur 
contingens,  sequitur  effectum.  esse  contingentem.  " 
13  DV23.5  Obj  3:  "Quando  effectus  est  contingens  propter  contingentiam, 
causae  secundae,  prima  causa  necessaria  existente,  non  esse  effectus 
potest  simul  stare  cum  esse  primae  causae;  sicut  arborem  non  florere  in 
vere,  potest  stare  cum  motu  solls.  Sed  eius  non  esse,  quod  est  volitum  a 
deo,  non  potest  stare  cum  divina  voluntate.  Haec  enim.  duo  sunt 
incompossibilia,  quod  deus  velit  aliquid  esse,  et  illud  non  sit.  Ergo 
contingentia.  causannn  secundarum  non  impedit  quin  volita  a  deo  sint 
necessaria  propter  necessitatem  divinae  voluntatis.  " 
14  DV23.5c:  "ut  non  solum  fiat  id  quod  deus  vult  fieri,  quod  est  quasi 
assimilari  secundum.  speciem;  sed  ut  fiat  eo  modo  quo  deus  vult  illud  fieri, 
ut  necessario  vel  contingenter,  cito  vel  tarde,  quod  est  quasi  quaedam. 310 
assimilatio,  secundum  accidentia.  Et  hunc  quidem  modum  rebus  divina 
voluntas  praefinit  ex  ordine  suae  sapientiae.  Secundum  autem  quod 
disponit  aliquas  res  sic  vel  sic  fleri,  adaptat  cis  causas  illo  modo  quem 
disponit;  quem  tamen  modum  posset  rebus  inducere  etiam  illis  causis  non 
mediantibus.  Et  sic  non  dicimus  quod  aliqui  divinorum  effectuum  Sint 
contingentes  solummodo  propter  contingentiam  causarum  secundarum, 
sed  magis  propter  dispositionem  divinae  voluntatis,  quae  talem  ordinem 
rebus  providit.  " 
15  In  Peri  Hermeneias  1.14:  "Similiter  ex  parte  voluntatis  divinae  differentia 
est  attendenda.  Nam  voluntas  divina  est  intelligenda  ut  extra  ordinem 
entium  existens,  velut  causa  quaedam  profundens  totum  ens  et  omnes 
eius  differentias.  Sunt  autem  differentiae  entis  possibile  et  necessarium;  ct 
ideo  ex  ipsa  voluntate  divina  originantur  necessitas  ct  contingentla  In 
rebus  et  distinctio  utriusque  secundum  rationem  proximarum  causarum: 
ad  effectus  enim,  quos  voluit  necessarios  esse,  disposuit  causas 
necessarias;  ad  effectus  autem,  quos  voluit  esse  contingentes,  ordinavit 
causas  contingenter  agentes.  ' 
16  In  Peri  Hermeneias  1.14:  "Hoc  autem  non  potest  dici  de  voluntatc 
humana,  nec  de  aliqua  alia  causa:  quia  omnis  alia  causa  cadit  iam  sub 
ordine  necessitatis  vel  contigentiae:  et  ideo,  oportet  quod  vel  lpsa  causa 
possit  deficere  vel  effectus  eius  non  sit  contingens,  sed  necessarius. 
Voluntas  autem  divina  indeficiens  est;  tamen  non  omncs  effcctus  clus  Bunt 
necessarii,  sed  quidam  contingentes.  ' 
17  Craig  [  1988]  p.  125 
Is  Craig,  op.  cit.  pp.  125-6 
19  DM3.2c:  "Manifestum  est  autem  quod  actio  peccad  est  quoddam  ens  et 
in  praedicamento  entis  positum;  unde  necesse  est  dicere  quod  sit  a  deo.  " 
20  DM3.2c:  "Secundo  autem  idem  patct  ratione  special  Necessc  cst  enim 
omnes  motus  secundarum  causarum  causari  a  primo  movente,  sicut 
onmes  motus  inferiorum  corporum  causantur  a  motu  caeli.  Deus  nutem 
est  primum  movens  respectu  omnium  motuum  et  spiritualium  ct 
corporalium,  sicut  corpus  caeleste  est  principium  omnium  motuum 
inferiorum  corporum.  Unde  cum  actus  peccati  sit  quidam  motus  liberi 
arbitrii  necesse  est  dicere  quod  actus  pcccati,  in  quantum  cst  actus,  sit  a 
deo.  ' 
21  DM3.2c:  "Sic  ergo  dicendurn  quod  cum  deus  sit  primum  principium 
motionis  ornnium,  quaedam  sic  moventur  ab  ipso  quod  etiam,  fpsa  scipsa 
movent,  sicut  quae  habent  liberum  arbitrium  :  quae  si  fucrint  in  debita 
dispositione  et  ordine  debito  ad  recipiendurn  motionern  qua  movcntur  a 311 
deo,  sequentur  bonae  actiones,  quae  totaliter  reducuntur  in  deum  sicut  in 
causam.;  si  autem.  deficiant  a  debito  ordine,  sequetur  actio  inordinata  quae 
eat  actio  peccati;  et  sic  id  quod  eat  ibi  de  actione,  reducetur  in  deum  sicut 
in  causam;  quod  autem  eat  ibi  de  inordinatione  vel  deformitate,  non  habct 
deurn  causam  sed  solum  libenun  arbitrium.  Et  propter  hoc  dicitur,  quod 
actio  peccati  eat  a  deo  sed  peccatum  non  eat  a  deo.  ' 
22  See  Appendix 
23  SCG3.69.29:  "Non  igitur  auferimus  proprias  actiones  rebus  creatis, 
quamvis  omnes  effectus  rerum  creatarum  deo  attribuamus  quasi  In 
omnibus  operanti.  ' 
24  STla.  105.5c:  "Dicendum  quod  Deum  operari  in  quolibet  operante  aliqui 
sic  intellexerunt  quod  nulla  virtus  creata,  aliquid  operaretur  in  rebus,  sed 
solus  Deus  immediate  omnia  operaretur;  puta  quod  ignis  non  calefacerct 
sed  Deus  in  igne,  et  similiter  de  omnibus  aliis.  Hoc  autem  eat  imPOssibile. 
...  Sic  igitur  intelligendum  eat  Deum  operari  in  rebus,  quod  tamcn  ipsae  rcs 
propriam,  habeant  operationem.  " 
25  de  Potentia  3.7:  "non  ergo  sic  eat  intelligendum  quod  deus  In  omni  re 
naturali  operetur,  quasi  res  naturalis  nihil  operetur,  sed  quia  in  Ipsa 
natura  vel  voluntate  operante  deus  operatur.  "  See  also  Chapter  3  above. 
26  de  Potentia  3.7:  'sequetur  quod  ipse  in  quolibet  operante  Immediate 
operetur,  non  exclusa  operatione  voluntatis  et  naturae.  " 
27  de  Potentia  3.7:  'Sic  ergo  deus  eat  causa  actionis  cuiuslibet  in  quantum 
dat  virtutem  agendi,  et  in  quantum  conservat  eam,  et  in  quantum  applicat 
actioni,  et  in  quantum  eius  virtute  omnis  alia  virtus  agit.  " 
28  SCG3.70.7:  "Patet  etiam  quod  non  sic  Idem  effectus  causae  naturali  et 
divinae  virtuti  attribuitur  quasi  partim  a  deo,  et  partim  a  naturali  agcnte 
fiat,  scd  totus  ab  utroquc  secundum  alium  modum:  sicut  idem  effectus 
totus  attribuitur  instrumento,  et  principali  agent!  etiam  totus.  0 
29  Allan  [1997]  p.  22 
30  On  analogical  existence,  see,  for  example  STIa.  4.3c:  "If  now  there  be  an 
agent  outside  even  genus,  its  effects  will  bear  an  even  remoter  resemblance 
to  the  agent.  The  likeness  borne  will  not  now  be  of  the  same  specific  or 
generic  type  as  the  form  of  the  agent,  but  will  present  the  sort  of  analogy 
that  holds  between  all  things  because  they  have  existence  in  common.  And 
this  is  how  things  receiving  existence  from  God  resemble  him.  "  And  ad  3: 
"Creatures  are  said  to  resemble  God,  not  by  sharing  a  form  of  the  same 
specific  or  generic  type,  but  only  analogically,  inasmuch  as  God  exists  by 
nature,  and  other  things  partake  existence.  " 
"Si  igitur  sit  aliquod  agens  quod  non  in  genere  contineatur,  effectus  ejus 312 
adhuc  magis  accedent  remote  ad  similitudinem  agentis,  non  tamen  ita 
quod  participent,  similitudinem  formae  agentis  secundum  eamdem 
rationem  speciei  aut  generis  sed  secundum  aliqualem  analogiam  sicut 
ipsum  esse  est  commune  omnibus.  Et  hoc  modo  illa  quac  sunt  a  Deo 
assimilantur  ei  inquantum  sunt  entia,  ut  prima,  et  universali  principio 
totius  esse.  "  "Ad  tertium  dicendum  quod  non  dicitur  esse  similitudo 
creaturae  ad  Deum  propter  communicantiam.  in  forma  secundum  eamdem 
rationem  generis  et  speciei,  sed  secundum  analogiam  tantum,  prout 
scilicet  Deus  est  ens  per  essentiam  et  alia  per  participationem.  " 
On  analogical  use  of  words  for  God  and  creatures,  see  STIa.  13.5c:  "it  is 
impossible  to  predicate  anything  univocally  of  God  and  creatures.  Every 
effect  that  falls  short  of  what  is  typical  of  the  power  of  its  cause  represents 
it  inadequately,  for  it  is  not  the  same  kind  of  thing  as  the  cause...  Whatever 
is  said  both  of  God  and  of  creatures  is  said  in  virtue  of  the  order  that 
creatures  have  to  God  as  to  their  source  and  cause  in  which  all  the 
perfections  of  things  pre-exist  transcendentally.  This  way  of  using  words 
[sci.  analogically]  lies  somewhere  between  pure  equivocation  and  simple 
univocity,  for  the  word  is  neither  used  in  the  same  sense,  as  with  univocal 
usage,  nor  in  totally  different  senses,  as  with  equivocation.  The  several 
senses  of  a  word  used  analogically  signify  different  relations  to  some  one 
thing  as  'health'in  a  complexion  means  a  symptom  of  health  in  a  man  and 
in  a  diet  means  a  cause  of  that  health.  " 
"impossibile  est  aliquid  praedicari  de  Deo  et  creaturis  univoce.  Quia  omnis 
effectus  non  adaequans  virtutem  causae  agentis  rccipit  similitudinem 
agentis,  non  secundum  eamdem  rationem,  sed  dericienter 
.........  Et  sic 
quidquid  dicitur  de  Deo  et  creaturis,  dicitur  secundum  quod  est  aliquis 
ordo  creaturae  ad  Deum  ut  ad  principium  et  causam,  in  qua  pmeexistunt 
excellenter  omnes  reum  perfcctiones.  Et  iste  modus  communitatis  medius 
est  inter  puram  aequivocationem  et  simplicem  univocationcm.  Neque  enim 
in  iis  quae  analogice  dicuntur  est  una  ratio,  sicut  est  in  univocis,  nec 
totaliter  diversa,  sicut  in  aequivocis;  sed  nomen  quod  sic  multipliciter 
dicitur  significat  diversas  proportiones  ad  aliquid  unum;  sicut  sanum  de 
urina  dictum  significat  signum  sanitatis  animalis,  de  medicina  vcro  dictum 
significat  causam  cjusdcm  sanitatis.  " 
31  Goris  [1996)  p.  302 
32  Goris,  op.  cit.  p.  299 
33  At  p.  304 
34  See  STIa.  3  and  STIa.  9.  In  STIa.  3.1,  Aquinas  maintains  that  "in  the  first 313 
existent  thing  everything  must  be  actual;  there  can  be  no  potentiality 
whatsoever.  "  ("vero,  modo  quia  necesse  est  id  quod  est  primum  ens  essc  in 
actu  et  nullo  modo  in  potentia.  ").  Since  God  has  been  shown  to  be  the  first 
existent  [in  STla.  2.31  there  can  be  no  potentiality  in  God.  Further,  Aquinas 
maintains  that  God  is  absolutely  simple,  without  any  composition 
[STIa.  3.71.  He  uses  these  two  points  to  establish,  in  STIa.  9.1,  that  there  can 
be  no  change  of  any  sort  in  God. 
Since  I  am  not  seeking  here  to  resolve  the  inconsistency  Identified,  a 
detailed  exposition,  or  evaluation,  of  Aquinas'well-known  general  position 
on  the  complex  issue  of  the  simplicity  of  God  would  be  peripheral  to  my 
argument.  This  unresolved  inconsistency  does  however  merit  further 
examination,  possibly  along  the  lines  sketched  here. 
35  Similar  lines  of  approach  are  taken  by  Gerard  Hughes,  in  Hughes  119951 
pp.  107-113 
36  Stump  [1997] 
37  Normore  [19821  pp.  358-381 
38  Zagzebski  [  1996]  pp.  154-162 
39  See  Frankfurt  [19691  and  Fischer  [19821  in  Fischer  [1986] 
40  That  the  Frankfurt/  Fischer  examples  successfully  demonstrate  that 
'alternative  possibilities'  are  not  necessary  for  freedom  is  not  universally 
accepted  -  see,  for  example,  Widerker  [1995).  1  do  not  wish  to  pursue  here 
the  merits  of  Frankfurt's  position,  only  to  say  that  it  is  at  least  a  plausible 
and  sustainable  one. 
41  The  examples  give  no  possibility  of  abstaining.  On  the  question  of 
whether  Jones's  act  is  determined,  see  however  Stump's  response  to 
Widerker  [  1995],  in  Jordan  [  19961  pp-73-88.  Stump  argues,  against 
Widerker,  that  Jones's  response  is  not  causally  determined.  Nevertheless,  it 
is  arguable,  I  believe,  that  the  outcome  of  the  election  is  determined  in 
some  sense  by  Black,  because  he  is  the  person  who  has  decided  what  the 
result  will  be,  and  that  is  what  it  will  be,  irrespective  of  Jones's  decision. 
42  DV22.5  ad  3  in  contrarium:  "  libertas'secundum  augustinum, 
'opponitur  necessitati  coactionis  non  autem  naturalis  inclinationis.  '* 
43  STIa.  82.1c:  "  Similiter  etiam  nec  necessitas  naturalis  repugnat 
voluntati.  "  Stump's  translation.  See  also  Obj  I  and  response  at  ad  1: 
"Augustine's  statement  [that  if  a  thing  is  necessary  it  is  not  voluntary,  in  de 
Civitate  Dei  v,  10]  refers  to  necessity  of  coercion.  Whereas  natural  necessity 
does  not  take  the  will's  liberty  away,  as  he  says  himself  in  the  same  work.  * 
"Ad  primum  ergo  dicendurn  quod  verbum  Augustini  est  intelligendurn  de 
necessario  necessitate  coactionis.  Necessitas  autern  naturalis  non  aufert 314 
libertatem  voluntatis,  ut  ipsemet  in  eodem  libro,  dicit.  " 
44  See  for  example  STIa  llae.  10.2c  :  "As  to  [the  exercise  of  its  activity)  no 
object  necessitates  the  will:  whatever  it  is  a  man  always  has  the  power  not 
to  think  about  it,  and  consequently  not  actually  to  will  it.  ' 
"Primo  ergo  modo  [ad  exercitum  actus]  voluntas  a  nullo  objecto  ex 
necessitate  movetur;  potest  enim  aliquis  de  quocumque  objecto  non 
cogitare,  et  per  consequens  neque  actu  velle  illud.  *  See  Chapter  3  above. 
4s  DV24.1  ad  20:  "ita  et  in  appetibilibus,  de  fine  ultimo  non  iudicamus 
iudicio  discussionis  vel  examinationis,  sed  naturaliter  approbamus,  propter 
quod  de  eo  non  est  electio,  sed  voluntas.  Habemus  ergo  respectu  cius 
liberam  voluntatem,  'cum  necessitas  naturalis  inclinationis  libertati.  non 
repugnet'  secundum  augustinum,  v  de  civitate  dei;  non  autem  liberum 
iudicium,  proprie  loquendo,  cum  non  cadat  sub  electione.  ' 
46  STIa.  82.1  ad  3:  "sumus  domini  nostrorum  actuum  secundum  quod 
possumus  hoc  vel  illud  eligere.  Electio  autem  non  est  de  fine  sed  de  his 
quae  sunt  ad  finem  .....  Unde  appetitus  ultimi  finis  non  est  de  his  quorum 
domini  sumus.  " 
47  STIa.  62.8  ad  2:  *Intellectus  enim  non  potest  non  assentire  principfis 
naturaliter  notis;  et  similiter  voluntas  non  potest  non  adhaererc  bono, 
inquantum  est  bonum,  quia  in  bonum  naturaliter  ordinatur  sicut  In  suum 
objectum.  Voluntas  igitur  in  angelis  se  habet  ad  opposita,  quantum  ad 
multa  facienda  vel  non  facienda;  sed  quantum  ad  Ipsum  Dcum,  quem 
vident  esse  ipsam.  essentiam  bonitatis,  non  se  habent  ad  opposita.  Sed 
secundum  ipsum  ad  omnia  diriguntur,  quodcumque  oppositorum  cligant, 
quod  sine  peccato  est.  ' 
48  See  STIa.  105.5,  considered  above. 
49  DV24.  lc:  "Homo  vero  per  virtutem  rationis  iudicans  de  agendis,  potcst 
de  suo  arbitrio  iudicare,  in  quantum  cognoscit  rationem  finis  et  eius  quod 
est  ad  finem  et  habitudinem  et  ordinem  unius  ad  alterum:  et  ideo  non  est 
solum  causa  sui  ipsius  in  movendo,  sed  in  iudicando;  et  ideo  est  liberi 
arbitrii,  ac  si  diceretur  liberi  iudicii  de  agendo  vel  non  agendo.  " 
50  DV24.2c:  "et  ideo  si  iudicium,  cognitivae  non  sit  in  potestate  aliculus, 
sed  sit  aliunde  determinatum,  nec  appetitus  crit  in  potestate  eius,  et  per 
consequens  nec  motus  vel  operatio  absolute.  ludicium  autem  est  in 
potestate  iudicantis  secundum  quod  potcst  de  suo  iudicio  iudicarc:  dc  co 
cnim  quod  est  in  nostra.  potestate,  possumus  iudicare.  ludicare  autem  dc 
iudicio  suo  est  solius  rationis  quae  super  actum  suum  reflectitur,  et 
cognoscit  habitudines  rerum  de  quibus  iudicat,  et  per  quas  iudicat  ...  * 
51  It  is  interesting  to  consider  what  Aquinas'  position  might  be  if  the 315 
Fischer  example  were  extended  so  that  Jones  could  neither  vote  for  Carter 
nor  abstain  i.  e.  the  mechanism  comes  into  play  if  Jones  appears  to  be 
going  to  vote  for  Carter  or  if  he  appears  to  be  deciding  not  to  vote  at  all.  In 
such  an  example,  Jones  would  definitely  seem  to  have  no  choice  but  vote 
for  Reagan.  I  think  that  in  these  circumstances  Aquinas  would  be  likely  to 
say  that  Jones's  action  in  voting  for  Reagan  was  11o  .A 
free,  on  the  grounds 
that  Jones  could  not  be  said  to  have  'decided'to  vote  for  Reagan.  'Decided' 
seems  to  have  little  content  if  there  is  no  possibility  of  considering  any 
other  alternative,  a  point  made  above.  Jones  might  perhaps  be  said  to  have 
'decided'  because  he  had  in  the  past  always  voted  for  the  Republican 
candidate  and  so  'automatically'did  so  again.  But  it  was  argued  in  Chapter 
4  that,  on  Aquinas'  account,  such  an  'automatic'  reaction  does  In  fact 
disguise  a  reasoning  process  in  which  there  is  always  the  possibility  - 
denied  to  Jones-  of  coming  to  a  different  conclusion.  And  even  habit  can  be 
broken.  In  my  view  therefore  Aquinas  would  conclude  that  Jones's  voting 
for  Reagan  was  not  free  if  he  were  unable  to  decide  instead  to  vote  for 
Carter  or  to  abstain. 
52  Stump  [19971  pp.  592-3 
53  Stump  [19971  p.  593 316 
Chapter  6 
CONCLUSIONS 
So  without  least  impulse  or  shadow  of  fate, 
Or  aught  by  me  immutably  foreseen, 
They  trespass,  authors  to  themselves  in  all 
Both  what  they  judge  and  what  they  choose;  for  so  I 
formed  them  free. 
Milton:  Paradisc  Lost 
In  Chapter  1,  we  noted  that  Aquinas  sought  to  resolve 
the  problem  of  temporal  fatalism  raised  by  God's 
knowledge  of  future  contingent  events  by  appealing  to 
the  eternity  of  God's  knowledge.  Since  God's 
knowledge  was  outside  time,  it  was  not  before,  but 
Present*  to,  a  temporal  event  and  so  imposed  no 
absolute  necessity  on  that  event.  It  was  noted  that 
there  were  difficulties  with  this  solution.  It  was  also 
noted  that  an  equally  interesting,  but  less  often 
considered,  aspect  of  Aquinas'  treatment  of  God's 
knowledge  of  future  contingent  events  was  that  his 
statement  of  the  dilemma,  in  particular  as  set  out  in 
DV2.12,  seemed  to  assume  that  if  all  future  events 
took  place  necessarily  there  would  be  no  human 
freedom.  In  DV2.12,  he  says:  "...  others  have  said 
that  God  has  knowledge  of  all  future  events,  but  that 317 
all  take  place  necessarily,  otherwise  his  knowledge  of 
them  would  be  subject  to  error.  But  neither  can  this 
opinion  stand,  for  it  would  destroy  free  choice  and 
there  would  be  no  need  to  ask  advice.  "'  This  in  turn 
seemed  to  imply  that  Aquinas  had  a  concept  of 
freedom  which  included  the  possibility  of  real  choice, 
of  doing  otherwise,  one  where  I  am  said  to  do  x  freely 
if  in  the  same  circumstances  I  could  have  done  (or  at 
least  could  have  chosen  to  do)  not-x. 
We  noted  too,  however,  that  Aquinas  held  that 
whereas  human  knowledge  of  a  thing  was  caused  by 
that  thing,  God's  knowledge,  together  with  his  will, 
was  the  cause  of  the  things  he  knew.  This  implied 
that  God's  knowing  that  I  do  x  is  the  cause  of  my 
doing  x.  But  since  Aquinas  also  held  that  I  do  x  freely 
despite  the  causal  nature  of  God's  knowledge,  there 
was  some  doubt  whether  his  concept  of  freedom 
could  be  one  wide  enough  to  include  the  possibility  of 
doing  otherwise.  That  uncertainty  was  illustrated  in 
the  widely  differing  views  of  modem  commentators  on 
Aquinas'concept  of  freedom. 
Given  this  uncertainty  over  a  major  underlying 
assumption  in  Aquinas'  treatment  of  God's 
knowledge,  the  following  chapters  examined  Aquinas' 
idea  of  contingency  and  his  concept  of  voluntary 
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he  understood  by  free  action.  The  implications  of  the 
causal  nature  of  God's  knowledge  for  the  concept  of 
freedom  emerging  from  that  examination  were  also 
considered. 
In  the  light  of  the  issues  which  have  been  considered 
in  these  preceding  chapters,  what  can  now  be  said 
about  the  nature  of  the  freedom  which  Aquinas  was 
so  anxious  to  preserve  in  dealing  with  the  problems 
arising  from  God's  knowledge  of  future  contingent 
events? 
In  my  view,  there  are  three  key  characteristics  of 
human  freedom  in  Aquinas'  account:  sclf-direction, 
the  combination  of  intellect  and  will  which  produces 
it,  and  choice.  These  characteristics  together  form  a 
picture  of  a  free  act  as  one  which  is  truly  mine, 
chosen  by  me  to  serve  my  purpose,  and  one  which  I 
could  equally  have  chosen  not  to  do.  And  this  picture 
of  human  freedom  is  consistent  with  God's  knowledge 
being  the  cause  of  things. 
(i)  Self-direction 
First,  for  Aquinas,  freedom  is  tied  to  the  notion  of 
voluntaly  action,  through  the  idea  of  'human'  action. 319 
The  two  important  features  in  Aquinas'  account  of 
voluntary  action,  considered  in  Chapter  3,  are  that  it 
arises  from  an  internal  source  of  motion  -  in  humans, 
the  will  -  and  that  it  is  directed  to  an  end,  the  good. 
What  human  action  adds  to  simple  voluntary  action, 
of  which  other  animals  are  capable,  is  recognition  of 
that  end  as  an  end,  and  of  the  relationship  between 
the  end  and  the  means  of  achieving  it.  Human  action 
is  action  done  for  a  recognisable  and  explainable 
purpose.  This  additional  feature  reflects  the 
rationality  of  the  human,  as  opposed  to  brute, 
animal.  Human,  or  fully  voluntary,  action  is  that  to 
which  praise  or  blame  attaches  and  therefore  that  to 
which  the  concept  of  freedom  applies.  It  is  in  the 
nature  of  human  action,  therefore,  that  the  nature  of 
free  action  can  be  found. 
An  essential  difference  between  human  and  animal 
action,  and  so  an  essential  feature  of  free  action,  is 
that  human  action  is  truly  self-directed  towards  an 
end.  This  is  shown  by: 
(a)  Aquinas'  distinction  between  the  respective  ways 
in  which  animal  and  human  action  are  directed 
towards  the  good.  The  good  to  which  animal  action 
is  directed  consists  of  a  limited  number  of 
particular  things  determined  for  the  animal  by  its 
nature.  Human  nature  is  also  determined  to  the 
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that  good  consists  in  is  not  determined  and  there 
is  no  natural  determination  to  any  particular  good. 
Animal  reaction  to  a  particular  good  is  determined 
by  instinct  -  presented  with  food,  a  hungry  dog 
will  always  eat  unless  in  danger.  Human  reaction 
is  determined  by  intellectual  judgment  of  what  is 
apprehended  as  good  in  the  circumstances  -  food 
can  be  refused  by  a  hungry,  but  fasting,  man; 
and 
(b)  Aquinas'  insistence  that  the  will  as  the  internal 
source  of  human  action  may  be  moved,  but  cannot 
be  compelled,  by  any  external  source  or  object 
short  of  something  completely  good.  Although 
Aquinas'  arguments  for  asserting  that  the 
lexercise 
of  the  will  cannot  be  compelled  at  all  are  open  to 
criticism  in  relation  to  the  totally  good,  it  is  clear 
from  his  account  that  no  created  (and  so  not 
totally  good)  thing  can  compel  either  the  cxcrcisc 
or  the  specification  of  the  will. 
The  particular  end  to  which  an  individual  human 
action  is  directed  is  therefore  neither  one  which  has 
been  naturally  determined  nor  one  to  which  the  agent 
has  been  compelled.  Instead,  humans  determine  for 
themselves  what  is  good,  and  their  action  is 
motivated  by  their  judgment  that  a  particular  thing 
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(ii)  Intellect  and  will 
Second,  a  human  voluntaly  act  involves  both  intellect 
and  will  in  a  dynamic,  indissoluble,  relationship. 
Aquinas  holds  that  nothing  can  be  willed  which  is  not 
first  known,  and  also  that  knowledge  by  itself  does 
not  produce  action:  the  thing  known  must  also  be 
wanted.  At  the  very  minimum,  therefore,  action 
requires  the  use  of  both  powers. 
It  is  clear  from  Aquinas'  analysis  of  the  various  stages 
of  a  human  act  that  the  acts  of  intellect  and  will 
involved  are  neither  sequential  nor  independent  of 
each  other,  though  they  may  be  treated  as  such  for 
the  purpose  of  philosophical  analysis.  On  the 
contrary,  intellect  and  will  are  influenced  by,  and 
operate  on,  each  other.  The  will  moves  the  intellect 
and  the  intellect  moves  the  will.  What  the  intellect 
recognises  as  good  is  influenced  by  what  it 
understands  of  the  will.  More  accurately,  perhaps, 
see  something  as  good  because  it  is  the  kind  of  thing 
I  incline  towards,  at  least  in  some  circumstances. 
This  reciprocity  and  close  relationship  of  intellect  and 
will  is  seen  most  clearly  in  the  discussion,  considered 
in  Chapter  4,  of  choice  and  deliberation,  where 
Aquinas  quotes  Aristotle's  description  of  choice  as 322 
"appetitivus  intellectus  vel  appetitus  intellectivuS"2 
and  himself  describes  choice  as  consisting  of  both  will 
and  intellect  as  the  material  and  formal  causes 
respectively. 
In  the  light  of  the  closely  inter-twined  relationship 
Aquinas  describes,  I  would  conclude  that  he  is 
neither  a  voluntarist  nor  an  intellectualist  about 
freedom.  For  him,  freedom  does  not  reside,  even 
ultimately,  in  either  the  will  or  the  intellect,  but  is 
ineluctably  a  product  of  both.  This  is  clearly  and 
succinctly  expressed  is  STla  llae.  17.1:  'The  will  is  the 
root  of  freedom,  for  that  is  where  freedom  lies,  yet  the 
reason  is  its  cause.  "3 
(iii)  Choice 
Third,  choice  is  an  essential  feature  of  a  human.  fully 
voluntaKy,  act  in  Aquinas'  account. 
This  is  implicit  in  the  distinction  he  draws  between 
humans  and  animals  in  relation  to  choice.  In  STIa 
llae.  13.2,  he  argues  that  choice  does  not  apply  to 
animal  activity  (which  is  not  fully  voluntary)  since 
that  is  determined  to  one  coursc.  4Further,  that 
Aquinas  believes  that  choice  exists  in  every  human 
action  can  be  drawn,  I  believe,  from  what  he  says 
about  the  will's  movement,  the  complex  'good/not 
good'nature  of  everything  that  exists,  and  the 323 
description  of  a  human  act  as  one  which  is 
'deliberately  willed'.  5 
Aquinas  holds,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  will  can  be 
moved  or  not  moved,  and  if  moved,  moved  to  x  or  to  y 
-  but  nothing,  not  even  the  wholly  good,  can  compel 
the  movement  of  the  will.  Although  there  may  be 
grounds  for  not  accepting  Aquinas'  argument  that 
even  the  wholly  good  cannot  compel  the  exercise  of 
the  will,  his  position  that  the  less-than-wholly-good' 
cannot  compel  the  exercise  of  the  will  is  clear.  Any 
movement  towards  x  is  neither  determined  nor 
compelled  -  and  need  not  be  made  at  all.  That  the 
movement  is  made  must  therefore  be  the  outcome  of 
some  decision  to  make  it  rather  than  do  nothing. 
Further,  since  every  thing  that  exists  is  good  insofar 
as  it  exists,  every  thing  may  be  seen  as  good  in  some 
respect.  Conversely,  since  no  created  thing  exists 
perfectly,  it  is  also  not-good  in  some  respect.  All 
human  action  arises  from  a  'deliberate  willing',  where 
the  willing  has  been  preceded  by  some  thinking 
process  or  other  -  whether  that  is  termed 
'deliberation'  or  not  and  whether  consciously 
undertaken  or  identified  retrospectively.  The 
intellectual  process  which  identifies,  and  then 
concentrates  on,  the  good  aspects  of  x  may  equally 
well,  depending  on  the  will's  input,  identify  and 324 
concentrate  on  the  not-good  aspects,  leading  to 
rejection  of  x.  Since  this  rational  input  is  a  feature  of 
every  human  act,  there  is  always  the  possibility  of 
choice. 
Although  Eleonore  Stump's  argument,  considered  in 
Chapter  4,  that  choice  is  not  an  essential  feature  of 
Aquinas'concept  of  freedom  is  eloquent,  it  is  not, 
ultimately,  convincing.  It  must  be  admitted,  however, 
that  the  view  that  there  is  always  the  possibility  of 
choice  sits  uneasily  with  what  Aquinas  says  about 
sinful  actions  done  in  a  fit  of  passion,  and  in 
particular  what  seems  to  be  said  in  DV24.12  and 
DV25.5  about  sinful  thoughts.  In  these  passages,  it 
seems  that  Aquinas  is  taking  the  line  that  a  thought 
may  be  sinful,  and  so  voluntary  and  free  at  least  to 
some  extent,  even  where  there  is  no  choice.  As  argued 
in  Chapter  4,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
Aquinas  can  consistently  describe  such  supposedly 
sinful  thoughts  as  voluntary  at  all.  Some  of  this 
argument  hinges  on  how  a  thought  may  be  regarded 
as  developing  from  an  'inkling'  to  a  fully  fledged 
thought,  as  it  were,  and  it  may  be  that  work  on 
Aquinas'  specific  views  in  this  area  -  outside  the 
scope  of  this  thesis  -  would  clarify  his  position  on 
sinful  thoughts.  Here,  I  would  say  that  it  is  at  best 
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Despite  this  apparent  ambiguity,  what  he  says  about 
the  specifically  human  ability  to  reflect  on  one's 
judgments  seems  to  re-inforce  the  possibility  of 
choice,  of  being  able  to  do  other  than  one  does.  For 
the  ability  to  reflect  on  one's  judgments  is  important 
only  if  one  can  then  change  the  judgment,  and  so  act 
differently. 
I  would  therefore  conclude  that  for  Aquinas  choice  is 
an  essential  element  of  a  human  act  and  so  of 
freedom. 
(iv)  God's  causation 
Fourth,  despite  Craig's  arguments  to  the  contra[ý. 
there  are  good  grounds  for  sgying  that-Aguinns'  view 
that  God's  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  things  is 
consistent  with  there  being  human  freedom. 
Craig's  arguments  are  based  on  a  univocal  use  of  the 
term  'cause'  in  relation  to  the  causation  of  God  and  of 
man,  but  it  seems  that  Aquinas  is  using  'cause' 
analogically,  for  God's  way  of  causing  is  significantly 
different  from  that  of  man:  God  gives  existence,  man 
does  not;  God  creates  from  nothing,  man  modifies 
existing  things.  Because  God  causes  in  this 
fundamentally  different  way,  it  is  possible  for  men's 
actions  to  be  genuinely  contingent  despite  the 326 
"irresistible  efficacy",  as  Goris  puts 
it,  6of  God's 
causation. 
However,  interpreting  'cause'in  a  way  which  permits 
such  contingency  seems  to  imply  a  potentiality  in 
God,  for  his  knowledge  of  what  I  do  would  depend  on 
my  determining  to  do  it.  This  is  inconsistent  with 
Aquinas'views  on  the  simplicity  and 
unchangeableness  of  God. 
This  inconsistency  could  be  avoided  if  one  took  the 
view  that  Aquinas  held  a  concept  of  freedom 
compatible  with  God's  determining  human  actions. 
God's  determining  human  actions  would,  howevcr, 
rule  out  my  actions'being  truly  self-directcd  or  the 
possibility  of  my  choosing  to  do  x  or  not-x,  x  or  y.  For 
the  reasons  set  out  in  the  preceding  sections,  I  believc 
that  these  are  essential  elements  of  Aquinas'concept 
of  freedom.  It  must  be  recognized,  therefore,  that 
there  remains  some  tension  between  that  wide 
concept  of  freedom  and  Aquinas'views  on  God's 
simplicity  and  unchangeableness,  important  issues 
for  him.  This  unresolved  tension  is  another  area 
where  further  work  could  usefully  be  done. 
The  picture  of  freedom  painted  is  therefore  not 
without  its  problems  in  relation  to  some  of  Aquinas' 327 
other  views;  there  is  nevertheless,  I  believe,  sufficient 
evidence  to  say  that  it  was  Aquinas'  picture. 
Notes 
1  DV2.12c:  "et  ideo  alii  dixerunt  quod  deus  ornnium  futurorum  scicntiam 
habet;  sed  cuncta  ex  necessitate  eveniunt,  alias  scientia  del  fallcretur  de 
eis.  Sed  hoc  etiam  esse  non  potest,  quia.  secundurn  hoc  pcrirct  libcrum 
arbitrium  nec  csset  necessarium  consilium  quaerere.  ' 
2  STIa.  Ilae.  13.1  c 
3  STIa  Ilae.  17.1  ad  2:  *  ...  radix  libertatis  est  voluntas  sicut  subjectum;  ised 
sicut  causa  est  ratio.  " 
4  STla  llae.  13.2c:  "Since  choice  is  the  taking  of  one  thing  In  preference  to 
another,  the  will  has  to  be  faced  with  several  courses  open  to  it.  In  those 
situations  where  a  determination  to  one  course  Is  effectually  at  work  there 
is  no  place  for  choice.  * 
"Dicendum  quod  cum  electio  sit  praeacceptio  unius  respcctu  alterius, 
necesse  est  quod  electio  sit  respectu  plurium  quac  eligi  possunt;  et  ideo  In 
his  quae  sunt  penitus  determinata  ad  unum  electio  locum  non  habct., 
5  STla  Rae.  1.1  c:  "Illae  ergo  actiones  proprie  humanae  dicuntur  quac  cx 
voluntate  delibcrata  procedunt.  ' 
6  Goris  [19961  p.  306 328 
"PENDIX 
The  following  chronology  of  Aquinas'works  has  been 
used,  based  on  McDermott  [1993]  and  Kretzmann 
[19971: 
1253-56  Scriptum  super  libros  Sententiarum 
1256-59  Quaestiones  disputatae  de  veritatö 
1259-65  Summa  Contra  Gentiles 
1265-68  Quaestiones  disputatae  de  potentia 
Summa  Theologiae  la 
1268-72  Quaestiones  disputatae  de  malo 
Summa  Theologiae  la  Ilae 
In  Peri  Hermeneias 
Sententia  libri  Ethicorum 
Summa  Theologiae  Ila  Ilae 
1272-73  Summa  Theologiae  llla 329 
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